Emergent Pentecost

The New Art

2009-07-04T13:37:00.005-04:00

The people of Caedman's Call have always been among the more brilliant artists in the Christian community. But Derek Webb has gone to a whole new plane after leaving that band for a solo career.

Now he has created some of the best art the Christian community has seen in some time.

Here is my short narrative of how the thing developed.

Several months ago, Webb wrote an e-mail to his e-mail list saying that his latest album was simply too controversial for his record label. He hinted at how he was going to have to do something risky and off the radar. So then he sends out another e-mail with the address of another website coded into the message. When you went to www.paradiseisaparkinglot.com you found a set of instructions to chase down little 2 second stems of the song that apparently got him in so much trouble with his record label. These song stems were on flash drives at coffee shops and such all over the country. When they were found, they were uploaded to the website for everyone to see. My friend, Chris Marchand, managed to get one of the ones that went to Chicago. They just released the last stems, which are available at shanebertou.wordpress.com in there completed form...give it a listen. Along the way, there were other links coded into the website and other places for people to download a few songs. All in all, it was giant easter egg hunt that took people literally all over the country and all over the WWW to find his music in what he said was a giant attempt to thwart his record label.

If you ask me, it is beautiful. Webb has done the marketing genius thing once before. His first album was shunned by many radio stations and Christian bookstores because he referred to himself and the Church as the whore of the book of Hosea. Clearly a traditional biblical allusion, but it was too much to use the word "whore" for the "Lord, I lift your name on high" crowd of CCM'ers. Later he released one of his albums for free download if you gave him the e-mail address of five friends that might also want to download for free and give him five more addresses. After about a month of that, he sold his album in stores. Sales of all his albums shot up from basic obscurity and he was getting interviewed by newspapers in Nashville for the stunt. Of course, other artists have done it since then. But Webb was among the first.

Personally, I think the whole thing was a hoax. If you listen to the song, it is clear why his Christian label did not want to sell it. He is touching on some hot button issues and calling some people "sinner" that aren't ready to be called that. But, I have a hard time believing that releasing the album for free via little 2 second flash drives and Internet downloads is any more legal than just releasing the album independently. Shane Bertou's blog (linked above) called it performance art, and I would have to agree. We should not be surprised that someone who is such a good artist musically is also a great marketing person. Marketing is the most prolific form of art in our generation.

The more pressing question that will arise will be from the controversy and the discussion in the blogosphere about this song.

The gist of it is this:
Out of the heart, the mouth speaks. Too many Christians only speak about homosexuality. They don't speak about the tens of thousands dying of malaria and AIDS every year. They must not be real Christians because sexuality matters more to them than people dying.

On one level, I agree with him. A whole host of other emerging church types think that this kind of judgment is at the heart of the whole movement. Two things are in play here. First, we should not be letting far right politicians set the Christian agenda. These politicians have ignited a nearly dominate evangelical movement by making Christianity about who you sleep with. Don't get me wrong, Christianity has a great deal to say about who we sleep with, but that isn't the point of Christianity. We cannot let the agenda of a particular political group set the mission of the Christian Church, which is primarily about proclaiming and working towards the coming Kingdom of God.

Secondly, even though Christianity has some things to say about proper sexual relationships, the way that some Christians have been saying it is not helpful to Christianity or the people they are speaking to. The medium is the message. Many have made the medium of communicating the Christian way of life a hate-filled string of thunderous accusations and fear-mongering. And, the same group of people seem to assume that this is a really easy issue and the lines are black and white. I don't think very many of them have had actual relationships with homosexual people who are trying to be faithful Christians. There are a great deal of them, though most of them eventually give up on Christianity or join churches that are so leftist and marginally Christian that there homosexuality is a non-issue or even a cause for martyrdom or sainthood. That isn't all of them. I have several gay friends who have refused to give up their evangelical form of Christianity, and can't see themselves giving up their homosexuality either. I think they would all agree that this can be a torturous place to be (though I haven't asked them this specific question).

I understand what Webb is saying. Most of the emerging church types are saying the same thing. My question is whether this is an either/or proposition. Do we have to change our sexual ethics if we are going to fight against poverty and sickness in Africa? It doesn't seem to be a necessary choice. Furthermore, it doesn't seem obvious to me that the only way to love homosexuals well is to suggest that this is how it is suppose to be. Perhaps the Church could love them better by journeying with them in their day to day trials. In fact, it may be that this is all we are to do in the struggle against disease and poverty and every other social ill. We are to be friends of those who are hurting. Sometimes this may mean bringing antibiotics to a malaria stricken nation. Other times this may mean we have to defend our gay friend's right to be in the hospital room when their long time partner needs them most.

I pray that I might be called a friend of sinners, just as Jesus was. If that means I am accused of being friends with homosexuals or even Derek Webb, then I am ready for that. Somehow I have to hope that means that people will see something of Jesus in me and they will point and say, "That is what God is like. That is what it means to be fully human." That is the incarnation of the Body of Christ.

Back to Mr. Webb: He is a brilliant artist. He happens to read a lot of the theologians that I read, and I like that. But, I am not sure that the either/or choice he implicitly presents us in this song is anything like the third way that Jesus proposed. Maybe it is just one more start to a leftist politics. Certainly the current strain of leftist politics is just as bankrupt as the current strain of the politically right. Maybe we can still understand God's design for humanity to be sexual love between a man and a woman, and yet be willing to honestly stand with our gay and lesbian friends in solidarity. Maybe we don't have to yell and hate in the process. Maybe those of us of a Pietistic bent can get motivated to make a difference on societal sin in the same way we do personal sin. Certianly the Pietists and early Methodists from whom most of us have inherited our spirituality had no problem putting away alcohol for themselves and trying to teach the poor how to read and write.

Enough for today. I challenge you all. If you want to see good modern art, then trace out some of the Derek Webb links I have given here...and see what has happened in the last few months. Fascinating. And give your comments back here. I would love to hear what you think.

Some closing reflections

2009-05-25T22:45:00.001-04:00

OK, so these aren't really closing reflections...in many ways they are only the beginning...but here it goes.

2 years to finish my Bachelors in theology
2 years to earn my Masters of Theological Studies
2 years of coursework for my PhD.

I am nearing the end of six years of classes to learn how to talk about God. It's not that I didn't talk about God before that. I did. Sort of.

I use to say a lot...I say even more now, but I am much more cautious about what I say. Part of the reason I am more cautious is because the words that I say are often more nuanced and deliberate than they were before. Maybe I am more cautious because I am more aware that I really don't have this entire theology and bible thing figured out. Before I started this journey, I and all of my friends thought we knew pretty much what everyone should say about God. Now I am much less certain. And then, sometimes I am more cautious because I am aware of how my words may offend others. Sometimes I still choose to offend because I think someone needs to be offended, but I know when I am doing it now.

I think the biggest question at this point in my education and my faith journey is...Has six years of higher education in theology made me a better Christian?

I think that was really the thing that my Assemblies of God friends were afraid of when I left for this journey. They weren't sure that I wouldn't come back hating the bible or Christianity, or at least not believing them.

The reason that churches are often afraid of their people going away to school should be obvious by now. A great number of them really do return with big doubts about the existence of God and the truth of the Jesus stories. Even those who still believe are often no good for ministry anymore. They like to include all of the big words for their congregations, especially if those words are in Greek. Of course, the people in their congregations are really impressed with this for the first two weeks. After that they realize that the newly educated minister knows much more about Greek grammar than they do about practicing the presence of God.

So I don't want to push the question aside that is so often pressed upon educated people of my tradition: Did higher education take away my Jesus?

Maybe the question seems odd. I suppose after all of my ramblings above, it doesn't seem that odd. I think the question is legitimate.

My first response is ...no. I know that learning all that I have about the historical situation in which Jesus ministered has changed my view of what Jesus was teaching. So in some ways, the Jesus that I once believed in has been altered. I use to think Jesus was trying to teach us all how to get to heaven. Now I think Jesus was trying to teach us how to be ready for when God brings heaven to earth (read Revelation 21-22). That is a pretty significant change. Some may see that change and say that my education has taken away my Jesus and replaced him something else. I prefer to think of it more like the man who was blind and Jesus spit in the dirt to make him see. When I was saved, I could see people walking around as though they were trees. Now I see people where the trees once stood. I certainly am seeing different things, but I don't think that is so bad.

But then, after thinking about it a little, I would have to respond with a really emphatic ...NO. I'll put it this way.

Though it now takes me 25 pages to write the same idea that use to take me seven sentences, I still believe the same things about Jesus that I did seven years ago. I believe Jesus was God incarnate. He was made to suffer on a cross by the Roman and Jewish leaders who feared him. After three days he was resurrected to a glorified body and visited his disciples. And then he ascended into heaven and sent the Holy Spirit to empower the infant church to do great miraculous works in Jesus' name.

That doesn't seem so bad, does it?

So, why am I writing this?

I guess I am thinking about two people tonight. First, I am thinking about my friends in my faith tradition. So many of them want to be faithful to God and want to be all that God called them to be. I only wish that they would take up a diligent study of theology and trust that God would sustain there faith. I am witness to the fact that this study will only make you stronger as a person of faith.

Second, I am thinking about my friends who want something of the person of Jesus and his teaching of love, but generally think the bible and the confession that Jesus was God is a little strange at best and at worst, dangerous. Many of these friends were told by a science professor in college or history teacher in high school, that religious belief is for the weak. They have been told so many times that belief in God is irrational. I can assure these friends that belief in God is neither irrational, nor dangerous. Believing without thinking can be dangerous. I was that at one time. But a thinking person can evaluate the evidence and believe that Jesus was God, the Holy Spirit still miraculously heals today, and God created the heavens and the earth. And, none of that belief will cause them to kill Muslims or hate homosexuals. If you want to see hatred, read the patron saints of (the New) atheism, Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens. You will see that religion isn't dangerous...sin is dangerous.

OK, so hopefully I will have some more time for posting now that I am finishing up my coursework. May this be only the beginning.

LEX LITURGIA, LEX AESTHETICA: THEOLOGICAL AESTHETICS AND LITURGICAL THEOLOGY

2009-03-09T23:19:00.000-04:00

“In every age and culture, the process of evangelism into faith is, at the same time, a process of being formed in a certain aesthetic—that is into certain patterned forms of perception.”[1] At first glance, this statement would seem to indicate that Don Saliers is purporting a kind of extreme religious aestheticism. When pietistic Evangelicals learn that Saliers is a liturgical theologian, then their fears will quickly be confirmed that liturgy itself is a “merely” aesthetic endeavor and has little to do with authentic Evangelical spirituality. Karl Barth shared this Evangelical concern for aestheticism. Barth explained that by saying that God is beautiful we must wonder whether we “bring the contemplation of God into suspicious proximity to that contemplation of the world which in the last resort is the self-contemplation of an urge for life which does not recognize its limits.”[2] Can a category as seemingly subjective as beauty actually carry the weight of a proper evangelical concern? Romantic aestheticism finally concludes itself in a nihilistic “art for art’s sake.” For Barth, this aestheticism and any other “ism” which would claim centrality in our theological contemplation (i.e. logism, moralism, intellectualism, etc.) is a reduction to idolatry.[3] This certainly cannot be an evangelical aesthetics. But this is not what Saliers intends at all.

Rather, Saliers is arguing that faith conversion is finally a change in perception. I have argued elsewhere that the primary category for evangelical and apologetic concerns is beauty, because beauty classically understood is the category of being related to the efficient cause of love. A beautiful thing is that which delights upon contemplation. If “the chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy Him forever”, then an evangelical theology is one that causes a person to take delight in God. Therefore, an evangelical theology is one that displays the beauty of God as an object of contemplation. Saliers contends that this conversion will require a new kind of seeing. Evangelical conversion therefore requires the formation of Christian “taste”. In this essay, I will explore how liturgy as an aesthetic object can (re)form aesthetic taste towards the Beauty of God. Conversely, I will explore the ways in which theological aesthetics can ministerially critique liturgy. Because of the formational character of liturgy, liturgists and liturgical theologians have an obligation towards an aesthetic that will help participants “see” God. This mutually critiquing relationship, liturgy teaching appropriate aesthetics and aesthetics teaching appropriate liturgy, is a particular instance of the lex orandi, lex credendi debate: lex liturgia, lex aesthetica.

Ascending to Higher Beauty

Plato argued that beauty must be learnt by experiencing particular beautiful things. By seeing many of these beautiful things, a person begins to see similarities between the beautiful things and is able to see that these similarities are the result of a single concept of beauty which exists prior to the particulars. Beginning with more physical beauties, a person may begin to contemplate the beauty of ideas and knowledge and finally understand the concept of Beauty itself.[4] Given Plato’s instructions and the infinite nature of God, the proper starting place for understanding aesthetic criteria and formation into aesthetic judgment is particular physical things. Much of philosophical aesthetics begins with a discussion of art for this reason. Likewise, theological aesthetics will also begin with particular aesthetic objects. However, the primary starting point of this theological aesthetics is not religious fine art, although fine arts have their place in aesthetic formation and evangelism. Everything that I will say about the liturgy as an artistic medium could also be said of Christian fine art in abstraction. However, I begin with the Christian liturgy because it is the everyday communal artful action. Only an elite group of artists and critics encounter fine art on a regular basis, though Christians would do well to make artistic contemplation a regular activity. But every person who attends a worship service encounters the artful action of Christian liturgy.[5] This regular participation in liturgy as an aesthetic object serves as the particular beautiful things which serve to form aesthetic taste in Plato’s schema.

Following St. Augustine, Frank Burch Brown speaks of how encountering a beautiful object or event such as a sunset or a symphony orchestra performance causes a delight that cannot be satisfied.[6] Aesthetic enjoyment is the cause of greater desire. If Plato is correct, then subsequent experiences of beautiful objects will train the observer towards similarities. Observers might question what element of the choirs’ weaving polyphony and the preacher’s dancing cadence caused their delight. Once tasting this beautiful liturgy, participants will begin to desire the “water” which will cause them “to never thirst again”.[7] As Plato described, encounter with the beautiful object of Christian liturgy is drawn to contemplate beauty in the abstract and finally must find God as the ultimate source of beauty.

This Augustinian-Platonic conception of aesthetic formation seems significantly more peaceful and gradual than that described by Derrida. For Derrida the aesthetic object is like Paul’s blinding on the road to Damascus, it is a blinding that causes one to see. But Derrida’s ‘blinded seeing’ (my terminology) is not total blinding or total seeing, but nevertheless a radical conversion of seeing. The security of seeing is lost and “tears of insight” are gained. All of which makes the “love of God grow within”.[8] This derridian artistic conversion is not unlike Aidan Kavanagh’s description of the liturgy’s effect on participants. The liturgical conversion is “an adjustment in the assembly of participants to its being brought to the brink of chaos in the previous liturgical act.”[9] The liturgy changes the participants, and the participants likewise change the liturgy in the next performance because of their adjustment. Following Gadamer, David Tracy likewise recognizes the transformative character of engagement with art.

Rather the work of art encounters me with the surprise, impact, even shock of reality itself. In experiencing art, I recognize a truth I somehow know but know that I did not really know except through the experience of recognition of the essential compelled by the work of art. I am transformed by its truth when I return to the everyday, to the whole of what I ordinarily call reality, and discover new affinities, new sensibilities for the everyday.[10]

Both Tracy and Derrida conceive of the aesthetic object as radically converting the observer by its shear beauty, a conversion that opens one’s eyes to seeing in a new way. Although transformation can happen in this way (we often still refer to this kind of transformation as a “Damascus Road experience”), it is not our normal experience. Though Augustine recounts his conversion to Christianity as a single event in a garden, the single event can only be conceived of as the final event in a transformational process. This transformation is consistently referred to by Augustine as a reordering of loves. The rate at which this happens is important but not critical at this juncture. If the efficient cause of love is beauty as both Plato and Aquinas agree, then a reordering of loves amounts to a conversion of aesthetic taste. Prioritizing the love of God is a change in aesthetic perception to recognize God’s Beauty as ultimate beauty. As Brown summarizes,

(C)ertain kinds of neo-Platonism emphasize that the sensible beauty that one can apperceive through taste is analogous to the divine beauty that can be known through the intellect or religious affections; one’s love of the former can lead therefore to love of the latter, and aesthetic taste can in this way be transformed into its spiritual analogue.[11]

Here the Platonic schema of particular beautiful things leading to a conception of beauty in general and therefore God is made explicitly religious. Taste enables aesthetic perception which leads to love of divine beauty. Because this process depends upon aesthetic taste which some people are perceived to have and others are not, “taste” plays a significant role in what it means to be formed aesthetically. As Saliers argues, evangelism is closely tied to developing a certain aesthetic.

Avoiding Aestheticism and Idolatry

Properly formed aesthetic is called good taste. Conversely, if good taste is proper aesthetic appreciation, then bad taste is a failure to see the aesthetic well. But taste as I speak of it does not refer to culturally formed elitist criteria. Rather good taste refers to the ability to properly judge to what extent a particular existing thing participates in beauty, goodness, and truth. Brown suggests four forms of “sinful taste”, that is bad taste theologically understood.[12] First is idolatrous aestheticism. Brown says that aestheticism maintains a perfection achieved through expressing an “inner vision” rather than correspondence to a really existing reality. Popular in Romantic art, this is art for art’s sake. Art needs no reference to God and is therefore worshipped as its own absolute.

Second, the sin of philistinism is failing to take delight in God. Barth referred to taking God’s glory as “mere fact.” The philistine takes no delight in theological and artistic truth and therefore can take no joy in God’s truth and beauty. Barth said, “The theologian who has no joy in his work is not a theologian at all.”[13] To truly apprehend God is find God beautiful. The philistine looks at the aesthetic and searches for its use. The doctrine of the Trinity, the rhythm of dance, and mystery of poetry are rendered obsolete for their uselessness. This is apparent in the constant inquiry into what art “means”.

Third, intolerant aesthetic elitism is the sin of pride. This indication of bad taste has often been the mark of good taste. The one well-steeped in aesthetic criteria is the most likely to dismiss “popular” art as mere kitsch. It may well be this popular art that avoids incommensurability with the “non-artist”. On the other hand, the fourth indication of bad taste is indifference to beauty. This indifference fails to distinguish between truthful and false representation. Like aestheticism, but for different reasons, evil and false representations can slip behind this “sinful taste” without aesthetic criteria to judge them.

Although each of these types of “sinful taste” is equally bad, the one that primarily concerns this work is the first, aestheticism. As I recognized in the introduction above, arguing for aesthetic formation as evangelism comes dangerously close to aestheticism. But evangelical theology is concerned primarily with reordering persons’ love towards God. Even as Barth warned of the dangers of aestheticism, he finally concluded that the final word in a proper doctrine of God must be that God is beautiful.[14] Therefore the most critical concern in theological aesthetics of this nature is aestheticism. As stated above, “art for art’s sake” or “liturgy for liturgy’s sake” are both properly called idolatry.

The key step in avoiding idolatry is a thorough grounding of all beauty in the beauty of God. More directly, all aesthetic appreciation must be contemplation of God. Brown speaks of the beauty of natural or created objects grounding in the ultimate Beauty of God. Classical Christian doctrine’s of Imago Dei or analogia entis support the view that created things participate in an infinitely less complete way in the Beauty, Truth, and Goodness of God. Likewise, liturgy as beautiful performance is grounded in the beauty of God.

Thus Beauty is distinguished from the merely pretty. Aestheticism which produces art for its own sake only describes the decorative and pretty. Beauty must refer also to what is good and true. Beautiful objects must point beyond themselves to real Beauty, the essence (or form) of Beauty. Medieval theologians borrowed this concept primarily from the Neoplatonists.[15] Neoplatonists thought that the extent to which a thing pointed beyond itself towards the form which it participated causes the particular to be perceived as beautiful (and good and true). Beauty was grounded in the forms. Medieval theologians drew on this concept to claim that beauty in particular existing things was due to their grounding in God, the Truly Beautiful. Something could be considered pretty without significant ontological grounding. But a beautiful thing was beautiful because it participated in God.

Like the medieval theologians, Gadamer too wanted to ground beauty in ontology, though not for theological reasons. He did so by drawing on the concept of symbol, a word often employed in sacramental theology. Gadamer explains that symbol was originally a token of remembrance between a guest and his or her host. The host would take an object from his or her home and break it, giving half to the guest. If a descendent of the guest were to meet the host some time later, he or she could bring the symbol and the two pieces could be fit together again. Therefore, symbol referred to “something in and through which we recognize something already known to us.”[16] Therefore, to speak of art or liturgy as symbol is not simply to say that the experience of liturgy “means” something else. Thus communion is not simply the recalling of a first century Passover meal or even a theatrical performance of a forthcoming heavenly banquet. Symbol refers to a broken piece of something larger. The liturgical event participates in the historical narrative of redemption in a real but incomplete way. Because it is only a piece of the reality of which it is a part, the liturgical act is always only a partial revealing of the truly Beautiful. Gadamer proposes that the symbolic always “rests upon an intricate interplay of showing and concealing.”[17] John Milbank proposes that seeing the beautiful is seeing the invisible in the visible. I take him to mean something like Gadamer’s hermeneutics of symbol.[18] For Milbank this may even include seeing the invisible as invisible, which is the heart of Christian mystery. Christian dogma names the mysterious as mysterious and contends that something is accomplished in doing so. Mystery is at the heart of sacrament. Naming bread and wine “body and blood” makes the mystery visible and yet still quite invisible. Nothing we see, eat, or smell in Christian liturgy looks, tastes, or smells like body and blood. In this sense the invisible is still invisible. In another real sense, these invisible are made visible in bread and wine. The bread and wine are a symbol in the sense that they participate in a “broken” way in Christ’s body and blood.[19] This grounding of the aesthetic object in a proper reference to God avoids idolatry. Only God can be identified with Beauty itself without qualification.

Therefore all proper speech about God is dependent on some form of analogy. Regardless of one’s acceptance of analogia entis or its rejection (Nein!) in favor of analogia fides, the role in theological speech is the same. Analogy opens up the possibility of speech about God without reducing God to a being like us. Analogy preserves the infinity of God and makes knowledge of God possible, avoiding univocity and equivocity. The use of analogy in theological and liturgical speech helps to distinguish the merely pretty from the beautiful. Pretty things may please the eye. But beautiful things point beyond themselves to the very reality of Beauty, God.

As David Bentley Hart has argued, the doctrine of analogy is the link between the Platonic conception of aesthetics and the doctrine of creation that must ground any Christian ontology. When creation is understood as a finite (and sinful) participation in the transcendental predicates of Being, then all creation can be expressed in terms of greater or lesser participation in God. This is the “principle” of analogy in all its various theological forms.[20]

This principle of analogy allows liturgical aesthetics to avoid aestheticism. Beautiful liturgical events are beautiful insofar as they point beyond themselves toward God. Christian liturgists and liturgical theologians must be attentive to the extent to which liturgy itself is the object of contemplation. Liturgy (and Christian fine arts) must cause observers to contemplate God rather than the liturgy.[21] Though the liturgy is the means of contemplation, God must be the object of contemplation. Like analogical speech, art and liturgy are always an approximation of truth that points beyond themselves to truth larger than themselves.

Thus the fruit of this extended treatment of idolatrous aestheticism and the principle of analogy is a liturgical theology which can be informed by aesthetic criteria without falling into aestheticism. Art and liturgy which avoid aestheticism have their proper grounding as symbol in the reality to which they themselves take part. The degree to which something participates in God, Beauty Itself, is the degree to which it is beautiful. A theological aesthetics must provide some principles, if not measures, by which participation in God and therefore the Beautiful can be recognized. This is the role of the conception of symbol proposed by Gadamer. However, liturgy is not beautiful only because it is symbol. Liturgists, like artists, must also consider aesthetic criteria if the liturgy will serve as a beautiful object that helps form aesthetic taste.

Theological Aesthetic Critique of Liturgy

Geoffrey Wainwright argues for the grammatical ambiguity of the Latin lex orandi, les credendi. As Wainwright argues, prayer and belief have a mutually critiquing interplay in which worship influences doctrine and doctrine influences belief.[22] Likewise, liturgy influences aesthetic formation and theological aesthetic criteria influences liturgy. I have said nothing more or less than Wainwright, only something more particular. A particular kind of theology, theological aesthetics, has a mutually critiquing interplay with a particular kind of prayer, liturgy. Lex liturgia, lex aesthetica is a particular form of lex orandi, lex credendi. Like the latter formula, the former formula must also be considered a proper principal for liturgical theology. However, aesthetics fails its role in liturgical critique if not a proper theological aesthetics. Thus it must be grounded in the Beauty and love of God according to the principle of analogy.

This principle of analogy provides the first theological aesthetic critique of liturgy. Liturgy as an aesthetic object must claim some kind of participation in God or collapse into aestheticism and idolatry. In other words, liturgy which attends to aesthetic concerns must be sacramental worship. Liturgical aesthetics must be a visible sign of the invisible Beauty of God.[23] Liturgy with no conception of participation and mediation of God cannot account for aesthetic concerns without already being clearly aestheticism, liturgical aesthetics for the sake of aesthetics.

Roman Catholic sacramentality extends the concept of mediation beyond the proper Sacraments to other sensible means. Of course Catholic thought insists that nothing is necessary but the Eucharist itself. But abundant aesthetic bells, incense, gesture, poetic language, music and grand architecture create a rich sensory awareness within the Mass. Though Catholic “Real Presence” is objectively so, these other sensory experiences serve to prepare the worshipper such that the Sacrament is efficacious.[24] This didactic use of aesthetic experiences cannot be the end for Catholic sacramentality, however. Because of the principle of analogy, all beautiful objects are such because of participation in divine beauty. The grand architecture is perceived as beautiful because God too is grand. Beautiful harmony is such because “all things work together for the good”, and so on.

Thus Puritan “liturgical aesthetics” make sense if one denies the principle of analogy as most Reformed theologians did.[25] Revelation (whether natural or special) as the only source of knowledge of God makes no room for liturgy made by persons as a legitimate source of divine knowledge. This liturgical theory is consistent with their conception of revelation. However, the theological error leads to an austerity that fails to take delight in God, a theological philistinism.

Sacramental theology, the conception that what happens in worship mediates and participates in God, requires that aesthetic concerns remain vital. God who is Beauty Itself is maligned by inattention to aesthetic criteria. To summarize several interdependent conclusions: God is Beautiful. Creation participates in God and God’s Beauty according to a principle of analogy. Sacramental worship therefore participates in God’s beauty as part of creation. Therefore, worship must be beautiful if it will participate in God well and form participants into a proper perception of God.

Beyond concerns regarding sacramentality, Christian liturgy must also account for aesthetic criteria. But aesthetic judgment is something that cannot be reduced to formulas. This fact makes it difficult to use beauty and aesthetics as a critical principle in the liturgy. Philosophical and theological aesthetics serve as resources to provide criteria for judging beauty in a particular thing. Though these criteria are not easily quantifiable, they can serve as diagnostic tools for assessing liturgical aesthetics. Without these criteria as a guide, worship may form participants into an aesthetic vision that is less then Christian orthodoxy.

Aquinas named three criteria which are relatively accepted in aesthetics universally: unity, harmony or proportion, and brightness.[26] Though these criteria have been adopted by philosophical aesthetics generally, they are theological categories for Aquinas. He explains the categories under the relations of the Trinity, attending to each regarding the Son. Beauty is a category that proceeds from God as it accords with God’s Being.

Christian liturgy attends to these aesthetic criteria regarding the liturgy’s internal cohesiveness and in relationship to the world which the liturgy portrays. If one attended only to the aesthetic qualities of the liturgy internal to itself, then this would amount to “liturgy for liturgy’s sake”. Internal aesthetics are necessary for the appeal of the senses to the liturgy itself, but the “truthfulness” of the liturgy to the outside world must also be attended to if Church and liturgy are in any way to be called “sacramental”. When Kavanagh refers to the sacramental he means that the Church is sacrament because it shows the World what it was meant to be.[27] Therefore, the liturgy should be an enactment of the world as it is meant to be. Therefore the aesthetic criteria help one judge the extent to which the Church’s liturgy points beyond itself towards a World rightly formed. The formal principle for a particular aesthetic genre is largely dependent upon socialized aesthetic preferences. However, the church’s liturgy and doctrine is largely a way of seeing, a worldview. Thus the formal principle is not something arbitrary or even socially formed. Liturgy and belief must make account for the world as it is experienced. The World therefore is the formal principle of Christian liturgy. However, it is not the World only, but the World as eschatologically oriented by the Church’s witness.

Taken as a whole, ‘fittingness’ describes the degree to which the theological or aesthetic point beyond themselves to the World well. Are the specific elements held in proper proportion such that each element is expressed to its proper intensity? Is the representation sufficiently rich such that it portrays seemingly disparate concepts with proper harmony or dissonance? Is the unity of the whole called into question by a significant concept’s overemphasis or omission? The concept of fittingness also takes into account the contextual appropriateness. Significant difference found between cultural expressions is simultaneously locally and universally conditioned. Though the aesthetic criteria below encompass localized definitions of unity, harmony, and brightness, the categories themselves are universal.

But this universality does not account for the way that a grand gothic cathedral would be inappropriate in a sub-Saharan African village. The expense of producing such a structure among financial poverty would be morally irresponsible. And the architecture would be misplaced among tribal ways of life. Thus attentiveness to particular localized taste is also necessary. So the aesthetic concept of ‘fittingness’ serves as a guide trans-culturally while considering cultural taste preferences.[28] Further parsing of the concept of ‘fittingness’ includes analysis of the individual aesthetic criteria. This provides guidelines for forming a beautiful liturgical witness.

Unity primarily concerns the coherence and completeness of the aesthetic object. As a theological principle, Aquinas derives this concept from the Son’s identical nature with the Father. Nicholas Wolterstorff explains that as an artistic criteria unity is based on the formal concept of unity inherent to particular art forms.[29] For example, this means that the medieval cathedral is unified by the formal conception of medieval architectural standards. When measuring the unity of a conception of the world’s reality the formal concept is reality itself. Therefore, unity of the Christian story or any other worldview will be the extent to which every area of reality is included in the conception.

For example, Christianity’s failure to convincingly account for or provide alternative visions for evolutionary theory has debatably been a lack of unity in contemporary Christian witness. Likewise, if a theory’s internal coherence broke down at significant points as Newtonian physics was known to do, then unity is lacking. Therefore as Christian liturgy performs the world, it must have a logic that makes internal sense and it must account well for the way the world is and should be if it is to be considered unified.

Practically speaking, Christian liturgy which uses the orthodox language of creation must give an account of modern evolutionary theories or it will appear to be fideistic to participants. Since liturgical formation is typically a process of ongoing engagement in worship, an account of creation language and evolutionary theories need not take place every week. But liturgically ignoring alternative accounts of the world which grasp the participants’ allegiances will lack aesthetic unity with reality as it is experienced. This will not be a simple Tillichian correlation or unthinking fideism. Liturgically this will require biblical preaching that explains the grammar of Christian faith found in the creeds. This is not to say that creation language should be explained away or deemphasized in light of modern science. But Christian liturgy must explain the imaginative language of the liturgical art without explaining it away.[30]

Proportion speaks of the relationship of one element to another. Aquinas speaks of proportion regarding Jesus as a perfect image of God. Proportion regards the degree to which the image reflects the imaged. Augustine explained proportion by lamenting the loss of single eyebrow from the human form. “Loss to the mere mass of the body is insignificant. But what a blow to Beauty!”[31] For example, liturgies which emphasize either mercy or judgment (or Oneness and Threeness) without the other are recognized as out of proportion. Likewise, harmony speaks of the beauty of varied elements when spoken of together, therefore holding such diverse concepts as mercy and judgment as mutually dependent. Contemporary Evangelical theologies often emphasize the grace and mercy displayed in sacrificial atonement without the ethical implications of incarnation. This results in a theological error with moral consequences, which effects the beauty of Christian witness. When each is given their proper place, Christian doctrine will proclaim forgiveness and also take up the social responsibility inherent to Christian faith. Outsiders will see that as a beautiful way of life.

Harmony also speaks of the richness of an account. A single musical note has unity, but it lacks the richness of harmony. The popular “Roman’s Road” or “Four Spiritual Laws” approaches to faith serve as an example here. When an account is reduced to a single concept without the tensions of other “dissonant” concepts it lacks beauty. As Don Saliers says about praise without lamentation, a theology that lacks richness may turn out to be simply a cheap imitation.[32] Proportion and harmony within the Christian liturgy will attend to the relationship of liturgical elements. Does the liturgy emphasize visual, aural, and tactile elements appropriately? Besides these internal aesthetic questions are the questions of the liturgy’s fittingness with reality. Hymnody which is primarily dissonant or, conversely, contains only major chords with melodies in perfect triads fails to project the world of harmony and disharmony well.

Aquinas named the third criteria “brightness”. For Aquinas this follows from the Logos as the “light and splendor of the intellect”.[33] Wolterstorff identifies this criterion with what he calls “fittingness-intensities”.[34] By this he means the degree to which an aesthetic object achieves the character to which it is intended. If Christian liturgy enacts a redeeming story, then its “brightness” would be measured by the depth of the redemption enacted. Is every area of a person’s life redeemed including the physical, emotional, and spiritual parts? Is creation itself redeemed? Can social entities, artistic forms, and academic disciplines (to name just a few examples) be redeemed? Does redemption mean a complete break from that which held bondage (i.e. does the alcoholic ever return to the drink and if so does redemption even extend there)? If the redemption enacted in liturgy is one that only “saves” a person’s soul from eternal damnation while leaving there present lives unchanged then the “redemption” portrayed is insignificantly “bright”.

These aesthetic criteria serve simply as an alternative way of considering the multi-level tensions which Saliers contends are necessary for faithful liturgy. The tension between divine ethos and human pathos cannot be reduced from artistic expression and imagination. Christian liturgy is always “both God-attentive and thoroughly grounded in human life always found in specific social/cultural patterns.”[35] This kind of tension cannot be expressed with words alone. But the liturgical art can enact these tensions without reducing them. Thus liturgy as artful action can make intelligible the tension between the similarity and greater dissimilarity of Creator and creature. In other words, liturgy as art can speak analogically in a way that plain speech and secondary theology cannot. It seems that Saliers attention to tension is the struggle to maintain unity, proportion, and brightness well.

Conclusion

Evangelical formation is largely dependent on the dynamic relationship between liturgy and aesthetics. By experiencing particular beautiful objects, which occurs regularly in Christian liturgy, a person is formed into a particular way of seeing. This way of seeing opens the worshipper to an imaginative artful framework which is able to hold significant tensions together without reduction. Not only is liturgy able to do this, it should be considered the primary way of doing so. This is not based on a Romantic desire for beauty for its own sake. God’s being is a multi-layered reality which cannot be contained with simple words. Likewise, the drama of salvation history is multi-faceted and requires a new way of perceiving if the uninitiated will be able to apprehend. By experiencing the liturgy and its multi-layered realities, a participant is formed into an aesthetic perception of the world. This beautiful perception entices thirst that can only be quenched by God. Thus aesthetic perception causes a person to love God, as Beauty is love’s efficient cause.

However, idolatry is liturgy as the object of contemplation rather than the means of contemplating God. This aestheticism results from aesthetic concerns in liturgy without a proper doctrine of creation. Liturgical aesthetics without the principle of analogy cannot account for its role in evangelism or worship. Sacramental worship leads the worshipper to contemplation of God by aesthetic means. Sacramental worship employs symbol to make the invisible beauty of God visible in the artful action of liturgy. Symbol as employed by liturgy is not a simple this means that. Rather, symbol serves as the visible mediation of an invisible reality without fully exhausting the invisible. One might say, “There is more to it than that.” Eucharist is the “real presence” of Christ, but does not contain the presence of Christ. The principle of analogy allows speech about God and divine reality which participates substantially but inexhaustibly in the divine. This is artful speech.

Because liturgy is an artful performance of divine reality, aesthetic categories are helpful in critiquing liturgical action. The aesthetic criteria of unity, proportion, and ‘fittingness-intensity’ ensure that liturgical acts form participants in a truthful aesthetic perception. They do so based on there theological basis in the doctrine of God. Aesthetic criteria not founded in the doctrine of God are only the basis for the merely pretty. But liturgy which points toward the Beauty of God by attending to the aesthetic criteria formed theologically will form an aesthetic vision that avoids aestheticism and leads persons to “enjoy God forever.”

[1] Saliers, Worship as Theology, 195.

[2] Barth, CD II/1, 651.

[3] Ibid., 655.

[4] Plato, Symposium, 210a-211a.

[5] I am careful here to distinguish between liturgy and what we often call “art”. The primary distinction for Saliers and others is the object of contemplation. Works of art are themselves the object of contemplation. However, the liturgy rightly performed uses aesthetic means to encourage the contemplation of God, not the liturgy. This distinction will return significantly in “Aestheticism and Idolatry” below. Cf. Saliers in Art, Theology and the Church, 188-9.

[6] Brown, Good Taste, Bad Taste, and Christian Taste, 97-100.

[7] Cf. John 4:13, NIV.

[8] These quotes and explanation of Derrida are from Brown, Good Taste, Bad Taste, and Christian Taste, 90-2.

[9] Kavanagh, On Liturgical Theology, 74.

[10] Quoted in Theological Aesthetics:A Reader, ed. by Gesa Elsbeth Theissen, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 2004), 261-2.

[11] Brown, Religious Aesthetics, 146. The “certain kinds of neo-Platonism” to which Brown refers are Thomas Aquinas in particular and neo-Thomists in general. Though I have thus far referred only to “medieval theologians,” my argument follows Aquinas significantly as he is the medieval theologian par excellence. As Brown shows, the Platonic schema of ascending from experiencing particular beautiful things to beautiful ideas and finally Beauty/God in general is made explicitly Christian with Aquinas and the medieval theologians.

[12] Brown, Religious Aesthetics, 151-157. Also see a expansion on Brown in De Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 80-94.

[13] Barth, CD II/1, 658.

[14] Barth, CD II/1, 652.

[16] Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful, 31.

[17] Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful, 33.

[18] Milbank, “Beauty and the Soul”, 2.

[19] Lathrop’s use of “broken symbol” is analogous to Gadamer’s symbol as two broken parts of a whole. For Lathrop, a symbols breaking opens it up to new meanings which it could not contain previous to the breaking. Its “meaning” is incomplete. For Gadamer, the “meaning” is equally opened by a kind of brokenness, the parts breaking from the whole.

[20] David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmands, 2003), 241-9. Cf. Brown, Religious Aesthetics, 123-4.

[21] Saliers, “Liturgical Aesthetics” in Arts, Theology, and the Church, 188-9.

[22] Wainwright, Doxology, 218-9.

[23] I intend here a faithful transposition of the classical definition of sacrament in theological aesthetic terms. Thus “an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace” is correlatively a “visible sign of the invisible Beauty of God.” Cf. Brown, Religious Aesthetics, 105.

[24] Brown, Religious Aesthetics, 124-5.

[25] One notable exception is the positive place for aesthetics and art for Jonathan Edwards. See Jonathan Edwards, Religious Affections, ed. John E. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 298-9; and Roland Dealattre, Beauty and Sensibility in the Thought of Jonathan Edwards (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.)

[26] Summa Theologica, I q. 39, a. 8.

[27] Kavanagh, On Liturgical Theology, 42-3.

[28] Wolterstorff has an excellent discussion of the use of particular artistic elements in liturgical acts. He explains that what is fitting for worship in Pentecost may not be fitting for worship at Lent. Likewise, music that is fitting for one congregation’s conception of confession may not be fitting for another congregation’s conception of confession. In this sense ‘fittingness’ is intimately concerned with context. Art in Action, 184-7.

[29] Wolterstorff, Art in Action, 164-5.

[30] I think this will require admitting the socially-embedded nature of religious grammar while revealing the socially-embedded nature of modern scientific language. Presuppositional apologists argue that we must “admit that we stand in a particular tradition…and remind our interlocutor that he or she does too” (Kevin Vanhoozer, “Theology and Apologetics” in New Dictionary of Christian Apologetics, 38.). Evangelism and therefore aesthetic formation must pay close attention to apologetics without being reduced to apologetics without remainder. Liturgists and preachers must do this kind of apologetic work without leaving the proper ethos of liturgy and worship. Liturgy is not primarily didactic.

[31] Civitas Dei, Bk. 11, Ch. 22.

[32] Saliers, Worship as Theology, 122-5.

[33] Summa Theologica, I q. 39, a. 8.

[34] Wolterstorff, Art in Action, 166-8.

[35] Saliers, Worship as Theology, 25.

Bibliography

Balthasar, Hans Urs von. The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol. I, Seeing the Form. Trans. by Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis. Ed. by Joseph Fession, SJ and John Riches. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1982.

Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics, II/1. Eds. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957.

Bourgeois, Jason Paul. The Aesthetic Hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hans Urs Von Balthasar. Peter Lang Publishing, 2007.

Brown, David, and Ann Loades, Eds. The Sense of the Sacramental: Movement and Measure in Art and Music, Place and Time. London: SPCK, 1995.

Brown, Frank Burch. Good Taste, Bad Taste, and Christian Taste: Aesthetics in Religious Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

--. Religious Aesthetics: A Theological Study of Making and Meaning. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

Campbell-Jack, C. and Gavin J. McGrath, eds. New Dictionary of Christian Apologetics. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006.

De Gruchy, John W. Christianity, Art and Transformation: Theological Aesthetics in the Struggle for Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambride University Press, 1986.

--. Truth and Method. London: Sheed and Ward, 1975.

Garcia-Rivera, Alejandro. The Community of the Beautiful: A Theological Aesthetics. Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1999.

Harries, Richard. Art and the Beauty of God: A Christian Understanding. New York: Mawbray, 1993.

Harrison, Carol. Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

Hart, David Bentley. The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth. Grand Rapids: Eerdmands, 2003.

Kavanaugh, Aidan. On Liturgical Theology. Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1984.

Milbank, John, Graham Ward, and Edith Wyschogrod. Theological Perspectives on God and Beauty. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.

Milbank, John. Theology and Social Theory, 2^nd Ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

Navone, John. Toward a Theology of Beauty. Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1996.

Oakes, Edward T., SJ, and David Moss. The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs Von Balthasar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Saliers, Don E. Worship as Theology: Foretaste of Glory Divine. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994.

Sherry, Patrick. Spirit and Beauty: An Introduction to Theological Aesthetics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

Theissen, Gesa Elsbeth, ed. Theological Aesthetics: A Reader. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 2004.

Vanhoozer, Kevin J. “Praising in Song: Beauty and the Arts.” In The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics ed. by Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells, 110-21. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd., 2004.

Vrudny, Kimberly, and Wilson Yates, eds. Arts, Theology, and the Church: New Intersections. Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 2005.

Wainwright, Geoffrey. Doxology: The Praise of God in Worship, Doctrine, and Life. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.

White, Nicholas P. “Plato’s Metaphysical Epistemology.” In Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Art in Action: Toward a Christian Aesthetic. Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1980.

My first publication

2008-11-29T01:46:00.000-05:00

I was recently published in the Christian Century. I wrote the article with a friend. Check it out

It's been a while

2006-12-04T23:53:00.000-05:00

Ok...it has been a long while...I have done a lot of work since my last post, so maybe it is time to post some of it here. I will make an attempt as soon as this semester breaks. If you are reading this you should comment here...it will encourage me to keep publishing.

Narrative Ethics/Theology

2006-01-24T15:31:00.000-05:00

I have recently been having significant problems understanding how the narrative ethics and interpretive method that I have been studing falls in line with my interest in the historical Jesus studies of N.T. Wright. Finally James Wm. McClendon has helped me do that. As one of the main proponents of narrative theology, McClendon finds the need to explain what it means in the opening volume of his systematic theology, which is interestingly, "Ethics." His illustration is that narrative requires three elements: character, social setting, circumstance. He explains this way. "The king died and then the queen died" does not give us the character of either of the participants (or for that matter, the social setting). "The king died and then the queen died of grief" begins to explain the character of the queen and the social setting that made her die. This properly explains our narrative of the queen's situation: character, social setting, circumstance (Ethics, Rev. Ed., 329).

When we allign this with the thesis of his entire work on ethics, we see that the three "strands" of Christian ethics lines up with this narrative framework. (1)Christian Ethics is incarnational/embodied ethics. What we do with our bodies matters. What we do with sex matters. What we do with hungry people matters. (2) Christian Ethics is communal. We cannot understand who we are as Christians without understanding who we are as members of the body of Christ. Here he seems to depend on Hauerwas' "Community of Character." We are to be a body of Christ followers who live out our Christian faith in dialogue and interaction with other Christians. We are a member of a body politic, namely the church. This point would require more extensive work than what I will give it here considering our individualistic/capitalistic soceity. (If you are interested, See: McClendon's 'Ethics' or Hauerwas' 'Community of Character.') (3) Christian ethics is eschatalogical (McClendon calls is 'resurrection ethics'). We are constantly to live as if the Kingdom of God (ie. 'heaven') has already started...because it has. 1. embodied (our character) 2. communal (our social setting) 3. eschatological (our circumstance)

With this in mind McClendon explains that the task of this narrative theology/ethics is to "discover, understand, and transformation of a shared and lived story, one whose focus is Jesus of Nazareth and kingdom he claims--a story that on its moral side requires such discovery, such understanding, such transformation as to be true to itself" (331).

This makes sense of where the historical Jesus work comes in. We must do the historical work because Jesus' story is our story. His character should be our character. To understand his character, we must understand his social setting (ie. historical Jesus studies). To understand how to live that character, we must understand our social setting (the failure of many Christians) and our circumstance...that the Kingdom has already been inaugurated.

Thank you to McClendon (God rest his soul).

I have been wondering for some time how this historical Jesus work fit into the narrative theology. I have known that we need to understand our ethics in light of his situation, but what does that mean for someone who lives in this situation.

Primarily it means reading the Scripture from behind the text not in front of it. For this to make sense I will use a modern hermenuetic problem. Many feminists look back on the Bible with a "hermenuetic of suspicion" and see a document reflecting its patriarchal soceity. They call in to question the authority of the Scriptures based on the great revelation of our "enlightened" age that men and women are equal. However, when we look not back on the Bible from our present social setting, but instead forward to the Scripture from their social setting we get a different picture. When Paul proclaims that in Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek, male or female, slave or free(see Gal. 3:28), he does so from a social setting that would not have affirmed any one of those statements. Paul makes a radical claim that all people are equal in the sight of God. His readers would have been somewhat shocked. Of course slaves aren't equal, because they aren't people, they are property (under Roman law).

When we look forward from the text to see it within its social setting, it gives us a vision to look forward from our social setting to witness to a Kingdom that has already been inaugurated.

Narrative ethics/theology. I am one step closer to being able to explain this.

The Church is a Social Ethic

2006-01-02T16:46:00.000-05:00

The following is a paper that responds to the statement: The Church is a Social Ethic. Much of how I understand the church is found here. Let me know what you think.

Again, the footnotes are deleted in the copy and paste. I am willing to give you where some of these arguments can be found if you are looking for further research.

Alasdair MacIntyre convincingly argues in his After Virtue that the Enlightenment’s ethical project has failed. Whether one bases their ethical program on the foundation of the existence and nature of God or a desire to alleviate pain, these ethical programs eventually end in emotivism. The most important failure of these systems is not, however, their failure of a priori reason to discern ethical practice. Certainly these ethical systems are relatively rational, for who can refute the categorical imperative on the grounds of its own logic. Kant was a wise enough man to anticipate questions and propose an ethical and logical solution to those who challenge him. According to MacIntyre, the real failure of the Enlightenment is that “Reason can supply, so these new theologies assert, no genuine comprehension of man’s true end.” The problem is not the logic or the conclusion of the ethical systems, for they all basically conclude on an ethics that looks very much like a Judeo-Christian ethic. The whole of their conclusions will surely not be doubted by those who hold to Christian virtue. However, what is lost is the telos of these ethical systems. When the direction of humanity is disconnected from the ethical systems that are created to obtain it, the ethical systems fail when brought against one another at points of contention.
The illustration of this point can be seen in American Protestantism. American conservative Evangelicalism, where I find my theological home, is based primarily on a deontological argument for the inerrancy of Scripture as a moral handbook. The common argument would consist of something like, “The Bible says, ‘Do not steal,’ therefore I must act ethically and not steal.” While the conclusion is actually quite like the ethical system that would guide humanity towards the Christian telos of peace within God’s created order, the sense of right and wrong has overtaken the purpose of the command, which is avoiding offense that will set man against man in warring conflict. On the other side of the American Protestant church is the mainline liberalism. This group proposes something like Mill’s utilitarianism when it argues that the consequences of acting unjustly is that people get hurt. Wendell Berry makes this point when he argues against war as a means to achieving peace. “Any victory won by violence necessarily justifies the violence that won it and leads to further violence.” While Berry may have reached a true conclusion, a logical argument can certainly be made to the contrary. In either case, this ethics presumes that some kind of moral preference exists that desires peace rather than war. This preference can only be effective within a community-wide definition of the state that includes peace-making as the telos.
The hope that the church brings to the discussion of ethics is not a new ethical system, for the Enlightenment had many of those from which we can choose. The church offers a telos that an ethical system can attempt to realize. Stephen Long argues that “Ethics is always subordinated to theology, for it requires us to discern what the church is to be and do as we constantly seek to live into our baptisms.” Whatever the church decides on some particular topic, whether it be radical pacifism or just war, celibacy or marriage, or communism or capitalism, each of these decisions will be based on the telos that is worked out in the faithful community of the church. The nature of 21st Century denominationalism does not allow that these decisions be truly catholic in nature, for each community’s polity will provide a different means for understanding the telos. But, this does not prevent individual communities from performing the interpretive task that is the call of the Church universal. For the Roman Catholic church, the interpretive task falls to the authority of the papacy. For the Evangelical churches, the interpretive task often falls to the little popes called pastors. For the Presbyterians or Anabaptists, the interpretive task falls to some form of a democratic process. In any of these cases, the only effective social ethic derived will be the one that is lived out by the faithful community, no matter where the interpretive task is focused. If the telos is never undertaken by the community, then the force of the community is lost.
Once we understand the importance of a community-wide telos, the interpretive task must be more clearly defined for the sake of the interpreters. First, the telos must be understood and agreed upon. Second, the means of achieving the telos must be discussed and argued with some end in sight. This second of the tasks, the means, is at least partly accomplished in the proclamation of the telos. This is to say, for a Christian to proclaim that life and justice are Christian virtues that must be our telos, the goal has already been set before the entire Christian community, hopefully with some influence on those outside of the community because of admiration of the Christian’s moral accomplishments. With the clear telos in mind, some might conclude that justice will require war, while others might conclude that life will require peace. Certainly the means to achieve justice are important and the goal of the interpretive task is to find a means that can be agreed upon by the community, but agreeing upon the telos does not necessitate that the community will agree upon the means. Even in the proclamation of the Christian values of justice and life something of the telos has been achieved.
With this in mind, we turn towards the telos of the church. As Stanley Hauerwas has said, “there can be no separation of christology from ecclesiology, that is, Jesus from the church.” The telos of the church is found first in Christ, specifically in the proclamation of the coming Kingdom of God. In the cross of Christ, the Church finds not only the hope for victory over death and the grave, but a model for all future cross-bearing activity. This is the first installment of the promises of the coming Kingdom. The Church is called to realize the eschatological vision of the Kingdom in its communion with one another and with God. The Church does this with the understanding that full realization is only in the parousia. By recognizing that fulfillment of the Kingdom is only found in eschatology, the ethics of the Church are freed from looking to effectiveness as a measure of faithfulness. Hauerwas argues,
Service is not an end in itself, but reflects the Kingdom into which Christians have been drawn. This means that Christians insist on service which may appear ineffective to the world. For the service that Christians are called upon to provide does not have as its aim to make the world better, but to demonstrate that Jesus has made possible a new world, a new social order.
Even as Hauerwas argues that changing the world is not the aim (telos) of Christian service, he does not deny that we can hope and pray that this change will occur. The telos of this kind of living is demonstrating the Kingdom of God to the world, not just making converts to this way of living, but we must certainly hope that the whole world will see that this is a better way of life. In summary, a christological ecclesiology demands that the church demonstrate the Kingdom of God that Christ inaugurates on earth, while recognizing that this Kingdom is only fully realized in the eschaton.
Now we must turn to the second aspect of the interpretive task, which is the means by which the Church will demonstrate the Kingdom of God. Within 21st Century denominationalism, I reluctantly conclude that no catholic understanding of demonstrating this ethic can be reached. In fact, I am belligerently confessing the previously stated christological ecclesiology in light of the fact that the denominational church has no means for even agreeing on this essential telos. The most that can be hoped for at this juncture is a communal agreement of both Christology and the means of demonstration. By this I propose a particular community, primarily the local congregation, must work out this Christology and means within their context. This follows from my understanding of the Incarnation. If Christ came to a First Century Jewish world as a First Century Jew, then we must do the same in inner-city Chicago or American suburbia or the rural south. This is not to say that the story of the historical Jesus is irrelevant to 21st Century American ethics. In fact, understanding Jesus in his First Century Jewish context becomes all the more important in this incarnational understanding. How Jesus responded to Roman imperialism must inform how an American Christian responds to American imperialism. What Jesus said about the institution of marriage and family has significant impact on how we understand marriage and family in America (which is, incidentally, relatively little other than to say that the family of God takes priority even over biological families). How Jesus responds to the economic oppression of First Century Jews by the Roman occupation should inspire us to take action in the ghettos of South-side Chicago. None of these statements are meant to say that we should try to do exactly what Jesus did in any of these situations. Jesus never took a wife or encouraged his disciples to marry, for example. But, it might be that 21st Century American Christians most faithful demonstration of the Kingdom of God is to embody the relationship between Christ and the Church in selfless marital relationships.
In what way does the Church or a congregation embody the Incarnation within its context? This is the interpretive task that I must admit will not be universal or catholic until the Church recognizes a mechanism to work these things out as a community. For the medieval church this mechanism was ecumenical councils. Maybe this is an option that the catholic Church can explore again. Until this mechanism is found or created, the community of the local congregation is the place this work will be done. And, I do suppose that a Christian can have some faith that the Holy Spirit will work as that catholic mechanism, though this has not been realized since the Protestant Reformation. These voices can also be in constant conversation with one another. This is to say that Congregation A might have something to add to the Christology and demonstrative means of Congregation B and vice versa. Only their conversation with one another can facilitate that exchange of ideas.
A proper proclamation of this ecclesiological ethic must recognize the weaknesses of the system. First, I would argue that the inability to agree upon central tenants of the telos and the means is debilitating to the influence of the ethics, as I have already argued above. But, as Hauerwas reminds us, the ethics of the proclamation and demonstration of the Kingdom is not dependant on effectiveness. Secondly, I also acknowledge that some will understand this as a sectarian ethic. Certainly this accusation has been leveled at Hauerwas, McClendon, and Long. Since I follow them closely, I anticipate the accusation will be thrust towards me. I answer with this: the communal nature of ethical practice and agreement does not necessitate separate living. I can interpret the telos and means of my ethical system in a relatively small community and yet live out this ethic in the public sphere. This is precisely what I am suggesting. The same transformative nature of the Jesus narrative that attracted me to Christ and Christian living can be found in the narrative of the Church that demonstrates the Kingdom. This transformative narrative can change society to be like itself, but even if it does not it has not lost its telos, therefore it has not lost its ethical identity.

Christian Marriage: An Image of the Church

2005-11-25T17:54:00.000-05:00

The following is a disputation I wrote on Christian marriage. The form is like Aquinas' Summa. If you are unfamiliar, only the "I answer" section and below are my arguments. The previous are common arguments that I am in discussion with.
The footnotes are lost in the copy and paste from my word processor. If you would like the full document, then just comment in this post with an e-mail address.

Whether it is better for a Christian not to marry

Argument 1 It would seem that it is better for a Christian not to marry. The ascetic practice of celibacy is considered not only an act of worship unto God, but also prevents the body from becoming dependant on lustful desire. Denying the body of pleasure seems to strengthen the spirit and bring one closer to God.

Argument 2 Again, the goodness of procreation that is found in the command to be fruitful and multiply is not necessary for the Christian. New Birth has replaced the biological birth as entrance into the people of God. New Birth is how you entered the Kingdom of God and how all who will believe shall enter the Kingdom, therefore procreation is no longer necessary.

Argument 3 Again, as the Apostle has said, “the time is short” and “the world in its present form is passing away.” It is better for a person not to marry because the aim of one who is unmarried is to be devoted in both body and spirit. The married Christian is devoted to pleasing his or her spouse. The devotion of a Christian should be undivided.

On the contrary, marriage is one of God’s holy institutions founded at the creation of the world. It is good for a person not to be alone. For this reason, marriage is like a sacrament of the Church. For in marriage the grace of God is shown in and through the marriage partner. Marriage has three goods: the restraint of sexual lust, faithfulness is nurtured and grown, and procreation and the blessing of children. It follows that it is better for a Christian to marry.

I answer: Christian marriage functions as a smaller and more intimate form of the Church in both mission and function. When God created man He said, “It is not good for the man to be alone.” He created woman and brought them together so that neither man nor woman would be alone, and He said that the two should become one flesh. It is also written that “the man and his wife were both naked, and they felt no shame.” God had created them in perfect union with one another in such a way that no enmity was between them. When the created choose to sin, the consequence was that perfect fellowship was broken. For God spoke to woman, “Your desire will be for your husband, and he will rule over you.” It is also written, “God made garments of skin for Adam and his wife and clothed them.” Therefore, God created humanity with a desire that they would be in close community with one another and those relationships would be a blessing to them.
God instituted the church to be the reconciling agent in humanity. For the Lord Jesus Christ said, “by this all men will know that you are my disciples, if you love one another.” The relationships that Christians have with one another would be a great testimony of God’s love for the world. When Jesus taught His disciples to pray, “let (the) Kingdom (of God) come on earth, as it is in Heaven” and He said “the Kingdom of God is at hand,” He proclaims that the Kingdom of God has been inaugurated and that is still to come. The Kingdom of God is here, and the Kingdom of God is yet coming. The perfect restored Kingdom of God on earth would have creation in perfect harmony with itself, as in the Garden of Eden story. This New Heaven and New Earth is the blessed hope of all who call Jesus “Lord.” He is coming to make all things new. If the Kingdom of God is yet coming, in what way is the Kingdom of God already at hand? This is the role of the Church in the earth. The Church is to be loving one another and trying to achieve that perfect fellowship of God’s created order. As God’s chosen communion, the Church is to be a reconciling agent of God and a witness to God’s love.
In the same way, marriage is to function as a witness to God’s perfect love for the church. For the Apostle said, “For this reason a man should leave his father and mother and be united to his wife--the two will become one flesh. This is a profound mystery--but I am talking about Christ and the Church.” God’s plan for marriage is to be like a small cell of the church that gives testimony of God’s love. Where the Church gives testimony to the whole world, it is surely flawed and will surely give testimony to the sinfulness of humanity as well. The marriage has a smaller witness, for it is limited to those who know the man and the wife, but the small is able to be greater, for the intimacy of the marriage is greater than that of the Church. The husband and wife are able to trust one another more fully and give themselves to one another more wholly, for “there is one flesh, there is also one spirit. Together they pray, together they prostrate themselves, together they fast, teaching each other, exhorting each other, supporting each other.” Even our local congregations recognize a need for greater intimacy to give a more full testimony of God’s love, for we continue to make smaller and smaller groups in which the church is represented, so that the levels of intimacy are greater. Where the modern church institutes small group ministries, God has already instituted the smallest group ministry of all, marriage.

On the first point: Ascetic denial of the body is acceptable for a time for the Apostle, to devote one’s self to fasting and prayer, but, unlike the Gnostic, the Christian professes the inherent goodness of both sex and the body. God created the body and he gave marriage for the two to enjoy perfect fellowship with one another. Only in this relationship can the two be truly “naked and not ashamed.” The sexual relationship of husband and wife brings glory to God as the two exist in perfect fellowship with one another.

On the second point: While it is true that the Kingdom of God no longer advances by the biological growth of the Church, growth is the inherent effect of a healthy, thriving Church. The telos of the Church is not growth, but rather loving one another and restoring that community that was lost at the fall of humanity. However, a healthy Church that is moving towards its end of loving each other will grow as an inherent effect of that healthy community. In the same way, procreation is the inherent effect of the healthy, thriving marriage. In modern times, certain people are unable to have children because of physical abnormality. This does not negate the good of the marriage, for its telos is love and witness. This inability to procreate is a consequence of the deterioration of creation that was caused by the fall of humanity. For some congregations, growth has become their telos, causing those congregations to lose their true telos. For some marriages, procreation has been said to not be a inherent effect of their relationship, denying the need for or blessing of children. Neither of the these positions participate in God’s full intention for the institutions of sacramental community.

On the third point: Celibacy is a viable option for the Christian, precisely because the telos of neither the Church nor marriage is procreation. As the Apostle has said, celibacy is a gift of God that allows the gifted the opportunity to give his or her whole self to the larger community. When the celibate gives themselves wholly to the community, the celibate fulfills the call to fellowship of marriage and the Church. The Apostle does not argue for celibacy so that the celibate can be alone for reasons of selfishness. Celibacy provides the celibate the opportunity to better serve the church, because the need is urgent. But, the Apostle recognizes this as a gift of some, not all. For he says, “I wish that all men were as I am. But each man has his own gift from God.” In their service to the whole community, the celibate is also able to give witness to the world of God’s great love for creation. “Both marriage and monasticism are for sanctification; both involve a commitment to living with others in which one cannot escape being transformed.”

Mission

2005-11-25T17:08:00.000-05:00

One of the things that has been most on my mind is the mission of the church. Most Assemblies of God people are very focused on the preaching mission of the church. I like this part and I think it is very important, but I think it misses the point. The lectionary reading that most protestant churches did this week was the story of the sheep and the goats from Matthew's gospel. Now, that story makes it clear that the way we will be judged on the final days has little to do with what we think and alot to do with how we treat others. I guess I need to learn a new way to live.

What does this mean for the church? To investigate, I will look at the Great Commission for a moment. Matthew 28:19-20 gives us our "marching orders." This verse is often mistranslated where I come from. I have even heard some preachers joke about how the Greek word for "go" in this verse should be translated "go." This is simply a failure to look at the text. Going, baptizing, and teaching are all participles. These are things that are done in order to accomplish the verb in the sentence: disciple (make disciples, NIV). Discipling is the point. In fact, I think I would even argue that "discipling all nations" is the point, but this nuance is the work of more able interpretors. In any case, I think the going is something that is just a part of life. As I walk through life, I encounter people who need discipling. I will baptize some of them into the name of the Father, Son, and Spirit. I will teach some of them about the things He has commanded me to do. In any case, these works shall disciple them. The point seems less about going, teaching, and baptizing as it is about discipling.

If disciple making is the point, then I think one of the ways I will fulfill that call is by living in the community and forming a community within the larger community that will give witness to God's good work in the world. Now this seems pretty simple. This seems like what the church was always called to do. We are to live in the world, but differently from the world. How is this productive?

I think we would have to live it out to understand. How would change someone's life for the better to see me being faithful. If someone observed me giving all that I have above my basic needs to people who need it more than me...if they saw me finding a sense of purpose in this act of kindness...if they saw me truly finding pure joy in that moment...would they be changed. I don't know. Would someone be changed by the witness you provide for the world? If someone observed your life, would they think "I wonder if that is what it was like in the Garden of Eden?" Would they think, "I bet that is what Heaven is like." I hope so.

Jeremiah

another update

2005-11-25T17:05:00.000-05:00

I haven't updated this site in a long time. I started using LiveJournal to stay connected with friends who were using that site. You can check out "agpreacher" at LiveJournal for more of that. But that site is more personal. I want this site to be about ministry. I guess I will consider it something of log of my thinking about the church that I hope to plant in Peoria. I live in the Northern suburbs of Chicago now, but Peoria is still home. The next post that comes will be the beginning of some of my thoughts on that church plant.

Jeremiah

Generously Disciples

2005-02-01T20:14:00.000-05:00

Prompted by Brain McLaren's Generous Orthodoxy, I have started a pretty intense study of many different denominations in hopes of gaining a bigger view of God and a bigger view of what it means to be the church. I start that study with the Disciples of Christ. Partly because they have in many ways been my arch-nemesis as an Assemblies of God guy in a vastly different world. I have often felt like Dorothy in the land of Oz. The rules are different here. Where I expect monkeys to hang in trees, they fly. Where I have expected the individual talking to me to be a human, he turns out to be a scarecrow. But a generous orthodoxy does not allow this to be only a dream that I will soon awaken from and find myself in Kansas. I find myself engaging this thinking head on and I have found something that is worthy of hanging my orthodoxy upon.

The Disciples of Christ was founded primarily on two principles: unity and biblical authority. Often times these two have a tendency to come in conflict with one another, precisely because we are not all unified on what the Bible says. Where conflict and disagreement exist, the Disciples have chosen to err to the side of unity. I think this is a valuable lesson for a Protestant church that would much rather just start another denomination as to work out disagreements and live with tension. Even when faced with what many would regard as blatant heresy, the Disciples have generally chosen unity. (There are a couple of splits in the history, so it wasn't that clean. But the group that now exists as the Disciples have generally been the split from rather than splitters.

Since the Enlighenment, the church has often been concerned with having right theology, a formidable and "biblical" challenge. The early reformers were often splitting into different groups based on theogical differences, political differences, and sometimes simple geographical/cultural differences. The founder of the Disciples, Thomas Campbell, found himself identified with a church that was carrying political differences that were twice removed from the New World in which he ministered. While a product of the Enlightenment himself, he chose to put off differences for the sake of unity. Frankly, Campbell thought that if everyone used the same rules of interpretation, then they would all come to the same conclusion about scripture. But, when this didn't happen, he and the early Disciples did maintain their commitment to unity.

Can the modern church exist with tension between those on different sides? I hope so. The Campbells main motivation comes from the prayer of Jesus for all the believers in John 17. He is motivated by the idea that a church united with itself and united to Him will be a powerful source of redemption and reconciliation to the world. The world will know that we are His disciples if we love one another. Some will cite the many times when the Epistles give instructions on how to deal with heretics and false teachers. I get that. I see those scriptures and I affirm their validity within the canon of inspired writings. What I question is where we can draw the line between heretic and the simply different? Just remember that the traditions that make up Protestantism were mostly rooted in some movement that at one time of another was considered heresy. Luther was a heretic. The Anabaptists were heretics. Arminean theology is heretical. But who decides what is orthodox...the church that is in power. In America today that is the conservative evangelical church. Sometimes I wonder if we are too busy condemning Martin Luthers. Where would the church be without the heretics of yesterday? ...I am not sure the church would be.

I imagine a church where Calvinists and Armineans, Charismatics and fundamentalists, liberals and conservatives, and Catholics and Protestants can worship together. Each celebrating their unique theologies and traditions and holding firmly to their own unique convictions. I think this church has some things to learn from the Disciples of Christ.

An evaluation of Thomas Aquinas

2005-01-20T23:37:00.000-05:00

Here is a recent essay that I wrote on Thomas Aquinas. Essentially the subject is what were Aquinas' goals in writing and the presuppositions that guide his thinking and how did those things effect his theology of grace. I think this is appropriate to post here because many people often consider Aquinas as a rationalist thinker. While he is rational, he maintains that faith must precede reason.

All the page number references are from Aquinas On Nature And Grace. An edited version of Aquinas' Summa Theologica by A.M. Fairweather. If anyone wants the article of the Summa that is referenced in any place then I will be glad to look it up.

One assumption made by the classical theologians is that our faith is to be first, primary to reason. To begin theological inquiry without first presupposing the articles of faith is a mistake. Our investigation, according to Anselm is not to “arrive at faith through reason, but in order that (we) may take delight in the understanding and contemplation of the things which we believe." Aquinas begins by saying this in a more philosophical way. It is necessary that some things which transcend human reason be made know by divine revelation, because this gives direction to the man is in exercise of using his reason. A man reasoning about God with revelation before him will likely make errors regarding the true nature of God. Even those few who would arrive at proper conclusions by reason alone, would be drowned out by the many voices of those who are wrong, and their correct doctrine would mixed and lost with those which are wrong (36). These things which transcend reason are to believed by faith. Aquinas then goes on to say that there are two distinct divisions of theology: one based on scripture and one based on philosophy. Aquinas says that the type of theology that is based on Scripture should not be used to prove anything about Scripture itself, for this is impossible. But, if one does the articles of faith as contained in Holy Scripture, then the philosopher can argue from these articles to speak of things outside of them. If a critic of Scripture is willing to concede nothing at all, then there is no way to prove the articles of faith by argument, except to disprove those grounds which he brings up against the faith (45). It is proper for reason to clarify those points of doctrine which are not clear in Scripture, but that does not allow that reason should be in conflict with these (46). Sacred doctrine uses these reasonable philosophical arguments as supporting and probable, but it uses the canonical Scripture as the proper authority (46). Aquinas includes an interesting statement here considering the authority that the church has given to men like Aquinas. Sacred doctrine “uses other teachers of the Church as authorities from which one may indeed argue with propriety, yet only with probability” (46). The Catholic Church has often given as much weight to the words of Thomas Aquinas as to Holy Scripture. This is something that Aquinas himself would have seen as improper. These are the points which resulted in a splitting of the church during the Reformation. The modern church could learn something here as they solidify their theology to the point that they consider it nearly divine as well.
In what way grace presupposes nature is a more difficult task to understand. Human nature for Aquinas is the victim and the cause of original sin. However, Aquinas does not view original sin as completely destructive of the original good that was in man. Good is only diminished in man in an amount proportionate to his sin (128). It seems that Aquinas believes that man is still mostly good, but has a sickness in sin. This part that is bad is where grace moves in. Aquinas asserts, “The will of a man…is moved by good which already exists in things, but presupposes it, partially or wholly” (157). This view of man’s goodness comes forth again when Aquinas speaks of co-operative grace. In this section, Aquinas asserts that there is something in man that wants to and is able to work with God towards the salvation of a man’s soul (165).
All of this talk of the goodness of the man’s soul does not change the source of that goodness. Grace presupposes nature in the sense that God is the gracious source of any good that is in man. God has given to creation a certain kind of good. But, rational creatures have been risen up to partake in the divine good. This act is only by grace and is above the natural good. Aquinas explains, “To say that a man has the grace of God, therefore, is to say that there is something supernatural in him, which God bestows” (158).
Finally, how does perfection presuppose what is to be perfected. Aquinas understands that man does not have the ability to achieve eternal life in him. Eternal life and grace are of God and for man to achieve these would make him like God. Will God grant the effects of predestination to anyone based on merit (109)? Some have said predestination is dependent upon the works of some previous life. Others say that God predestined based on the works of this life. Still others claim that predestination is based on God’s foreknowledge of the works of those who would be predestined (109-110). Instead, Aquinas answers that the whole good which is in man to deserve any honor is contained in his predestination. Grace moves upon a man according to predestination and a whole series of good works is then given to his nature. These good works are then worthy of some merit, but these good works are dependant upon first being predestined. In this way, the perfect, God, presupposes what is to be perfected, man.
Aquinas seems to cause a difficulty with this formation of grace and predestination. On one hand, he says that nothing in a man is in any man worthy of being predestined and receiving grace. On the other hand, he says that a good nature is in all creatures and man as well. Here I must prefer the opinion that man is completely bankrupt and able to do no good except by grace. While some who follow Aquinas theology would insist that he maintains this doctrine in his understanding of grace presupposing nature, it seems to me that there is still conflict that he did not resolve.

After reading this work again I have decided that it wasn't well-written...at least not at the end. Maybe comments here can finish it up!!!

the upcoming topics

2005-01-10T11:36:00.000-05:00

I will start a class tomorrow on the history of religion in America. This class combined with some recent reading from Brian McLaren's book A Generous Orthodoxy has inspired me to do a bible study at the college. I will be covering a different denomination each week and presenting what I see as the most important contribution that they have made to Christianity. One of the most important aspects of Emergent theology is that we recognize that none of us have the last word on what is being said. Since the Reformation much of denominationalizing has been a process of finding out where you disagree with the other guy and then founding a new sect based on your differences. We will intend to find out what we agree on. We will also try to find out what the others have emphasized that we missed the boat on. I hope that we can all come up with a bigger view of God in the process.

a recent e-mail

2005-01-10T11:19:00.000-05:00

This could be of interests to some. It is a recent e-mail coorespondence on defining the Emergent thinkers main point of thought. To be more precise, what are they trying to revolutionize. I think my conclusion was that it comes down to the certainty and completeness of the knowledge of God. Without context, some of this coorespondence may be out of place for you. I won't give the context (which was someone else's blog) mostly because the argument got a little heated and I don't want to promote that. Tell me what you think.

Jeremiah

Matt,
> I am an Assemblies of God minister who has a
> theology
> degree from a very liberal college. I have studied
> under liberals for about two years and I have been a
> conservative for alot longer than that. I feel that
> I
> can say with authority that Emergent is neither
> liberal nor conservative. I am not surprised that
> you
> consider it liberal, because it will consider the
> voice of the liberals...but to say that
> "liberals are usually all for inclusion of all kinds
> of perspectives, while conservatives typically are
> not
> so open to that. The reason being, liberals don't
> value doctrinal rigidity much, and so they don't
> care
> what positions you take on a lot of issues, they
> feel
> they can still collaborate."
> seems a little misinformed. Liberals are not
> interested in considering your viewpoint at all
> frankly. They reach a set of conclusions that are
> just as rigid as the conservatives, however, theirs
> are based on higher biblical criticism. Don't
> forget
> that the liberals father, Schleiermacher, also
> published SYSTEMATIC Theology. What the Emergent
> theologians are promoting is a deconstruction of
> SYSTEMATIC Theology in place of an expressive one.
> Emergent thinkers conclude that any one method of
> interpreting Scripture is not complete. Truth (yes,
> objective, unchanging Truth with a big T) is far too
> important to get only one opinion. (If you had a
> serious health condition, would you see only one
> doctor, just a thought.) Instead, we evaluate many
> different interpretations and take what can
> contribute
> something to our understanding of God. Emergent
> thinkers prefer theology to come in the form of
> narrative, novel, metaphor, poetry, prose, or art.
> (Some of which were popular methods of our Lord, by
> the way) If I am to say that the men who
> revolutionized much of Christianity in the early
> 20th
> Century with Pentecostal theology were completely
> right, then I lose the great contributions of men
> like
> Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli of your Reformed
> tradition. If I presume that Calvin somehow got it
> right, then I must assume that Aquinas (the great
> doctor of the Catholic church) missed the boat. If
> Aquinas was absolutely correct in engaging the
> Aristotilean thought of his day, then Augustine has
> no
> worth in his Platonic influenced theology. It seems
> much more valuable to look at how this great list of
> men have each contributed to our view of God and
> then
> try to engage our culture with each of them cheering
> us on from their privileged box seats at the feet of
> the Almighty.
>
> Let's not forget that the systematic theology that
> you
> hold dear was a response primarily to the
> Enlightenment...an attempt to engage what the
> philosophical culture was throwing at the world of
> theology (and I dare say a successful one, since we
> are still here theologizing).
>
> Matt says: "Everything that the "Emergent Church"
> wants to do has been done, successfully, for
> millennia. But all of a sudden that's not good
> enough,
> and we need new models. Just over the last 20 years,
> people have apparently fundamentally changed from
> what
> they were for the previous 2000"
>
> I could address everything that is "logically" and
> historically wrong with this statement, but I will
> (graciously,I hope) leave it at this. Augustine saw
> a
> world that was consumed with Platonic thought and he
> communicated the Truth within his context. By the
> time Aquinas writes, the church thinks Platonic
> influenced Theology is it, so Aquinas has to
> re-write
> the theology to engage the re-emergence of
> Aristotilean thought. The Enlightenment thinkers
> built their "scientific" systematic theologies to
> answer the materialistic rationalists, and did quite
> well. Today, you and I stand at the face of a
> changing philosophical landscape, and if the church
> will still be clothing the poor in 2 more millennia,
> then we must learn to follow in the footsteps of the
> saints who have walked before us.
>
> Maybe this helps. Maybe it makes you mad. In any
> case, I hope it makes us think, and I hope it
> encourages rather than destroys conversation.
>
> Jeremiah Gibbs

And now for Matt's response:

Jeremiah,
> Thanks for your response.
>
> Without systematic theology, how can I discern
> whether someone is
> teaching truth or error about God?
>
> Matt

And mine:

Truth or error is not the problem. eg. God is love.
Is this systematic theology? no. But it is true. The
point is that "God is love" doesn't tell us everything
about God, and neither do our systematic theologies.
It is not that they are wrong. They are just one
tracked. I will give you an example that I think will
be close to your heart, coming from a reformed
background. I know it is close to mine. Systematic
theology defined Arminean and Calvinists theologies
and said that they cannot both be true. Emergent
theology might say that they are both absolutely and
completely true...in the same way that God is both
three and one (two completely different things). We
don't have a problem with the idea of Trinity, but we
do have a problem with who made the choice in
salvation. In the same way that three and one are the
same, predestination and free-will are the same. It
is a mystery.
God bless.

And then it starts to get a little ugly:

1 John 4:1ff tells us to test the spirits to see if they are of God or
not, and then follows with the test, which is a test
of doctrine. We are commanded in the Bible to distinguish between
> > truth and error.
> >
Truth or error is totally the problem. The fact that you do not think
> > that it is tells me everything I need to know about
> > your view of "church".
> >
> > Matt

Matt,
> I don't want to get into an argument on this, cause
> I
> don't think I will change your mind. Truth is, I
> don't want to...cause I probably agree with you on
> most of your positions.. I just don't think that you
> or I have it all figured out. One little point of
> critical exegesis: the passage in 1 John...John
> says
> that all who acknowledge Christ as Lord are from
> God...think about that. The very fact that you have
> just equated our discussion with "church" tells me
> quite a bit about your view of "church" as well.
> Notice that neither of us mentioned church even
> once...we were discussing theology, yet you equated
> this to "church." If theology and church are the
> same, then how right does someone have to be to be
> part of the church. 1 John 4:1-4 makes it clear
> that
> we are both among the called out preisthood of
> believers, and so are the Emergent leaders...and I
> dare say that even the professors at harvard and
> yale
> divinity schools might even say that Christ has come
> in the flesh...maybe even they are among the
> "church."
> Jeremiah

> Jeremiah,
> You already got into an argument. I just love it
> when folks come along
> and insult my beliefs (my theological framework
> comes from the
> Enlightenment), and then say "I don't want to get
> into an argument."
>
> I never said I have it all figured out. I don't
> know any theologian in
> the history of ever who ever said that. That's a
> complete red herring.
> The fact is, you have a consciously antirational
> approach to theology,
> which will of course affect the way you run a church
> or preach a sermon
> or anything else. You can call my rational approach
> "Enlightenment" all
> day long, but it doesn't make it so. Augustine,
> Aquinas, Anselm, all
> had systematic approaches hundreds of years before
> the printing press.
> Were they "Enlightenment" too?
>
> If you've got a position, then stake it out and
> defend it. But don't
> come along, insult my position, then say yours isn't
> really different
> from mine. And if you take a position, you have to
> accept the
> consequences of that position, and if you take an
> antirational,
> anti-systematic approach, one of the consequences is
> that it becomes
> very difficult to identify heretics and false
> teachers, which is an
> obligation that Scripture has laid on us. It would
> be a lot easier if
> we could all just hold hands and sing songs, but
> Scripture doesn't give
> us that option.
>
> 1 John 4 doesn't say acknowledging Christ as Lord.
> It says "Jesus
> Christ is come in the flesh."
>
> What does that mean, "Jesus Christ is come in the
> flesh?" That's a
> doctrinal statement. Nobody said you had to agree
> with any particular
> 1200 page long tome on systematics. But the
> systematicians, God bless
> them, were just trying their very best to be
> faithful to God's command
> to test the spirits. Would that we all had their
> zeal for the truth of
> who God is, and what Jesus came here to do.
> Matt

Matt,
"But the systematicians, God bless
them, were just trying their very best to be faithful
to God's command
to test the spirits. Would that we all had their zeal
for the truth of
who God is, and what Jesus came here to do."

Amen--- This statement is the most coherent and
well-thought statement you have made in this brief
discussion. And just as the systematic theologians
were trying there best to test spirits...I am actively
doing the same. Just keep in mind that the Reformers
were called heretics in their day by those who had
decided they had cornered the market on
interpretation. My intention is not and was not to
insult your beliefs...I truly do hold many of the same
ones that you do, so I don't intend to insult them. I
am sorry. But, I hope you will read some of the
Enlightenment thinkers before you judge them so
harshly. Alot of what came out of the Enlightenment
did not acknowledge Christ had come in the flesh...and
should rightly be called what it is. But, some of
their thoughts are what have shaped ours...and
therefore should be considered. As for Anselm,
Augustine, and Aquinas...I have read all of them
extensively and they are rational...So am I (contrary
to what you think). Aristotle literally invented
logic and everyone was required to use rational
thought since his time...there is a difference between
systematic and rational. Do yourself a favor and read
Augustine's On The Trinity. Tell me if you think that
he thinks he is right or whether he has just given us
a bunch of different metaphors for a very mystical
concept.

Is it hard to identify heretics in light of this
acceptance of a very mystical faith? yeah...I think
about it every day. I haven't totally figured out
where we draw that line. But, I work towards the goal
of righteousness and purity in my life as well as my
theology.

Thanks for the discussion. I just want to let you
know ahead of time that I won't write again. I will
read your response if you have one, but I don't want
to embrace an argument that will cause a rift between
you and I when we stand before God in worship on the
other side. God bless.

Jeremiah

It may be a little hard to follow all of it. But it starts to illustrate some of the discussions that are being made.

What is this about?

2004-12-23T12:46:00.000-05:00

I hope this to be a place of conversation about topics relevant to the church in emerging culture. I have a relatively diverse Christian heritage and want to be able to look at lots of different topics from lots of different viewpoints. Feel free to post at will. Let the blogging begin!!!