NJ Personal Injury and Civil Cases

06-26-09 STENGART v. LOVING CARE AGENCY A-3506-08T1

2009-06-30T06:48:00.000-07:00

06-26-09 MARINA STENGART v. LOVING CARE AGENCY, INC.
A-3506-08T1

In this appeal, the court addressed whether workplace
regulations converted an employee's emails with her attorney --
sent through the employee's personal, password-protected, web-
based email account, but via her employer's computer -- into the
employer's property. Finding that the policies undergirding the
attorney-client privilege substantially outweigh the employer's
interest in enforcement of its unilaterally imposed workplace
regulation, the court rejected the employer's claimed right to
rummage through and retain the empattorney.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

06-26-09 PISCITELLI V. CLASSIC RESIDENCE BY HYATT A-5027-07T2

2009-06-30T06:45:00.000-07:00

06-26-09 MARILYN PISCITELLI V. CLASSIC RESIDENCE BY HYATT
A-5027-07T2

Plaintiff, Marilyn Piscitelli, sued defendant, Classic
Residence by Hyatt, for compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of its hiring of an illegal alien, Rosa Marchena,
who obtained employment with defendant as a maid using
plaintiff's social security number and name.

On appeal, plaintiff asserted she, a victim of identity
theft, may recover compensatory and punitive damages from the
employer of the identity thief, based on (1) the employer's
alleged negligence in complying with the federal employment
verification requirements set forth in the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b); (2) the
employer's alleged negligence in not utilizing the federal
voluntary pilot program established by Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-655 to 3009-665, to obtain confirmation of the
identity of the thief; (3) the employer's alleged negligence
enabling the identity thief to obtain employment with it; (4)
the alleged fraud by the employer against plaintiff; and (5) the
alleged breach by the employer of its "contract with the Federal
and State tax authorities" to correctly report plaintiff's
earnings.

We held there is no private right of action pursuant to
IRCA, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a; no negligence cause of action based on
IRCA and the voluntary pilot program for employee eligibility
confirmation; plaintiff's common law negligence claim is
preempted by IRCA, and; we decline to recognize the tort of
negligent enablement of imposter fraud in the context of this
case. We also found no basis for a fraud or third-party
beneficiary claim.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

06-19-09 VAN NOTE-HARVEY ASSOCS. V. NJ SCHOOLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY A-3115-07T1

2009-06-25T10:43:00.001-07:00

06-19-09 VAN NOTE-HARVEY ASSOCS., P.C. V. NEW JERSEY SCHOOLS
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
A-3115-07T1

Defendant New Jersey Schools Development Authority did not
comply with N.J.A.C. 19:38C-5.6 when it selected seven firms to
serve as site consultants with respect to school construction in
special needs districts. The regulation calls for preparation
of a consolidated ranking, including technical scores and
interview scores. The Authority did not prepare a consolidateranking but based its decision on interview scores alone.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

06-19-09 IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF W.X.C., SVP-458-07 A-0347-07T2

2009-06-25T10:42:00.000-07:00

06-19-09 IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF W.X.C.,
SVP-458-07
A-0347-07T2

In this case, we held that a sexually violent predator who
did not receive sexual offender treatment while incarcerated
does not have an ex post facto claim when he is committed
pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-
27.24 to -27.38.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

06-18-09 CRESPO v. CRESPO (A-0202-08T2/A-0203-08T2)

2009-06-25T10:40:00.000-07:00

06-18-09 VIVIAN CRESPO v. ANIBAL CRESPO
A-0202-08T2/A-0203-08T2 (consolidated)

The trial court in this matter found unconstitutional the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35,
because, in the trial judge's view: (a) the Legislature's
enactment of practices and procedures for the adjudication of
cases brought pursuant to the Act violated the separation of
powers doctrine; and (b) the Legislature's requirement that such
cases be adjudicated through application of the preponderance
standard, instead of the clear-and-convincing standard, violated
due process principles. The court disagreed on both points and
reversed. In addition, the court rejected defendant's other
constitutional arguments, which the trial judge had also
rejected, regarding the Act's impact on the rights to: bear
arms, trial by jury, the appointment of counsel, and discovery.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

6-25-09 NJ Shore Builders Association v. Jackson and Builders League of South Jersey v. Egg Harbor (A-51/52-08)

2009-06-25T10:37:00.000-07:00

6-25-09 New Jersey Shore Builders Association v. Township of
Jackson and Builders League of South Jersey v. Egg
Harbor Township (A-51/52-08)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially
for the reasons expressed in Judge Winkelstein’s opinion below.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

6-24-09 Mount Holly Board of Education v. Mount Holly Education Association (A-24-08)

2009-06-25T10:36:00.000-07:00

6-24-09 Mount Holly Township Board of Education v. Mount Holly
Township Education Association (A-24-08)

The Court reaffirms the principles articulated in Lullo v.
International Ass’n of Fire Fighters and Troy v. Rutgers: in
general, collective agreements supersede individual contracts.
To the extent provisions in an individual employment contract
conflict or are inconsistent with terms in a collectively
negotiated agreement (CNA), and diminish or interfere with
rights provided by the CNA, the language in the individual
contract must yield to the CNA. Gonzalez’s employment contract
conflicted with the CNA and diminished its specific terms by
depriving him of the right to arbitration; therefore, on remand,
Gonzalez is entitled to a hearing before an arbitrator to
address the grievance filed.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

6-23-09 Berk Cohen Associates at Rustic Village v. Borough of Clayton (A-55-08)

2009-06-25T10:34:00.000-07:00

6-23-09 Berk Cohen Associates at Rustic Village, LLC v.
Borough of Clayton (A-55-08)

A municipal garbage-collection scheme requiring all residents to
abide by the same curbside requirements facially adheres to the
guarantees of equal protection, but its application in a
particular case cannot be so arbitrary as to deny due process of
law. Here, the trial court’s findings that curbside collection
was “unhealthful, unsanitary, utterly inefficient, unsightly and
unreasonable,” established that the offer of curbside pickup
lacked a rational relation to the legislative goal of shielding
the public from the hazards associated with accumulating refuse.
In this case, the only viable option under N.J.S.A. 40:66-1.3(a)
is reimbursing the apartment complex for its trash-removal.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

6-22-09 Shore Orthopaedic Group v. The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States (A-4-08)

2009-06-25T10:33:00.000-07:00

6-22-09 Shore Orthopaedic Group, LLC v. The Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States (A-4-08)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially
for the reasons expressed in Judge Stern’s opinion below.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

06-17-09 WARREN HOSPITAL v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES A-1261-07T2

2009-06-17T08:10:00.000-07:00

06-17-09 WARREN HOSPITAL v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES, DIVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
A-1261-07T2

We conclude that the involuntary psychiatric commitment
law, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.1 to -27.23, does not require the
designated screening center that conducts psychiatric screening
services to be located in a hospital, so long as the statutorily
required psychiatric assessment is accomplished in a setting
where screening center staff can explore whether involuntary
psychiatric commitment is actually necessary. Despite the
absence of a statutory requirement, DHS promulgated a regulation
requiring screening services to be "physically located in a
hospital," and be "either directly operated by or formally
affiliated by written agreement with said hospital." N.J.A.C.
10:31-6.1(b). DHS also adopted a regulation, N.J.A.C. 10:31-
1.4, allowing waiver of this location requirement.

The location waiver issued to the screening service in
question was the result of a comprehensive and thoughtful
analysis of the relevant clinical and programmatic regulatory
criteria, and is not violative of the involuntary commitment
statutes. Because the statutes governing screening services do
not obligate a designated screening center to be physically
located in a hospital, issuance of the location waiver
constituted valid agency action, and was neither arbitrary nor
capricious.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

06-16-09 HADFIELD V. PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE AND LILLO A-5140-07T1

2009-06-17T08:08:00.000-07:00

06-16-09 RONALD HADFIELD, ET AL. V. THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
CO. AND ROSE ANN LILLO
A-5140-07T1

Defendant married decedent in 2002, and in 2003 he named
her the beneficiary of his group life insurance policy. They
divorced in 2004, and decedent died March 15, 2006, not having
changed that designation. Amended N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14, effective
February 27, 2005, controls; the policy proceeds pass as if the
former spouse disclaimed her interest.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

06-15-09 DAVANNE REALTY V. EDISON TOWNSHIP A-0333-08T3

2009-06-17T08:06:00.000-07:00

06-15-09 DAVANNE REALTY V. EDISON TOWNSHIP
A-0333-08T3

In conformity with Chapter 91 of the Laws of 1979, N.J.S.A.
54:4-34, the Tax Court dismissed plaintiff Davanne Realty's
challenge to the assessed value of its commercial property.
Davanne appeals from that order and contends that its tax bill
is a fine, forfeiture or penalty imposed in violation of the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment and Article I,
paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution. We conclude that
the Tax Court properly rejected this claim.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

06-10-09 FRIENDS OF PEAPACK-GLADSTONE V. PEAPACK-GLADSTONE LAND USE BOARD A-4668-07T3

2009-06-17T07:53:00.000-07:00

06-10-09 FRIENDS OF PEAPACK-GLADSTONE V. BOROUGH OF PEAPACK-
GLADSTONE LAND USE BOARD; THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE
BOROUGH OF PEAPACK-GLADSTONE; HF COTTAGES, L.L.C.; AND
HF DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.
A-4668-07T3

Appellants, a coalition of local residents, appealed the
Law Division's approval of settlement that a local land use
board entered into with a developer. The settlement permitted
the developer to build age-restricted, single-family homes on
property adjacent to a golf course, in lieu of corporate-
accommodation "golf cottages" that had originally been planned
for the site. The settlement resolved a pending prerogative
writs action that the developer had brought against the board
and the municipality. The settlement terms were approved at a
public hearing before the board patterned after Whispering Woods
at Bamm Hollow v. Middletown Planning Bd., 220 N.J. Super. 161
(Law. Div. 1987).

Appellants contend that the settlement did not comply with
the notice precepts and other requirements of Whispering Woods,
and also violated the Municipal Land Use Law ("MLUL"), N.J.S.A.
40:55D-1 to -163. They mainly argue that the settlement
improperly allowed the developer to circumvent, without
obtaining a density variance, stricter density requirements that
were extended to the property when it was rezoned after the
developer had obtained preliminary and final approvals for the
golf cottages.

We affirm the Law Division's approval of the settlement,
and its finding that no density variance was required because
the developer was still within the time frame protecting it from
adverse rezoning.

In particular, we hold that: (1) the filing of litigation
by objectors seeking to prevent the project's construction; and
(2) a zoning official's decision to withhold issuance of a
construction permit to the developer because of perceived
deviations from the prior approvals, are both "legal action[s] .
. . to protect the public health and welfare," sufficient to
invoke the tolling of the developer's approval period provided
for by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-21.

Second, we hold that although a land use board has the
discretion at the preliminary approval phase to extend
protection to a developer beyond the minimum three years
prescribed by the MLUL, see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-49, any such
extended period of protection flowing out of the preliminary
approval is extinguished once the respective board grants final
approval. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-52. Upon the adoption of final
approval, a developer is instead protected from changes in the
applicable zoning laws for a minimum of two years, subject to
the board's ability to grant, in its discretion, three one-year
extensions of protection. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-52. Those subsequent
extensions may be issued either prospectively or retroactively,
as permitted by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-52(c), and are further subject
to tolling under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-21 because of certain
intervening actions that interfere with construction.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

6-11-09 R.L. v. Voytac (A-61-08)

2009-06-17T07:46:00.000-07:00

6-11-09 R.L. v. Kenneth Voytac (A-61-08)

Pursuant to the Child Sexual Abuse Act, a trial court must first
determine when a reasonable person subjected to childhood sexual
abuse would discover that the defendant’s conduct caused him or
her injury (an objective test). If that period is more than two
years prior to the filing of the complaint, then the court must
next determine whether the statute should be tolled because of
“the plaintiff’s mental state, duress by the defendant,other equitable grounds,” (a subjective test).

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

6-10-09 Bardis and Bardis v. First Trenton Insurance (A-110-07)

2009-06-17T07:43:00.000-07:00

6-10-09 John Bardis and Helen Bardis v. First Trenton
Insurance Company (A-110-07)

The Court concludes that there are strong reasons supporting the
rule that the Underinsured Motorist (UIM) litigation proceed in
the name of the tortfeasor rather than the insurer, that these
reasons ordinarily militate in favor of identifying the
defendant in the trial by using the name of the tortfeasor, and
that the decision to identify the UIM insurer as the defendant
instead remains a matter left to the sound discretion of the
trial judge should circumstances dictate. The Court further
concludes that payment of PIP benefits for treatment of an
injury is irrelevant to the question of causation of that
injury. In addition, the closing argument by counsel disavowing
his and the actual tortfeasor’s knowledge about the insurer’s
employee and her decisions to make PIP payments had the capacity
to confuse the jury, and its admissioerror.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

06-09-09 GONZALEZ V. SILVER A-2264-07T1

2009-06-09T10:31:00.000-07:00

06-09-09 ANTHONY GONZALEZ, JR. V. SETH SILVER, M.D., ET ALS.
A-2264-07T1

In this medical malpractice action, it was reversible error
to have charged the stricter "but for all-or-nothing" causation
test rather than the more relaxed "substantial factor" standard
where plaintiff was not claiming negligence in causing his elbow
to dislocate during surgery for a fractured wrist, but rather
that defendant physician did not timely diagnose the dislocation
because he failed to perform the recognized tests either through
post-surgery x-rays or at follow-up visits.

We also addressed two other issues capable of repetition at
retrial. One was evidential concerning the admission of
testimony of plaintiff's car surfing (standing on the roof of a
car) just before the accident, for credibility purposes given
plaintiff's contradictory accounts at time of deposition and
earlier to his physician. We held that since "car surfing" was
related to neither diagnosis nor treatment of the injury
plaintiff sustained, contradiction on such a marginal,
collateral matter was especially likely to have injected
prejudice into the proceeding and therefore under identical
circumstances on retrial, reference to car surfing should be
disallowed.

The other issue concerned the trial judge's conduct of voir
dire, which did not fully conform to AOC's Directives #21-06 and
#04-07 (Standards for Jury Selection), in that the court failed
to ask three open-ended questions of each prospective juror. In
this particular case, we found that plaintiff's counsel was
complicit in the procedure ultimately employed, but noted that,
as a general proposition, we consider it error not to have asked
the requisite open-ended questions until a juror answered the
initial voir dire question in the affirmative. Although in
civil matters a certain residual discretion resides in the trial
judge to accommodate the individual circumstances of each case
and the consensus views of counsel, we emphasized both the
importance of following the proper voir dire protocol as
provided in the Directives, which are intended as uniform
practices binding on all trial courts, and the need, on retrial,
to conform to those dictates.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

06-08-09 KAS ORIENTAL RUGS v. ELLMAN A-2567-07T2

2009-06-09T10:30:00.000-07:00

06-08-09 KAS ORIENTAL RUGS, INC. v. ELLMAN
A-2567-07T2

In this appeal, the court addressed another variation of
the problems recently considered in Romagnola v. Gillespie,
Inc., 194 N.J. 596 (2008), and Best v. C & M Door Controls,
Inc., 402 N.J. Super. 229 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 197 N.J.
13 (2008), regarding the impact of rule amendments on a rejected
offer of judgment. In its earlier decision in this matter, Kas
Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman, 394 N.J. Super. 278 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 192 N.J. 74 (2007), the court found without
merit one aspect of the sales representative's damage award and,
for the first time, made relevant his rejection of his
adversary's offer of judgment; however, by the time the court
decided the earlier appeal, Rule 4:58 had been amended and, in
its amended form, made available defenses to a fee allowance
that were not expressed in the Rule as it existed when the offer
was made and rejected.

The court held that, absent an injustice or interference
with vested rights, the new amendments should apply to cases
pending at the time of amendment. The court held that even if
this were not so, it would apply the new rule amendments in this
case due to its idiosyncratic nature and, as a result, reversed
the allowance of offer-of-judgment fees.

The court also interpreted the fee-shifting provisions of
the Sales Representatives' Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:61A-1 to -7,
as permitting awards to both the sales representative and his
principal where the former had filed claims that should be
viewed independently and where one claim was meritorious and the
other potentially frivolous. As a result, the court remanded
for a determination as to whether the second claim was
frivolous.

Judge Miniman concurred in the holding regarding the offer
of judgment rule and dissented from the majority's
interpretation of the Sales Representatives' Rights Act.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

06-05-09 MYRON V. ATLANTIC MUTUAL INSURANCE A-5528-07T2

2009-06-09T10:28:00.000-07:00

06-05-09 MYRON CORPORATION V. ATLANTIC MUTUAL INSURANCE
CORPORATION
A-5528-07T2

Plaintiff Myron Corporation, based in New Jersey and
insured under a CGL policy written in New Jersey, was sued in
several states by businesses claiming that Myron sent them "junk
faxes" in violation of federal law. Plaintiff's insurer,
Atlantic Mutual, refused to defend or indemnify Myron in the
"junk fax" litigation. After successfully fending off a federal
declaratory judgment action on coverage, which Atlantic filed in
Illinois but which the federal court dismissed on abstention
grounds, Myron prevailed on its New Jersey coverage lawsuit
against Atlantic. We held that because Myron prevailed on the
merits of its New Jersey coverage lawsuit and was entitled to
fees for that litigation under Rule 4:42-9(a)(6), Myron was also
entitled to counsel fees for the Illinois federal litigation,
which was part of the same controversy over the coverage issue.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

06-04-09 BOUIE V. NJ DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, LEVIN AND HEINZ A-0842-07T3

2009-06-09T10:23:00.000-07:00

06-04-09 BOUIE V. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY
AFFAIRS, SUSAN BASS LEVIN AND DEBORAH HEINZ,
A-0842-07T3

The hearing that the Department of Community Affairs must
afford a recipient of federal Section 8 rental assistance
benefits before terminating those benefits is a "contested case"
within the intent of the APA, which must be heard by an ALJ.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

06-03-09 ST. GEORGE'S DRAGONS V. NEWPORT REAL ESTATE A-5779-06T1/A-6115-06T1

2009-06-09T10:19:00.000-07:00

06-03-09 ST. GEORGE'S DRAGONS, L.P V. NEWPORT REAL ESTATE
GROUP, L.L.C.
A-5779-06T1/A-6115-06T1 (consolidated)

The case concerns a lease giving the tenant of a commercial
building the right of first refusal to purchase the property.
We reviewed the legal principles applicable to rights of first
refusal, concluding that both the first-refusal clause and the
third-party offer were to be construed using traditional
principles of contract interpretation. A first-refusal clause
may specify that the right-holder must pay brokers' commissions
and may guarantee the seller a net recovery on the sale.
However, where neither the right of first refusal nor the third-
party contract contained such provisions, the right-holder was
only required to match the third party's purchase offer, and the
seller was obligated to pay the brokers' commissions, although
this resulted in the seller othe sale to the right-holder.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

6-3-09 Lee v. First Union National Bank (A-58-08)

2009-06-09T10:14:00.000-07:00

6-3-09 Margaret L. Lee v. First Union National Bank, et al.
(A-58-08)

The sale of securities is not included within the Consumer Fraud
Act’s definition of “merchandise,” and defendants’ conduct in
connection with the sale of securities cannot be characterized
as a “service” covered by the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) because
that would thwart the statute’s design to keep the sale of
securities beyond the CFA’s application.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

06-02-09 REDVANLY V. AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING and FEENEY A-4082-06T2

2009-06-03T06:42:00.000-07:00

06-02-09 DIANE REDVANLY V. AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING, INC., and
RICHARD FEENEY
A-4082-06T2

The United States Supreme Court held in McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 115 S. Ct. 879,
130 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1995), that an employee, who was wrongfully
terminated but was found to have committed misconduct that would
have resulted in termination or non-hire, is not barred from all
remedy at law, but the jury may consider evidence of misconduct
in determining the damages award. In this appeal, we hold that
in a case where this "after-acquired defense" is appropriate,
the trial must be bifurcated into a liability and damages phase
and evidence of the defephase.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

06-01-09 DEB ASSOCIATES V. GREATER NEW YORK MUTUAL INSURANCE A-5308-07T3

2009-06-03T06:41:00.000-07:00

06-01-09 DEB ASSOCIATES V. GREATER NEW YORK MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY
A-5308-07T3

We addressed insurance coverage for costs associated with
bringing undamaged portions of a damaged structure up to current
construction code standards. In this case, but for wind damage
to the seventh floor of plaintiff's building (a covered claim),
plaintiff would not have been required to bring the wall-to-
floor connections in the rest of the building up to current code
standards. Therefore, thounder the policy.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

05-29-09 UNITED HEARTS v. ZAHABIAN and ZAN ASSOCIATES A-6234-07T3

2009-06-03T06:38:00.000-07:00

05-29-09 UNITED HEARTS, L.L.C. v. MOZAFAR ZAHABIAN, a/k/a MIKE
ZAHABIAN and ZAN ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.
A-6234-07T3

For purposes of imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 1:4-
8(b), a pleading cannot be considered frivolous, nor can an
attorney be deemed to have litigated the matter in bad faith,
when the trial court denies summary judgment claim and allows the matter to proceed to trial.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor

5-29-09 SCHMIDHAUSLER, SHARPLES, SHARPLES, WADE, CIECURA, CIECURA and AYERS-KAVTARADZE v. PLANNING BOARD OF LAKE COMO and GLYNN A-5932-07T3

2009-06-03T06:29:00.000-07:00

05-29-09 ELIZABETH SCHMIDHAUSLER, JOSEPH SHARPLES and SHIRLEY
SHARPLES, LISA ANN WADE, JOHN CIECURA and MARION
CIECURA and HILARY AYERS-KAVTARADZE v. PLANNING BOARD
OF THE BOROUGH OF LAKE COMO and RONALD GLYNN
A-5932-07T3

In this case, a Planning Board member who was ineligible to
vote on an application because he had missed one meeting at
which the application was heard voted although he neither read
the transcript nor listened to the tape of the meeting before
voting, as required by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.2. We held that the
remedy for such violation may be a remand to the Board to have
all the current members revote with those who had not attended
one or all of the hearings in the matter first review the
transcript or listen to the tape of any meeting or meetings they
may have missed, certify they have done so, and then deliberate
and vote.

Richard Sadowski
Assistant Editor