There has always been an implicit contradiction between Shinzo Abe's
declared desire to "bring Japan back" and the US wish to lead "Free
Asia". The divergence of aims has been obscured by the eagerness of the
US defense establishment to encourage Japan's increasing heft as a
"security" "defense" "active pacifist"; well, let's just say "military"
power, in order to add to the credibility of US hegemony in the Western
Pacific, and Japan's awareness that US military backing - if properly
exploited by invoking the US-Japan Security Treaty - can give Japan a
significant leg up in its confrontation with the People's Republic of
China.
The Abe administration has performed exactly as desired by American military strategists, both in its willingness, nay eagerness to build up its military and endorse the concept of
"collective self defense", and on the highly contentious issue of
shoving the Futenma airbase relocation down the throats of the resisting
Okinawan people by a combination of financial blandishments and crude
political pressure.
However, there are signs that the are tensions in the US-Japan romance,
largely because the Obama administration is serious about exploiting the
potential of its "honest broker" role to carve out a role for itself as
the even-handed interlocutor between Japan and China - a role that the
PRC is encouraging in order to drive a wedge between Tokyo and
Washington - and is therefore not giving Prime Minister Shinzo Abe the
full-throated support that he believes he needs and deserves.
Also, the Abe administration may consider the current moderate Asia
policy of President Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, and Secretary of
State John Kerry to be a fleeting, transitory dream of an administration
entering its lame-duck phase, to be carefully defied in expectation of a
more militant and pro-Japanese successor.
One of the less-noted ramifications of US Asia policy has been the
marked divergence between US and Japanese responses to the Chinese
declaration of its air defense identification zone or ADIZ in the East
China Sea. Prime Minister Abe immediately jumped into Churchillian
"this shall not stand" rhetoric and declared that no Japanese aircraft -
including Japanese civilian carriers that had already declared their
intention of complying with the Chinese declaration - would respect the
ADIZ.
The United States, perhaps conscious that it maintains a ferociously
defended ADIZ over North America, decided to defy the ADIZ only to
affirm the right of United States military aircraft to fly anywhere they
wanted outside of Chinese airspace, and sent two B-52s lumbering over
from Guam into the ADIZ unannounced. The United States, however, did
not recommend that US civilian carriers ignore the ADIZ.
South Korea took advantage of the ruckus to expand its own ADIZ, which
it apparently has been trying to do for a long time, gained the
acquiescence of the PRC, and it appears that ROK civilian carriers now
respect the zone.
This left Japan pretty much out on a limb by itself, a state of affairs
that the Western press tactfully decided to ignore but that seems to
have awakened some resentment towards the United States, perhaps by the
Abe administration and certainly by its confront-China sympathizers in
the US.
Although Prime Minister Abe had failed to summon up a united front
against the PRC over the ADIZ, he took another crack at it at the global
elite confab in Davos, Switzerland.
International affairs boffin Ian Bremmer and a suspiciously large
contingent of think-tank poobahs were primed to love the speech (the
text of which was, by Davos practice, not made available to the common
herd), and they did.
First, Bremmer:
And Prime Minister Abe just came, he gave a great speech.
Folks are optimistic about the economy. The one part of the speech that
people were really concerned about was Japan-China. And understandably.
He's criticizing the Chinese as being aggressive and militaristic. He
compared Japan-China relations explicitly to relations between Germany
and the UK in 1914, where the economic relations were good but the
security tensions, let's say, were not so good. And we saw what happened
there.
I wouldn't say that Abe was directly raising the specter of war, but he
was saying that China is acting in a manner that's unacceptable and
Japan won't tolerate it. [1]
Bremmer also implied that the PRC was taking advantage of a certain lack of American testicular fortitude on the China question:
So clearly the Chinese want to engage with Americans in a
serious way. There are a lot of reasons for that. The US economy is
picking up. But also they see a window here because all of the hawks on
China are gone from the US administration. Hillary's gone, [former
assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Kurt
Campbell's gone, [former Treasury secretary Timothy] Geithner, much more
focused on this region, is gone, and [former National Security Advisor
Thomas] Donilon's gone. And so they see an opportunity with Biden
effectively leading US-China relations right now to build the US-China
relationship while really changing the rules on the ground with Japan.
Contemporaneously, two worthies from the Center for a New American
Security, a "left of center" security think tank, declared their concern
that peace might break out between the US and the PRC, and advocated
for heightened tensions instead, with an assist from Japan and other
Asian allies:
US officials have been careful to avoid provoking a China
that appears increasingly willing to flex its newfound military muscle.
Perhaps that's why Biden invoked his father's advice in warning on the
eve of his Beijing visit that "the only conflict that is worse than one
that is intended is one that is unintended". But an overemphasis on
stability can be dangerous.
The point is simply that a country with the power of the USSR or China,
unsatisfied with features of the existing order, motivated to do
something to change it, and skeptical of the resolve of the United
States, could well pursue a policy of coercion and brinkmanship, even
under the shadow of nuclear weapons.
[T]he United States needs to inject a healthy degree of risk into
Beijing's calculus, even as it searches for ways to cooperate with
China. This does not mean abandoning engagement or trying to contain
China, let alone fomenting conflict. But it does mean communicating that
Beijing has less ability to control escalation than it seems to think.
China must understand that attempts to roil the waters could result in
precisely the kinds of costs and conflicts it seeks to avoid.
To make this work, the United States should pursue policies that
actually elevate the risks - political, economic, or otherwise - to
Beijing of acting assertively. ... [T]he US military needs
capabilities and plans that not only prepare it for major war, but that
also offer plausible, concrete options for responding to Chinese
attempts to exploit America's perceived aversion to instability. Leaders
throughout Asia will be watching. Too much caution, especially if China
is clearly the initiator, may be read as US weakness, thereby
perpetuating rather than diminishing China's incentives toward
adventurism.
The United States can further raise the stakes by deepening its military ties with Japan ... [2]
Senator John McCain, whose confidant Roy Pflauch handles the Abe
administration's careful and extensive informal outreach to the American
right wing, also invoked the 1914 analogy during the confirmation
hearings for new ambassador to the PRC, Max Baucus, an indication
perhaps that Abe's allies in Washington are all determinedly singing
from the same hymnal.
Wow, looks like everybody's ready to join Japan and stand up to China
except that Chamberlain in VPOTUS clothing, Joe Biden! Well, almost
everybody.
President Obama's relations with Prime Minister Abe are considered cool at best.
Abe, it should be pointed out, is an unreconstructed Cheneyite when it
comes to admiration and emulation of Dick Cheney's Manichean worldview,
especially where it pertains to China. (In passing, it might be noted that Cheney's loyal aide Scooter Libby introduced Abe for his September 2013 speech to the Hudson Institute).
Abe has also been insistent in his quiet outreach
to Republican, hawkish, and anti-Obama elements in Washington, most
recently in an effort to obtain US acquiescence for his Yasukuni shrine
visit, and, as a result, is reportedly no particular friend of the White
House, let alone the amiable and often-maligned as "soft on everything"
Joe Biden.
Maybe the Obama team did not appreciate the implication that they had to
stand beside Japan right now! 1914! (I guess World War II analogies are
a bit awkward) - in an anti-PRC alliance, or risk getting tarred with
the brush of appeasement, and made its displeasure known.
In any case, Abe quickly backpedaled on the 1914 analogy, lamely blaming the misunderstanding on an interpreter's interpolation and going into full-court spin mode. He
didn't mean war was possible if the world didn't stand up to China. He
meant war was impossible! Per Japan Times:
The government has repeatedly said that what Abe wanted to convey is
that a war between Japan and China is not possible because it would
cause devastation not only to the two countries but to the world as a
whole.
"We will convey what the prime minister meant through diplomatic
channels," Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga told a press
conference.
When meeting with journalists at the World Economic Forum in Davos,
Switzerland, Abe was asked whether a war between Japan and China is
conceivable, and in response he compared the current tensions between
the countries to the rivalry between Britain and Germany in the years
before World War I.
Abe called it a "similar situation", according to the Financial Times and some other media.
By Friday morning, the government had briefed the BBC about Abe's
intention, a Foreign Ministry source said. The British public
broadcaster was among the media outlets that were reporting intensely on
the prime minister's comments. Tokyo will also brief Reuters soon, the
source said.
Many media reports "left the impression that Abe had not denied (the
possibility of) a military clash (between Japan and China) and this
caused misapprehension," a different government source said. [3]
Then Abe jetted off to the welcoming environs of India, where he served
as guest of honor at the Day of the Republic celebrations and concluded a
passel of agreements - and there were no dissenting voices when it came
to advancing an anti-PRC Japanese-Indian security alliance.
The trip was apparently arranged at the last minute and at the cost of
Abe missing the preparations for the opening of the Diet. One is free
to speculate that his disappointment at the hands of the Obama
administration provoked him to make a statement that Japan was not by
any means solely reliant on its US patron to make its way in 21st
century Asia.
Abe described
the Japan-India relationship as "the greatest potential of any
bilateral relationship anywhere in the world". Insert crying bald eagle
graphic here, since it's another indication that the Abe
administration's rejection of the "victor's justice" of World War II is
not just a matter of cheesing off China; it's a rejection of US
diplomatic and security tutelage and an announcement that Japan will
give priority to pursuing its own interests, instead of sacrificing them
as America's loyal ally.
The visit was marked by an Indian pundit writing in the Nikkei Asia
Review and explicitly making the case for an Indian-Japanese alliance to
contain China and, in fact, touted security ties as the most stable
foundation for economic ties.
As in:
Japan and India, natural allies strategically located on
opposite flanks of the continent, have a pivotal role to play in
ensuring a regional power equilibrium and safeguarding vital sea lanes
in the wider Indo-Pacific region - an essential hub for global trade and
energy supply. ... The logic for strategic collaboration is no less
compelling. If China, India and Japan constitute Asia's scalene triangle
- with China representing the longest Side A, India Side B, and Japan
Side C - the sum of B and C will always be greater than A. It is thus
little surprise that Japan and India are seeking to add strategic bulk
to their quickly deepening relationship.
Indeed, the world's most stable economic partnerships, such as the
Atlantic community and the Japan-US partnership, have been built on the
bedrock of security collaboration. Economic ties lacking that strategic
underpinning tend to be less stable and even volatile, as is apparent
from China's economic relations with Japan, India, and the US.
The transformative India-Japan entente promises to positively shape Asia's power dynamics. [4]
Upon Abe's return to Tokyo, it was promptly leaked
to the Kyodo news service that Vice President Biden had fruitlessly
attempted to persuade Abe not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine in December.
This is an interesting state of affairs, since the previous version of
the story was that Prime Minister Abe had received mixed messages from a
mixed bag of formal and informal Japanese envoys in Washington on the
official US government attitude toward his visit.
A one-hour phone call from VP Biden saying "Please don't go"; on the other is a pretty unambiguous message.
And, I might add, that Prime Minister Abe disregarding Biden's call and
going to Yasukuni anyway is also a pretty clear message that he does not
want to buy whatever Biden is selling.
As AFP put it: "But the news that personal overtures from Joe Biden, who
has enjoyed a good working relationship with senior Japanese figures,
were rejected will be an embarrassment to the White House."
It is possible that Abe believed that he deserved to be lobbied on this
vital issue personally by President Obama and declined to heed American
intentions out of pique; however, it's more likely that he wanted to
make it clear that the United States is not going to receive automatic
fealty from Japan on matters that Abe believes to be against Japan's
interests.
Also, he may wish to send the message that a US administration that does
not back Japan's China gambits to the hilt is no real ally - and no
real leader of the Asian coalition.
It will be interesting to see whether Abe and his allies regard
President Obama as a lame duck, and will concertedly criticize his China
strategy - by attacking the convenient cut-out Joe Biden - while
waiting for more a more militant administration come 2016, either under
pivot architect-helmswoman and China-basher Hillary Clinton or a
suitably anti-PRC Republican administration.
Key indicators of the Abe administration's attitude might include a
spate of op-eds in the US that the Obama administration is too
circumspect in confronting the PRC, and more than the usual sniggering
at Vice President Biden as an amiable foreign-policy lightweight (the
latter theme has been greatly assisted, in the media at least, by the
PRC's high-handedness in refusing to provide visas for two New York
Times correspondents assigned to China, despite the earnest
presentations of Biden to the Beijing leadership.)
A more significant assertion of an independent Japanese regional policy
in the waning years of the Obama administration would be unilateral
contacts with North Korea, thereby breaking the PRC-ROK-US united front
that is the hallmark of the current negotiations. Abe's chief cabinet
secretary has already been called on to deny reports that Japanese
envoys met with DPRK representatives in Hanoi.
Also, the Indian embassy in Pyongyang - potentially a eager and
supportive cut-out for Prime Minister Abe, since direct Japanese
diplomacy is hindered by the demand that the abductee issue be resolved
first - and the DPRK regime have been suspiciously fulsome in their
expressions of mutual regard. According to North Korean media, the
Indian ambassador hosted a reception at the embassy for DPRK worthies
and stated:
[I]ndia would value and boost the traditional friendly ties with the
DPRK, hoping that the country would prosper and make dynamic progress.
He referred to the fact that the two countries, member nations of the
Non-Aligned Movement, have common views on many international issues.
He hoped that tensions would be defused and Korea be reunified
peacefully through dialogue, adding that India would send every possible
support for this.
He said that the Indian people revere President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il, eternal leaders of the Korean people.
Noting that Marshal Kim Jong Un, supreme leader of the Korean people, is
paying deep attention to the development of the bilateral friendly
relations, he expressed the belief that thanks to his wise leadership,
the cause of building a thriving nation would be successfully
accomplished. [5]
Anyway, expect surprises in the evolution of the Japanese security
posture in its "near beyond". And, for the United States, don't assume
that all the surprises will be pleasant ones.
"Is Abe Starting to Treat the Obama Administration as a Lame Duck?"
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