[This piece originally appeared at Asia Times Online on October 20, 2012. It can be reposted if ATOl is credited and a link provided.]
Jaded China watchers observe the fall of
Chongqing's "Red Leader" Bo Xilai and see little
more than the disposal of another corrupt
Communist sociopath who crossed multiple red lines
- not of reckless criminality, but of naked
ambition, of disobedience to the Center, and of
unseemly and embarrassing behavior involving
foreigners - and got slapped down by the party
leadership.
Score one for the Chinese
Communist Party, in other words, for the efficient
use of party disciplinary functions, media
operations, and kangaroo courts to wrap up the
messy package without overt violence and organized
public dissent or embarrassing private leaks from
Bo's allies inside and outside the CCP, thereby maintaining the public
veneer of leadership unity going into the
transitional 18th party congress.
This
interpretation is not satisfactory to China's
reformers, who see the country lurching into
crisis and hope to shoehorn the Bo Xilai affair
into a narrative of national political, social and
economic renaissance.
Their efforts have
elicited a faint but unmistakable echo in state
media, serving as an indication that the party
leadership accepts the reality of crisis and the
need for reform, if not the radical changes
advocated by the reformers.
Sun Liping -
who acted as Xi Jinping's PhD thesis adviser at
Tsinghua University and therefore symbolizes the
reformers' hopes for access and influence at the
highest levels of the new party leadership -
recently posted his thoughts on the Bo Xilai case,
opining that it would have been better if the
verdict had been delivered after, instead of
before, the party congress:
If the verdict had come down after
the congress, it would have diminished the
political tinge of the case. Instead, it could
have been part of an overall consideration of
the rule of law for the next 10 years ... and
even helped create a "force" for reform ... a
wedge for further major reforms ... It could
have served as the starting point for the
political institutionalization of the reformist
faction.[1]
Central to Sun's thesis is
that Bo was an atypical representative of
anti-reform forces, and his fall before the
congress was not a decisive victory for reform
that would secure the ascendancy of pro-reform
forces in the new leadership.
Sun Liping
believes that the main obstacle for China's
reformers is not nostalgic Maoists trying to push
back reforms; it is the inertia represented by the
massive, entrenched interests that have corruptly
benefited from the current, flawed reforms, and
which oppose further, more thoroughgoing reforms
that would threaten their advantages.
Sun
characterizes this dilemma as the "political
transition trap", the real trap, in his view, as
opposed to the "income transition trap" (the
difficulty of evolution beyond labor-intensive
industries and thereby hoisting per capita income
into the promised land of middle-class pay
packets) that obsesses Chinese and international
developmental economists.
A significant if
unspoken corollary of Sun's persuasive analysis is
that entrenched interests - maybe we should call
them the "cadre-industrial complex" in a hat-tip
to the late US president Dwight Eisenhower's
prescient warnings about the "military-industrial
complex" - hold the upper hand under normal
circumstances.
In other words, an
exceptional set of circumstances, if not a crisis,
is necessary to break the inertia and get the
reformist bandwagon rolling.
For Sun, a
nice, thorough mastication of the Bo Xilai case by
the powers that be after the party congress might
have provided a suitable kick-start to the
reformist movement.
Although the Bo Xilai
ship has sailed (Bo has been expelled from the CCP
by its disciplinary mechanism and now awaits his
final, legal fate in the politically irrelevant
civil courts), reformers are apparently still
trying to make hay from the state of affairs in
Chongqing.
On the serious-progressive end
of the reformist spectrum, the financial news
outlet Caixin editorialized:
Bo taught us all a painful lesson.
Thirty years of reform and opening up has
brought China tremendous success, but also
created many problems in society. Its people are
desperate for solutions. Chinese leaders should
heed the call for change and deepen their reform
efforts.
Their priority now is to
continue fighting corruption and speed up the
reform of the economic and political systems,
particularly the legal system. "All people are
equal before the law" must be more than a
slogan, and the system of checks and balances
strengthened.
Bo showed us that going
backwards or standing still are not options for
China; only by striking out can it thrive.
[2]
An influential reformer, Han
Zhiguo (previously on the staff of the State
Planning Commission and then a big wheel at
various economic and sociology journals; now head
of a private university) tried to exploit the
Chongqing issue from another angle by providing a
jolt of old-fashioned Communist rabble-rousing.
Han posted an item on his weblog calling
for a purge of extreme-left elements in Chongqing.
Literally. As in:
The main harm of the Chongqing
affair is a return of the Cultural Revolution
and the reigniting of an extreme-left line ...
Chongqing must completely purge
[qingsuan] the extreme left line.
[3]
The "Chongqing affair" is the
matter of a hapless youth, Ren Jianying, who
reposted content hostile to the Bo government on
his webpage, was subsequently discovered by the
local cops to possess a T-shirt with the
inflammatory slogan "Live free or die," and
received a sentence of two years' labor reform.
The post is illustrated by a pretty
picture of clouds over a pasture intended to
convey the image of a ferocious gathering storm.
Leaving aside the completely creepy
reference to qingsuan - which literally
means "a thoroughgoing settling of accounts" and,
in particularly rough times for the CCP, referred
to the execution of political enemies - and the
question of whether Han is advocating the
top-down, legalistic, and numerical quota purges
imposed in the 1950s as opposed to the chaotic
"bottom-up" assaults orchestrated by the Red
Guards in the 1960s or something else - it is
somewhat doubtful that Chongqing is groaning under
the tyranny of extreme-left red terror.
Zhou Yongkang, an erstwhile political ally
of Bo Xilai (and, in the overheated imagination of
some bloggers, fomenter of an attempted coup
d'etat to repair the fortunes of his buddy),
recently made a publicized tour of Sichuan
province. Zhou holds the security brief in the
Standing Committee of the Politburo and his
overweening emphasis on "stability maintenance"
was seen as complementing Bo Xilai's public stance
as hard-charging, crime-fighting mayor.
Reading between the lines, Zhou's visit
was intended to reassure local security cadres
that despite the discrediting of Zhou's
law-and-order agenda by the exposure of rampant
criminality in Bo's government, all would be well
as long as Bo's disappointed neo-Maoist acolytes
were not allowed to make trouble on the streets in
the run-up to the 18th congress:
Zhou visited the procuratorial,
judicial and police departments in the
provincial capital of Chengdu.
When
meeting with representatives from these
departments, Zhou urged them to honestly carry
out their legal responsibilities by enhancing
law enforcement, providing better service for
the people, dissolving disputes, and maintaining
justice, social harmony and stability.
He asked for major achievements from
them to mark the CCP's 18th National Congress,
which is scheduled to start on November 8.
[4]
It appears that residents of
Chongqing fearing a reign of terror by Bo Xilai's
red-bandanna diehards can rest easy.
As
Sun Liping has asserted, the main problem in China
is not maniacal neo-Maoists; it is cadres and
businessman happy to suck up bank loans to line
their pockets and prop up local governments even
as the country slides off a cliff.
Anecdotal support for this view was
provided by the blog post of another reformer, who
recounted his experience in a Chengdu restaurant:
At the next table some party and
government staff people were talking loudly, we
couldn't help overhearing. They were discussing
one of their friends: should he stay in the
first cadre section of the organization
department as the leader, or should he leave and
act as a bureau chief in a local jurisdiction?
They did a comparison: how much could he earn as
section chief, and how much could he earn as a
bureau chief? (The unit for their discussion was
millions of yuan). I asked myself, how far can
the country go with this kind of people? How far
can they go?
Possibly, Han's
provocative post was intended as a nudge in the ribs encouraging Xi
Jinping and the new leadership to take advantage
of Chongqing's political embarrassment to go in
and make a bit of reformist hay, as in: Bo Xilai's
fall provides a golden chance for the central
government to clean house in Chongqing and put the
fear of Marx (or at least Beijing) in the hearts
of the local cadres.
It can certainly be
argued that impunity of the local party/government
regime from legal, administrative, and financial
accountability is at the heart of China's
inexorably unfolding crisis.
With tax reform,
local governments were cut loose from the central
government and encouraged to make their own
financial way. Where they could, they did so by
throwing themselves wholeheartedly into the
business of real-estate development: expropriating
suburban lands at bargain-basement prices, then
reselling them to developers and speculators. When
the central government unleashed the Great
Stimulus of 2008-09, it was the local governments
and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that took the
bank loans and plowed them into infrastructure and
real-estate investments, many of dubious
profitability.
Now the world and Chinese
economies are slowing, and the financial chickens
are coming home to roost. With international
demand slumping, the Chinese economy is overbuilt
and ill-equipped to receive another stimulus
without fueling waste and igniting inflation. The
real challenge - engineering a soft landing by
properly unwinding the indebtedness and ending the
addiction to overspending by local governments and
SOEs - require central-government levers that, as
yet, don't exist.
And the local
governments and SOEs have little incentive to
change a system in which they are the primary and
indispensable conduits for the government to
sluice money into the economy.
The
discomfiture of central-government leaders,
theorists and media can be seen in a spate of
articles calling urgently but rather vaguely for
reform. What is significant is that the call is
for political reform, in a recognition that
economic reform - or the neo-mercantilist version
of it embedded in the People's Republic of China -
does not provide clear solutions for the current
problems.
Global Times posted an op-ed
that looked as if it came from the Democratic
Underground:
[A] limited government is
dispensable. So far, China's reform is also a
process of transformation from an unlimited
government to a limited one. In other words, the
central government delegates power to local
authorities, and local governments give power to
the public.
The building of a limited
government does not lower government efficiency.
Instead, it helps address problems like the
abuse of power, corruption, and the lack of
credibility of many government departments.
Building a limited government actually
creates great potential for China's future
development. At the moment, China must
accelerate the establishment of a limited
government through constitutional means, so as
to ensure the success of its political reform.
In the future, China needs to expand
trials in local political reform throughout the
nation. Such reform should be gradually boosted
in a transparent, open and rational manner.
[5]
Under the attention-grabbing
headline "Reform or perish, journal warns
Communist Party", the South China Morning Post
reported that the leading CPP theoretical journal,
Qiushi, had published an essay on the eve of the
party congress pushing the reform imperative:
Headlined "Sparing no effort in
pushing ahead with reform and openness", the
long article said China was standing on a
historical threshold and "stagnation or turning
back would be a dead end".
It called on
the government to seize the moment to advance
comprehensive reform in all areas, and "actively
press ahead with restructuring of the political
system and develop socialist democracy".
[6]
No question that the leadership
sees itself beset by ugly problems without easy
solutions.
The status-quoers nibble around
the edges of the problem - bailing out banks,
cautiously deflating the real-estate bubble,
doling out subsidies to the disadvantaged, and
applying selective stimulus to industrial sectors
that can use the money effectively - and hope that
a global economic recovery will help China grow
out of its problems.
Reformers appear to
want something more: integrating local governments
and SOEs into a coherent system of market, legal
and public supervision that will reduce corruption
and increase economic efficiency and rationality.
In other words, democracy, rule of law, further
empowerment of free-market forces.
That
means taking confrontational, painful, and risky
steps to strip the dead hand of local governments
and SOEs from national civil and economic life.
That isn't easy.
To advance such a
politically difficult and costly agenda, the
reformers need a game changer, the existential
shock to the system that the Bo Xilai case
apparently did not provide to the CPP leadership.
Borrowing a concept from evolutionary
biology, the reformists could be said to
preoccupied with "catastrophism".
The idea
behind catastrophism is that change is not
necessarily smooth, incremental, and completely
driven by internal forces. To achieve radical
change, sometimes an external event - a
catastrophe like the asteroid that wiped out the
dinosaurs - is needed.
The reformist
literature is now a ceaseless search for dark
clouds in the local and international media:
evidence of looming catastrophe, harbingers like
reduced power generation, slowing economic growth,
capital flight, and collapsing industrial sectors.
It also seems to manifest itself as
Chicken-Littleism: heralding natural and man-made
tragedies inside China, such as earthquakes,
landslides, and exploding gas tankers, as damning
evidence of the current regime's moral and
political bankruptcy - especially if they involve
the death of children, and can accommodate a
blizzard of exclamation points, weeping and raging
emoticons, and bathetic harangues.
So far,
symbolic and limited calamities have failed to
crystallize a conviction as to the compelling need
for immediate and thoroughgoing reform, damn the
political cost, in the minds of the Chinese
leadership.
It remains to be seen whether
such a game-changing event will occur - or if such
an event can even be recognized in the restricted
mental landscape of the insulated, privileged, and
risk-averse Chinese national party cadre.
"China's reformers hope for a game-changer"
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