Hi Jayarava, many thanks for this clear post! I am particularly interested in your final questions. Consider for instance the treatment of pratītya-samutpāda in the Śālistamba-sūtra, where two kinds of relation are discussed: the one taking place among phychological factors (i.e., the classical chain of 12 elements, starting with avidyā), this is called “internal (Sk. bāhya; Tib. phy) pratītya-samutpāda;” the other taking place among non-psychological factors (in this case the states of existence concurring to constitute a plant of rice, from seed to sprout, from sprout to leaf, etc.), this is called “external (Sk. adhyātmika, Tib. nang) pratītya-samutpāda.” This second kind of relation is objective because it would depend on the coming together of six factors: earth, water, fire, wind, ether (ākāśa) and season (ṛtu). Thus, as we can see, the formula of pratītya-samutpāda seems to apply in general to every kind of conditional relation. (Also Nāgārjuna takes into consideration at least two aspects of “relation:” between psychological elements, for instance avidyā and saṃskāra, and between tangible elements, for instance father and son.) Do you agree with these impressions of mine? Moreover: could you pleas specify the bibliographical reference of Gonda’s essay? :-)
I'm not very familiar with Sanskrit Buddhist sources so far. I haven't come across this distinction before, but it seems to me that the 'elements' have been reified. For instance air is not simply what we breath in pre-sectarian Buddhism, it is the principle of movement. Fire is not simply fire but the principle of heat whether it is internal or external - just as the Vedics considered Agni to be the heat of the sun, or digestion, or the spark of imagination as well as fire; in fact the principle which underlies all of these. Rūpa as a khandha is properly the living body, not the body as matter. So to think of the elements as external is already a step away from the pre-sectarian Buddhist attitude (as I understand it, and under the strong influence of Sue Hamilton who I am re-reading at present).
The Buddha many times, but emphatically in the Sabba Sutta (SN 35.23) states that the proper range (visaya) to consider as 'everything' (sabbaṃ) is the āyatanas (which we could translate as 'meeting places') i.e. the senses and their objects. Out of contact between the two arises vedanā and it is on our relationship to vedanā that the whole of the Buddha's teaching revolved.
So rather than saying "pratītya-samutpāda seems to apply to every kind of conditional relation" I would phrase it more like "thus Buddhists applied the idea of pratītya-samutpāda to everything they could think of - thereby expanding the teaching beyond it's original range". There's no apriori need to understand how external conditionality works in order to be liberated from craving - it's like the story of the man with the arrow in his eye who won't let it be pulled out until he knows the caste of the man who shot him. It is irrelevant to the cure. I would also suggest that the laws of physics offer much greater insight into the workings of the world than ancient Indian elemental speculation!
This is not to say that we should not try to understand how and why Buddhism changed - and I would be interested to know if you have any thoughts on why such changes occurred. Was it simple intellectual curiosity? Was it driven by the needs of practice?
I note that neither source seems to deal with lokuttara pratītya-samutpāda which is an obvious gap in my own writing. Sometime soon I'd like to translate AN x.2 and comment on it.
I have added the Gonda ref into the bibliography.
Thanks for taking the time to comment. I'm enjoying your input.
Hi Jayarava, It seems to me that an external objectivity can be detected (even if indirectly) also in Pāli Buddhism, see for instance the Loka-kāma-guṇa-sutta of the Saṃyutta-nikāya (34. 12. 3 if I remember well), in which we find the following sentence: yena kho āvuso lokasmiṃ lokasaññi hoti lokamāni ayaṃ vuccati ariyassa vinaye loko. «By whatever means there is cognition of the world, conceit of the world, that is the “world” according to the definition of the noble ones.» According to me (but also according to Peter Harvey, “The Selfless Mind,” sorry but I don’t remember the page!) here we have at least two – but actually three – different levels of “world”, from the external, objective one (lokasmiṃ) – that is: the world representing the basis on which the buddhist definition of “world” is built –, to the world which is the result of a perceptual activity (loko) – that is: the buddhists definition of “world”. Add also all those passages where Gotama speaks of external earth, water, etc., that when considered internally are seen as constituents of the human body. Only in part these passages can be interpreted as “reifications”, as you call it, because for instance during the meditation on the corpse one observes a body becoming real earth, real water or a fluid element, etc. The problem, in any case, subsists with the invisible air and heat (as you point out). As far as vedanā is concerned, it seems that – according to the Majjhima Nikāya – phassa represents a first interpretative act which takes place before vedanā, and on which vedanā depends (as Tilmann Vetter notes in his “The Khandha Passages…”). It would be a vedanā ante litteram. But phassa takes place – as you rightly point out, by means of āyatanas – between the sense organ and the object… thus, we have again an internal element distinct from an external one. In all this I see the seeds of all further developments of Buddhism (so, also the Śālistamba Sūtra). As you remark, the Sabba Sutta is “more representative” of the main Buddhist philosophy, than other minor positions that we can find in the Nikāyas. (Consider for instance the term sammuti: in the main Nikāyas it appears only once, but apparently this was sufficient for the theoretical development – indeed a philosophical explosion – of its Sanskrit equivalent saṃvṛti.) This is of course due to the process of systematization of the various Suttas in a consistent corpus, or to the possible errors of the bhāṇakas in the oral transmission, etc. All this reveals that the pre-sectarian (as you call it) Buddhism is not always consistent and this because it has not been built as an organic system of though: it is indeed become (more or less) organic and systematic step by step. As far as pratītya-samutpāda is concerned, it means “conditional relation,” (or as you explain: “having depended [on a condition] it is produced”) thus as I have said it applies to every conditional relation (i.e., every relation in which something is produced dependently on something else). Consider MN I, 111-112: cakkhuñ c’āvuso paṭicca rūpe cakkhuviññāṇaṃ, tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso, phassa-paccayā vedanā… («By the eye and the form the visual awareness IS CONDITIONED, the union of the three is contact, BY MEANS OF – or FROM THE CONDITION OF – contact there is feeling…»). The visual awareness is conditioned by the eye and the EXTERNAL OBJECT; thus, an external object can condition another thing (why not another external object constituted by external elements?). Last but not least: my name is Krishna (without dots) because I am Italian and we do not have diacritics in our alphabet, only some accent. In any case, imagine, this is my real name! Indeed, I’m not a dvija, but a – so to speak – “son” of the ’68 (it was an idea of my father… my brother’s name is Arjuna!). And what about you: is Jayarava your real name or you are a dvija?
Thanks once again for a thoughtful comment. However what is it about your first quote that makes you think that loka refers to anything external? It is certainly not explicit, and not, I think, implicit.
Take a closer look at those terms. This world (ayaṃ loko) is defined (vuccati)... through (yena) *lokasaññi and lokamāni*. You and Harvey are reading these as simple tatpuruṣa compounds. Actually they may well be locative tatpuruṣa and the hint is that they are preceded by lokasmiṃ, a locative. So, in this world: there are perceptions in this world [saññā being used in it's general sense] and 'conceit' [actually comparison or belief in 'I' based on perceptions] in this world. Both saññi and māna, the qualities that define 'the world', are cognitive.
Boil this down and it is saying where there is perception and comparison based on it, then that is what the āryas call 'the world' - in contra-distinction presumably to what the 'worldly' call it 'the world'. The focus is on saññā and māna because they are central to solving the problem of dukkha. Note that Hamilton explicitly links dukkha and loka as referring to the same thing in many Buddhist texts.
To interpret different levels here is to proliferate definitions.
I suppose this also shows that such quotes really are very vague and can be read a number of different ways. What we see depends on what we expect to see.
Agreed, the Buddha does talk about external elements at times; and we can readily observe that there is cause and effect in the objective world which is the subject of the physical sciences. But so what? So what if objects are conditioned? I've known this since I was 9 years old, studied it in great detail for 20 years culminating in a B.Sc, proved many of the fundamental theorems of physics and chemistry for myself, and that got me not one jot closer to liberation - except that it did cause me a certain amount of disappointment that may eventually have lead to becoming a Buddhist :-)
Re names. My real name? Well, what is real? Realin the sense of 'substantial' or real in the sense of 'true'? My true name really is Jayarava. It was given to me during the most meaning event of my life and represents both the story of my life so far, and my life's goal. That is far more real to me than what it says on my birth certificate. You could easily find out what my parents called me - in their innocence and naivety - since I make no secret of it. However my real name is Jayarava - my cry is victory! I would never describe myself as dvija - I have no wish to be associated with any of the traditions which use such terminology.
Regards Jayarava
PS Adding a few paragraphs would make your comments a lot more readable. I struggle to scan large blocks of text.
Hey Jayarava, nice to meet you! Very nice analysis indeed. However I don't quite understand your conclusive remarks. Do you really believe P.S. means any general kind of conditional relation? I thought it was common knowledge that it meant the two opposites co-defining each other? Like the top-bottom, life-death, happiness-suffering, object-subject etc. Even your analysis hints at that with all its "opposite", "against each other", "co-" and such. The translation I see used a lot in all kinds of books is "dependent co-arising" -- which is a bit closer to what I think it means. This topic is well developed in Taoism as well. It also helps understand how the goal-setting (driven by desires) causes arising of the Ego -- via same process of implication. If there is "here", there is "there", if there is getting from "here" to "there", there is something that moves -- i.e. the "I". Would this be too much of a stretch of imagination or would you see a virtue in this line of thinking?
Wednesday, March 07, 2012
[Image]‘Dependent Arising’, ‘Dependent Origination’, ‘Interdependent Arising’, ‘Conditioned Co-production’ – these are all synonyms (almost always capitalised) for the sine qua non of Buddhist doctrines and technical jargon. In Sanskrit the word is pratītyasamutpāda, and in Pāli paṭiccasamuppāda. We also have the related past-participle pratītyasamutpanna (paṭiccasamuppannna) ‘dependently arisen’. The word is a usually treated as a compound which is clearly reflected in the English translations. In this short essay I want to unpick and unpack these words; in technical jargon we’ll do a morphological and semantic analysis. I’ll work in Sanskrit and add Pāli equivalents in parentheses since the morphology is more obvious in Sanskrit, though my main interest is how the word is used in Pāli.
Pratītya
Pratītya (paṭicca) is a gerund or absolutive, a verbal form indicating an action occurring before the action of the main verb. [1] The form of the gerund for verbs with prefixes is different from verbs without prefixes, and probably originated in Indo-European as an instrumental singular of a verbal noun in -i, which form instrumentals by substituting -i with -yā. [2] The verb in this case is pratyeti (pacceti) which we can analyse as prati + √i. The root √i is related to the Latin eo, [3] and the cognate is only rarely found in English words like ‘iterate’ (meaning ‘to go again’). The form pratītya is regular and arises out of some sandhi changes along the way. √i is a second class verb in Sanskrit (first class in Pāli) that undergoes guṇa (strengthening) and forms a stem by adding the vowel ‘a’. The guṇa grade of i is e. Sandhi rules say that e + a > e, [4] and we’re left with a stem e- The 3rd person plural is eti. When we add the prefix prati- there is another sandhi change i + e > ye: so the final stem is pratye-; 3rd person singular pratyeti. When this devolves to Pāli we get some phonetic changes in the conjunct consonants: pra > pa; tye > cce: this gives us pacceti.
The root √i ‘to go’ is the same in Pāli and Sanskrit. The suffix prati- (paṭi-) gives a sense of towards, near; or opposition. Prati-√i, then, should mean something like ‘go towards, go near, go back’. The affect of combining a prefix and a root is not always predictable from the parts but this is what we get more or less: patyeti means ‘to come on to or back to, to fall back on’, as well as ‘to go towards, go to meet’.
To form the gerund in the case of a verb with a prefix, in both Pāli and Sanskrit, one adds a suffix -ya to the weakest grade of the root (simply ‘i’ in the case of √i), or in this case because the stem vowel is short: -tya. [5] So we get prati + i + tya. Sandhi applies here so i + i > ī giving pratītya. In Pāli pra > pa, tya > cca, and we find that tī > ṭi (with retroflexion of the consonant, and shortening of the vowel). [6] The meaning of the gerund should be something like ‘having come to, having fallen back on’ but in application it means more like ‘grounded on, on account of’.
One very common form of use for paṭicca in Pāli Buddhist texts is in the twelve-fold formula of paṭiccasamuppāda which is sometimes written like this: avijjāpaccaya paṭicca saṅkhārā... grounded on unknowing as a condition, there are the processes... Samutpāda Samutpāda (samuppāda) is a verbal noun from a root with two prefixes: saṃ + ud + pāda. The root is √pad which primarily means ‘to go, to walk’ (but also ‘to fall’). The prefix ud- ‘up, upwards’ becomes ut- with the unvoiced ‘p’ of √pad to give the present stem utpada- ‘to arise, originate, come forth, be produced’. From this we get the past-participle, utpanna (uppanna) ‘arisen, originated’. The causative form of the verb has the stem utpādaya (with the addition of ‘-ya-’ and the lengthening of the root vowel) meaning ‘to produce, beget, generate’. There’s not a great deal of difference between here the indicative and the causative - the difference between ‘to arise’, and ‘to produce’. From utpādaya- we get the verbal noun utpāda (uppāda) ‘coming forth, birth, production, arising’. And in Pāli the tpā conjunct devolves to ppā. Perhaps, given that utpāda seems to derive from the causative, we should favour translations which retain that flavour – ‘arising’ is something that just happens, whereas if something is ‘produced’ we get the sense of a definite process causing the arising.
The suffix sam- gives the sense of ‘completed’ or ‘together’ (it is cognate with the English suffix ‘com-’). The word samutpāda (samuppāda) means ‘appearing with, arising together’. It is only infrequently used as a stand-alone word in Pāli. [7]
Pratītya-samutpāda
The two parts (pratītya and samutpāda) are usually understood as forming a compound, and should therefore be written as one word pratītyasamutpāda, though we often find it written with a hyphen for readability: pratītya-samutpāda. The last thing is to discuss what type of compound they form, and the relationship between the two parts. In fact it is unusual to find a compound with gerund as the first member. This type of compound where one part retains the syntactical form it would have in a non-compounded sentence is called a ‘syntactical compound’. [8] Philologists suggest that this type of compound was originally a gerund and verb form which has become lexicalised. [9] We do find this kind of construction with the verb utpadyate (uppajjati) in the Pāli phrase: paccayaṃ paṭicca uppajjati - (‘arising in dependence on a condition’). [10]
In the case of pratītya-samutpāda the compound is formed from the gerund and the verb as a past-participle or verbal noun. Because the words retain their syntactical relationship, i.e. ‘having depended [on a condition] it is produced’, we do not need to analyse them in terms of the nominal compound paradigms. If we did do such an analysis we could take the gerund in its archaic the sense as an instrumental, and treat the compound as an instrumental tatpuruṣa meaning ‘produced through depending on’.
Conclusions
We’ve now looked at each of the separate elements – (prati+√i+tya) + (saṃ+ud+√pad) - and how they go together (morphology); and we’ve looked at how the individual parts contribute to the meaning (semantics). However it is not enough to know the etymology in order to understand a word. We have to look at how it is used in context. Even then we must accept that we have only an imperfect understanding since in the case of Buddhist texts we are far removed in time and culture from the authors or composers. Not being a native speaker of a language means we never really have the same facility as someone who is. When we hear a foreigner speaking our mother tongue we almost always hear words being used incorrectly, idioms being misunderstood, sentences oddly constructed. We need to keep this in mind when reading a Sanskrit or Pāli text, even when we think we understand the words. Back in 1966 the Dutch philologist Jan Gonda wrote a 165 page essay on the uses of the single word ‘loka’ in Vedic literature in which he suggests that the most common translation – ‘world’ – is actually the least likely to apply in any given situation.
By far the most common use of our term is with reference to the twelvefold nidāna chain. The links in the chain are called ‘dependently arisen elements’; in Pāli ‘paṭicca-samuppanne dhamme’. [11] And the whole system of one thing arising with the previous one as a condition (paccaya) is known as ‘dependent arising’ – paṭiccasamuppāda.
We can see how the English Translations get at the meaning, but only as long as we already know what is being said. The phrase ‘dependent arising’ is probably now the most popular translation of pratītya-samutpāda but it does not communicate very much to the uninitiated. Even if we choose a more descriptive translation such as Conze’s ‘conditioned co-production’ this isn’t much help. In any case the form of the syntactical compound tells us that pratītya-samutpāda is a short-hand way of referring to a longer description: ‘the process by which something is produced because the necessary conditions for its production are in place’. Even then it leaves many questions: what type of ‘something’ we are referring to? Does the formula constitute a general theory of causation, or only apply to the production of mental states? To this extent Buddhism is esoteric and much of our jargon is opaque to outsiders.
Bibliography
Coulson, Michael. 2003. Sanskrit. 2nd Ed. Teach Yourself Books. Gonda, J. 1966. Loka : World and heaven in the Veda. Amsterdam, Noord-Hollandsche U.M.Hamp. Eric P.1986. ‘On the Morphology of Indic Gerunds.’ Indo-Iranian Journal 29 (2), p.103-107Macdonell. A.A. 1926. A Sanskrit Grammar for Students. 3rd Ed. D.K. Printworld (2008)Norman, K.R. (trans.) 2001. The Group of Discourses (Sutta-Nipāta). 2nd. Ed. Pali Text SocietyNorman, K. R. 1991. ‘Syntatical Compounds in Middle Indo-Aryan’ in Middle Indo-Aryan and Jaina Studies, Leiden, p.3-9. Also in Collected Papers, 1990-2001, Vol.4, p.218-25.Whitney, William Dwight. 1885. The Roots, Verb Forms and Primary Derivatives of the Sanskrit Language. Motilal Banarsidass. (2006 printing) Plus a range of Pāli, Sanskrit, and English dictionaries and other reference works both printed and online Notes
[1] The gerund is used extensively in Buddhist texts. We might read for instance that someone approaches the Buddha, and having approached the Buddha, they salute him; and having saluted him, they sit off to one side; and having sat off to one side they respectfully asked a question. The Gerundsindicated here in italics – in English they are usually rendered as a perfect participle (having approached), or as a present participle (approaching). [2] Authorities are divided on the origins of the gerund in –tvā, though seem to agree on it being an instrumental singular of a verbal noun. See Coulson Sanskrit, p.67, Macdonell 163 (p.137-8) derive it from a verbal noun in -tu; and for a dissenting view Hamp On the Morphology of Indic Gerunds who argues that –tvā must derive from a verbal noun in –tva, especially as nouns in –tu usually require guṇa and we don’t see this in gerunds.
[3] Fans of Monty Python's Life of Brian will recall that Brian misuses the verb eo in his slogan 'romanes eunt domus' and is forced to conjugate the verb while having his ear twisted by the centurion. He is looking for the third person plural imperative ite - 'romani ite domum'. [4] If we have for instance ete aśvāḥ (these horses) we would write it ete śvāḥ or we can use an apostrophe to indicate the missing letter ete 'śvāḥ; in Devanāgarī we might use the avagrāha एतेऽश्वाः [5] The addition of -t- for roots with short vowels is regular: cf Macdonell A Sanskrit Grammar for Students. 182.a (pg.160). [6] Sanskrit prati- can become either pati- or paṭi- and it's not clear in each case why. Maybe due to the influence of different dialects? [7] E.g. Vin i.96, S v.374, A iii.405, A v.201.
[8] K.R. Norman has adopted this term coined by G.V. Davane in 1956. They are also called ‘unregelmässige’ (irregular) by J. Wackkernagel, and ‘anomalous’ by Whitney – see Norman 'Syntactical Compounds', (in collected papers) p.218.
[9] See note 72 in Norman The Group of Discourses, p.175; and Norman 'Syntactical Compounds'. I'm grateful to Dhīvan Thomas Jones for pointing out Norman's note in the Sutta Nipāta. [10] M i.259. This appears to be the only occurrence of this phrase in the Pali Canon. The shorter phrase, paṭicca uppajjati, occurs a number of times throughout the nikāyas. I cannot find the obvious precursor: paṭicca samuppajjati.The Verb samuppajja- appears to occur only once in the Nikāyas at SN 36:12 (PTS S iv.219) in verses which accompany prose using uppajja-.
[11] See especially The Discourse on Conditions Paccayasuttaṃ (SN 12:20 PTS S ii.25-27)
My thanks to Dr Vincenzo Vergiani for pointing out several errors in a draft of this essay, all remaining errors are mine.
5 Comments
Close this window Jump to comment formHi Jayarava, many thanks for this clear post!
I am particularly interested in your final questions. Consider for instance the treatment of pratītya-samutpāda in the Śālistamba-sūtra, where two kinds of relation are discussed: the one taking place among phychological factors (i.e., the classical chain of 12 elements, starting with avidyā), this is called “internal (Sk. bāhya; Tib. phy) pratītya-samutpāda;” the other taking place among non-psychological factors (in this case the states of existence concurring to constitute a plant of rice, from seed to sprout, from sprout to leaf, etc.), this is called “external (Sk. adhyātmika, Tib. nang) pratītya-samutpāda.” This second kind of relation is objective because it would depend on the coming together of six factors: earth, water, fire, wind, ether (ākāśa) and season (ṛtu).
Thus, as we can see, the formula of pratītya-samutpāda seems to apply in general to every kind of conditional relation. (Also Nāgārjuna takes into consideration at least two aspects of “relation:” between psychological elements, for instance avidyā and saṃskāra, and between tangible elements, for instance father and son.)
Do you agree with these impressions of mine?
Moreover: could you pleas specify the bibliographical reference of Gonda’s essay?
:-)
Sunday, February 28, 2010
Hi Krishna (or Kṛṣṇa with all your dots!)
I'm not very familiar with Sanskrit Buddhist sources so far. I haven't come across this distinction before, but it seems to me that the 'elements' have been reified. For instance air is not simply what we breath in pre-sectarian Buddhism, it is the principle of movement. Fire is not simply fire but the principle of heat whether it is internal or external - just as the Vedics considered Agni to be the heat of the sun, or digestion, or the spark of imagination as well as fire; in fact the principle which underlies all of these. Rūpa as a khandha is properly the living body, not the body as matter. So to think of the elements as external is already a step away from the pre-sectarian Buddhist attitude (as I understand it, and under the strong influence of Sue Hamilton who I am re-reading at present).
The Buddha many times, but emphatically in the Sabba Sutta (SN 35.23) states that the proper range (visaya) to consider as 'everything' (sabbaṃ) is the āyatanas (which we could translate as 'meeting places') i.e. the senses and their objects. Out of contact between the two arises vedanā and it is on our relationship to vedanā that the whole of the Buddha's teaching revolved.
So rather than saying "pratītya-samutpāda seems to apply to every kind of conditional relation" I would phrase it more like "thus Buddhists applied the idea of pratītya-samutpāda to everything they could think of - thereby expanding the teaching beyond it's original range". There's no apriori need to understand how external conditionality works in order to be liberated from craving - it's like the story of the man with the arrow in his eye who won't let it be pulled out until he knows the caste of the man who shot him. It is irrelevant to the cure. I would also suggest that the laws of physics offer much greater insight into the workings of the world than ancient Indian elemental speculation!
This is not to say that we should not try to understand how and why Buddhism changed - and I would be interested to know if you have any thoughts on why such changes occurred. Was it simple intellectual curiosity? Was it driven by the needs of practice?
I note that neither source seems to deal with lokuttara pratītya-samutpāda which is an obvious gap in my own writing. Sometime soon I'd like to translate AN x.2 and comment on it.
I have added the Gonda ref into the bibliography.
Thanks for taking the time to comment. I'm enjoying your input.
Best Wishes
Jayarava
Sunday, February 28, 2010
Hi Jayarava,
It seems to me that an external objectivity can be detected (even if indirectly) also in Pāli Buddhism, see for instance the Loka-kāma-guṇa-sutta of the Saṃyutta-nikāya (34. 12. 3 if I remember well), in which we find the following sentence: yena kho āvuso lokasmiṃ lokasaññi hoti lokamāni ayaṃ vuccati ariyassa vinaye loko. «By whatever means there is cognition of the world, conceit of the world, that is the “world” according to the definition of the noble ones.» According to me (but also according to Peter Harvey, “The Selfless Mind,” sorry but I don’t remember the page!) here we have at least two – but actually three – different levels of “world”, from the external, objective one (lokasmiṃ) – that is: the world representing the basis on which the buddhist definition of “world” is built –, to the world which is the result of a perceptual activity (loko) – that is: the buddhists definition of “world”. Add also all those passages where Gotama speaks of external earth, water, etc., that when considered internally are seen as constituents of the human body. Only in part these passages can be interpreted as “reifications”, as you call it, because for instance during the meditation on the corpse one observes a body becoming real earth, real water or a fluid element, etc. The problem, in any case, subsists with the invisible air and heat (as you point out).
As far as vedanā is concerned, it seems that – according to the Majjhima Nikāya – phassa represents a first interpretative act which takes place before vedanā, and on which vedanā depends (as Tilmann Vetter notes in his “The Khandha Passages…”). It would be a vedanā ante litteram. But phassa takes place – as you rightly point out, by means of āyatanas – between the sense organ and the object… thus, we have again an internal element distinct from an external one.
In all this I see the seeds of all further developments of Buddhism (so, also the Śālistamba Sūtra). As you remark, the Sabba Sutta is “more representative” of the main Buddhist philosophy, than other minor positions that we can find in the Nikāyas. (Consider for instance the term sammuti: in the main Nikāyas it appears only once, but apparently this was sufficient for the theoretical development – indeed a philosophical explosion – of its Sanskrit equivalent saṃvṛti.) This is of course due to the process of systematization of the various Suttas in a consistent corpus, or to the possible errors of the bhāṇakas in the oral transmission, etc. All this reveals that the pre-sectarian (as you call it) Buddhism is not always consistent and this because it has not been built as an organic system of though: it is indeed become (more or less) organic and systematic step by step.
As far as pratītya-samutpāda is concerned, it means “conditional relation,” (or as you explain: “having depended [on a condition] it is produced”) thus as I have said it applies to every conditional relation (i.e., every relation in which something is produced dependently on something else). Consider MN I, 111-112: cakkhuñ c’āvuso paṭicca rūpe cakkhuviññāṇaṃ, tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso, phassa-paccayā vedanā… («By the eye and the form the visual awareness IS CONDITIONED, the union of the three is contact, BY MEANS OF – or FROM THE CONDITION OF – contact there is feeling…»). The visual awareness is conditioned by the eye and the EXTERNAL OBJECT; thus, an external object can condition another thing (why not another external object constituted by external elements?).
Last but not least: my name is Krishna (without dots) because I am Italian and we do not have diacritics in our alphabet, only some accent. In any case, imagine, this is my real name! Indeed, I’m not a dvija, but a – so to speak – “son” of the ’68 (it was an idea of my father… my brother’s name is Arjuna!). And what about you: is Jayarava your real name or you are a dvija?
Sunday, February 28, 2010
H Krishna
Thanks once again for a thoughtful comment. However what is it about your first quote that makes you think that loka refers to anything external? It is certainly not explicit, and not, I think, implicit.
Take a closer look at those terms. This world (ayaṃ loko) is defined (vuccati)... through (yena) *lokasaññi and lokamāni*. You and Harvey are reading these as simple tatpuruṣa compounds. Actually they may well be locative tatpuruṣa and the hint is that they are preceded by lokasmiṃ, a locative. So, in this world: there are perceptions in this world [saññā being used in it's general sense] and 'conceit' [actually comparison or belief in 'I' based on perceptions] in this world. Both saññi and māna, the qualities that define 'the world', are cognitive.
Boil this down and it is saying where there is perception and comparison based on it, then that is what the āryas call 'the world' - in contra-distinction presumably to what the 'worldly' call it 'the world'. The focus is on saññā and māna because they are central to solving the problem of dukkha. Note that Hamilton explicitly links dukkha and loka as referring to the same thing in many Buddhist texts.
To interpret different levels here is to proliferate definitions.
I suppose this also shows that such quotes really are very vague and can be read a number of different ways. What we see depends on what we expect to see.
Agreed, the Buddha does talk about external elements at times; and we can readily observe that there is cause and effect in the objective world which is the subject of the physical sciences. But so what? So what if objects are conditioned? I've known this since I was 9 years old, studied it in great detail for 20 years culminating in a B.Sc, proved many of the fundamental theorems of physics and chemistry for myself, and that got me not one jot closer to liberation - except that it did cause me a certain amount of disappointment that may eventually have lead to becoming a Buddhist :-)
Re names. My real name? Well, what is real? Realin the sense of 'substantial' or real in the sense of 'true'? My true name really is Jayarava. It was given to me during the most meaning event of my life and represents both the story of my life so far, and my life's goal. That is far more real to me than what it says on my birth certificate. You could easily find out what my parents called me - in their innocence and naivety - since I make no secret of it. However my real name is Jayarava - my cry is victory! I would never describe myself as dvija - I have no wish to be associated with any of the traditions which use such terminology.
Regards
Jayarava
PS Adding a few paragraphs would make your comments a lot more readable. I struggle to scan large blocks of text.
Monday, March 01, 2010
Hey Jayarava, nice to meet you! Very nice analysis indeed. However I don't quite understand your conclusive remarks. Do you really believe P.S. means any general kind of conditional relation? I thought it was common knowledge that it meant the two opposites co-defining each other? Like the top-bottom, life-death, happiness-suffering, object-subject etc. Even your analysis hints at that with all its "opposite", "against each other", "co-" and such. The translation I see used a lot in all kinds of books is "dependent co-arising" -- which is a bit closer to what I think it means. This topic is well developed in Taoism as well. It also helps understand how the goal-setting (driven by desires) causes arising of the Ego -- via same process of implication. If there is "here", there is "there", if there is getting from "here" to "there", there is something that moves -- i.e. the "I". Would this be too much of a stretch of imagination or would you see a virtue in this line of thinking?
Wednesday, March 07, 2012