In "The Grand Design" Hawking says that we are somewhat like goldfish in a curved fishbowl. Our perceptions are limited and warped by the kind of lenses we see through, “the interpretive structure of our human brains.” Albert Einstein rejected this subjective approach, common to much of quantum mechanics, but did admit that our view of reality is distorted.
Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity has the surprising consequences that “the same event, when viewed from inertial systems in motion with respect to each other, will seem to occur at different times, bodies will measure out at different lengths, and clocks will run at different speeds.” Light does travel in a curve, due to the gravity of matter, thereby distorting views from each perspective in this Universe. Similarly, mystics’ experience in divine oneness, which might be considered the same "eternal" event, viewed from various historical, cultural and personal perspectives, have occurred with different frequencies, degrees of realization and durations. This might help to explain the diversity in the expressions or reports of that spiritual awareness. What is seen is the same; it is the "seeing" which differs.
In some sciences, all existence is described as matter or energy. In some of mysticism, only consciousness exists. Dark matter is 25%, and dark energy about 70%, of the critical density of this Universe. Divine essence, also not visible, emanates and sustains universal matter (mass/energy: visible/dark) and cosmic consciousness (f(x) raised to its greatest power). During suprarational consciousness, and beyond, mystics share in that essence to varying extents. [quoted from my e-book on comparative mysticism]
I'm not sure I understand your point in quoting this. I certainly don't think introducing supernatural stories like "divine essence" is helpful.
I don't think anyone understands what dark matter is, none has ever been seen and it is only a hypothetical story to explain an observation, likewise dark energy. They're just ideas at the moment. I certainly don't think that the fact that there must be more mass in the universe than we can see through telescopes at millions of light-years distance, or that the universe is expanding faster than expected is any reason to accept concepts like "divine essence".
I think this demonstrates why the discussion is polarised. People seem to believe things that there are no evidence for what-so-ever. They tells stories and believe them as thought they are real. This really isn't helpful.
Thanks for this interesting summary of Lawson and McCauley.
I guess we will disagree about the following remark, but –personally– I really cannot understand why should not one just accept that science and religion have different fields of application. If a religious text/teacher/tradition… tells us, i.e., that the sun is smaller than the earth, it either goes beyond its own field (and is hence irrelevant), or has some other purpose (e.g., telling us that human beings should be our main concern). Similarly, a scientist/science book/… who tells us that there is no free will seems to overlook the distinction between ontology (including physiology) and phenomenology. As you pointed out, science cannot answer the question "What is a life worth living?". This is probably also the reason (is it?) why a person like you might be persuaded by scientific arguments about X and Y and yet remain a Buddhist.
The texts, and therefore the worldviews, that we study are centuries old and pre-scientific. We don't expect them to provide accurate information about the world, though they can provide accurate information about what a "good life" might be like. Sometimes what they communicate through symbols and images is still relevant and valuable.
But why should a living religion be stuck with a centuries old pre-scientific worldview? Do we refrain from using the internet because the form of communication we value is a hand-written manuscript? No!
Actually science is rapidly moving into the area of how we live, and love. People are studying what happiness is, and how to achieve it (e.g. Martin Seligman and the 'Positive Psychology' movement). People are studying the brain and how it functions, and seeing clear implications for the good life as well (e.g, V S Ramachandran, Antonio Damasic, Joseph LeDoux). Thomas Metzinger is using the results of neuroscience to ask the question of 'what is a good life?', but also the very Buddhist question 'what is a good state of mind?' People like Sara Laza are measuring changes in the brain due to meditation. Crossing over the other way I note that mindfulness based techniques drawn from Buddhist practice are now the treatment of choice for some ailments in the UK.
You're right that I don't agree that religion and science are different fields of application - religieux and scientists disagree as well. Scientists are very busy trying to contribute to the 'how should we live?' question, and religieux are constantly commenting on material and ontological questions. Scientists do interpret, and religieux do explain.
I suppose it raises the question of what is a religion? What is religion for? (And is Buddhism one?) And critically why are religieux so resistant to change and new knowledge?
I think the freezing of knowledge in time (be it religious or materialist), and resistance to change causes a split in the psyche that is pathological. We end up denying things that are straight-forwardly true, and/or ignoring other ways to value knowledge.
I'm more inspired by a universe in which the sun is a massive, gravity contained nuclear fusion explosion 93 millions miles away; than I am by a universe where it is a tiny portal to God. I feel awed by this universe; and at the same time ready to drop this view and embrace something new if better evidence is presented to me.
Dear Jayarava, thanks for engaging in every discussion! I see your point, I would also be quite disappointed with a religion which kept on maintaining that dinosaurs never existed (for instance). And I understand, in this sense, your parallel with Internet. One expects religion not to be conditioned by yesterday's lack of experience in chemical reactions or physiology. Luckly enough most contemporary "Western" religions (including Buddhism, and many forms of Islam, even pre-dating this gross category, etc.) accept that their purpose is not to tell us what is the world, but rather what for is our life.
Well I have the time, and find it fascinating. Yes. Dinosaurs are too cool to leave out! :-)
I think you are right about religion generally - although fundamentalists get all the press, there are a lot of reasonable people living good lives. My mother is a fundamentalist Christian missionary and we still manage to get on well. She does good work in Africa I think.
A lot of this inquiry is about my personal journey, about my own inner cadences - the many aspects of myself which I must integrate to find wholeness.
Dear Jayarava, I am full of sympathy with your last statement, one I can easily identify with. I constantly elaborate self-narratives which hold togethere my life and make sense of it. I am quite far from Galen Strawson's feeling of non-continuity. However, how do you consider this need out of a Buddhist perspective? Since there is no unitary ātman, trying to integrate our illusory Is, could not it conduce to attachement to one's illusory selves?
(I have discussed this here: http://elisafreschi.blogspot.com/2010/08/subject-no-subject-and-their.html)
Well I'm speaking in terms of psychological integration, of an inclusive awareness - this doesn't require an ātman (I hope!)
I am doubtful about saying that the ego/self is illusory. If it is illusory whose illusion is it? (To paraphrase Thomas Metzinger). Also as I have argued on my blog, without an ego or sense of self we are mentally crippled: incapable of communication, interaction, or learning.
No, I would say that the sense of self arises in dependence on conditions. It is not really an illusion, but it is impermanent, disappointing and impersonal. The illusion, if it can be called that, is that the sense of selfhood is not simply an experience, but something more lasting, satisfying and substantial or personal. I.e. we usually mistake our self-narratives for reality (even when we don't have them as an metaphorical voice in our head).
Re your blog: Remembering is simply an experience too. We know that memory is influenced by many factors and is extremely plastic. I'm not sure I believe Strawson - though some people are clearly less introspective than others. I think we do tend to under-estimate the role of social environment in creating our sense of identity.
Self narratives don't hold our life together and make sense of it; self-narratives are our life. IMHO.
It does get interesting as we examine these narratives in detail and see how they are constructed in the moment, from moment to moment; and what it is like to let go of them.
I meant to post a quick comment the other day but it slipped my mind.
There is a parallel between what you describe as explanation/interpretation and nature/nurture. Those favouring the 'nature' side of the dichotomy would prefer to locate human subjectivity in the discourses of the biological or neuro sciences for instance, whilst those favouring the 'nurture' side would prefer to locate human subjectivity in broader historical, economic, discursive, or linguistic structures and practices.
But much like what you are saying, there is a growing awareness in the humanities and social sciences that to begin with the premise of a strict nature/nurture dichotomy is to start off on the wrong foot.
As far as I'm aware, in the past 10-20 years, scholarship in the humanities have begun to realise that in challenging scientific determinism (nature)--which in its extreme form marginalises people--they have sometimes unwittingly gone too far down the interpretation (nurture) route. Researchers are now exploring mutually supportive relationships between the 'nature' and 'nurture'. I think the Buddhist understanding of form, subjectivity, and personhood provides some helpful resources for thinking this through.
I have had a parallel discussion on this post on Facebook. It's been very difficult to clarify the issue. I think the extremes are not as visible to many people so it's hard to see what the pure positions look like.
Most people seem to see the humanities critique of determinism as orthodox, and despite conducting the conversation via the internet (!) they see science as rather flawed. The fantastic success of science is backgrounded or dismissed as 'materialism' (which is a rude word for Buddhists).
The nature/nuture see-saw has been very divisive but seems typical of the kind of argument that's gone on. I think common sense says it has to be both!
Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar, Nobel astrophysicist, in 1959 invited me to the University of Chicago's Yerkes Observatory and introduced me to mysticism. Heisenberg, Schroedinger, de Broglie, Jeans, Planck, Pauli, and Eddington were supporters of mysticism. A good reference is "Quantum Questions / Mystical Writings of the World's Greatest Physicists," edited by Ken Wilber (Shambhala 1984, 2001). I had read 40 books on physics, biology and psychology while writing my e-book, but am certainly not a scientist.
Again Ron, I don't understand your point - how is this relevant to the post? What do you mean that those names "supported mysticism"? What would it signify in this case? How does this contribute to our understanding of the interactions between different styles of knowledge seeking?
I make a point of not reading Ken Wilbur. Life is short, books are many, and what I have seen of Wilbur and his disciples doesn't impress me.
Could you please keep your comments on topic - ie read the post, and comment on the topic of the post, or don't comment.
And be aware that I'm really not interested in mysticism, or the subject of your book, so you might want to discuss it somewhere else.
Saturday, February 26, 2011
gruff said...
re: Elisa's comment "If a religious text/teacher/tradition… tells us, [e.g.], that the sun is smaller than the earth, it either goes beyond its own field (and is hence irrelevant), or has some other purpose (e.g., telling us that human beings should be our main concern)."
The statement that the sun is smaller than the earth (or comparable statements such as Heraclitus's assertion that "the sun is the breadth of a man's foot") is literally true - if one drops preconceptions and examines one's direct experience. In the immediate sense-world in which one finds oneself every day, the earth is in fact far larger than the sun: it fills a much greater portion of the visual field than does the sun.
It's not a matter of dropping preconceptions, it's a matter of which preconceptions you prioritise. You simply wish to tell a different story.
There is no such thing as the "immediate sense world". What we are conscious of is always accompanied by stories - the idea that there is an immediate sense world is the "naive realist" story i.e. "What you see is what there is". Often, as we all know from experience, what we see is not what is there.
There are plenty of simple observations you can make to show that the sun cannot be small, but must be very large, and very far away - naive realism is one of the views that prevents us from seeing the truth of this.
Perspective is pretty obvious in many other cases - a tree a mile away is not literally the size of our thumb, and does not grow in size as we approach it. To believe this would be to make a simple error about perception. The fact that something takes up a certain proportion of the field of view is related to both size and distance - we all know this to be true. For what you suggest to be true we would have to understand our visual field as 2 dimensional, whereas we do see in 3 dimensions.
Subhash Kak argues that the Ṛgvedic Indians knew to within 1 or 2% how large and how far away the moon and sun were - the ratio between the width and distance is approximately 108 in both cases. I don't necessarily believe Kak, but he is not completely implausible.
Sunday, February 27, 2011
gruff said...
I take your points. However I made my comment above because it has two foundations.
The first is in experiences I and others have had during meditation retreats. It may be that what we are conscious of is always accompanied by stories, but it is possible for those stories to dwindle away almost to nothing, and yet for the sense-world still to be present. If I look at my mind right now, the story seems to be at the center of it, constantly explaining and narrating various phenomena. But it has been the case on more than one occasion that the story has been no longer at the center, but that sense-phenomena are still present, and that e.g. the sun is seen as tiny, or bugs as colossal.
The second foundation is in the Canon. It seems to me that this sort of thorough investigation into all aspects of sense experience is part of what the Buddha was getting at when he said, as he did repeatedly, things like "You should know the sense-bases, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation" - likewise with consciousness, forms, etc.
The ending of all stories seems to be pretty clearly what he had in mind. In MN 2 he states "Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress."
Or again: "He then hears a Perfect One expounding the Teaching for the removal of all grounds for views, of all prejudices, obsessions, dogmas and biases; for the stilling of all processes, for the relinquishment of all substrata, for the extirpation of craving, for dispassion, cessation, Nibbaana."
On my reading Nibbaana, the awakening that the Buddha states is available to all in this very life, can be characterised as the destruction of all one's stories, including scientific ones. And by destruction I understand not that e.g. one no longer studies or practices science or scientific thought but that "cessation of clinging" occurs and one is no longer married to one's stories.
I hope these comments are of some value.
Sunday, February 27, 2011
gruff said...
Forgot to add mention of the instruction to Bahiya: "In the seen there is only the seen" etc.
Hmmm. You don't really see the sun as tiny - you see visual perceptions which you interpret as a tiny thing which is nearby. That too is a story. There is no reason for the gestalt not to flip and for it to seem like a huge thing very far away. What is the difference? Depth perception - it's a physical thing that combines information focal length and convergence. The problem with 3D movies for instance is that the eyes converge on the flat surface of the screen but focus in front and behind, giving some people (me!) a headache.
Depth perception is "raw data" too. What you seem to be saying is the liberation plays havoc with your depth perception. I'm not won over by this.
But I suspect there is something rather difficult to communicate about such experiences which has not come across in what you write. And I expect you would be the first to admit that these experiences did not amount to liberation.
I do know that intense mediation often alters sense perceptions in unexpected ways. I personally have never felt that I've experienced raw sense perception with no stories what-so-ever; though I have had a few startling shifts in perspective and insights.
I'm familiar with these kinds of stories about Nibbāna in the Canon. You are right to suggest that my earlier assertion was too dogmatic - all unenlightened experience involves stories. And very tactful as well, thanks :-). Having nothing much to say about nibbāna I sometimes talk as if there were no alternative which is unhelpful. Enlightened experience is somehow different from unenlightened - although after 2500 years we're still uncertain how to capture that in words!
I rather suspect that these ultimate states were post-mortem affairs, and that while embodied there continued to be a core of human consciousness, but that there was no intoxication with it. Otherwise I fail to see how ordinary human communication could go on, and the traditional Buddha does seem to be extraordinarily attuned to ordinary human relationships.
Doesn't science/explanation have an interpretation side to it too?
Does it really exist as pure logic, pure thought? Most scientific discoveries are then applied to utilitarian & economic uses such as atomic bombs, solar panels, etc which then have an impact on human life. Which rises ethical issues, which leads us back to 'interpretation'.
If you read the whole article this is exactly what I am saying.
Why do you say, however, that ethical issues lead us back to interpretation? Are ethics really without a factual basis? Are there no laws which apply to ethics?
Neisser proposed a cognitive cycle in which concept is adapted by percept (the more you look, the more your information/mind map about something is adapted ) and visa versa ie that percept is guided by concept (you see what you expect to see or only what you can understand).
This fits in well with mindfulness moving into the spheres of rupa & sensation, leaving behind interpretation.
As an artist-painter, working from observation, I confirm that I frequently move into a perceptual mode where the visual field becomes forms, colours, edges etc. Confirm that this isn't liberation but the act of distancing one's self from one's interpretations ... allows for the possibility of a more detached awareness of perception.
Anyway, imo, most of my thoughts arises from themselves, a continuation from previous thoughts, the endless stream of thoughts, they don't just disappear but rattle on with their preferences, the feeling skandhra underneath... manasikkrarah (excuse my poor sanskrit). What interests me is to observe the moment when sensations are attributed a feeling-reponse. In seeing this, then do I then have to take my responses as 'truth' or 'the way to hapiness'?
Neisser : "The term "cognition" refers to all processes by which the sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used. It is concerned with these processes even when they operate in the absence of relevant stimulation, as in images and hallucinations... "
One of the things I personally like about the Dharma is the importance given to perception.'Right view' traditionally is presented as the first step on the eight-fold path.
I post some rather jumbled thoughts here… hope they make sense :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Here's wiki on Neisser :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulric_Neisser
Cognitive psychology is more about the study of input into the brain & the brain's response to this input ( as I understand as it, not being a psychologist, only an artist & art teacher, but... working everyday with these issues).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_psychology
Neisser made great contributions to how perception & conception interact. ie how evaluation & interpretation 'inter-are' in a process of anticipation & adaption. Personally I particularly like his use of the word 'percept' and regret that it isn't in more common usage.
Here is a link explaining 'Neisser's perceptual cycle' ie it's cyclical model & not linear:
Don't worry you can rely on me to say if I can't make sense of what you post ;-)
I agree about the central importance, though I note with wry amusement that no two Buddhists seem to agree on the definition of right-view.
If you like that sort of thing have you ever read The Analysis of Sensations, and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical by Ernst Mach? He was somewhat ahead of his time I think.
Tuesday, March 01, 2011
[Image]IN THE INTRODUCTION to their book Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture,[Image] the authors Thomas Lawson and Robert McCauley admit they intend to cause trouble. The audience for the book is probably involved on one side or the other of the sometimes bitter scholarly conflict they are writing about. The combination of jargon and assumed common political and intellectual background make it a bit daunting for the general reader. However in Chapter One Lawson and McCauley make some interesting observations about the social sciences generally and the study of religion in particular that I want to pick up on.
They note a dichotomy between those who seek knowledge through explanation and those who seek it through interpretation, but make the point that the dichotomy is in many ways a false one.
In its extreme form the explanation camp says that all interpretation is irrelevant. The stereotype here is the materialist scientist, the logical empiricist who is only concerned with the observation of facts. Knowledge is the discovery of causal laws, and interpretive efforts simply get in the way. The approach to knowledge puts strict limits on acceptable subject matters and methods. The important thing about science - which distinguishes it from common sense - is that scientific explanations form general systems of abstract principles. These principles can be applied beyond the domain in which they were discovered. It is the inter-connectedness of scientific theories, the way they work together to support each other, that contributes to their success. Common sense knowledge, by contrast, is typically restricted to a particular domain, and it isn't related strongly to other knowledge. Explanations lead to consensus, but only on the subset of all possible knowledge amenable to empirical observations.
We can safely let Richard Dawkins stand as a good example of the scientist explanationist camp. He is known for his impatience with superstition and ignorance of facts, and for his public attacks on religious beliefs. Interestingly Richard Dawkins evinces surprise that people should see him as 'cold' and 'nihilistic' on reading The Selfish Gene,[Image] and attempts to alter that impression with his next book, Unweaving the Rainbow.[Image] But for all that he shows that he is familiar with poetry and deft at manipulating metaphors in his factual explanations, he also seems to misunderstand something fundamental about human cognition and decision making - the role of emotion in our lives. Dawkins appears to explain his failure to communicate himself as laziness or stupidity on the part of his audience. He is openly contemptuous of people who are not persuaded by his explanations, but makes no attempt to connect with the values of the audience, which means that he presumes that everyone prioritises cold hard facts as he does. Note that his sub-title for Unweaving the Rainbow contrasts science with delusion as though these are the only two possible positions. His contumely is reminiscent of legacy attitudes of the British upper-classes to the common people. Similarly Stephen Hawking in his recent book The Grand Design declares "philosophy is dead", and that scientific determinism is simply how things are - he goes as far as denying the possibility of free will, but allows that despite the lack of true agency that behaviour is so complex that it remains unpredictable. The Grand Design trumpets itself as offering "new answers to life's ultimate questions" - and the selection of the questions is telling. First and foremost Hawking seeks to answer: 'why is there something rather than nothing?'. Socrates question 'how should we live?' is not only not addressed, is it not even asked! Scientific determinism creates a sterile vacuum by placing many aspects of human life - especially all the creative and imaginative arts, and the human emotions and values - outside the sphere of knowledge seeking and making.
On the other hand is the interpretationist who says that all inquiry about human life and thought occurs in irreducible frameworks of values and subjectivity. Human beings are subjects not objects. The search for knowledge about human beings - and therefore about religion - is the search for reasons (hermeneutics) and meaning (semiotics). Explanation is not only unnecessary it is at best undesirable, and at worst not possible. Since interpretation allows no common (objective) standard and there is much less interactivity amongst knowledge found in this way, there is a tendency to splinter into factions e.g. Freudian, Foucauldian, Feminist, Marxist, Christian, Buddhist, etc. Each group comes up with a plausible story about what things mean, and criticises the other groups with no possibility of consensus. The interpretationist account of humanity is overly fecund, and reaches an apotheosis in the Post-Modernists who reject all explanation and all objectivity, and disclaim all possibility of wider consensus since there is only personal interpretation. However interpretation allows us to structure and understand those areas of life which science cannot touch - particularly human experience. Although laws may not be possible, there are certainly patterns. Identifying and discussing problems such as universal human rights rely on interpretation rather than explanation.
I'm not familiar with any of the examples of interpretationist type given in the book, but it strikes me that Joseph Campbell fits the profile. He interprets myths and legends, seeking reasons for human behaviour and sources of meaning relating to it. He is not concerned with what causes us to behave, in the way that a scientist is, only in what it means that we do behave the way we do. Campbell on the other hand accepts everything as part of life's rich tapestry without judgement. So when discussing the theme of rebirth (in his interviews with Bill Moyers published as The Power of Myth[Image]) he sees the images of the Buddha peacefully meditating beneath the bodhi tree, and Jesus brutally nailed to a cross as being the same story without any qualification (I disagree). Equally he discusses ritual murder in the same context without any sense of moral judgement - every expression of human behaviour is valid to him because it is simply an expression of the myth. The term for this kind of view is monist - expressed sometimes as "all is one". There is no way to prove what Campbell says - it is simply one interpretation of a range of observations. Campbell's position is not easily reducible, but he is broadly speaking a Jungian, I think. If he were a Marxist his reading of the myths would no doubt be different. However Campbell creates extremely plausible narratives in many cases and he seems to shed light on the content and importantly the function of myths. Since the Enlightenment myth has become a byword for something which is not true. Campbell shows how myths have value because they symbolically communicate meanings and purposes, and has to some extent rehabilitated the word myth.
Lawson and McCauley outline some intermediate positions, but these require some familiarity with the literature and are therefore harder to explain. Overall when there are concessions made by 'social scientists', the authors say, they inevitably privilege interpretation and subordinate explanation. Some see the methods of social science as yet inadequate to the task of an empirical approach, leaving interpretation as the only way forward. A second group acknowledge that explanation has a role, but see human actions as guided by reasons and not by causes, so it seems natural to focus on interpretation while not actually discounting explanation (I think the problem here is free will). A third intermediate position sees all knowledge seeking - including the natural sciences - as fundamentally interpretive, and in particular argue for the importance of subjectivity in the construction of scientific knowledge systems. For this last group interpretation sets the agenda for explanation. In studying humans they prioritise the concrete contents of human experience over the abstract theories about them.
In my experience most religious people are interpretationists of either the extreme kind who deny any possible explanation for human, especially religious, experience; or they tolerate a level of explanation but place certain types of experience forever beyond the reach of empiricism and factual knowledge (my Buddhist teacher Sangharakshita is overtly in this camp I would say). Religious people are wary of explanation which they see as 'cold', and as 'killing the magic'. They speak of scientists 'explaining away' their beliefs. The danger religious people see is that science, in explaining human religious behaviour, will destroy the things they value about their religious practices and communities. And on past evidence this is not an unreasonable fear as explanationists are often insensitive to values.
It's clear that the extreme approaches are not always helpful. Although both have had their successes, they have tended to polarise the discussion about religion and stymie communication and understanding. The point that Lawson and McCauley wish to make is that there is a way to combine both interpretation and explanation without privileging or banishing one or the other, and that in effect we all do it anyway. They point out that in fact explanation and interpretation are different cognitive tasks. "When people seek better interpretations they attempt to employ the categories they have in better ways. By contrast, when people seek better explanations they go beyond the rearrangement of categories; the generate new theories which will, if successful, replace or even eliminate the conceptual scheme with which they presently operate." (p.29) Interpretation presupposes a body of explanation (of facts and laws), and seeks to (re)organise empirical knowledge. Explanation always contains an element of interpretation, but successful explanations winnow and increase knowledge. The two processes are not mutually exclusive, but interrelated, and both are necessary.
In the process of attempting to integrate Buddhism and Western Culture (which includes science and technology as well as distinctive myths and ideas about what gives life meaning) we cannot afford to take an exclusively explanatory or interpretive approach. We are forced, by intellectual honesty, to accept the strong conclusions of science: the classical laws of physics and chemistry for instance are not really in doubt despite being dependent on a frame of reference - we do in fact live in that frame of reference. Some of the critique of each camp is useful - explanation helps to put useful limits on interpretation; while we are reminded that facts are not always hard (think of statistics and how vital they are in biology or quantum mechanics) and laws governing imagination and emotion are vague, though not without importance.
One of the big issues of religion in the modern world is the status of the supernatural. On the trivial level we have ghosts and 'energies' of various kinds, and on a more serious level we have a transcendental Buddha beyond any predication or description, let alone explanation. Nirvāṇa is taboo, and remains not just inaccessible but forbidden to scientists. Though one of the most interesting areas of neuroscience is the effects of meditation on the brain.
To even consider trying to explain the Buddha is seen as a kind of heresy. We Buddhists do maintain conceptions equivalent to both heresy and blasphemy - despite all protestations to the contrary - that emerge when we transgress. It can be heresy to deny some doctrines. To some denying rebirth is a heresy. More or less any doctrinal innovation in Buddhism leaves one open to the charge of heresy. If we go further and declare our belief that consciousness is entirely based in the brain (which I more or less accept) or that the Buddha was just a human being who was kind and not troubled by psychological suffering then we will find the charge of blasphemy being laid surreptitiously at our doorstep. We may find that someone will say that we are not in fact Buddhists if we don't accept a transcendental version of Buddhism; or we may be called a materialist. The label materialist has a powerfully pejorative sense in this context; and often comes with an offhand, sometimes contemptuous, dismissal of the so-called materialist's opinions. The form of the arguments is identical, I would say, to those we see in theistic milieus.
Buddhists like to emphasise true, original (in the temporal sense) and authentic teachings; genuine masters, living Buddhas; unbroken lineages; and fully ordained individuals. We are a bit obsessed with appealing to external authorities to bolster our internal authority. Why do I constantly refer to the Pāli Canon for instance when I have my personal experience? Could it be from lack of experience?
We have some way to go as most of these issues are not even conscious. As someone with a science education and a leaning towards explanation, I regularly find myself in conflict with those who embrace interpretation - often having to point out that my disinclination to supernatural interpretations of experience does not amount to materialism (see Am I a Materialist?). The important thing about Lawson and McCauley's analysis is that it clarifies what issues and values are at stake so that we can bring them to awareness, and have the discussion in the open. Facts are important, and we should not be denying facts in promoting Buddhism. One fact is that human values are not easily objectified, and another is that experience doesn't necessarily conform to mathematical laws.
Lawson, E. T. and McCauley, R. N. (1990). Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chapter One Reprinted as Lawson, E. T. and McCauley, R. N. (2006). "Interpretation and Explanation: Problems and Promise in the Study of Religion." J. Slone (ed.). Religion and Cognition: A Reader, London: Equinox.
See also: Oliver Sacks on Why the brain creates myths on bigthink.com: "Jerome Bruner, a great psychologist, has spoken of two modes of thinking. One is to create narratives, one is to create paradigms or explanations or models."
24 Comments
Close this window Jump to comment formIn "The Grand Design" Hawking says that we are somewhat like goldfish in a curved fishbowl. Our perceptions are limited and warped by the kind of lenses we see through, “the interpretive structure of our human brains.” Albert Einstein rejected this subjective approach, common to much of quantum mechanics, but did admit that our view of reality is distorted.
Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity has the surprising consequences that “the same event, when viewed from inertial systems in motion with respect to each other, will seem to occur at different times, bodies will measure out at different lengths, and clocks will run at different speeds.” Light does travel in a curve, due to the gravity of matter, thereby distorting views from each perspective in this Universe. Similarly, mystics’ experience in divine oneness, which might be considered the same "eternal" event, viewed from various historical, cultural and personal perspectives, have occurred with different frequencies, degrees of realization and durations. This might help to explain the diversity in the expressions or reports of that spiritual awareness. What is seen is the same; it is the "seeing" which differs.
In some sciences, all existence is described as matter or energy. In some of mysticism, only consciousness exists. Dark matter is 25%, and dark energy about 70%, of the critical density of this Universe. Divine essence, also not visible, emanates and sustains universal matter (mass/energy: visible/dark) and cosmic consciousness (f(x) raised to its greatest power). During suprarational consciousness, and beyond, mystics share in that essence to varying extents. [quoted from my e-book on comparative mysticism]
Friday, February 18, 2011
Hi Ron,
I'm not sure I understand your point in quoting this. I certainly don't think introducing supernatural stories like "divine essence" is helpful.
I don't think anyone understands what dark matter is, none has ever been seen and it is only a hypothetical story to explain an observation, likewise dark energy. They're just ideas at the moment. I certainly don't think that the fact that there must be more mass in the universe than we can see through telescopes at millions of light-years distance, or that the universe is expanding faster than expected is any reason to accept concepts like "divine essence".
I think this demonstrates why the discussion is polarised. People seem to believe things that there are no evidence for what-so-ever. They tells stories and believe them as thought they are real. This really isn't helpful.
Jayarava
Friday, February 18, 2011
Thanks for this interesting summary of Lawson and McCauley.
I guess we will disagree about the following remark, but –personally– I really cannot understand why should not one just accept that science and religion have different fields of application. If a religious text/teacher/tradition… tells us, i.e., that the sun is smaller than the earth, it either goes beyond its own field (and is hence irrelevant), or has some other purpose (e.g., telling us that human beings should be our main concern). Similarly, a scientist/science book/… who tells us that there is no free will seems to overlook the distinction between ontology (including physiology) and phenomenology. As you pointed out, science cannot answer the question "What is a life worth living?".
This is probably also the reason (is it?) why a person like you might be persuaded by scientific arguments about X and Y and yet remain a Buddhist.
Saturday, February 19, 2011
Hi Elisa
The texts, and therefore the worldviews, that we study are centuries old and pre-scientific. We don't expect them to provide accurate information about the world, though they can provide accurate information about what a "good life" might be like. Sometimes what they communicate through symbols and images is still relevant and valuable.
But why should a living religion be stuck with a centuries old pre-scientific worldview? Do we refrain from using the internet because the form of communication we value is a hand-written manuscript? No!
Actually science is rapidly moving into the area of how we live, and love. People are studying what happiness is, and how to achieve it (e.g. Martin Seligman and the 'Positive Psychology' movement). People are studying the brain and how it functions, and seeing clear implications for the good life as well (e.g, V S Ramachandran, Antonio Damasic, Joseph LeDoux). Thomas Metzinger is using the results of neuroscience to ask the question of 'what is a good life?', but also the very Buddhist question 'what is a good state of mind?' People like Sara Laza are measuring changes in the brain due to meditation. Crossing over the other way I note that mindfulness based techniques drawn from Buddhist practice are now the treatment of choice for some ailments in the UK.
You're right that I don't agree that religion and science are different fields of application - religieux and scientists disagree as well. Scientists are very busy trying to contribute to the 'how should we live?' question, and religieux are constantly commenting on material and ontological questions. Scientists do interpret, and religieux do explain.
I suppose it raises the question of what is a religion? What is religion for? (And is Buddhism one?) And critically why are religieux so resistant to change and new knowledge?
I think the freezing of knowledge in time (be it religious or materialist), and resistance to change causes a split in the psyche that is pathological. We end up denying things that are straight-forwardly true, and/or ignoring other ways to value knowledge.
I'm more inspired by a universe in which the sun is a massive, gravity contained nuclear fusion explosion 93 millions miles away; than I am by a universe where it is a tiny portal to God. I feel awed by this universe; and at the same time ready to drop this view and embrace something new if better evidence is presented to me.
Sunday, February 20, 2011
Dear Jayarava,
thanks for engaging in every discussion!
I see your point, I would also be quite disappointed with a religion which kept on maintaining that dinosaurs never existed (for instance). And I understand, in this sense, your parallel with Internet. One expects religion not to be conditioned by yesterday's lack of experience in chemical reactions or physiology. Luckly enough most contemporary "Western" religions (including Buddhism, and many forms of Islam, even pre-dating this gross category, etc.) accept that their purpose is not to tell us what is the world, but rather what for is our life.
Sunday, February 20, 2011
Hi Elisa
Well I have the time, and find it fascinating. Yes. Dinosaurs are too cool to leave out! :-)
I think you are right about religion generally - although fundamentalists get all the press, there are a lot of reasonable people living good lives. My mother is a fundamentalist Christian missionary and we still manage to get on well. She does good work in Africa I think.
A lot of this inquiry is about my personal journey, about my own inner cadences - the many aspects of myself which I must integrate to find wholeness.
Sunday, February 20, 2011
Dear Jayarava,
I am full of sympathy with your last statement, one I can easily identify with. I constantly elaborate self-narratives which hold togethere my life and make sense of it. I am quite far from Galen Strawson's feeling of non-continuity.
However, how do you consider this need out of a Buddhist perspective? Since there is no unitary ātman, trying to integrate our illusory Is, could not it conduce to attachement to one's illusory selves?
(I have discussed this here:
http://elisafreschi.blogspot.com/2010/08/subject-no-subject-and-their.html)
Monday, February 21, 2011
Hi Elisa
Well I'm speaking in terms of psychological integration, of an inclusive awareness - this doesn't require an ātman (I hope!)
I am doubtful about saying that the ego/self is illusory. If it is illusory whose illusion is it? (To paraphrase Thomas Metzinger). Also as I have argued on my blog, without an ego or sense of self we are mentally crippled: incapable of communication, interaction, or learning.
No, I would say that the sense of self arises in dependence on conditions. It is not really an illusion, but it is impermanent, disappointing and impersonal. The illusion, if it can be called that, is that the sense of selfhood is not simply an experience, but something more lasting, satisfying and substantial or personal. I.e. we usually mistake our self-narratives for reality (even when we don't have them as an metaphorical voice in our head).
Re your blog: Remembering is simply an experience too. We know that memory is influenced by many factors and is extremely plastic. I'm not sure I believe Strawson - though some people are clearly less introspective than others. I think we do tend to under-estimate the role of social environment in creating our sense of identity.
Self narratives don't hold our life together and make sense of it; self-narratives are our life. IMHO.
It does get interesting as we examine these narratives in detail and see how they are constructed in the moment, from moment to moment; and what it is like to let go of them.
Cheers
Jayarava
Monday, February 21, 2011
Hi Jayarava
I meant to post a quick comment the other day but it slipped my mind.
There is a parallel between what you describe as explanation/interpretation and nature/nurture. Those favouring the 'nature' side of the dichotomy would prefer to locate human subjectivity in the discourses of the biological or neuro sciences for instance, whilst those favouring the 'nurture' side would prefer to locate human subjectivity in broader historical, economic, discursive, or linguistic structures and practices.
But much like what you are saying, there is a growing awareness in the humanities and social sciences that to begin with the premise of a strict nature/nurture dichotomy is to start off on the wrong foot.
As far as I'm aware, in the past 10-20 years, scholarship in the humanities have begun to realise that in challenging scientific determinism (nature)--which in its extreme form marginalises people--they have sometimes unwittingly gone too far down the interpretation (nurture) route. Researchers are now exploring mutually supportive relationships between the 'nature' and 'nurture'. I think the Buddhist understanding of form, subjectivity, and personhood provides some helpful resources for thinking this through.
Wednesday, February 23, 2011
Hi Ed & Thanks.
I have had a parallel discussion on this post on Facebook. It's been very difficult to clarify the issue. I think the extremes are not as visible to many people so it's hard to see what the pure positions look like.
Most people seem to see the humanities critique of determinism as orthodox, and despite conducting the conversation via the internet (!) they see science as rather flawed. The fantastic success of science is backgrounded or dismissed as 'materialism' (which is a rude word for Buddhists).
The nature/nuture see-saw has been very divisive but seems typical of the kind of argument that's gone on. I think common sense says it has to be both!
Wednesday, February 23, 2011
Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar, Nobel astrophysicist, in 1959 invited me to the University of Chicago's Yerkes Observatory and introduced me to mysticism. Heisenberg, Schroedinger, de Broglie, Jeans, Planck, Pauli, and Eddington were supporters of mysticism. A good reference is "Quantum Questions / Mystical Writings of the World's Greatest Physicists," edited by Ken Wilber (Shambhala 1984, 2001). I had read 40 books on physics, biology and psychology while writing my e-book, but am certainly not a scientist.
Saturday, February 26, 2011
Again Ron, I don't understand your point - how is this relevant to the post? What do you mean that those names "supported mysticism"? What would it signify in this case? How does this contribute to our understanding of the interactions between different styles of knowledge seeking?
I make a point of not reading Ken Wilbur. Life is short, books are many, and what I have seen of Wilbur and his disciples doesn't impress me.
Could you please keep your comments on topic - ie read the post, and comment on the topic of the post, or don't comment.
And be aware that I'm really not interested in mysticism, or the subject of your book, so you might want to discuss it somewhere else.
Saturday, February 26, 2011
re: Elisa's comment "If a religious text/teacher/tradition… tells us, [e.g.], that the sun is smaller than the earth, it either goes beyond its own field (and is hence irrelevant), or has some other purpose (e.g., telling us that human beings should be our main concern)."
The statement that the sun is smaller than the earth (or comparable statements such as Heraclitus's assertion that "the sun is the breadth of a man's foot") is literally true - if one drops preconceptions and examines one's direct experience. In the immediate sense-world in which one finds oneself every day, the earth is in fact far larger than the sun: it fills a much greater portion of the visual field than does the sun.
Sunday, February 27, 2011
Hi Gruff
It's not a matter of dropping preconceptions, it's a matter of which preconceptions you prioritise. You simply wish to tell a different story.
There is no such thing as the "immediate sense world". What we are conscious of is always accompanied by stories - the idea that there is an immediate sense world is the "naive realist" story i.e. "What you see is what there is". Often, as we all know from experience, what we see is not what is there.
There are plenty of simple observations you can make to show that the sun cannot be small, but must be very large, and very far away - naive realism is one of the views that prevents us from seeing the truth of this.
Perspective is pretty obvious in many other cases - a tree a mile away is not literally the size of our thumb, and does not grow in size as we approach it. To believe this would be to make a simple error about perception. The fact that something takes up a certain proportion of the field of view is related to both size and distance - we all know this to be true. For what you suggest to be true we would have to understand our visual field as 2 dimensional, whereas we do see in 3 dimensions.
Subhash Kak argues that the Ṛgvedic Indians knew to within 1 or 2% how large and how far away the moon and sun were - the ratio between the width and distance is approximately 108 in both cases. I don't necessarily believe Kak, but he is not completely implausible.
Sunday, February 27, 2011
I take your points. However I made my comment above because it has two foundations.
The first is in experiences I and others have had during meditation retreats. It may be that what we are conscious of is always accompanied by stories, but it is possible for those stories to dwindle away almost to nothing, and yet for the sense-world still to be present. If I look at my mind right now, the story seems to be at the center of it, constantly explaining and narrating various phenomena. But it has been the case on more than one occasion that the story has been no longer at the center, but that sense-phenomena are still present, and that e.g. the sun is seen as tiny, or bugs as colossal.
The second foundation is in the Canon. It seems to me that this sort of thorough investigation into all aspects of sense experience is part of what the Buddha was getting at when he said, as he did repeatedly, things like "You should know the sense-bases, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation" - likewise with consciousness, forms, etc.
The ending of all stories seems to be pretty clearly what he had in mind. In MN 2 he states "Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress."
Or again: "He then hears a Perfect One expounding the Teaching for the removal of all grounds for views, of all prejudices, obsessions, dogmas and biases; for the stilling of all processes, for the relinquishment of all substrata, for the extirpation of craving, for dispassion, cessation, Nibbaana."
On my reading Nibbaana, the awakening that the Buddha states is available to all in this very life, can be characterised as the destruction of all one's stories, including scientific ones. And by destruction I understand not that e.g. one no longer studies or practices science or scientific thought but that "cessation of clinging" occurs and one is no longer married to one's stories.
I hope these comments are of some value.
Sunday, February 27, 2011
Forgot to add mention of the instruction to Bahiya: "In the seen there is only the seen" etc.
Sunday, February 27, 2011
Hi Gruff
Hmmm. You don't really see the sun as tiny - you see visual perceptions which you interpret as a tiny thing which is nearby. That too is a story. There is no reason for the gestalt not to flip and for it to seem like a huge thing very far away. What is the difference? Depth perception - it's a physical thing that combines information focal length and convergence. The problem with 3D movies for instance is that the eyes converge on the flat surface of the screen but focus in front and behind, giving some people (me!) a headache.
Depth perception is "raw data" too. What you seem to be saying is the liberation plays havoc with your depth perception. I'm not won over by this.
But I suspect there is something rather difficult to communicate about such experiences which has not come across in what you write. And I expect you would be the first to admit that these experiences did not amount to liberation.
I do know that intense mediation often alters sense perceptions in unexpected ways. I personally have never felt that I've experienced raw sense perception with no stories what-so-ever; though I have had a few startling shifts in perspective and insights.
I'm familiar with these kinds of stories about Nibbāna in the Canon. You are right to suggest that my earlier assertion was too dogmatic - all unenlightened experience involves stories. And very tactful as well, thanks :-). Having nothing much to say about nibbāna I sometimes talk as if there were no alternative which is unhelpful. Enlightened experience is somehow different from unenlightened - although after 2500 years we're still uncertain how to capture that in words!
I rather suspect that these ultimate states were post-mortem affairs, and that while embodied there continued to be a core of human consciousness, but that there was no intoxication with it. Otherwise I fail to see how ordinary human communication could go on, and the traditional Buddha does seem to be extraordinarily attuned to ordinary human relationships.
Best Wishes
Jayarava
Sunday, February 27, 2011
Hi. Yes I've blogged about Bahiya and understanding the teaching using the Māluṅkyaputta Sutta (SN 35.95 PTS: S iv.72)
http://jayarava.blogspot.com/2009/05/in-seen.html
Sunday, February 27, 2011
Doesn't science/explanation have an interpretation side to it too?
Does it really exist as pure logic, pure thought? Most scientific discoveries are then applied to utilitarian & economic uses such as atomic bombs, solar panels, etc which then have an impact on human life. Which rises ethical issues, which leads us back to 'interpretation'.
Monday, February 28, 2011
Hi Adam
If you read the whole article this is exactly what I am saying.
Why do you say, however, that ethical issues lead us back to interpretation? Are ethics really without a factual basis? Are there no laws which apply to ethics?
Monday, February 28, 2011
Neisser proposed a cognitive cycle in which concept is adapted by percept (the more you look, the more your information/mind map about something is adapted ) and visa versa ie that percept is guided by concept (you see what you expect to see or only what you can understand).
This fits in well with mindfulness moving into the spheres of rupa & sensation, leaving behind interpretation.
As an artist-painter, working from observation, I confirm that I frequently move into a perceptual mode where the visual field becomes forms, colours, edges etc. Confirm that this isn't liberation but the act of distancing one's self from one's interpretations ... allows for the possibility of a more detached awareness of perception.
Anyway, imo, most of my thoughts arises from themselves, a continuation from previous thoughts, the endless stream of thoughts, they don't just disappear but rattle on with their preferences, the feeling skandhra underneath... manasikkrarah (excuse my poor sanskrit). What interests me is to observe the moment when sensations are attributed a feeling-reponse. In seeing this, then do I then have to take my responses as 'truth' or 'the way to hapiness'?
Neisser : "The term "cognition" refers to all processes by which the sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used. It is concerned with these processes even when they operate in the absence of relevant stimulation, as in images and hallucinations... "
Monday, February 28, 2011
Hi Adam. Yes. My experience as meditator and artist sounds similar.
Who is Neisser?
Monday, February 28, 2011
Hi Jay
One of the things I personally like about the Dharma is the importance given to perception.'Right view' traditionally is presented as the first step on the eight-fold path.
I post some rather jumbled thoughts here… hope they make sense :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Here's wiki on Neisser :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulric_Neisser
Cognitive psychology is more about the study of input into the brain & the brain's response to this input ( as I understand as it, not being a psychologist, only an artist & art teacher, but... working everyday with these issues).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_psychology
Neisser made great contributions to how perception & conception interact. ie how evaluation & interpretation 'inter-are' in a process of anticipation & adaption. Personally I particularly like his use of the word 'percept' and regret that it isn't in more common usage.
Here is a link explaining 'Neisser's perceptual cycle' ie it's cyclical model & not linear:
http://webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/genpsyperception.html
Tuesday, March 01, 2011
Hi Adam
Don't worry you can rely on me to say if I can't make sense of what you post ;-)
I agree about the central importance, though I note with wry amusement that no two Buddhists seem to agree on the definition of right-view.
If you like that sort of thing have you ever read The Analysis of Sensations, and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical by Ernst Mach? He was somewhat ahead of his time I think.
Tuesday, March 01, 2011