[This piece originally appeared on Asia Times Online on March 8, 2013. It can be reposted if ATOl is credited and a link provided.]
The Western media outrage on the execution in China of Naw Kham focused
on the circus surrounding the televising - or non-televising - of the
event, which followed the conviction of the Burmese pirate and several
of his associates for the massacre of 13 Chinese crew members of two
ships on the Mekong River in October 2011. But maybe they are focusing
on the wrong problems.
By its own - and Western - standards, China's capture, trial, and
execution of Naw Kham appears a model of legality. According to China's
Global Times, the PRC was tempted to assassinate him via a drone strike
in his foreign hideout, but declined.
Neither was he shot in the head by special forces and his corpse[Image] secretly dumped in the ocean, as was done with Osama
bin Laden. Nor was he torched in his hideout with incendiary grenades,
as the San Bernadino Sheriff's Department did to alleged murderer and
cop killer Christopher Dorner just a few weeks ago.
Instead, Naw Kham was captured, tried in a Chinese court, and executed
by lethal injection, together with three accomplices. The PRC's
propaganda lords understandably decided to celebrate this demonstration
of Chinese political and legal efficacy with a 21st century
wall-to-wall coverage live media festival on the occasion of the
execution.
Western media outlets, whose prime directive appears to be to deny the
People's Republic of China any hint of a soft-power victory, were
determined to shoehorn the execution of Naw Kham and his fellows into
the Butchers of Beijing template.
The heavy lifting was done by the South China Morning Post's John Kennedy, who somewhat forgivably misconstrued CCTV's promise of live, execution-related coverage from the scene to coverage of the lethal injection itself.
The relevant screen cap from CCTV read "Death sentence to be carried
out" and "Live broadcast and more details to be revealed tomorrow".
Perhaps not the finest moment in chyron-writing. However, it's not just
CCTV. If one Googles "Timothy McVeigh TV execution", (Timothy McVeigh
was the Oklahoma City bomber who murdered 168 people and was executed in
2001) the first hit is: McVeigh Execution: C-Span Video Library. Spoiler: the video does not show the actual execution of Timothy McVeigh.
Another hit from the first page of results: TV coverage of McVeigh execution keeps focus on victims. Written by the AP TV writer, David Bauder, the article relates:
During the moments that lethal drugs were coursing through
McVeigh's veins - unseen to television viewers - ABC showed footage
of survivors and relatives
And one more: Networks Plan McVeigh Execution Coverage.
John
Kennedy,obviously
unaware of such ancient, tedious, and non-Chinese media history, then
doubled down with the tweet:
CCTV said, unambiguously and in plain Chinese, it's going to
live broadcast the execution. I'm not going to put words in its mouth.
If it turns out CCTV is deliberately misleading the public to boost
viewership (and in a way or two I hope it is), that's a story in itself.
With that, Western reporters were off to the races.
In a story titled "China TV Kills Live Execution Plans at Last Minute",
ABC News Beijing Bureau declared (I suspect on the strength of John
Kennedy's post that live coverage of the actual execution had been
promised):
... but as the program neared its close, the station abruptly changed plans and did not show the execution.
The piece rather shamefacedly hedged its bets in the last paragraph:
For whatever reason, CCTV did not broadcast the actual execution.
Maybe the reason was that the Chinese government had never announced its intention to broadcast the actual execution anyway.
Not good enough for UPI's Kristen Butler, who linked to the ABC News story in order to buttress her piece,
"China's CCTV Cuts Live Execution Broadcast at Last Minute", staffers
adding the apparently ludicrous sub-head: "State-run CCTV cut short the
live execution after a poll on Chinese Twitter, Weibo, showed firm
opposition".
Butler provided no documentation for the assertion that the Weibo poll
prompted CCTV to drop its plans to broadcast the actual execution; in
keeping with the fug of ambiguity that pervades this story, perhaps she
or her editors felt that alternate interpretations of "after" - for
instance, referring merely to temporal sequence and not causality -
shielded UPI from the need to come up with any sourcing for the claim.
Now, at least in the Western press, the TV event was a public relations rout:
New York Times: Chinese TV Special on Executions Stirs Debate/ Divided Chinese See a Live TV Program About Executions as Crass, or Cathartic
NPR: China's Broadcast Of Drug Lord's Final Hours Sparks Controversy Reuters: "Execution parade" of four behind Mekong murders angers Chinese The Guardian: China divided on TV 'execution parade': judicial resolve or crude voyeurism
Wall Street Journal: Debate Swirls Around China Execution Broadcast
Virtually alone on the opposite side of the ledger, Sinostand's Eric Fish
had questioned the "actual execution to be televised" meme before the
fact and was excoriated by commenters for correctly predicting actual
events and thereby "underestimating the potential stupidity of the
Chinese Communist Party".
With this generous evidentiary and analytic standard, it is surprising
that the China's Western critics confined themselves to the transitory
pleasures of China bashing, media criticism, and fisking of CCTV
chyrons, and did not take aim at the most interesting possibility,
namely: Did China Execute the Wrong Pirate?
And it would have been the right question to ask!
Naw Kham's hometown paper, so to speak, in northeast Myanmar (also known
as Burma) is the Shan Herald, and it had access to his friends and
associates during his detention in China. According to the Herald, there
would be little difficulty in convicting Naw Kham's underlings for the
murders; apparently a security camera on one of the ships recorded the
horror and placed them at the scene.
According to an informed source, his subordinates, especially Hsang Kham
and Yilai, appear to be impossible to elude the court decision. "They
were caught by the close circuit TV camera," he said. "But with Naw
Kham, it [his guilt] was only by conjecture: authorities believed the
killing wouldn't have been carried out without his orders." [1]
However, it hasn't been proven, or as far as can be determined, even
alleged that Naw Kham was present during the murders. The Herald
interviewed a lawyer, who opined that the chances of conviction for Naw
Kham in a Thailand court would have been slim:
"[T]he
Mekong, where the 13 Chinese sailors were killed, does not belong to Naw
Kham. Those who had been witnesses to his masterminding the killings
were also the co-accused (who could be deemed as doing what they could
to seek official pardon). And I have not heard [that] weapons used in
the killings had been produced as evidence during the trial. Had he been
tried in a Thai court, these are not sufficient to convict him." [2]
About those weapons.
Rumor has it that that forensics revealed that the cartridge cases found
on the ships belonged to Royal Thai Army-issued munitions. And that
brings up the issue of the Royal Thai Army's Pha Muang Task Force, or
PMTF, which engages in drug-war derring do in the area of the Golden
Triangle.
As a Reuters investigation reported, the PMTF's official account of the incident has several holes in it:
Pha Muang said the ships had already docked near Chiang Saen
[downstream in Thai waters] when its soldiers boarded them. But if one
ship had only a dead captain aboard, and the other no crew at all, how
did they drift down the fast-flowing Mekong without running aground,
then safely moor near Chiang Saen?
"It's a 200-tonne ship," said Sunai [Jullapongsathorn, a Thai
parliamentarian]. "With nobody steering, it would have lost control long
before it reached the riverbank."
The same point is made by a senior Thai official in Chiang Rai province
who is close to the investigation and spoke on condition his name and
exact profession were not identified. The boats could not have docked
without both a captain and engineer on board, and they would probably
need to read Chinese to understand the controls, he insisted. [3]
The most charitable case that can be made for the PMTF's performance per
this version of events is that, having been alerted to a drug run, it
stood idly buy as the hijackers forced the captains to sail into Chiang
Saen at gunpoint, executed them, and motored off in speedboats.
As it transpired, the most charitable interpretation is regrettably not
the most likely one. Shortly after the incident, nine members of the
PMTF "approached their superiors" concerning their involvement. Their
commander stated that they had come forward to "demonstrate their
innocence" - but it strengthened the appearance of malfeasance
surrounding the PMTF's behavior. [4]
As the Thai government investigation proceeded, the cloud of suspicion
enveloping the PMTF soldiers thickened, as Reuters reported in January:
"Circumstantial evidence suggests that Thai officials were
involved in the sailors' deaths," the House Foreign Affairs Standing
Committee said on January 12 in an apparent reference to the military
task force. "However, their motive, and whether it is connected to the
drugs found on the ships, remains inconclusive," it said in preliminary
findings seen by Reuters.
[5]
Shortly after the incident, Michael Winchester wrote for Asia Times Online:
Almost certainly closer to the truth is a scenario in which
the troops targeted vessels which they knew on the basis of good
intelligence to be carrying a shipment of narcotics from Sop Lui [a port
in Myanmar's Shan State] into Thailand. By definition such accurate
intelligence would have come from a source working with the rogue RTA
team with inside knowledge of the shipment and an interest in betraying
the cartel moving it. Asia Times Online sources have heard several
separate but unconfirmed reports all of which have implicated a wife of
senior UWSA commander and indicted drugs-trafficker Wei Xuegang.
Given the complexity of the operation and the systematic brutality
involved, one Chiang Mai-based analyst familiar with drug trafficking
operations on both sides of the border was inclined to draw two
conclusions. The first was that the original shipment was actually far
greater than the 920,000 tablets finally retrieved at Chiang Saen and
that the bulk of it was likely taken ashore either on the Lao or Myanmar
bank well north of the tri-border area.
What was left was a credible minimum for which the Thai troops could
claim credit and a cash reward in addition to a share of the loot. The
second conclusion was that the systematically conducted slaughter
allegedly carried out by the Thai troops was intended as a calculated
and unmistakable message from one criminal group to another as much as a
means of disposing of witnesses. [6]
The motive for Naw Kham's participation remains a mystery. Naw Kham
operated a waterborne protection racket and the occasional "catch and
release" kidnapping for ransom, not a wholesale murder operation.
Efforts to link Naw Kham's interests to the horrific body count of the
October 5 massacre - explanations include a vendetta against Chinese
ships for transporting Burmese and Laotian troops, or a war with the operators of the gigantic Kings
Roman Casino/Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone just downstream -
founder on the presence of the PMTF.
There are plenty of doubters:
A relative of two of the
victims also refuted the official account. "We have worked on ships on
the Mekong for 14 years and never once heard that Chinese ships pay
protection money to Naw Kham," Mekong shipper He Xilun, who lost both
his older brother He Xixing and sister-in-law Chen Guoying in the
attack, recently told The Irrawaddy.
"I am saying, that in this trial the truth has not been revealed. I
don't know why [the attack] happened," he said. "We only know the tip of
the iceberg in this case, I hope the country will continue to look into
this and find out the truth. [7]
If this was a matter of rogue army personnel hijacking a drug shipment, then one can speculate that Naw Kham's
involvement was secondary, in order to 1) provide the necessary veneer
of pirate-related illegality, 2) assistance in hauling away and
disposing of a sizable pile of amphetamines and/or heroin and/or gold
and/or cash on behalf of the renegades, and 3) provide a useful fall guy
if the bloody outrage brought down too much heat.
In the event, there was definitely too much heat.
The Chinese crew members, including two female cooks, had not died in
some Wild West shootout; they had been handcuffed, gagged, slaughtered
with knives and guns, and pitched overboard, outraging Chinese popular
opinion. The Chinese government temporarily halted commercial traffic
along the Mekong and demanded beefed-up "joint patrols".
The PRC, in the persons of Wen Jiabao and Politburo security heavy Zhou
Yongkang, insisted on full and effective cooperation from the region's
governments in apprehending Naw Kham, who had an irritating history of
targeting Chinese interests, individuals, and security forces, and was
universally recognized by his many friends and few genuine local
adversaries as the premier pirate in that stretch of the river.
Naw Kham's ties to the Burmese government were apparently a given:
Wanted in Burma, Laos, Thailand and China, Naw Kham, 50, has
surprised many observers with his staying quality. The business circle
in Shan State East believes the reason is that Burma's junta authorities
are on his payroll.
The Shan State Army (SSA) South agrees. "When we were there," said
Lt-Col Gawnzeun, Commander of Kengtung Force, "the Burma Army and its
militias never allowed us an easy time. We were chased out from every
hideout we had setup. But Naw Kham never has to worry about it." He
denies the SSA South is also on Naw Kham's payroll. Naw Kham has
reportedly said for every 3 baht he made, 1 baht was for the Burma Army,
another baht for the SSA and the last baht for himself. [8]
However, the main outlet for drugs produced in the Shan State is via the
Mekong to Thailand, and it appears that Naw Kham would have to have had
a modus vivendi with some Thai financiers as well:
"What about the Lao-bans [financiers] from Thailand who are
helping us set up refineries and maintain them? Will there be prices on
their heads?" a businessman known to be engaged in shady businesses
asked. "What about the government officials, both here [in Burma] and
Thailand, who see to it that both the raw materials and the drugs reach
their destinations safe and sound? Aren't they [the Thai government]
going to do anything about them?"
According to sources in Shan State East, most of the financiers are
ethnic Chinese from Thailand, Laos, China, Taiwan and Burma, "especially
from Thailand". Caffeine, used for manufacturing yaba [tablets
containing methamphetamine], and implements also come from Thailand. [9]
One might speculate that one reason that the PRC decided to forego the
intangible psychic benefits of graduating to full implacable superpower
status by assassinating Naw Kham via drone - or agree to let him face
the Burmese or Thai version of drugland justice - and instead, according
to rumors passed on by the Telegraph, [10] spend 200,000 English pounds
(US$300,000) to extract him from his Laotian captors, was so they could
get him to China and encourage him to reveal the details of his
operation and his protectors and allies and strengthen the PRC's hand
along the Mekong. (The Thai government rebuffed Chinese demands after
the massacre to escort vessels along the Thai stretch of the Mekong;
joint patrols involving Chinese armed police vessels only took place in
the northern reaches shared by Laos and Burma).
The Bangkok Post reported:
A regional security officer acknowledged that the arrest of Naw Kham could open a political can of worms.
''The Chinese have said in open source materials that they are pushing
for the death penalty for him, but in reality, they will want names of
those running with him, they want the bigger players behind him.'' [11]
It appears that Naw Kham spent his months of incarceration in China
bargaining unsuccessfully for his life. At first, invoking the legal
approach that might have worked in the Thai courts, he denied
culpability and blamed his subordinates for organizing the attack.
Then, according to Chinese media, he confessed:
"I was terribly wrong for having done it. I am sorry for the
Chinese sailors and hope the Chinese can grant me leniency," Naw Kham
told reporters in an arranged interview in police custody ahead of the
trial.
"I apologize to the victims' families," Naw Kham said. "We organized and carried out the murders." [12]
Perhaps he believed that his life would be spared in return for his
confession and US$975,000 in compensation for the victims, and with the
help of representations from the Myanmar government.
The Myanmar government did negotiate immunity from Chinese prosecution
for several of Naw Kham's followers who surrendered in the time-honored
fashion; however there seems to have been a general desire to close the
books on Naw Kham forever.
Then, perhaps because he came to understand that the Chinese government
planned to execute him anyway, Naw Kham withdrew his confession and
indicated he was going to implicate the Thai army, presumably hoping
that the Thai government would spring to his aid in order to win his
silence and save itself the embarrassment.
On September 21, 2012, Deutsche Presse-Agentur reported:
But in a surprise move for China's carefully orchestrated
trial system, Nor [sic] Kham denied any involvement in the case when
questioned in court yesterday, despite reportedly confessing his role in
the killings earlier.
The semi-official China News Service said prosecutors asked him if he
had ordered the hijacking of Chinese boats, killing the crew and
planting drugs on the vessels.
In court, Nor Kham denied all charges, saying: "The [crime] was carried
out by the Thais. I knew about it through television." [13]
However, if closed-circuit cameras aboard the vessels did record the
presence of Royal Thai Army troops during the incident and support Naw
Kham's assertion, which this passage from the Chiang Rai Times of
December 2, 2011, would seem to confirm...
Pheu Thai Party list MP Sunai Jullapongsathorn, who heads
the foreign affairs committee that is investigating the deaths,
yesterday said he had obtained evidence suggesting the soldiers were
linked to the deaths.
Mr Sunai said he had received a photograph of a soldier holding a
machine gun that had been taken on one of the two Chinese cargo ships.
The soldier in the picture was one of the nine soldiers suspected of being involved. [14]
...this is apparently a load of dirty linen that neither the Thai military
nor the PRC government are interested in airing in public, and it was
not enough to save Naw Kham.
Although the Chinese government and press have repeatedly referenced the
involvement of "nine renegade Thai soldiers" in the incident,
apparently justice has been adequately served by execution of Naw Kham
and his associates.
As for the Thai side, civilian arrest warrants were issued for the nine
PMTF personnel involved in the issue, presumably under Chinese pressure,
but to date there is no indication of any detention or public trial.
Naw Kham could have answered the question of who masterminded the Mekong
massacre, and why. But he won't, at least not for public consumption.
He's dead. That is more important than obsessing over whether the final
moments of Naw Kham's silencing were televised or not.
"Did China execute the wrong pirate?"
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