In the back and forth about Syria, there is surprisingly
little discussion about Saudi Arabia’s Prince Bandar.
Even though Bandar apparently took over the Saudi covert
account last year and has driven the Kingdom’s hard line against the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt and Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria.
It’s also clear that Saudi Arabia has slipped the leash and
is no longer a cooperative US ally. The
general narrative is that the Saudis got disgusted and disillusioned by the
Obama administration’s dithering in Egypt.
Maybe it wasn’t just dithering. Maybe the Obama administration was
consistently supportive of civilian rule and insufficiently sedulous in the
attention it paid to the Egyptian army and its role in assuring the institutional
continuity (ahem) and stability of Egyptian political life.
It is also possible that the Saudis finally decided that it
would not try to paper over the disagreements between the US and the KSA over
persistent US support for the Morsi regime, especially since the Saudi
government was determined to overwhelm US attempts to control the Egyptian
military through withholding the US aid package of $1.2 billion by “flooding
the zone” with a promise of $12 billion from Riyadh.
So a clean break was marked by a coup, a defiant massacre of
America’s preferred political partners in Egypt, and orchestration of a
vociferous and extremely public anti-US PR campaign that has made the Obama
administration’s name mud in pro-coup activist circles.
My thoughts returned to Prince Bandar on the occasion of a
piece on Kevin Drum’s blog about President Obama’s miserable Syrian options.
In a previous post I speculated that the Syrian gas attack might have been a false flag attack
designed to force the Obama administration to intervene in Syria.
At the time I wasn’t aware of the reporting on Prince
Bandar’s extensive involvement in Saudi Arabia’s Syria project, so I coyly referred
to the hypothetical visitor as “Prince B---“.
But based on Mour Malas’ August 25 piece in the Wall Street Journal—including the
revelation that Saudi Arabia had already been trying to push the Obama
administration over the chemical weapons red line several months ago—we can
certainly fill in the blanks and speculate about Prince Bandar’s possible role
in a false flag attack:
That winter, the Saudis also started
trying to convince Western governments that Mr. Assad had crossed what
President Barack Obama a year ago called a "red line": the use of
chemical weapons. Arab diplomats say Saudi agents flew an injured Syrian to
Britain, where tests showed sarin gas exposure. Prince Bandar's spy service,
which concluded in February that Mr. Assad was using chemical weapons, relayed
evidence to the U.S., which reached a similar conclusion four months later. The
Assad regime denies using such weapons.
According to Malas, Saudi Arabia has also been repeatedly
telling the Obama administration its stature in the Middle East is toast unless
it acts firmly on Syria.
Connoisseurs of US Congressional diplomacy will also be
pleased to know that Senator John McCain, who has been all over the airwaves
pushing for a US response of regime-change dimensions and not a symbolic slap
on the wrist, is hand-in-glove with Prince Bandar.
Anyway, as cited by Kevin Drum, Malas’ most recent piece
fills in (boldface by Drum) some of the blanks, making the case that President
Obama’s rather more genuine dithering on Syria resulted from the unwillingness
to knock down the Assad regime until the U.S. and Syrian opposition moderates
had gotten their act together and could field a plausible team to handle New
Syria transition and governance.
The delay, in part, reflects a broader
U.S. approach rarely discussed publicly but that underpins its decision-making,
according to former and current U.S. officials: The Obama
administration doesn't want to tip the balance in favor of the opposition for
fear the outcome may be even worse for U.S. interests than the current
stalemate.
....The administration's view can also
be seen in White House planning for limited airstrikes—now awaiting
congressional review—to punish Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for his alleged
use of chemical weapons. Pentagon planners were instructed not to offer
strike options that could help drive Mr. Assad from power: "The
big concern is the wrong groups in the opposition would be able to take
advantage of it," a senior military officer said. The CIA declined to
comment.
....Many rebel commanders say
the aim of U.S. policy in Syria appears to be a prolonged stalemate
that would buy the U.S. and its allies more time to empower moderates and
choose whom to support....Israeli officials have told their American
counterparts they would be happy to see its enemies Iran, the Lebanese Shiite
militia Hezbollah and al Qaeda militants fight until they are weakened,
“Slow and steady” is manifestly not the strategy that Prince
Bandar prefers in Syria. Given the dysfunction
of the Syrian overseas opposition—as opposed to the murderous efficiency of the
distinctly non-democratic jihadis—one can’t really blame him.
The Geneva peace talks, by the way—which embodied the US
hopes of some kind of negotiated transition involving the Syrian opposition democratic goodniks—are not going ahead, thanks to the
gas attack.
As the Russian media reported:
Earlier on Monday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said
the timing of the chemical attack “suited” the opposition, “who
obviously do not want to negotiate peacefully”, instead they want to “sabotage”
the talks.
“Why go to a conference if you believe that the regime’s infrastructure
will all be destroyed anyway by allies, and then you can just march into
Damascus unopposed, and take control?” said the official in Moscow.
Good question.
Anyway, Prince Bandar has been very active on the Syrian
brief. He arranged the high profile
shipment of arms to the rebels out of Croatia and also—according to disputed but plausible
reports—unsuccessfully cajoled/threatened Vladimir Putin to drop Assad by
promising that Saudi Arabia could in return deliver a) support for Russia’s gas
export ambitions and b) hold in check the Chechen rebels who otherwise might do
awful, awful things to Putin’s Olympics in Sochi.
Inevitably, there are also mumblings linking Saudi Arabia to the supply of sarin gas to the rebels.
Now, thanks to President Obama’s injudicious red line/chem
munitions remark, he’s being forced to make a choice, to “get off the fence”.
Well, maybe the choice has been made for him. Maybe he got pushed off the fence. By Prince Bandar.
I think we are creeping closer to confirmation of the
hypothesis I’ve been advancing http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2012/11/world-braces-for-syrian-trainwreck.htmlhttp://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2013/01/saudi-arabia-vs-qatar-on-syria.htmlhttp://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2013/01/saudi-arabia-vs-qatar-redux.html
since November of last year: that Saudi Arabia had not only decided to push the
Qatar-backed Muslim Brotherhood out of the leadership of the Syrian opposition (something
which has subsequently been confirmed and reconfirmed), but that the Saudi
strategy for Syria involved regime collapse first, rejecting the strategy of
cutting a deal with Assad to get him to the
bargaining table after prolonged bleeding for some kind of negotiated
capitulation and a democratic transition.
Anyway, in the proxy war for Syria it looks like we now have
a debate between the rather conflicted but intensely risk-averse and
regime-transition fixated Obama administration and Saudi Arabia + John McCain’s
regime collapse advocacy.
And everybody’s waiting for Israel—which is uncomfortable with
a jihadi-led insurrection but probably feels that clout and initiative are
slipping out of President Obama’s fingers—to get off its fence and either push
for a strike, a big strike, or nothing at all.
Wonder how that will work out.
In any case, if we’re talking about Syria, we need to talk
about Prince Bandar.
"We Need to Talk About Bandar"
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