Very good! I found your explantation of the Timbaruka Sutta to be, overall, very helpful.
There are a couple points which prompted me reply:
1. "Experiences constantly arise and cease, meaning that there is nothing to hang on to, nothing to let go of even."
While I think this is in line in spirit to what the Buddha taught I think it is wrong in practice. The gradual training, Eightfold path are practices which the apsirant is advised to hold on to. Because it is only holding on to these practices that a point of not holding can be reached. Conversley there are things which should be abandoned, let go of (ie not-path) to reach a point of not holding on to anything.
I think its important to emphasise this aspect of the Buddha's training as one quite often comes across the idea that the one should be equanimous towards all experiences: that one should try to just let go and not hold onto any experiences at all.
Equanimity does of course have a place in the path but its not a blanket strategy applied at all times.
2. "I have a growing suspicion that this is what asaṅkhata [unconditioned] means."
I think what you say is right here. Considering the dependent origination teaching, it shows an impersonal process which is neither totally determinstic or chaotic. There are patterns which can be understood and influenced by personal intention, which means that the process can be brought to an end.
Looking at the factor of clinging/feeding, Upādāna - it highlights the dependency of the mind on experiences. The mind gains its sustinence from experiences (the six senses) (in much the same that food sustains the body). By developing and completing the Path, to the Uncondtioned, clinging ceases. The mind stands on its own, not sustained by anything, not feeding on anything at all.
3."In order to change this we need to step outside that frame of reference and see our experience in a completely new light - as impermanent and impersonal."
The use of the word impermanent is problematic here I think. The Pali is anicca. Is impermanent a good translation here? What about inconstant? I think impermanent is probelmatic because it implies complete dissapperance of things. Inconstant implies the changability of things which is quite different. When applying this difference in meaning to expierences of sukha and dukkha and the objects of those feelings there is to my mind a more helpful correspondence.
Going back to the earlier point about Upādāna, the mind being dependent on experiences for sustance, the relevant point is the minds dependency. 'nicca' being constancy - the mind is dependent on the constancy of experiences. When those experieces change (and not necssarily dissappear) that dukkha is felt precisly because of that relationship of dependency on things which are inconstant.
In fact you can't hold on to any experience, even if you tried - they are quite simply transient and entirely insubstantial. They come and they go - whatever we do. They, experiences that it, most definitely do cease and utterly disappear to be replaces by something new. I'll return to this point as it's important.
One can consistently apply the practical techniques, but the object is not in order to recapitulate previous experiences, or to hold on to present experiences.
Every moment your experience is different. This is just a truism that the Western intellectual tradition is also fully cognisant of. It's not an ideological position, it's something that everyone who pays attention sees immediately (it's not the insight that liberates in other words!!).
We don't hold on to practices, we consistently apply the methods. But even then, as again any experienced practitioner will tell you, our approach to practice is also constantly changing. Experience informs practice, and no one that I know who practices does so in just the same way that they were taught.
Most people would take my view of 'unconditioned' as wrong - it conflicts with the received view. I'm not sure there is any textual support for it. So I wouldn't be in a hurry to agree with me if I were you.
You are closer to the received view when you talk about "the Unconditioned" with the definite article and capital letter indicating a reified concept. Conditioned and unconditioned are adjectives or adverbs, not nouns - the definite article does not, and cannot apply. They refer to the way that experience arises or has arisen, not some "thing" that has arisen. We cannot talk about "an experience of the unconditioned" for instance, only and "an experience which arises unconditionally". This is an important point that is often lost on those who know nothing of Pāli grammar (which has no definite article).
Again the point is about impersonal process rather than lasting (or even non-lasting) objects. As far as I can see doctrinally, and experientially, is no "the conditioned" nor "the unconditioned".
Similarly 'the mind' is not a thing. "The" is out of place here - 'mind' isn't a thing, and since we could be translating any number of Pāli terms as mind (manas, citta, viññāṇa) then there is already a lot of ambiguity in the discussion. What are we talking about? Whatever it is, it is not a thing. Not a noun.
'impermanent' is not only the most widely used translation of anicca, but it is entirely apposite. There is no significant semantic difference between permanency and constancy. They are just synonyms. The implication you read into impermanence is not one that is generally shared apparently - certainly not by any scholar of Buddhism or Indic languages that I am aware of. I don't see the distinction as useful. The dictionary also suggests continuous, on going. In Pāli it is synonymous with dhuva, sassata, avipariṇāmadhamma. Changeable would also work. The fine distinctions do not matter, what matters is the impermanence.
Experiences (which result from sense faculty meeting sense object) are not nicca, they are anicca. The mind is not dependent on experience. What we Westerners call "the mind" (again the definite article is out of place) is an experience in process. There is no "the mind" in Buddhist psychology, that is a Western concept with no real counterpart, and is bound up in attempts to describe the human being in terms of body substance and mind substance. Neither apply here.
Things do cease - the Buddha draws attention to this again and again. You may find the Kaccānagotta Sutta (SN 12.15) illuminating on this point. The fact of the experience of cessation constitutes the Buddha's argument against eternalism!
I take fully oboard what you say about the Unconidtioned as a verb not a noun and similary citta etc and I am in agreement with it. When one looks at the Buddha's teaching in general what ones sees is activites, kamma. Dependent origination is exmaple of process rather than object.
I did point to the activity nature of experience rather than its objectification when talking about Upadana as a kind of feeding and that when that activity stops then what is experienced is Unconditioned (rather than The Unconditioned). Buddha uses the ananlogy of fire going out which is an elegant way of describing cessation of the process. The fire burns in dependence on its fuel (feeding).
I think it is my own habit, the tendency to objectification in the English language and recieved understanding of Buddhist terminology that these terms tend to be expressed as things rather than activities.
The main point in your response which I am not convinced about is:
"In fact you can't hold on to any experience, even if you tried - they are quite simply transient and entirely insubstantial. They come and they go - whatever we do. They, experiences that it, most definitely do cease and utterly disappear to be replaces by something new. I'll return to this point as it's important."
One can consistently apply the practical techniques, but the object is not in order to recapitulate previous experiences, or to hold on to present experiences."
It is true that experiences are transient and inconstant. But I would say that the object is to recapitulate previuos experience. The act of trying to develop concentration and the other factors of the path necessiates seeing patterns in ones experience. One tries to understand the causes and make that repeatable.
We do need to hold onto the practice. If it was the case that our experiences were completely chaotic then it wouldnt be possible to have a path of development at all. Its by discerning those patterns and using ones ingenuity in applying ones understanding of those patterns that there is development.
The Buddha makes the point about holding on to the practice in the analogy of the raft. The raft is used to cross over - its only let go once one has crossed over.
The main point about impermanent/inconstant was more to do with the aspect of dependency which I dont think that impermanance reveals so well. It is because of dependency on what is anicca that clinging/feeding off the five aggregates (to be clear: by aggregates I mean activities rather than things)is stressful.
I think maybe I have not been clear enough in my statements, as I do not say that one experience is exactly the same as another.
What I am saying is:
The "nidāna chain",that process is to be seen - thats the duty of the first nobel truth. In order to see that chain properly the Buddha recommends development of jhana, supported by the other seven factors of the path.
The development of jhana requires the development of skill with the five aggregates. The development jhana is accomplished when that skilfulness is repeatable. That experience of jhana needs to be repeatable and maintained. The first jhana is recognised by its five factors. Thorugh pratice ones comes to know its factors and that it is the first jhana: a repeatble experience.
Now the experience itself is not excatly the same but what enables the experience of concentration to be mastered (repeatable) is the discernment of patterns in those activities of the aggregates. The reference point is the discernment of patterns in the context of the chain (dependent origination) and the four noble truths.
Hows that?
Apologies if my explanations are rather scholastically clumsy. I appreciate your replies and hope it is not too bothersome.
Yes. Patterns in experience enable us to function in the world. Quite. And not just in jhāna. Taking the patterns of experience as something substantial, however, is the essence of delusion.
I don't think that first jhāna is anything like as repeatable as you suggest. It is different each time. Though there are patterns, ideas of e.g. 'first jhāna' are part of an artificial model imposed onto experience for the purposes of teaching meditation. In principle the doctrinal aspect of meditation teaching emphasises repetition, but in practice the method isn't really like that, because experience is never like that.
In fact no two meditation sessions are ever the same. Are they?
Jhāna is fine and good. But it is not what liberates. For that you need to cultivate vipassana - which I suggest is all about seeing the contingency of experience.
Which nidāna chain are we talking about? Take a look at my map of paṭicca-samuppāda and you will quickly see that there is no 'the nidāna chain' but only a plurality of 'nidāna chains'. Read the notes as well, because you'll see that some of the links have no connection to experience, but serve other purposes.
What is presented as "Buddhism" is usually a subset of a vastly more complex and changeable ecosystem of ideas and practices. The Canon itself shows clear signs of processes like story development and multiple parallel story telling lineages; editing - both skilled and clumsy, and translating. The tradition presents itself as stable and conservative, but in fact is always changing and developing. Nothing is the same as it was 20, or 200, or 2000 years ago.
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
Timbaruka Sutta S 12.18, PTS ii.22 [1] [Image]STAYING AT SĀVATTHĪ. Then the wanderer Timbaruka approached the Bhagavan, and having exchanged pleasantries, he sat to one side and asked a question.
Are happiness and unhappiness (sukhadukkha) made by one's-self (sayaṃ-kata)?
No, Timbaruko, that's not it, replied the Bhagavan.
Are happiness and unhappiness made by another (paraṃ-kata)?
No, that's not it.
Are happiness and unhappiness made by one's-self and others?
No, that's not it.
Do happiness and unhappiness appear without any reason?
No, that's not it.
Is there no such thing as happiness and unhappiness?
It's not that there is no happiness and unhappiness. Clearly there is happiness and unhappiness.
Is it that you don't know or see happiness and unhappiness?
It's not that I don't know or see happiness and unhappiness. I do know them, and see them.
Gotama, you've answered 'no' to all my questions. Please explain to me what you mean. Explain happiness and unhappiness to me.
Well Timbaruka, I do not say "happiness and unhappiness are caused by one's-self" because underlying that statement is the eternalist view that the experience (vedanā) and the one experiencing (so vedayati) are the same.
I do not say "happiness and unhappiness are caused by another" because underlying that is the view of one overcome by sensations, [i.e.] that the experience and the one experiencing are different.
Avoiding both of these positions I point to a foundation (dhamma) in the middle. With ignorance (avijjā) as condition there are volitions (saṅkhārā), and with volitions as condition there is consciousness etc... [i.e the nidāna chain] and thus the whole mass of disappointment comes about. With the complete cessation ignorance, volitions cease, with the cessation of volitions, ignorance ceases, etc... thus the whole mass of disappointment ceases.
When this was said the wanderer Timbaruka said Gotama I go for refuge to the Bhagavan Gotama, to the Dhamma and the community of Bhikkhus. Please remember me as a non-monastic disciple from this day forward.~:o:~
Comments
I've translated sukha and dukkha as happiness and unhappiness here which is fairly conventional. On this level they represent the positive and negative aspects of experience, the things we find pleasing and displeasing, the aspects of experience on which we base our notions of happiness and unhappiness. However the words are used in a variety of ways, and there may be other interpretations. I've noted in my comments on Dhammapada v.1-2 that sukha/dukkha can represent nibbāna and saṃsāra for instance.
Timbaruka seeks to understand the problem of suffering in terms of self and/or other. The Buddha lets Timbaruka exhaust all the possible options within that paradigm without committing himself. It seems that some of the wanderers were a bit like the sophists in ancient Athens and some people these days, who go around just arguing with everything. One gets the sense that Timbaruka was ready to argue whatever the Buddha might agree with or disagree with. The fact that the Buddha does not take a stand on any of the views presented is a strategy Timbaruka has apparently not anticipated. The Buddha uses this strategy fairly often. The approach the Buddha takes is distinctly different to this one which proposes a dichotomy and then finds fault with all possible alternatives.
Having rejected the Timbaruka's terms the Buddha gives an explanation of why he is not interested in that particular argument, and then gives his alternative way of looking at things. There are two basic positions: the experience is either the same as the experiencer, or different. From the fact that the Buddha doesn't bother to answer the other variations proposed by Timbaruka, we might conclude that he does not take them seriously. His answer though partial from Timbaruka's point of view, covers the only sensible points.
We see that the rejection is in terms of Buddhist technical terminology, which reminds us that the story is told specifically for a Buddhist audience. Eternalism and nihilism as critical terms are distinctively Buddhist.
The first view - that suffering is caused by self - is that of the eternalist. The problem here is that we identify ourselves with experience, and see our self as continuous and lasting. This is almost the default setting for humanity: in effect we are our thoughts and emotions. By this I mean we don't consciously make this decision, it's just how things seem to us. As Thomas Metzinger says we are all 'naive realists'. However this leaves us with no real choice in how we respond to situations and causes us problems. [2] Elsewhere the Buddha uses the metaphor of intoxication (pamāda) to describe this condition.
The second view - that suffering is caused by other - is the view, not of the nihilist, but of someone overwhelmed by sensations [vedanābhitunna]. In this we aren't identified with the sensations, but feel compelled by them as when we are "overcome with grief", or we "see red". Again we often imagine that we have no choice about responding to powerful desires and aversions. Falling in love is such a powerful sensation, and chaos if not mayhem often ensues. The nihilist would presumably argue that ultimately there is no suffering (something I've heard Buddhists argue, to my consternation!)
To reiterate an important point: these 'views' are not conscious ideologies, not philosophies that we take on willingly. They are the default settings for human beings, a mixture of evolution and early conditioning; nature and nuture. Buddhists, like other religieux, tend to express a tinge of blame when describing the human condition. Although we reject the explicit notion of original sin, we smuggle through an implicit one. We often describe people as basically greedy and hateful for instance. I find this both philosophically problematic, and unhelpful. The Buddha here is arguing for a much less personal view of the problem of suffering. Suffering is not caused by oneself! At least in this text.
The kind of dichotomy that Timbaruka proposes doesn't apply in the Buddha's frame of reference. And note that what is being rejected is not the self/other dichotomy per se, but the idea that suffering comes from either. This is not advaita (non-dualist) philosophy, it is pragmatism aimed at relieving suffering. The kind of view which is engendered by mystical experiences such as oceanic-boundary-loss - i.e. all is one - is being criticised here, and throughout the Pāli canon.
In his explanation the Buddha focusses on how dukkha arises and ceases as an impersonal process. Understanding that experience is impermanent we see that there is nothing to identify with. Identity is just another experience - impermanent, disappointing, and impersonal. Experiences constantly arise and cease, meaning that there is nothing to hang on to, nothing to let go of even. Seeing experience as an impersonal process, in which the first-person perspective is a just another conditioned experience, means we don't blame anyone. If there is a painful state we see it has arisen dependently, and often we do have some influence on the conditions that contribute to suffering. Dependency does not do away with agency, at least not completely.
The more subtle point is that our own relationship to experience is the primary condition to think about. By dis-identifying with experience we make it less likely that we are either caught up in, or overwhelmed by experience, and we have a choice about being happy or unhappy that is not related to (not conditioned by) the particular experience we are having now. I have a growing suspicion that this is what asaṅkhata [unconditioned] means.
In a sense Timbaruka is right. Any view about happiness or unhappiness based on self and/or other leads to contradictions and argumentation. Human intercourse in any age has shown this to be true, and such tensions and disagreements continue to play out in human civilisations, even nominally Buddhist ones (2500 years, and we still can't agree on some things!). The problem is not this or that strategy for achieving happiness, but a fundamental mistake about the nature of happiness. What we naively pursue is not happiness, but following our evolutionary heritage and conditioning we pursue pleasant sensations. So we are not happy, and our conditioning says that someone must be to blame - if not me, then you, or him, or perhaps God or the Universe! In order to change this we need to step outside that frame of reference and see our experience in a completely new light - as impermanent and impersonal. Then a kind of happiness not conditioned by pleasant or unpleasant experiences can and does arise.
~~oOo~~
Notes main points identical to S 12.17. My translation. There is a distant echo here of the Brahmanical view that one achieves liberation through a comprehensive identification with the world, probably associated with the mystical experience sometimes described as oceanic boundary loss. The feeling of breaking down the subject/object distinction and identification with everything. Jill Bolte Taylor's description of this experience during a major stroke is instructive because she articulates the relevant aspects of it, even if a stroke is not attractive as a way to have that experience [See her TED presentation; and my response An Experience of Awakening?]. I say the echo is distant because I don't think that Brahmins are the target here. The target is everyday naive realism, the identification with experience as real.
7 Comments
Close this window Jump to comment formVery good! I found your explantation of the Timbaruka Sutta to be, overall, very helpful.
There are a couple points which prompted me reply:
1. "Experiences constantly arise and cease, meaning that there is nothing to hang on to, nothing to let go of even."
While I think this is in line in spirit to what the Buddha taught I think it is wrong in practice. The gradual training, Eightfold path are practices which the apsirant is advised to hold on to. Because it is only holding on to these practices that a point of not holding can be reached. Conversley there are things which should be abandoned, let go of (ie not-path) to reach a point of not holding on to anything.
I think its important to emphasise this aspect of the Buddha's training as one quite often comes across the idea that the one should be equanimous towards all experiences: that one should try to just let go and not hold onto any experiences at all.
Equanimity does of course have a place in the path but its not a blanket strategy applied at all times.
2. "I have a growing suspicion that this is what asaṅkhata [unconditioned] means."
I think what you say is right here. Considering the dependent origination teaching, it shows an impersonal process which is neither totally determinstic or chaotic. There are patterns which can be understood and influenced by personal intention, which means that the process can be brought to an end.
Looking at the factor of clinging/feeding, Upādāna - it highlights the dependency of the mind on experiences. The mind gains its sustinence from experiences (the six senses) (in much the same that food sustains the body). By developing and completing the Path, to the Uncondtioned, clinging ceases. The mind stands on its own, not sustained by anything, not feeding on anything at all.
3."In order to change this we need to step outside that frame of reference and see our experience in a completely new light - as impermanent and impersonal."
The use of the word impermanent is problematic here I think. The Pali is anicca. Is impermanent a good translation here? What about inconstant? I think impermanent is probelmatic because it implies complete dissapperance of things. Inconstant implies the changability of things which is quite different. When applying this difference in meaning to expierences of sukha and dukkha and the objects of those feelings there is to my mind a more helpful correspondence.
Going back to the earlier point about Upādāna, the mind being dependent on experiences for sustance, the relevant point is the minds dependency. 'nicca' being constancy - the mind is dependent on the constancy of experiences. When those experieces change (and not necssarily dissappear) that dukkha is felt precisly because of that relationship of dependency on things which are inconstant.
Saturday, February 12, 2011
Hi Alex,
We are not quite on the same wavelength.
In fact you can't hold on to any experience, even if you tried - they are quite simply transient and entirely insubstantial. They come and they go - whatever we do. They, experiences that it, most definitely do cease and utterly disappear to be replaces by something new. I'll return to this point as it's important.
One can consistently apply the practical techniques, but the object is not in order to recapitulate previous experiences, or to hold on to present experiences.
Every moment your experience is different. This is just a truism that the Western intellectual tradition is also fully cognisant of. It's not an ideological position, it's something that everyone who pays attention sees immediately (it's not the insight that liberates in other words!!).
We don't hold on to practices, we consistently apply the methods. But even then, as again any experienced practitioner will tell you, our approach to practice is also constantly changing. Experience informs practice, and no one that I know who practices does so in just the same way that they were taught.
Most people would take my view of 'unconditioned' as wrong - it conflicts with the received view. I'm not sure there is any textual support for it. So I wouldn't be in a hurry to agree with me if I were you.
You are closer to the received view when you talk about "the Unconditioned" with the definite article and capital letter indicating a reified concept. Conditioned and unconditioned are adjectives or adverbs, not nouns - the definite article does not, and cannot apply. They refer to the way that experience arises or has arisen, not some "thing" that has arisen. We cannot talk about "an experience of the unconditioned" for instance, only and "an experience which arises unconditionally". This is an important point that is often lost on those who know nothing of Pāli grammar (which has no definite article).
Again the point is about impersonal process rather than lasting (or even non-lasting) objects. As far as I can see doctrinally, and experientially, is no "the conditioned" nor "the unconditioned".
Similarly 'the mind' is not a thing. "The" is out of place here - 'mind' isn't a thing, and since we could be translating any number of Pāli terms as mind (manas, citta, viññāṇa) then there is already a lot of ambiguity in the discussion. What are we talking about? Whatever it is, it is not a thing. Not a noun.
'impermanent' is not only the most widely used translation of anicca, but it is entirely apposite. There is no significant semantic difference between permanency and constancy. They are just synonyms. The implication you read into impermanence is not one that is generally shared apparently - certainly not by any scholar of Buddhism or Indic languages that I am aware of. I don't see the distinction as useful. The dictionary also suggests continuous, on going. In Pāli it is synonymous with dhuva, sassata, avipariṇāmadhamma. Changeable would also work. The fine distinctions do not matter, what matters is the impermanence.
Experiences (which result from sense faculty meeting sense object) are not nicca, they are anicca. The mind is not dependent on experience. What we Westerners call "the mind" (again the definite article is out of place) is an experience in process. There is no "the mind" in Buddhist psychology, that is a Western concept with no real counterpart, and is bound up in attempts to describe the human being in terms of body substance and mind substance. Neither apply here.
Things do cease - the Buddha draws attention to this again and again. You may find the Kaccānagotta Sutta (SN 12.15) illuminating on this point. The fact of the experience of cessation constitutes the Buddha's argument against eternalism!
Saturday, February 12, 2011
Hi Jayarava
Thank you for the helpful reply.
I take fully oboard what you say about the Unconidtioned as a verb not a noun and similary citta etc and I am in agreement with it. When one looks at the Buddha's teaching in general what ones sees is activites, kamma. Dependent origination is exmaple of process rather than object.
I did point to the activity nature of experience rather than its objectification when talking about Upadana as a kind of feeding and that when that activity stops then what is experienced is Unconditioned (rather than The Unconditioned). Buddha uses the ananlogy of fire going out which is an elegant way of describing cessation of the process. The fire burns in dependence on its fuel (feeding).
I think it is my own habit, the tendency to objectification in the English language and recieved understanding of Buddhist terminology that these terms tend to be expressed as things rather than activities.
The main point in your response which I am not convinced about is:
"In fact you can't hold on to any experience, even if you tried - they are quite simply transient and entirely insubstantial. They come and they go - whatever we do. They, experiences that it, most definitely do cease and utterly disappear to be replaces by something new. I'll return to this point as it's important."
One can consistently apply the practical techniques, but the object is not in order to recapitulate previous experiences, or to hold on to present experiences."
It is true that experiences are transient and inconstant. But I would say that the object is to recapitulate previuos experience. The act of trying to develop concentration and the other factors of the path necessiates seeing patterns in ones experience. One tries to understand the causes and make that repeatable.
We do need to hold onto the practice. If it was the case that our experiences were completely chaotic then it wouldnt be possible to have a path of development at all. Its by discerning those patterns and using ones ingenuity in applying ones understanding of those patterns that there is development.
The Buddha makes the point about holding on to the practice in the analogy of the raft. The raft is used to cross over - its only let go once one has crossed over.
The main point about impermanent/inconstant was more to do with the aspect of dependency which I dont think that impermanance reveals so well. It is because of dependency on what is anicca that clinging/feeding off the five aggregates (to be clear: by aggregates I mean activities rather than things)is stressful.
Best wishes
Alex
Sunday, February 13, 2011
This comment has been removed by the author.
Monday, February 14, 2011
Hi Alex,
Let me ask you a question then. How would you know that one experienced is exactly the same as another. What is your reference point?
Jayarava
Monday, February 14, 2011
I think maybe I have not been clear enough in my statements, as I do not say that one experience is exactly the same as another.
What I am saying is:
The "nidāna chain",that process is to be seen - thats the duty of the first nobel truth. In order to see that chain properly the Buddha recommends development of jhana, supported by the other seven factors of the path.
The development of jhana requires the development of skill with the five aggregates. The development jhana is accomplished when that skilfulness is repeatable. That experience of jhana needs to be repeatable and maintained. The first jhana is recognised by its five factors. Thorugh pratice ones comes to know its factors and that it is the first jhana: a repeatble experience.
Now the experience itself is not excatly the same but what enables the experience of concentration to be mastered (repeatable) is the discernment of patterns in those activities of the aggregates. The reference point is the discernment of patterns in the context of the chain (dependent origination) and the four noble truths.
Hows that?
Apologies if my explanations are rather scholastically clumsy. I appreciate your replies and hope it is not too bothersome.
Kind regards
Alex
Monday, February 14, 2011
Hi Alex
Yes. Patterns in experience enable us to function in the world. Quite. And not just in jhāna. Taking the patterns of experience as something substantial, however, is the essence of delusion.
I don't think that first jhāna is anything like as repeatable as you suggest. It is different each time. Though there are patterns, ideas of e.g. 'first jhāna' are part of an artificial model imposed onto experience for the purposes of teaching meditation. In principle the doctrinal aspect of meditation teaching emphasises repetition, but in practice the method isn't really like that, because experience is never like that.
In fact no two meditation sessions are ever the same. Are they?
Jhāna is fine and good. But it is not what liberates. For that you need to cultivate vipassana - which I suggest is all about seeing the contingency of experience.
Which nidāna chain are we talking about? Take a look at my map of paṭicca-samuppāda and you will quickly see that there is no 'the nidāna chain' but only a plurality of 'nidāna chains'. Read the notes as well, because you'll see that some of the links have no connection to experience, but serve other purposes.
What is presented as "Buddhism" is usually a subset of a vastly more complex and changeable ecosystem of ideas and practices. The Canon itself shows clear signs of processes like story development and multiple parallel story telling lineages; editing - both skilled and clumsy, and translating. The tradition presents itself as stable and conservative, but in fact is always changing and developing. Nothing is the same as it was 20, or 200, or 2000 years ago.
Tuesday, February 15, 2011