Though I have only your account to go on, I suspect that Prof. Pollock's statement should be seen not as a claim of being "able to determine absolutely what a text means", but simply as an affirmation of the idea that a true meaning (more or less) exists (and philology — and also, as you said, experience/experiment) can help, not necessarily succeed), or at the very least a rejection of the silly postmodernist idea that no meaning exists at all, and regardless of what the (con)text suggests, it "really" means whatever we want, etc.
[I also suspect the remarks have some relation to the following context. There exists, in the fields of Indology or religion studies in the US today, an awful tendency to postmodernism, and of generating "meanings" of texts that are at variance with all prior understandings of them (which made-up nonsense is then rewarded for being "original"). See for example the (long) articles "RISA Lila" 1 and 2, summarized here. Although I don't agree with the general tone there, nor accusations of malice, am not even a particularly religious Hindu, and believe in academic freedom at all costs, looking at some of the examples it pains me that it is such poor scholarship, based on awful mistranslations that even a first-year student of Sanskrit wouldn't make. (Budddhism is relatively safe in this regard.) Anyway, I fear I'm on a soapbox so I'll end this paragraph. :-)]
The point, though, is that some sections of the humanities are rejecting not only science, but by attacking philology and by their other theories seem to be rejecting facts as well, and Pollock's comments may (my fantasy) have been his polite, indirect, reaction to this trend.
Well I only have my recollections of the colloquium to go on, and they may well be imperfect. At times he came across as good natured and playful, at times rather cross and strident.
Is it true to say that post-modernists deny there is *any* meaning in texts? I'm no expert but this is not my understanding of their work. The claim was more relativist than nihilistic. We *do* find meaning in texts, but that meaning is not inherent in the text but comes about as a result of our interaction with it. Not far from the Buddhist point of view, and I'm not the first person to observe this. It's interesting to see the straw man argument being used - it suggests an unwillingness to engage with the ideas themselves.
While Indology may be riddled with post-modernists I find it quite rare in my reading. At best I can think of one or two authors who draw positive parallels with Derrida and someone like Nagarjuna.
Courtright's analysis is Freudian, not post-modern. So how is this relevant? I have no sympathy what-so-ever with the fundamentalist critique of his work. A pox on them. I'll take your word for his mistranslations, but isn't that a completely unrelated issue?
Buddhism is safe from mistranslations and sloppy scholarship? I doubt it.
I see Pollock and others as over-reacting to post-modern critiques because po-mo undermined their claims to objectivity and certainty. For a while we could believe that the humanities were really 'sciences' after all and could have the prestige which came with that label. Derrida and co pointed out the fallacy of this notion - and upset the apple cart because they were right. Translation is an art, not a science (I have a B.Sc in chemistry). Reading is an interaction with a text, not a download of inherent meaning. This is because, pace Marshall McLuhan, the text is an extension of verbal communication which is itself a negotiation of meaning.
Friday, May 21, 2010
S said...
Hi,
I have strayed far my area of competence, but still, perhaps this discussion can be in the best tradition of clarifying positions and differences.
I completely agree with you, of course, that translation is an art not a science, and that not all the meaning is inherent in the text itself to be downloaded, one can never have complete objective certainty, and so on. On the other hand, it seems to me that there is often some meaning that was intended, and although the text does not contain "everything", it is a decent approximation, and when it is the only thing we have, we can benefit from a close and careful reading (up to some extent). This, I think, is the aim of philology. (And, from reading a few of Prof. Pollock's articles, what I think he believes as well.)
For instance, wouldn't you agree that it's not very useful to take a discussion of Nagarjuna and, ignoring the purpose he himself has laid out in the text, insist on post-modern grounds that it's actually about sex? And even if that perspective lends some insight in some way, don't you think it ought not to become seen as the primary meaning? [This is what has happened in many areas of Hinduism studies (only) in the US. And it is my impression as an amateur occasional reader that scholarship in Buddhism is in better state; also philosophical discussions are less susceptible to this treatment than colourful stories; also — to not ignore other influences — Buddhism has more Buddhist scholars well-funded and able to have their say.]
Without going into what post-modernism actually is (because I don't know), I think the position being argued against is the idea that just because each reader does tend to find his/her own meaning in a text, all readings are equally "valid", including very careless ones, ones clearly not supported by the text or intentions of the author and including ones where it is obvious that a meaning is being "read into" a text without being present.
[I am also curious to learn why you are sure that the critiques I referred to above are "fundamentalist". One of the most distressing features of the events mentioned is how every criticism, even by serious scholars, gets branded as "fundamentalist" and ignored. (Not described in the link above, but I can tell you more if you're interested.) It seems that if one doesn't want to be called a fundamentalist, one must simply shut up, even ignoring deception, and this is what many have chosen to do. But this is straying from what you care about, so I'll stop.]
When someone makes this kind of argument: "Nowhere in Hindu scripture, nor in Hindu belief or practice, will a researcher find any of these bizarre ideas. Courtright simply made them up." then I would say it is both ignorant and fundamentalist. It goes beyond saying that Hinduism can only be understood by believing Hindus, that Hinduism is only what Hindus say it is. It says that that no other view point on Hinduism is valid. This is the nature of fundamentalism. In fact I'm probably open to the charge of being a fundamentalist Buddhist as I believe that without at least trying the methods the Buddha set out, that one cannot really understand his work more generally. I am planning to write more on this subject in the next few weeks. However I allow that someone might want to construct (make up) a Freudian interpretation of Buddhist narratives or iconography and that is fine, as long as I don't have to take it seriously. Again the critique you refer to takes the Freudian reading of Ganesha too seriously - fundamentalists not only forbid any alternative readings of their religion, they have no sense of humour about it. One has to be able to laugh at oneself, at one's religion, at one's god even.
The funny thing is that Hinduism is made up too. A man with an elephant's head?
You once again confuse Freudian readings (which are indeed all about sex) and Post-Modernism. They are *not* the same thing. In contemporary critical theory there are a number of different approaches to reading texts. Even Post-Modern is something of a lazy term.
The whole point of psycho-analytic critiques is that there are unconscious intentions as well as conscious intentions. By definition we are not aware of our own unconscious intentions, and it is very difficult to become aware of them. Clearly all authors write texts with conscious intent, but unconscious intentions play a much bigger role. Freudian readings aim to highlight unconscious intentions of authors, most of which are related to sex from their point of view. I disagree, but not enough to want to silence Freudians who I think on the whole are quite amusing.
If you can't tell your Freudian from your Foucauldian then your criticism is every bit as problematic as his alleged mistranslations. It's not helpful.
The rest I have already addressed in the body of my post and I'm not going to go over it again. If I've misread Professor Pollock then I apologise, though from what he and his colleagues were saying last week he is entirely used to being misunderstood. He also pointed out that he likes to make strong statements for the purposes of getting discussion going - so he has not failed in that sense.
Interesting post! As a humanities scholar, post-modernist and fan of philology without being a philologist I would say that one of the reasons that philology might have become seen as suspicious at a certain point is the relationship between the work of Max Muller et al and the 'Aryanism' that became characteristic of Nazism, with all that accompanied it - which was a misreading, as I understand, but perhaps it appears that the way the discipline was formulated meant that it was easily available to that kind of misreading.
Maybe the broader issue with translation and postmodernism is that translation in some sense is a questo to find the 'best' or most accurate translation (I don't know if you'd agree), whereas post-modernism is highly suspicious of claims to obejctive accuracy - but to infer from that that there can't or shouldn't be a post-modernist approach to philology seems to me to be comparing concept with method - apples with oranges.
As you touch upon in your post, to my mind also there are similarities between Buddhism and post-modernism inasmuch as they are both concerned with deconstructing things that we take for granted. But there is then some tension, though I think not as major as it is sometimes made out to be, between the practitioner's project of trying to get as close as possible to the Buddha's teachings - to which the academic pursuit is invaluable, to my mind - and the post-modernist suspicion of superior truth claims, so to speak (related to the backlash against the value-laden Victorian and early twentieth-century Western studies of Buddhism, and then also perhaps Western claims with rots in 60s counterculture about Buddhism which were more aligned with an idalised version of what people wanted it to be in comparison to Western culture, rather than as it actually was).
But still, post-modernist or not, we all have to operate in the world using the knowledge that is instilled in us or that we seek out as a guide. Here I think may be where the divide between scholar and practitioner (or the scholar and practitioner aspects of experience) come into play - what else can we do at this junction but use experience as a guide for our own choices while not ceasing to interrogate ourselves - equally a tenet of Dhamma and of postmodernism (even if, for myself as a practitioner, the second, that is, a purely intellectual-philosophical position, must unquestionably play a secondary role).
I had some fun trying to figure out how to read your name: Gen Renaut (possibly French?) then realised it's probably genre-naut on the model of astro-naut. I'm also a fan of Mulato Astake btw.
Yes, I think Max Müller's name came up at the colloquium. As was the spectre of orientalism. I think early scholars were dismissive of Indian scholars/religious. I don't see that happening, at least not very often in contemporary Buddhist studies. I'm aware that Indology generally is more contentious.
I'm also suspicious of claims to Truth or to unique truths. My reading of the Buddhist texts is highly influenced by (non-Buddhist, non-post-modernist) scholar Sue Hamilton who is sadly no longer active in the field. My teacher Sangharakshita had taught me that Buddhism starts with an experience, the experience of dukkha (disappointment). Dr Hamilton convinced me that it also consists in the middle of experience, and ends with experience. There is no objective truth to be discovered because the Buddhist program is focussed on subjectivity, and understanding the subjective experience in order that we cease to think of it as objective, that is we cease to be intoxicated with, empassioned by, and enthralled to, sensory experience. I'll be writing about Buddhism as *recipe* (as opposed to philosophy or religion) in the coming weeks.
I welcome the rise of the practitioner scholar - someone who both studies the recipe, and has a go at baking the cake.
Thanks for your comments. Jayarava
Saturday, May 22, 2010
[Image]I recently attended a colloquium with Professor Sheldon 'Shelly' Pollock (left) at Cambridge University which was ostensibly about philology and culture. Actually the first half was about attacks on philology as a discipline and the second half a mix of talks mostly by historians which touched on the subject of the role of Sanskrit in Indian culture. A major theme of the afternoon consisted of rhetorical questions for Prof Pollock in light of his 2001 article "The Death of Sanskrit". [1] This article appeared as part of a series of articles under the rubric of Sanskrit Knowledge-Systems on the Eve of Colonialism.
I hadn't realised just how poorly philology is viewed by other humanities scholars. It seems that the philological enterprise is closely allied to colonialism in the minds of many scholars. As such it has been seen as a tool of Orientalism (per Edward Said's polemic against European scholars of Islamic literature and culture). If those scholars present were correct then the attempts to curtail academic philology, to divert their funding, and dismantle their departments are coming not from the sciences but from fellow humanities scholars. It was evidently quite a painful topic. Maybe calling myself an amateur philologist is a bad idea? I am a colonial though not, I think, a colonialist, let alone an imperialist. Another thing to come out of the discussions is the poor state of Classical language study in India which is not only not producing world class scholars as it used to, but losing the knowledge of languages and scripts altogether in some cases. See Prof Pollock's article in The Hindu [2]
Several people pointed out that all scholars who deal with texts, especially texts not in their mother tongue and even more so ancient texts in languages which are no one's mother tongue, must of necessity employ philological methods - just as economists and sociologist employ mathematical tools. Though I did not agree that everyone should learn philology just like everyone learns mathematics - Prof Pollock likes to make bold statements in order to stimulate discussion.
One thing which stood out was Prof Pollock's vehement rejection of the post-modern approach to truth. I'm no post modernist, nor well versed in that idiom, but as I understand it the argument is that the 'meaning' of a text is a negotiation between the reader, the text and the author. As such it meaning is entirely relative to who is reading it. Pollock on the other hand was insistent that though each reader does tend to find there own message in a text, that there is a 'true meaning' to any given text and that we can discover what that is by employing the methods of philology.
One of the speakers got a laugh by quoting a Victorian scholar who felt that Sanskrit was not a useful language because it was too rich in synonyms. I didn't catch the name but the theme is an important one in European intellectual history and explored quite entertainingly in Umberto Eco's book The Search for the Perfect Language[Image]. The idea is that everything ought to have one unique name in order that the imperfection of ambiguity be removed language. In this view the ideal of communication is the elimination of ambiguity. It has resonances with the idea that before the Tower of Babel incident in the Book of Genesis everyone spoke one language and that synonymy is a product of the sundering of languages. More broadly concern for original truths, the notion that a fundamental truth can be expressed in a text is something specific to the intellectual milieu growing out of religions of the book, especially Christianity, and specifically Protestantism. [3] (The Higher criticism not-withstanding). One powerful symbol deriving from this ideology is the evolution of languages and species described as trees with branches spreading out from an origin. In fact neither species nor languages are related to each other in this way. There is always hybridisation for instance. There are crossed branches (look at English for instance). Regional factors in language - such as retroflex consonants in Sanskrit - cannot be explained by the tree structure since they come from another tree altogether!
My sense is that Pollock subscribes to a variety of this idea, that the role of the philologist is to remove ambiguity from reading texts in order to establish an absolute truth - he certainly emphasised his point dramatically when stating it. I foresee some problems with this. It is quite striking that one of Prof Pollock's repeated statements during the day was that his articles, especially his article on the death of Sanskrit had been misunderstood by his contemporaries and that what people were really arguing with was ideas they imputed to him (having presumably misread his text). Setting down an idea on paper (or in a blog) is far from easy - great writing is a rare gift. The thought is seldom entirely captured by the text. What's more we always bring our own preconceived ideas to reading a text - our conditioning, our education, etc. Pollock seemed to argue that it is possible for us to read a text without somehow triggering any of these factors. Is this really possible? If one's living contemporaries don't get it, then what hope for the rest? I can think of examples of scholars who are not Buddhists who have shed important light on Buddhist texts (Jan Nattier, Sue Hamilton, Richard Gombrich, Paul Harrison, etc); but I can think of larger number of scholars who have simply missed the point of the texts - I can't bear reading comparative religion texts for this reason.
The problem is magnified by an order of magnitude when we consider that the discussion we were having was on texts written centuries ago in a language which may never have been anyone's mother tongue. We seldom gain the same mastery of a second language, that we do of our mother tongue. So that adds a layer of potential confusion to the text. There is always the possibility that having understood the words, we fail to understand the argument. Much early scholarship of Buddhism is like this.
At best a manuscript might be a 5th or 6th generation copy in passable handwriting, and my observation is that handwriting is often appalling in these manuscripts. It will be in a script we have learned only for the purpose. It may or may not accurately record long and short vowels; anusvāra and anunāsika; similar pairs such as b/v, m/s etc. Take into account also the effects of dialects. Although Classical Sanskrit is reasonably well defined there are ambiguities - times when only the context can supply the preferred reading. Other times when the reading remains obscure. Within Classical Sanskrit were still minor dialectical variations, and when it comes to Pāli or other Prakrits and Buddhist Sanskrit then ambiguity radically expands. We translate to the best of our ability, perhaps we consult previous translations and commentaries, but even a complete novice can see the extent of variation that occurs in two expert translations of even a simple text. [4]
We also need to understand the time and place of the author. As I pointed out in my simple example The Stream of Life (April 2010) basic metaphors might be lost on us if we have no first hand experience of the geography which gave rise to the metaphor. Professor Richard Gombrich has reconstructed metaphors and even jokes that were lost for centuries - many more remain so opaque to us that we don't even know to look for them. Political and social events also shape the way an author puts their thoughts into words in ways that we need to comprehend in order to fully understand their idiom. When we are talking about Indian some tens of centuries ago how can we hope to do this accurately. It may be that Prof Pollock had in mind his project on (just) pre-colonial India which is reasonably well documented and represented in thousands of texts, but the situation with pre-sectarian Buddhism is completely different. The context is almost entirely supplied by the texts themselves - there is no neutral view point from which to view the text. We have reason to doubt that taking such a neutral position would ever have occurred to an ancient author.
So can we ever say that we know the 'truth' encapsulated by a text? With ancient Indian texts? Not hardly! It may be that all we can hope to do is approach the 'truth' of a text asymptotically without ever getting to an absolute, but continuing to go deeper approaching the limit, but never reaching it. Does this leave us with post-modern relativism? Well that would be to collapse into pessimism. As Buddhists we have a particular take on texts because so many of them are actually recipes. We have the option, open to everyone but rejected by the objectifying scholar, of baking the cake. While academics argue about the truth of the recipe for meditation, we can sit down and pay attention in the way the texts describe and see what happens. Anyone who has done this knows that something interesting happens, even if we do not feel very adept at it or able to fully commit to that exploration. This unwillingness to commit to practical action based on what the texts say will always relegate the academic to secondary importance in dealing with Buddhist texts. The history of the time, the intellectual arguments are quite interesting, and I for one eagerly read any new insights into these questions, but they are merely interesting and not vital. In putting the recipe to work we can then evaluate the results and adjust it if necessary - our authority is not the recipe, but the cake itself!
In the long-run many of the questions which engage secular objectifying academics are not very important to me. I value their work but only to the point where it helps me to practice more effectively. And I need to be clear that my faith owes a great debt to some scholars and to their intellectual endeavour. Claims to discover truth in texts are always going to be suspect, and if Sheldon Pollock, Professor of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, has shot himself in the foot by proclaiming the death of Sanskrit, then he shoots higher up in claiming to be able to determine absolutely what a text means. The proof of the pudding is in the eating.
Notes
Pollock, Sheldon. 'The death of Sanskrit.' Comparative Studies in History and Society, 43.2, 2001, 392-426. http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pollock/sks/papers/death_of_sanskrit.pdf
Pollock, Sheldon. "The Real Classical Languages Debate" (The Hindu, 27 November 2008) http://www.columbia.edu/cu/mesaas/faculty/directory/pollock_pub/real_classical_languages.pdf
I have an untested theory that only the Roman Catholic European philosophers who, historically, do not rely so heavily on the authority of the Bible could come up with the post-modern reading of texts which dispenses entirely with the authority of the text; whereas the Protestant Anglo-Americans who, partly in reaction to Catholicism, take the Bible as their main authority are much less tolerant of the idea that no absolute truth resides in texts. It's something that would require a lot more thought before trying to articulate it more fully.
Paul Harrison is about to bring out a new translation of the Diamond Sūtra which should put all previous translations in the shade. Watch this excellent YouTube video of Prof. Harrison talking about his work. Personally I'm excited by this.
The colloquium was organised by The Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities (CRASSH). Image from their website.
6 Comments
Close this window Jump to comment formThis was interesting post, thank you.
Though I have only your account to go on, I suspect that Prof. Pollock's statement should be seen not as a claim of being "able to determine absolutely what a text means", but simply as an affirmation of the idea that a true meaning (more or less) exists (and philology — and also, as you said, experience/experiment) can help, not necessarily succeed), or at the very least a rejection of the silly postmodernist idea that no meaning exists at all, and regardless of what the (con)text suggests, it "really" means whatever we want, etc.
[I also suspect the remarks have some relation to the following context. There exists, in the fields of Indology or religion studies in the US today, an awful tendency to postmodernism, and of generating "meanings" of texts that are at variance with all prior understandings of them (which made-up nonsense is then rewarded for being "original"). See for example the (long) articles "RISA Lila" 1 and 2, summarized here. Although I don't agree with the general tone there, nor accusations of malice, am not even a particularly religious Hindu, and believe in academic freedom at all costs, looking at some of the examples it pains me that it is such poor scholarship, based on awful mistranslations that even a first-year student of Sanskrit wouldn't make. (Budddhism is relatively safe in this regard.) Anyway, I fear I'm on a soapbox so I'll end this paragraph. :-)]
The point, though, is that some sections of the humanities are rejecting not only science, but by attacking philology and by their other theories seem to be rejecting facts as well, and Pollock's comments may (my fantasy) have been his polite, indirect, reaction to this trend.
Friday, May 21, 2010
Hi Shreevasti
Well I only have my recollections of the colloquium to go on, and they may well be imperfect. At times he came across as good natured and playful, at times rather cross and strident.
Is it true to say that post-modernists deny there is *any* meaning in texts? I'm no expert but this is not my understanding of their work. The claim was more relativist than nihilistic. We *do* find meaning in texts, but that meaning is not inherent in the text but comes about as a result of our interaction with it. Not far from the Buddhist point of view, and I'm not the first person to observe this. It's interesting to see the straw man argument being used - it suggests an unwillingness to engage with the ideas themselves.
While Indology may be riddled with post-modernists I find it quite rare in my reading. At best I can think of one or two authors who draw positive parallels with Derrida and someone like Nagarjuna.
Courtright's analysis is Freudian, not post-modern. So how is this relevant? I have no sympathy what-so-ever with the fundamentalist critique of his work. A pox on them. I'll take your word for his mistranslations, but isn't that a completely unrelated issue?
Buddhism is safe from mistranslations and sloppy scholarship? I doubt it.
I see Pollock and others as over-reacting to post-modern critiques because po-mo undermined their claims to objectivity and certainty. For a while we could believe that the humanities were really 'sciences' after all and could have the prestige which came with that label. Derrida and co pointed out the fallacy of this notion - and upset the apple cart because they were right. Translation is an art, not a science (I have a B.Sc in chemistry). Reading is an interaction with a text, not a download of inherent meaning. This is because, pace Marshall McLuhan, the text is an extension of verbal communication which is itself a negotiation of meaning.
Friday, May 21, 2010
Hi,
I have strayed far my area of competence, but still, perhaps this discussion can be in the best tradition of clarifying positions and differences.
I completely agree with you, of course, that translation is an art not a science, and that not all the meaning is inherent in the text itself to be downloaded, one can never have complete objective certainty, and so on. On the other hand, it seems to me that there is often some meaning that was intended, and although the text does not contain "everything", it is a decent approximation, and when it is the only thing we have, we can benefit from a close and careful reading (up to some extent). This, I think, is the aim of philology. (And, from reading a few of Prof. Pollock's articles, what I think he believes as well.)
For instance, wouldn't you agree that it's not very useful to take a discussion of Nagarjuna and, ignoring the purpose he himself has laid out in the text, insist on post-modern grounds that it's actually about sex? And even if that perspective lends some insight in some way, don't you think it ought not to become seen as the primary meaning? [This is what has happened in many areas of Hinduism studies (only) in the US. And it is my impression as an amateur occasional reader that scholarship in Buddhism is in better state; also philosophical discussions are less susceptible to this treatment than colourful stories; also — to not ignore other influences — Buddhism has more Buddhist scholars well-funded and able to have their say.]
Without going into what post-modernism actually is (because I don't know), I think the position being argued against is the idea that just because each reader does tend to find his/her own meaning in a text, all readings are equally "valid", including very careless ones, ones clearly not supported by the text or intentions of the author and including ones where it is obvious that a meaning is being "read into" a text without being present.
[I am also curious to learn why you are sure that the critiques I referred to above are "fundamentalist". One of the most distressing features of the events mentioned is how every criticism, even by serious scholars, gets branded as "fundamentalist" and ignored. (Not described in the link above, but I can tell you more if you're interested.) It seems that if one doesn't want to be called a fundamentalist, one must simply shut up, even ignoring deception, and this is what many have chosen to do. But this is straying from what you care about, so I'll stop.]
Friday, May 21, 2010
Hi Shreevasti
When someone makes this kind of argument: "Nowhere in Hindu scripture, nor in Hindu belief or practice, will a researcher find any of these bizarre ideas. Courtright simply made them up." then I would say it is both ignorant and fundamentalist. It goes beyond saying that Hinduism can only be understood by believing Hindus, that Hinduism is only what Hindus say it is. It says that that no other view point on Hinduism is valid. This is the nature of fundamentalism. In fact I'm probably open to the charge of being a fundamentalist Buddhist as I believe that without at least trying the methods the Buddha set out, that one cannot really understand his work more generally. I am planning to write more on this subject in the next few weeks. However I allow that someone might want to construct (make up) a Freudian interpretation of Buddhist narratives or iconography and that is fine, as long as I don't have to take it seriously. Again the critique you refer to takes the Freudian reading of Ganesha too seriously - fundamentalists not only forbid any alternative readings of their religion, they have no sense of humour about it. One has to be able to laugh at oneself, at one's religion, at one's god even.
The funny thing is that Hinduism is made up too. A man with an elephant's head?
You once again confuse Freudian readings (which are indeed all about sex) and Post-Modernism. They are *not* the same thing. In contemporary critical theory there are a number of different approaches to reading texts. Even Post-Modern is something of a lazy term.
The whole point of psycho-analytic critiques is that there are unconscious intentions as well as conscious intentions. By definition we are not aware of our own unconscious intentions, and it is very difficult to become aware of them. Clearly all authors write texts with conscious intent, but unconscious intentions play a much bigger role. Freudian readings aim to highlight unconscious intentions of authors, most of which are related to sex from their point of view. I disagree, but not enough to want to silence Freudians who I think on the whole are quite amusing.
If you can't tell your Freudian from your Foucauldian then your criticism is every bit as problematic as his alleged mistranslations. It's not helpful.
The rest I have already addressed in the body of my post and I'm not going to go over it again. If I've misread Professor Pollock then I apologise, though from what he and his colleagues were saying last week he is entirely used to being misunderstood. He also pointed out that he likes to make strong statements for the purposes of getting discussion going - so he has not failed in that sense.
Saturday, May 22, 2010
Interesting post! As a humanities scholar, post-modernist and fan of philology without being a philologist I would say that one of the reasons that philology might have become seen as suspicious at a certain point is the relationship between the work of Max Muller et al and the 'Aryanism' that became characteristic of Nazism, with all that accompanied it - which was a misreading, as I understand, but perhaps it appears that the way the discipline was formulated meant that it was easily available to that kind of misreading.
Maybe the broader issue with translation and postmodernism is that translation in some sense is a questo to find the 'best' or most accurate translation (I don't know if you'd agree), whereas post-modernism is highly suspicious of claims to obejctive accuracy - but to infer from that that there can't or shouldn't be a post-modernist approach to philology seems to me to be comparing concept with method - apples with oranges.
As you touch upon in your post, to my mind also there are similarities between Buddhism and post-modernism inasmuch as they are both concerned with deconstructing things that we take for granted. But there is then some tension, though I think not as major as it is sometimes made out to be, between the practitioner's project of trying to get as close as possible to the Buddha's teachings - to which the academic pursuit is invaluable, to my mind - and the post-modernist suspicion of superior truth claims, so to speak (related to the backlash against the value-laden Victorian and early twentieth-century Western studies of Buddhism, and then also perhaps Western claims with rots in 60s counterculture about Buddhism which were more aligned with an idalised version of what people wanted it to be in comparison to Western culture, rather than as it actually was).
But still, post-modernist or not, we all have to operate in the world using the knowledge that is instilled in us or that we seek out as a guide. Here I think may be where the divide between scholar and practitioner (or the scholar and practitioner aspects of experience) come into play - what else can we do at this junction but use experience as a guide for our own choices while not ceasing to interrogate ourselves - equally a tenet of Dhamma and of postmodernism (even if, for myself as a practitioner, the second, that is, a purely intellectual-philosophical position, must unquestionably play a secondary role).
Saturday, May 22, 2010
Hi Genrenaut,
I had some fun trying to figure out how to read your name: Gen Renaut (possibly French?) then realised it's probably genre-naut on the model of astro-naut. I'm also a fan of Mulato Astake btw.
Yes, I think Max Müller's name came up at the colloquium. As was the spectre of orientalism. I think early scholars were dismissive of Indian scholars/religious. I don't see that happening, at least not very often in contemporary Buddhist studies. I'm aware that Indology generally is more contentious.
I'm also suspicious of claims to Truth or to unique truths. My reading of the Buddhist texts is highly influenced by (non-Buddhist, non-post-modernist) scholar Sue Hamilton who is sadly no longer active in the field. My teacher Sangharakshita had taught me that Buddhism starts with an experience, the experience of dukkha (disappointment). Dr Hamilton convinced me that it also consists in the middle of experience, and ends with experience. There is no objective truth to be discovered because the Buddhist program is focussed on subjectivity, and understanding the subjective experience in order that we cease to think of it as objective, that is we cease to be intoxicated with, empassioned by, and enthralled to, sensory experience. I'll be writing about Buddhism as *recipe* (as opposed to philosophy or religion) in the coming weeks.
I welcome the rise of the practitioner scholar - someone who both studies the recipe, and has a go at baking the cake.
Thanks for your comments.
Jayarava
Saturday, May 22, 2010