Hafez of Arabia

Proud to wear the Red Beret

2008-08-20T11:51:00.001+02:00

Une grande hommage aux mes copains parachutistes morts en Afghanistan!

2008-08-20T11:46:00.004+02:00

...und immer wieder!

Olympics... Without words

2008-08-20T11:05:00.000+02:00

Lets go Pumuckl!

2008-08-20T10:49:00.004+02:00

A displaced boy seen in a shelter for refugees in Tbilisi, Georgia. The United Nations have estimated that the fighting during Georgia's conflict with Russia has displaced more than 158,000 people.

THE REAL WORLD ORDER

2008-08-20T10:26:00.000+02:00

On Sept. 11, 1990, U.S. President George H. W. Bush addressed Congress. He spoke in the wake of the end of Communism in Eastern Europe, the weakening of the Soviet Union, and the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. He argued that a New World Order was emerging: "A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor, and today that new world is struggling to be born. A world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak."

After every major, systemic war, there is the hope that this will be the war to end all wars. The idea driving it is simple. Wars are usually won by grand coalitions. The idea is that the coalition that won the war by working together will continue to work together to make the peace. Indeed, the idea is that the defeated will join the coalition and work with them to ensure the peace. This was the dream behind the Congress of Vienna, the League of Nations, the United Nations and, after the Cold War, NATO. The idea was that there would be no major issues that couldn't be handled by the victors, now joined with the defeated. That was the idea that drove George H. W. Bush as the Cold War was coming to its end.

Those with the dream are always disappointed. The victorious coalition breaks apart. The defeated refuse to play the role assigned to them. New powers emerge that were not part of the coalition. Anyone may have ideals and visions. The reality of the world order is that there are profound divergences of interest in a world where distrust is a natural and reasonable response to reality. In the end, ideals and visions vanish in a new round of geopolitical conflict.

The post-Cold War world, the New World Order, ended with authority on Aug. 8, 2008, when Russia and Georgia went to war. Certainly, this war was not in itself of major significance, and a very good case can be made that the New World Order actually started coming apart on Sept. 11, 2001. But it was on Aug. 8 that a nation-state, Russia, attacked another nation-state, Georgia, out of fear of the intentions of a third nation-state, the United States. This causes us to begin thinking about the Real World Order.

The global system is suffering from two imbalances. First, one nation-state, the United States, remains overwhelmingly powerful, and no combination of powers are in a position to control its behavior. We are aware of all the economic problems besetting the United States, but the reality is that the American economy is larger than the next three economies combined (Japan, Germany and China). The U.S. military controls all the world's oceans and effectively dominates space. Because of these factors, the United States remains politically powerful -- not liked and perhaps not admired, but enormously powerful.

The second imbalance is within the United States itself. Its ground forces and the bulk of its logistical capability are committed to the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States also is threatening on occasion to go to war with Iran, which would tie down most of its air power, and it is facing a destabilizing Pakistan. Therefore, there is this paradox: The United States is so powerful that, in the long run, it has created an imbalance in the global system. In the short run, however, it is so off balance that it has few, if any, military resources to deal with challenges elsewhere. That means that the United States remains the dominant power in the long run but it cannot exercise that power in the short run. This creates a window of opportunity for other countries to act.

The outcome of the Iraq war can be seen emerging. The United States has succeeded in creating the foundations for a political settlement among the main Iraqi factions that will create a relatively stable government. In that sense, U.S. policy has succeeded. But the problem the United States has is the length of time it took to achieve this success. Had it occurred in 2003, the United States would not suffer its current imbalance. But this is 2008, more than five years after the invasion. The United States never expected a war of this duration, nor did it plan for it. In order to fight the war, it had to inject a major portion of its ground fighting capability into it. The length of the war was the problem. U.S. ground forces are either in Iraq, recovering from a tour or preparing for a deployment. What strategic reserves are available are tasked into Afghanistan. Little is left over.

As Iraq pulled in the bulk of available forces, the United States did not shift its foreign policy elsewhere. For example, it remained committed to the expansion of democracy in the former Soviet Union and the expansion of NATO, to include Ukraine and Georgia. From the fall of the former Soviet Union, the United States saw itself as having a dominant role in reshaping post-Soviet social and political orders, including influencing the emergence of democratic institutions and free markets. The United States saw this almost in the same light as it saw the democratization of Germany and Japan after World War II. Having defeated the Soviet Union, it now fell to the United States to reshape the societies of the successor states.

Through the 1990s, the successor states, particularly Russia, were inert. Undergoing painful internal upheaval -- which foreigners saw as reform but which many Russians viewed as a foreign-inspired national catastrophe -- Russia could not resist American and European involvement in regional and internal affairs. From the American point of view, the reshaping of the region -- from the Kosovo war to the expansion of NATO to the deployment of U.S. Air Force bases to Central Asia -- was simply a logical expansion of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a benign attempt to stabilize the region, enhance its prosperity and security and integrate it into the global system.

As Russia regained its balance from the chaos of the 1990s, it began to see the American and European presence in a less benign light. It was not clear to the Russians that the United States was trying to stabilize the region. Rather, it appeared to the Russians that the United States was trying to take advantage of Russian weakness to impose a new politico-military reality in which Russia was to be surrounded with nations controlled by the United States and its military system, NATO. In spite of the promise made by Bill Clinton that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union, the three Baltic states were admitted. The promise was not addressed. NATO was expanded because it could and Russia could do nothing about it.

From the Russian point of view, the strategic break point was Ukraine. When the Orange Revolution came to Ukraine, the American and European impression was that this was a spontaneous democratic rising. The Russian perception was that it was a well-financed CIA operation to foment an anti-Russian and pro-American uprising in Ukraine. When the United States quickly began discussing the inclusion of Ukraine in NATO, the Russians came to the conclusion that the United States intended to surround and crush the Russian Federation. In their view, if NATO expanded into Ukraine, the Western military alliance would place Russia in a strategically untenable position. Russia would be indefensible. The American response was that it had no intention of threatening Russia. The Russian question was returned: Then why are you trying to take control of Ukraine? What other purpose would you have? The United States dismissed these Russian concerns as absurd. The Russians, not regarding them as
absurd at all, began planning on the assumption of a hostile United States.

If the United States had intended to break the Russian Federation once and for all, the time for that was in the 1990s, before Yeltsin was replaced by Putin and before 9/11. There was, however, no clear policy on this, because the United States felt it had all the time in the world. Superficially this was true, but only superficially. First, the United States did not understand that the Yeltsin years were a temporary aberration and that a new government intending to stabilize Russia was inevitable. If not Putin, it would have been someone else. Second, the United States did not appreciate that it did not control the international agenda. Sept. 11, 2001, took away American options in the former Soviet Union. No only did it need Russian help in Afghanistan, but it was going to spend the next decade tied up in the Middle East. The United States had lost its room for maneuver and therefore had run out of time.

And now we come to the key point. In spite of diminishing military options outside of the Middle East, the United States did not modify its policy in the former Soviet Union. It continued to aggressively attempt to influence countries in the region, and it became particularly committed to integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, in spite of the fact that both were of overwhelming strategic interest to the Russians. Ukraine dominated Russia's southwestern flank, without any natural boundaries protecting them. Georgia was seen as a constant irritant in Chechnya as well as a barrier to Russian interests in the Caucasus.

Moving rapidly to consolidate U.S. control over these and other countries in the former Soviet Union made strategic sense. Russia was weak, divided and poorly governed. It could make no response. Continuing this policy in the 2000s, when the Russians were getting stronger, more united and better governed and while U.S. forces were no longer available, made much less sense. The United States continued to irritate the Russians without having, in the short run, the forces needed to act decisively.

The American calculation was that the Russian government would not confront American interests in the region. The Russian calculation was that it could not wait to confront these interests because the United States was concluding the Iraq war and would return to its pre-eminent position in a few short years. Therefore, it made no sense for Russia to wait and it made every sense for Russia to act as quickly as possible.

The Russians were partly influenced in their timing by the success of the American surge in Iraq. If the United States continued its policy and had force to back it up, the Russians would lose their window of opportunity. Moreover, the Russians had an additional lever for use on the Americans: Iran.

The United States had been playing a complex game with Iran for years, threatening to attack while trying to negotiate. The Americans needed the Russians. Sanctions against Iran would have no meaning if the Russians did not participate, and the United States did not want Russia selling advance air defense systems to Iran. (Such systems, which American analysts had warned were quite capable, were not present in Syria on Sept. 6, 2007, when the Israelis struck a nuclear facility there.) As the United States re-evaluates the Russian military, it does not want to be surprised by Russian technology. Therefore, the more aggressive the United States becomes toward Russia, the greater the difficulties it will have in Iran. This further encouraged the Russians to act sooner rather than later.

The Russians have now proven two things. First, contrary to the reality of the 1990s, they can execute a competent military operation. Second, contrary to regional perception, the United States cannot intervene. The Russian message was directed against Ukraine most of all, but the Baltics, Central Asia and Belarus are all listening. The Russians will not act precipitously. They expect all of these countries to adjust their foreign policies away from the United States and toward Russia. They are looking to see if the lesson is absorbed. At first, there will be mighty speeches and resistance. But the reality on the ground is the reality on the ground.

We would expect the Russians to get traction. But if they don't, the Russians are aware that they are, in the long run, much weaker than the Americans, and that they will retain their regional position of strength only while the United States is off balance in Iraq. If the lesson isn't absorbed, the Russians are capable of more direct action, and they will not let this chance slip away. This is their chance to redefine their sphere of influence. They will not get another.

The other country that is watching and thinking is Iran. Iran had accepted the idea that it had lost the chance to dominate Iraq. It had also accepted the idea that it would have to bargain away its nuclear capability or lose it. The Iranians are now wondering if this is still true and are undoubtedly pinging the Russians about the situation. Meanwhile, the Russians are waiting for the Americans to calm down and get serious. If the Americans plan to take meaningful action against them, they will respond in Iran. But the Americans have no meaningful actions they can take; they need to get out of Iraq and they need help against Iran. The quid pro quo here is obvious. The United States acquiesces to Russian actions (which it can't do anything about), while the Russians cooperate with the United States against Iran getting nuclear weapons (something Russia does not want to see).

One of the interesting concepts of the New World Order was that all serious countries would want to participate in it and that the only threat would come from rogue states and nonstate actors such as North Korea and al Qaeda. Serious analysts argued that conflict between nation-states would not be important in the 21st century. There will certainly be rogue states and nonstate actors, but the 21st century will be no different than any other century. On Aug. 8, the Russians invited us all to the Real World Order.

By George Friedman/stratfor.com

LAILAT UL-BARÂ'A - NACHT DER FREISPRECHUNG

2008-08-16T10:05:00.002+02:00

Die «Nacht der Freisprechung» ist eine der heiligen Nächte im Islam. Dieses Jahr fällt sie auf die Nacht von Samstag auf Sonntag, also vom 16. auf den 17. August 2008.

Gemäss einer Überlieferung der Propheten Muhammad (Friede sei mit ihm), werden in der Nacht der Freisprechung die Tore der sieben Himmel aufgetan, und Engel stehen an jedem Tor, um Vergebung für die Muslime zu erflehen. Auch werden die Engel ihre Abrechnung für die vergangenen zwölf Monate vorlegen. Die Nacht der Freisprechung fällt auf die 15. Nacht des Monats Scha'ban (8.Monat im islamischen Kalender) und wird deshalb auch Nisfu-Schâ'bân (Mitt-Scha'bân) genannt. Es ist gut, schon im Scha'bân mit den Vorbereitungen für den Ramadan zu beginnen, denn auch iin ihm liegt ein besonderer Segen, der nicht verpasst werden sollte. Wer schon an einigen Tagen des Scha'bân zu fasten beginnt (ausser an den letzten beiden Tagen vor dem Ramadan), der ist besser vorbereitet auf die Prüfungen des Ramadan.

Red Alert!

2008-08-09T10:25:00.001+02:00

Given the speed with which the Russians reacted to Georgia’s incursion into South Ossetia, Moscow was clearly ready to intervene. We suspect the Georgians were set up for this in some way, but at this point the buildup to the conflict no longer matters. What matters is the message that Russia is sending to the West.
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev summed this message up best: “Historically Russia has been, and will continue to be, a guarantor of security for peoples of the Caucasus.”
Strategically, we said Russia would respond to Kosovo’s independence, and they have. Russia is now declaring the Caucasus to be part of its sphere of influence. We have spoken for months of how Russia would find a window of opportunity to redefine the region. This is happening now.
All too familiar with the sight of Russian tanks, the Baltic countries are terrified of what they face in the long run, and they should be. This is the first major Russian intervention since the fall of the Soviet Union. Yes, Russia has been involved elsewhere. Yes, Russia has fought. But this is on a new order of confidence and indifference to general opinion. We will look at this as a defining moment.
The most important reaction will not be in the United States or Western Europe. It is the reaction in the former Soviet states that matters most right now. That is the real audience for this. Watch the reaction of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Balts. How will Russia’s moves affect them psychologically?
The Russians hold a trump card with the Americans: Iran. They can flood Iran with weapons at will. The main U.S. counter is in Ukraine and Central Asia, but is not nearly as painful.

Tactically, there is only one issue: Will the Russians attack Georgia on the ground? If they are going to, the Russians have likely made that decision days ago.
Focus on whether Russia invades Georgia proper. Then watch the former Soviet states. The United States and Germany are of secondary interest at this point.

Friday

2008-08-08T12:40:00.002+02:00

Liebe Brüder und Schwestern,

Assalamu Alaykum wa Rahmatullahi wa Barakatuh

Abu Musa, Allahs Wohlgefallen auf ihm, berichtete:

Der Prophet, Allahs Segen und Heil auf ihm, sagte: Einem jeden Muslim obliegt die Abgabe eines Almosens(Zakah). Es wurde gesagt: Und wie wenn man nichts hat? Er sagte: Er soll mit seinen Händen arbeiten und etwas verdienen, von dem er für sich selbst Nutzen hat und ein Almosen gibt! (Die Leute) fragten: Und wie
wenn man keine Arbeit findet? Er antwortete: Er soll dann einem Behinderten in seiner Not helfen! Es wurde gesagt: Und wie wenn man es nicht tun kann? Er antwortete: Er soll dann das gebieten, was Rechtens ist, oder zum Guten einladen. Es wurde dann gefragt: Und wie wenn man es nicht tut? Da sagte er: Er soll dann sich vom Übel fernhalten; denn dies ist von ihm ein Almosen.

[aus dem Hadith Buch "Sahi Muslim"]

Do you remember, Pumuckl? (SWIC-Times)

2008-08-07T20:05:00.002+02:00

Sunday evening, I ll be there... just for a few days

I love Mauritania!

2008-08-07T17:58:00.002+02:00

NEIN, NEIN, Pumuckl!....du hast recht... völlig! This really is an another opportunity for sarcasm!!! Lese mal richtig:

Einen Tag nach dem Staatsstreich in Mauretanien haben die Militärs SCHNELLE NEUWAHLEN versprochen. Sie kündigten Präsidentschaftswahlen an, die «den DEMOKRATISCHEN PROZESS im Land wieder ankurbeln und auf ein festes Fundament stellen» sollten. In einer Erklärung des elfköpfigen MILITÄRRATS, der unter FÜHRUNG DES GENERALS Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz den Präsidenten abgesetzt hatte, hiess es am Donnerstag, die Neuwahlen sollten so schnell wie möglich abgehalten werden. «Sie werden frei und transparent sein und sollen IN ZUKUNFT EIN HARMONISCHES UND KONTINUIERLICHES ZUSAMMENSPIEL aller verfassungsmässigen Gewalten ermöglichen», hiess es weiter. Ein KONKRETES DATUM wurde jedoch NICHT genannt.
Er war abgesetzt worden, nachdem er hohe Militärs «auswechseln» und General Aziz als Chef der Präsidentengarde entlassen wollte. Die Militärs brachten gewaltlos den Präsidentenpalast, den Sitz des Regierungschefs sowie die staatliche Radioanstalt unter ihre Kontrolle.
Ministerpräsident Yahya Ould Ahmed Waghf, ein Minister und zwei Vertraute des Präsidenten wurden ebenfalls verhaftet. In der Nacht liessen die Putschisten im Radio verkünden, dass der HOHE RAT DER STREITKRÄFTE «die Macht des Präsidenten» beendet habe. Laut der Nachrichtenagentur Agence Nouakchott d'Information (ANI) bat Aziz die übrigen Minister, in ihren Ämtern zu bleiben (DIE HATTEN OHNEHIN SCHON NIE WAS ZU SAGEN). Abdallahi wurde nach Angaben von Sicherheitskräften im Haus der Präsidentengarde in der Hauptstadt Nouakchott festgehalten. Am Donnerstag versammelten sich etwa tausend Mauretanier in Nouakchott, um ihrer Unterstützung für die Putschisten Ausdruck zu verleihen. Zu der Demonstration hatten einige Parlamentarier aufgerufen, die den Staatsstreich unterstützt hatten. Die Lage in der drei-Millionen-Einwohner-Stadt war weitgehend ruhig.

Der Staatsstreich war weltweit verurteilt worden. UNO- Generalsekretär Ban Ki Moon forderte die Putschisten auf, umgehend zur verfassungsmässigen Ordnung zurückzukehren. Die Europäische Union drohte, Hilfsleistungen an Mauretanien auszusetzen. US-Aussenministerin Condoleezza Rice forderte die Militärs auf, den Präsidenten sowie den Regierungschef unverzüglich frei zu lassen und «die demokratisch gewählte Regierung wieder herzustellen». Die Afrikanische Union rief zur Einhaltung der Rechtstaatlichkeit auf. Sie kündigte an, ihren Kommissar für Frieden und Sicherheit nach Mauretanien zu entsenden. (STELL DIR VOR: Die RALLEY PARIS-DAKAR wäre gefährdet!)

Mauretanien galt seit der Wahl Abdallahis zum Präsidenten im März 2007 als VORBILD FÜR DIE DEMOKRATISCHE ENTWICKLUNG Afrikas. Seit seiner Unabhängigkeit von Frankreich 1960 erlebte das Land vier Staatsstreiche.
BRAVO! Ein echter Klassiker! man wundert sich, dass dies heute noch gelingt.... Zum Glück gibts Mauretanien! Es lebe die Bevölkerung von Mauretanien! Aber etwas fehlt noch im Konzept:
DEN WOHLFAHRTSAUSSCHUSS! Den könnten wir eigentlich bilden, Du, Worlman und ich! Wir würden es uns sicher WOHL ergehen lassen und die Bevölkerung käme auch nicht zu kurz.... (Ich will nur ein Swimming Pool)

CHINA AND THE ENDURING UIGHURS

2008-08-07T13:21:00.004+02:00

On Aug. 4, four days before the start of the Beijing Olympics, two ethnic Uighurs drove a stolen dump truck into a group of some 70 Chinese border police in the town of Kashi in Xinjiang, killing at least 16 of the officers. The attackers carried knives and home-made explosive devices and had also written manifestos in which they expressed their commitment to jihad in Xinjiang. The incident occurred just days after a group calling itself the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) claimed responsibility for a series of recent attacks and security incidents in China and warned of further attacks targeting the Olympics.

Chinese authorities linked the Aug. 4 attack to transnational jihadists, suggesting the involvement of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which Beijing has warned is the biggest terrorist threat to China and the Olympics. Despite the Chinese warnings and TIP claims and the intensified focus on the Uighurs because of the Aug. 4 attack, there is still much confusion over just who these Uighur or Turkistani militants are.

The Uighurs, a predominately Muslim Turkic ethnic group largely centered in China’s northwestern Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, have their own culture, language and written script distinct from their Han Chinese counterparts. Uighur ethnic nationalists and Islamist separatists have risen several times to challenge Chinese control over Xinjiang, but the Uighur independence movement remains fractured and frequently at odds with itself. However, recent evolutions within the Islamist militant Uighur movement, including growing links with transnational jihadist groups in Central and Southwest Asia, may represent a renewed threat to security in China.

Origins in Xinjiang

Uighur nationalism traces its origins back to a broader Turkistan, stretching through much of modern day Xinjiang (so-called “East Turkistan”) and into Central Asia. East Turkistan was conquered by the Manchus in the mid-1700s and, after decades of struggle, the territory was annexed by China, which later renamed it Xinjiang, or “New Territories.” A modern nation-state calling itself East Turkistan arose in Xinjiang in the chaotic transition from imperial China to Communist China, lasting for two brief periods from 1933 to 1934 and from 1944 to 1949. Since that time, “East Turkistan” has been, more or less, an integral part of the People’s Republic of China.

The evolution of militant Uighur separatism -- and particularly Islamist-based separatism -- has been shaped over time by both domestic and foreign developments. In 1940, Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan (Islamic Party of Turkistan or Turkistan Islamic Movement ) emerged in Xinjiang, spearheading a series of unsuccessful uprisings from the 1940s through 1952, first against local warlords and later against the Communist Chinese.

In 1956, as the “Hundred Flowers” was blooming in China’s eastern cities, and intellectuals were (very briefly) allowed to air their complaints and suggestions for China’s political and social development, a new leadership emerged among the Uighur Islamist nationalists, changing the focus from “Turkistan” to the more specific “East Turkistan,” or Xinjiang. Following another failed uprising, the Islamist Uighur movement faded away for several decades, with only minor sparks flaring during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.

In 1979, as Deng Xiaoping was launching China’s economic opening and reform, there was a coinciding period of Islamic and ethnic revival in Xinjiang, reflecting the relative openness of China at the time. During this time, one of the original founders of Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan, Abdul Hakeem, was released from prison and set up underground religious schools. Among his pupils in the 1980s was Hasan Mahsum, who would go on to found ETIM.

The 1980s were a chaotic period in Xinjiang, with ethnic and religious revivalism, a growing student movement, and public opposition to China’s nuclear testing at Lop Nor. Uighur student protests were more a reflection of the growing student activism in China as a whole (culminating in the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident) than a resurgence of Uighur separatism, but they coincided with a general movement in Xinjiang to promote literacy and to refocus on religious and ethnic heritage. Amid this revival, several Uighur separatist or Islamist militant movements emerged.

A critical moment occurred in April 1990, when an offshoot of the Uighur Islamist militant movement was discovered plotting an uprising in Xinjiang. The April 5 so-called “Baren Incident” (named for the city where militants and their supporters faced off against Chinese security forces) led Beijing to launch dragnet operations in the region, arresting known, suspected or potential troublemakers -- a pattern that would be repeated through the “Strike Hard” campaigns of the 1990s. Many of the Uighurs caught up in these security campaigns, including Mahsum, began to share, refine and shape their ideology in prisons, taking on more radical tendencies and creating networks of relations that could be called upon later. From 1995 to 1997, the struggle in Xinjiang reached its peak, with increasingly frequent attacks by militants in Xinjiang and equally intensified security countermeasures by Beijing.

It was also at this time that China formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), enlisting Central Asian assistance in cracking down on Uighur militants, many of whom had fled China. In some ways this plan backfired, as it provided common cause between the Uighurs and Central Asian militants, and forced some Uighur Islamist militants further west, to Pakistan and Afghanistan, where they would link up with the Taliban, al Qaeda, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), among others.

Among those leaving China was Mahsum, who tried to rally support from the Uighur diaspora in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey but was rebuffed. Mahsum and a small group of followers headed to Central Asia and ultimately Afghanistan, where he established ETIM as a direct successor to his former teacher’s Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan. By 1998, Kabul-based ETIM began recruiting and training Uighur militants while expanding ties with the emerging jihadist movement in the region, dropping the “East” from its name to reflect these deepening ties. Until the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, ETIM focused on recruiting and training Uighur militants at a camp run by Mahsum and Abdul Haq, who is cited by TIP now as its spiritual leader.

With the U.S. attack on Afghanistan in October 2001, ETIM was routed and its remnants fled to Central Asia and Pakistan. In January 2002, Mahsum tried to distance ETIM from al Qaeda in an attempt to avoid having the Uighur movement come under U.S. guns. It did not work. In September 2002, the United States declared ETIM a terrorist organization at the behest of China. A year later, ETIM experienced what seemed to be its last gasps, with a joint U.S.-Pakistani operation in South Waziristan in October 2003 killing Hasan Mahsum.

A Movement Reborn?

Following Mahsum’s death, a leaderless ETIM continued to interact with the Taliban and various Central Asian militants, particularly Uzbeks, and slowly reformed into a more coherent core in the Pakistan/Afghanistan frontier. In 2005, there were stirrings of this new Uighur Islamist militant group, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), which established a robust presence on the Internet, posting histories of the Uighur/Turkistan people in western China and Central Asia and inspirational videos featuring Mahsum. In 2006, a new video surfaced calling for jihad in Xinjiang, and later that year there were reports that remnants of ETIM had begun re-forming and moving back into far western Xinjiang.

It was also around this time that Beijing began raising the specter of ETIM targeting the Olympics -- a move seen at the time as primarily an excuse for stricter security controls. In early January 2007, Beijing raided a camp of suspected ETIM militants near the Xinjiang border with Tajikistan, and a year later raided another suspected camp in Urumchi, uncovering a plot to carry out attacks during the Olympics. This was followed in March by a reported attempt by Uighur militants to down a Chinese airliner with gasoline smuggled aboard in soda cans.

Publicly, the Uighur militant issue was quickly swept aside by the Tibetan uprising in March, leaving nearly unnoticed an anti-government protest in Hotan and a series of counterterrorism raids by Chinese security forces in late March and early April that reportedly found evidence of more specific plots to attack Beijing and Shanghai during the Olympics.

In the midst of this security campaign, TIP released a video, not disseminated widely until late June, in which spokesman Commander Seyfullah laid out a list of grievances against Beijing and cited Abdul Haq as calling on Uighur Islamist militants to begin strikes against China. The video also complained that the “U.S.-led Western countries listed the Turkistan Islamic Party as one of the international terrorist organizations,” an apparent reference to the United States’ 2002 listing of the ETIM on the terrorist exclusion list.

In addition to linking the TIP to the ETIM, the April video also revealed some elements of the movement’s evolution since the death of Mahsum. Rather than the typical rhetoric of groups closely linked to the Wahabi ideology of al Qaeda, TIP listed its grievances against Beijing in an almost lawyer-like fashion, following more closely the pattern of Hizb al-Tahrir (HT), a movement active in Central Asia advocating nonviolent struggle against corrupt regimes and promoting the return of Islamic rule. Although HT officially renounces violence as a tool of political change, it has provided an abundance of zealous and impatient idealists who are often recruited by more active militant organizations.

The blending of the HT ideologies with the underlying principles of Turkistan independence reflects the melding of the Uighur Islamist militancy with wider Central Asian Islamist movements. Fractures in HT, emerging in 2005 and expanding thereafter, may also have contributed to the evolution of TIP’s ideology; breakaway elements of HT argued that the nonviolent methods espoused by HT were no longer effective.

What appears to be emerging is a Turkistan Islamist movement with links in Central Asia, stretching back to Afghanistan and Pakistan, blending Taliban training, transnational jihadist experiential learning, HT frameworks and recruiting, and Central Asian ties for support and shelter. This is a very different entity than China has faced in the past. If the TIP follows the examples set by the global jihadist movement, it will become an entity with a small core leadership based far from its primary field of operations guiding (ideologically but not necessarily operationally) a number of small grassroots militant cells.

The network will be diffuse, with cells operating relatively independently with minimal knowledge or communication among them and focused on localized goals based on their training, skills and commitment. This would make the TIP less of a strategic threat, since it would be unable to rally large numbers of fighters in a single or sustained operation, but it would also be more difficult to fight, since Beijing would be unable to use information from raiding one cell to find another.

This appears to be exactly what we are seeing now. The central TIP core uses the Internet and videos as psychological tools to trigger a reaction from Beijing and inspire militants without exposing itself to detection or capture. On July 25, TIP released a video claiming responsibility for a series of attacks in China, including bus bombings in Kunming, a bus fire in Shanghai and a tractor bombing in Wenzhou. While these claims were almost certainly exaggerated, the Aug. 4 attack in Xinjiang suddenly refocused attention on the TIP and its earlier threats.

Further complicating things for Beijing are the transnational linkages ETIM forged and TIP has maintained. The Turkistan movement includes not only China’s Uighurs but also crosses into Uzbekistan, parts of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and spreads back through Central Asia all the way to Turkey. These linkages may have been the focus of quiet security warnings beginning around March that Afghan, Middle Eastern and Central Asian migrants and tourists were spotted carrying out surveillance of schools, hotels and government buildings in Beijing and Shanghai -- possibly part of an attack cycle.

The alleged activities seem to fit a pattern within the international jihadist movement of paying more attention to China. Islamists have considered China something less imperialistic, and thus less threatening, than the United States and European powers, but this began changing with the launch of the SCO, and the trend has been accelerating with China’s expanded involvement in Africa and Central Asia and its continued support for Pakistan’s government. China’s rising profile among Islamists has coincided with the rebirth of the Uighur Islamist militant movement just as Beijing embarks on one of its most significant security events: the Summer Olympics.

Whatever name it may go by today -- be it Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement or the Turkistan Islamic Party -- the Uighur Islamist militant movement remains a security threat to Beijing. And in its current incarnation, drawing on internationalist resources and experiences and sporting a more diffuse structure, the Uighur militancy may well be getting a second wind.

By Rodger Baker
Copyright 2008 Strategic Forecasting, Inc.

Mehr SEIN als HABEN erforderlich..

2008-08-06T20:41:00.003+02:00

Wir leben im Westen im Überfuss und vergessen den Rest der Welt. Das was uns normal ist, ist überhaupt nicht selbstverständlich. Werden wir die Augen öffnen, bevor wir in der gleichen Lage sind?

Die Welt hungert... Und wir gucken nicht einmal zu...

You should never be "the driver" ---- 'Guilt by association'

2008-08-06T17:42:00.007+02:00

I remember my friend Aktar who drove me all around Kabul, and I remember those who where translators and fixers in the time I spend in Afghanistan. A lot of those where translators and drivers in the Taliban period as well. But they had to look for their families and bring money home... I remember all those children walking around in the streets, working hard, washing and cleaning my car...I suppose they did the same in the few years before....
I was used to drink a fine cup of tea in the former Villa of Osama bin Laden, later called the Gandamack Lodge.... We had nice BQ there,... nice evenings, sitting on the beautiful carpets Peter collected.... and so on ....

But when you used to be "the driver"...

(BBC:) A US military jury at Guantanamo Bay has convicted Osama Bin Laden's former driver of supporting terrorism.
The verdict on Salim Hamdan is the first to be delivered in a full war crimes trial at the US prison in Cuba. Sentencing begins later on Wednesday. The jury found Hamdan guilty of five of eight charges of supporting terrorism but acquitted him of two separate, more serious, charges of conspiracy. The White House said the trial was fair and looked forward to more tribunals.
Hamdan, a Yemeni, was initially impassive when the verdict began to be read out, but the BBC's Kim Ghattas, at the trial, said he later appeared to break down in tears.

HAMDAN CHARGES
Conspiracy:
Found not guilty on two counts of conspiring with al-Qaeda to attack civilians, destroy property and commit murder
Providing support for terrorism: Found guilty on five counts, including being the driver and bodyguard for Osama Bin Laden, a man he knew to be the leader of a terrorist group

Hamdan, who is about 40 and was captured in Afghanistan in November 2001, faces a maximum life sentence when the sentencing hearing gets under way later on Wednesday. Our correspondent says the case could still go as far as the Supreme Court, if there is an appeal. The jury of six military officers had deliberated for about eight hours over three days in the first US war crimes trial since World War II. The prosecution had said Hamdan played a "vital role" in the conspiracy behind the 9/11 attacks. But defence lawyers said he was a low-level employee. The BBC's Adam Brookes in Washington says US President George W Bush will hope to use the conclusion of the first full trial as evidence that the Guantanamo Bay system does actually work. In its first response, the White House said Hamdan had received a "fair trial". Spokesman Tony Fratto said: "The Military Commission system is a fair and appropriate legal process... We look forward to other cases moving forward to trial." However, defence lawyers had said they feared a guilty verdict was inevitable and that the system was geared to convict.

Hamdan had admitted working for Bin Laden in Afghanistan from 1997 to 2001 for $200 (£99) a month, but said he worked for wages, not to make war on the US. The defence said the case was "guilt by association". But the prosecution said Hamdan was an "uncontrollably enthusiastic warrior" for al-Qaeda. About 270 suspects remain in detention in Guantanamo Bay. Among the dozens of other inmates due to be tried there in the coming months are men accused of plotting the 9/11 attacks.

Poor Hamdan!

Happiness...

2008-08-06T14:22:00.003+02:00

Happiness is an emotion associated with feelings ranging from contentment and satisfaction to bliss and intense joy.
A variety of philosophical, religious, psychological and biological approaches have been taken to defining happiness and identifying its sources.

Mystery of Siddiqui disappearance

2008-08-06T13:11:00.004+02:00

Aafia Siddiqui, whom the US accuses of al-Qaeda links, vanished in Karachi with her three children on 30 March 2003.
The next day it was reported in local newspapers that a woman had been taken into custody on terrorism charges. Initially, confirmation came from a Pakistan interior ministry spokesman.
But a couple of days later, both the Pakistan government and the FBI publicly denied having anything to do with her disappearance. Two days after Aafia Siddiqui went missing, "a man wearing a motor-bike helmet" arrived at the Siddiqui home in Karachi, her mother told the BBC. "He did not take off the helmet, but told me that if I ever wanted to see my daughter and grandchildren again, I should keep quiet," Ms Siddiqui's mother told me over the phone in 2003. The mother, who has since died, also related the affair to other newspapers.
But the government continued to deny having anything to do with her daughter's disappearance. This is despite the fact that Mrs Siddiqui's other daughter, Fauzia, says she was told by then Interior Minister Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat in 2004 that her sister had been released and would return home shortly. Research at the time refused to turn up anything on the status of Aafia Siddiqui - she was not listed as wanted by any federal or Pakistani agency. At that point, it seemed she had vanished off the face of the earth.
Islamic activities
Aafia Siddiqui is the youngest of three children of a British-trained doctor. Her brother is an architect based in Houston, while Fauzia is a neurologist who used to work at Mount Sinai hospital in New York. Aafia Siddiqui went to school in Karachi and graduated with a biology degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the US. It was during this time that she got actively involved in on-campus Islamic activities. A fellow Pakistani student recalls her as being one of the "hello, brother" types. "They were the ones with scarves who used to get after us to come to the association meetings," the student, Hamza, told the BBC. "I remember Aafia as being sweet, mildly irritating but harmless. You would run into her now and then distributing pamphlets." After graduation, Aafia Siddiqui married Muhammad Amjad Khan, a young Pakistani doctor in Boston. She continued with her studies, enrolling in Brandeis University near Boston for a PhD in neuro-cognitive science. Her degree has often been misreported as being in microbiology or genetics.
US discrimination
At that time, her main problems arose from married life. She and her husband argued over where to bring up their children. "Aafia wanted them to be brought up in the US and receive a Western education, but Amjad was against it," her mother said in 2003. The 11 September 2001 attacks in the US changed everything. Her husband was detained by the FBI for questioning. The reason was his purchase of night vision goggles, body armour and military manuals. He is said to have told the FBI it was for big-game hunting. Aafia Siddiqui was also questioned briefly, but later released, as was her husband. Soon, they decided to return to Pakistan, citing the increasing discrimination against Muslims in the US following the 9/11 attacks. In Pakistan, the already estranged couple soon separated, and they divorced in 2002, while she was pregnant with their third child. Following the birth, Aafia Siddiqui worked briefly in Baltimore, US, before returning to Pakistan in December 2002, where she disappeared months later.
Mounting charges
Various theories about her disappearance started to appear in international and local publications. The first of these was on 23 June 2003 - three months after her disappearance - in Newsweek. An investigative report, calling her a micro-biologist, said she and her husband were part of an al-Qaeda sleeper cell. In Baltimore, she is alleged to have opened a mailbox for a suspected al-Qaeda operative now in Guantanamo Bay. Majid Khan has been accused of planning to blow up petrol stations across the US.
The charges started to mount. In 2004 then-FBI director Robert Mueller announced at a press conference that Aafia Siddiqui was wanted for questioning. She was later named as part of an alleged al-Qaeda diamond smuggling operation in Liberia. Publications such as Newsweek quoted the FBI as saying this was to finance al-Qaeda's biological and chemical weapons programme. After that, her name remained on the list of disappeared - until she surfaced last month in Afghanistan in US military custody.
Sister speaks out
Aafia Siddiqui is now in the US facing charges of assaulting and attempting to kill US personnel while in detention in Afghanistan. The FBI has been unable to make any of the other charges stick. "It is always believed one is innocent until proven guilty, not the other way round," her sister, Fauzia, told reporters in Karachi on Tuesday. She added that every time she had met US officials, they had said they had never formally accused Aafia Siddiqui of being a terrorist. Ex-security officials also point out that if Ms Siddiqui was detained for being a terror suspect, her ex-husband, who is free, should have been too. Why, then, would Aafia Siddiqui have been arrested and kept in secret confinement for so long?
The answer may lie in her relationship with the family of alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Aafia Siddiqui is said to have married Ali Abd'al Aziz Ali, one of his nephews following her divorce. Although her family denies this, the BBC has been able to confirm it from security sources and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's family. It is an open secret in Karachi, that any member of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's family deemed to be "a 1% threat to US security" is in American custody. hat may be the only "crime" that Aafia Siddiqui has committed. In the eyes of US and Pakistani security officials, it was apparently too big to ignore.

By Syed Shoaib Hasan
BBC News, Islamabad

«Nimm dir ein Beispiel an Mohannad»

2008-08-05T16:40:00.002+02:00

Türkischer Seifenoper wird zum Strassenfeger im Nahen Osten

Von Karin Laub und Dalia Nammari

Seit vier Monaten bricht ein junger Mann mit blauen Augen reihenweise Frauenherzen in der arabischen Welt, in den Flüchtlingslagern im Gazastreifen ebenso wie in den Luxusvillen von Riad. Die Rede ist von Mohannad, dem Star der türkischen Seifenoper «Nur», die binnen kürzester Zeit zum Strassenfeger wurde und jeden Abend Millionen Zuschauer an den Fernseher fesselt. Der Erfolg rief umgehend konservative Kritiker auf den Plan, die die Serie als unislamisch geisseln und zum Boykott aufrufen. Denn «Nur» führt den Zuschauern eine Welt vor Augen, in der der Spagat zwischen muslimischen Traditionen und modernen westlichen Werten perfekt gelingt. So ist es nicht nur Mohannads blendendes Aussehen, das Zuschauerinnen gefällt, sondern auch sein Umgang mit seiner Ehefrau Nur: Er ist romantisch, fürsorglich und unterstützt Nur in ihrer Selbstständigkeit und ihren beruflichen Ambitionen als Modedesignerin.

«Ich habe meinem Mann gesagt: «Nimm dir ein Beispiel an ihm, wie er sie behandelt, wie er sie liebt, wie er sich um sie kümmert», sagte die 24-jährige Jordanierin Heba Hamdan. Die Sendung habe sie dazu ermutigt, sich eine eigene Arbeit zu suchen, sagte die Hausfrau, die direkt nach dem Abschluss ihres Studiums heiratete.
Der riesige Erfolg von «Nur» im Nahen Osten dürfte auch darauf zurückzuführen sein, dass den Zuschauern die Identifikation leichter fällt als bei westlichen Importen - schliesslich spielt die Serie in der Türkei und damit in einem islamischen Land. Die Figuren begehen den Fastmonat Ramadan, und die Ehe zwischen Mohannad und Nur wurde vom Grossvater des Bräutigams arrangiert. Zugleich geniessen sie westliche Freiheiten und trinken beispielsweise Alkohol zum Abendessen. Auch ausserehelicher Sex und Abtreibung sind keine Tabus, und Mohannad hat ein Kind mit einer früheren Freundin. Besonders freizügige Szenen werden jedoch für die arabischen Sender zensiert.

«Mohannad» und «Nur» beliebte Vornamen für Babys

Die tägliche Soap zeige, «dass es Muslime gibt, die anders leben», sagte Islah Dschad, Professor für Frauenforschung an der Universität Bir Seit im Westjordanland. Der türkische Produzent der Serie, Kemal Üzün, erklärte: «Wir sind ein bisschen offener, nicht so konservativ wie einige dieser Länder (im Nahen Osten), und ich denke, das spricht die Zuschauer an.» Kritikern hingegen missfällt genau das. «Diese Serie widerspricht unserer islamischen Religion, unseren Werten und Traditionen», sagte Hamed Bitaui, Abgeordneter der radikalislamischen Hamas und Prediger in Nablus.

Doch dürfte es den Konservativen kaum gelingen, die Begeisterung für «Nur» zu stoppen. In Saudi-Arabien verfolgen jeden Abend drei bis vier Millionen der insgesamt knapp 28 Millionen Einwohner die neueste Folge. In den palästinensischen Autonomiegebieten sind die Strassen während der Sendezeit wie ausgestorben, und Verabredungen werden darauf abgestimmt. Entbindungskliniken in der saudiarabischen Hauptstadt Riad sowie in Hebron im Westjordanland verzeichneten einen Anstieg der Vornamen «Nur» und «Mohannad» für Neugeborene. Ein Posterhändler im Westjordanland hat an seinem Stand Porträts von Jassir Arafat und Saddam Husseins gegen «Nur»-Plakate ausgetauscht.

Touren für arabische Besucher am Drehort

Das Modegeschäft «Dscharos» in Gaza erzielt glänzende Umsätze, indem es Kopien der Outfits der «Nur»-Stars anbietet, darunter eine ärmellose Bluse im Metallic-Look. Am Drehort der Serie, einer Villa in Istanbul, werden laut Produzent Üzün inzwischen «Nur»-Touren für arabische Besucher angeboten, und es wurde ein Museum eingerichtet. Die saudiarabische Tageszeitung «Al Riad» veröffentlichte vor kurzem eine Karikatur, in der ein Mann mit einem Bild Mohannads als Vorlage ins Büro eines Schönheitschirurgen kommt.
Mohammed Daraghmeh hat an seinem Fernseher den Sender MBC, auf dem «Nur» läuft, gesperrt, damit seine Kinder sich die Serie nicht ansehen können. Doch die Familie drohte damit, sich «Nur» dann eben im Haus eines Onkels anzuschauen, so dass Daraghmeh nachgab, wie er erzählte.
Im Flüchtlingslager Schati drängen sich zur «Nur»-Sendezeit allabendlich vor allem junge Mädchen und Frauen vor dem Fernseher. Die 17-jährige Ala Hamami sagte, sie bewundere Nur für ihre Unabhängigkeit: «Die Serie bestärkt die Frauen für die Zukunft».

Jenseits von Harry Potter

2008-08-04T16:09:00.002+02:00

Ein Verlag für islamische Kinderbücher zieht in die Bestsellerlisten ein.

Von Syed Ali Mujtaba

Muslimischen Eltern ist es wichtig, einen Weg zu finden, ihre Kinder in einer multikulturellen Gesellschaft zu erziehen und gleichzeitig deren religiöse Identität zu bewahren. Bei diesen Bemühungen übertreiben manche Eltern ihre Aufgabe und machen ihre Kinder zu vollkommenen Außenseitern in der sie umgebenden Welt. Oder aber die Kinder bleiben unwissend über ihren Glauben, was dazu führt, dass sie den Einflüssen des dominanten sozialen Millieus ungehindert ausgesetzt sind. In dieser komplexen Situation möchten Eltern ihren Kindern religiöse Inhalte auf eine zeitgenössische Weise vermitteln. Dabei müssen sie die Erfahrung machen, dass es schwierig ist, hochwertige Kinderbücher zu finden, die ein leichtes Verstehen des Islams anbieten können.
Dieses Dilemma verstehend, hat der Herausgeber im indischen Neu-Delhi, Saniyasnain Khan, die Idee entwickelt, ein breites Spektrum von Kinderbüchern über den Islam auf Englisch herauszugeben. Unter dem Namen Goodword Books steigen die Publikationen des Verlages stetig auf der Rangliste, sodass einige sie bereits als „Harry Potter“-Bücher über den Islam bezeichnet haben.

Geburt eines Verlags

Der Weg zur Gründung von Goodword Books begann mit den bescheidenen Anfängen des indischen Gelehrten Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, dessen Anstrengungen, den Geist des Islam zu verbreiten, zur einer Akzeptanz und Popularität dessen Bücher geführt hat. Sein Sohn Saniyasnain hat die Arbeit seines Vaters weitergeführt, dessen Bücher veröffentlicht, und die Initiative ergriffen. Um hochwertige Kinderbücher zum Thema Islam herausgeben zu können, begann er 1996 mit Goodword Books und 1999 mit Goodword Kidz. Zur Zeit arbeiten 35 Angestellte in der Verlagszentrale in der indischen Hauptstadt.

Ursprünglich unter der Marke Al-Risala veröffentlicht, bietet Goodword Books ein reichhaltiges Angebot für Kinder: Islamische Kinderbücher, Bücher mit Kindergeschichten, Brettspiele, Geschenkpakete, Malbücher, Labyrinthe, Kreuzworträtsel, Erzählungen aus dem Qur’an und der Prophetengeschichte und weitere Produktideen für Kinder. Mit über hundert Outlets in 20 Ländern sind die USA, Großbritannien, Indien und Pakistan bisher die Hauptmärkte für Goodword Books.

Ideen für Kinder

Khan, umtriebiger Kopf im Verlag, ist Autor verschiedener Kinderbücher. Bisher sind mehr als 100 Titel unter seinem Namen erschienen. Zu diesen zählen: Tell Me About the Prophet Muhammad, Tell Me About Hajj, Tell Me About the Prophet Musa, Tell Me About the Prophet Yusuf, My First Quran Storybook und andere. Khans Bücher wurden ins Französische, Dänische, Türkische, Urdu, Arabische, Malaiische und Usbekische übersetzt.

Im Gespräch erzählt er, dass der Islam im Wesentlichen eine Religion des Friedens und der Harmonie sei, dass es aber zwei Hauptgründe gebe, warum andere Muslime und ihre Religion ablehnten. Der eine sei die Assoziation von Gewalt mit dem Islam und der andere, dass Muslimen unterstellt werde, ihre Frauen schlecht zu behandeln. „Ich hatte das Gefühl, dass es eine dringende Nachfrage danach gab, die nächste Generation über die wirklichen islamischen Werte zu informieren, sodass sie zu Botschaftern im Kleinen für die Eigenschaften des Islam werden können. Außerdem wollte ich die Kinder dazu stimulieren, während ihres Wachstums die islamischen Ideale zu erlernen“, meinte Khan, dessen erstes Buch „Tell Me About Hajj“ mehr als 30.000 mal verkauft wurde. „Die Kinder erhalten viele negative Informationen über den Islam. Es besteht die Notwendigkeit, ihnen ein richtiges Bild zu vermitteln, damit sie zu ausgeglichenen Individuen werden“, erläutert der Herausgeber, dessen Artikel zum Thema Islam und Spiritualität regelmäßig in der „Times of India“ erscheinen.

Als Vorstandsmitglied eines gemeinnützigen Vereins, sei es sein „Bestreben, Bücher zu verlegen, die ein solides Fundament auf Grundlage der moralischen Werte des Islam aufbauen helfen sollen. Der Hauptzweck dieser Bücher ist es, sie mit Hilfe von bewusst ausgesucht qur’anischen Versen - und Aussagen aus anderen islamischen Quellen - auszubilden, damit diese nicht nur die ethischen Werte des Islam erlernen, sondern diese auch in ihrem Leben verkörpern.“

Erfolg und Qualität

Nachdem er über die Popularität seiner Bücher sprach, berichtete Khan, dass seine „Tell Me (Erzähl mir!)“-Serie bei Eltern beliebt ist und zeigt den Brief eines malaysischen Vaters, in dem es heißt: „Ich glaube, dass bei der herrschenden Weltlage Geschichten aus ihrer ‘Tell Me’-Reihe sehr wichtig sind. Es ist meine Hoffnung und mein Wunsch, dass diese Bücher auch von Nichtmuslimen gelesen werden und genauso populär werden wie herkömmliche Kinderbücher.“ Ähnliches schrieb ein Mittelschul-Lehrer aus dem englischen Middlesex: „Ich bemühe mich darum, dass die muslimischen Kinder das Gefühl bekommen, dass sie mit ihrem Glauben an dieser Schule anerkannt werden. Ich würde mich freuen, wenn Sie es mir gestatten würden, ihre ‘Little Hearts (Kleine Herzen)’-Bücher als Teil eines Vortrags für die Schul-Versammlung zu verwenden.“

Khan, der häufig an Veranstaltungen mit Vertretern anderer Religionen teilnimmt, ist übrigens der Ansicht, dass seine Bücher auch für Kinder aus nichtmuslimischen Familien geeignet seien. Kürzlich bestellte eine Schule in Delhi Bücher des Verlags für ihre Bibliothek. Im fernen Großbritannien findet das Buch „My first Quran“ Empfehlung in einem Lesekatalog für Lehrer an britischen Schulen.

„Es ist eine bekannte Tatsache, dass Texte und Bilder zusammen das effektivste Mittel sind, wenn es um den Unterricht von Kindern gibt. Unsere Titel verbinden verständliche Texte mit phantasievollen Bildern, sodass die Kinder sich von ihnen angezogen fühlen“, fügt Khan hinzu. Man bemühe sich um einen vernünftigen und einfachen Ansatz, sodass die Bücher für „Kinder aus allen Religionen“ attraktiv finden.

Goodwords Spezialität sind muslimische Kindergeschichten, die auf dem Qur’an und den Hadith beruhen. Es gibt mehr als 500 Titel aus diesem Bereich. „Diese Bücher widmen sich vollkommen der Entwicklung von aussagekräftigen und vollwertigen islamischen und ethischen Werten.“ Es gibt augenblicklich mehr als 20 Autoren aus aller Welt, die mit dem Verlag zusammen arbeiten.

Neben dem Kernbereich, den Kinderbüchern, verlegt Saniyasnain Khain auch Bücher für Erwachsene. Diese bewegen sich thematisch von Geschichte, Religion bis zu Philosophie und dem Erlernen der arabischen Sprache. Auch für diese Produktlinie hat er bekannte Publizisten gewinnen können.

Saniyasnain Khan fasst seine Visionen für Goodword Books zusammen. Er hoffe, mit seinen Büchern Liebe zum Islam in Kindern und Jugendlichen zu erzeugen, sodass sie als Erwachsene dessen Schönheit in voller Blüte verkörpern können.

03.08.2008 Islamische Zeitung Berlin

Happy birthday Switzerland!

2008-08-01T19:58:00.001+02:00

Und in Basel, immer einen Tag früher als die Andern, nämlich am 31. Juli:

... and an exemption card for Pumuckl

2008-08-01T19:49:00.004+02:00

Arabian Nights - and Art Nouveau

2008-08-01T16:33:00.002+02:00

Syrian dancers of Enana ballet perform -Sindbad the Sailor - during the 44th International Carthage festival at the Roman theatre in Carthage, near Tunis, Tunisia
Being one of the most important Arab, African and World festivals, the International Carthage Festival holds this year its 44nd edition. The amphitheatre which was restored at the beginning of the 20 th Century and adapted to modern technology (it takes in up to 7500 spectators), hosted various civilisations, and is considered today in Tunisia as a symbol site. It was used during the 1960's to host jazz concerts and plays...

Carthage Festival was founded in 1964, It attracted famous artists throughout the world such as: Hedi Semlali, Ali Riahi, Hedi Jouini, Feyrouz, Sabeh Fakhri, Warda. Moreover, the Festival invited artists from outside the Arab and Mediterranean area to offer its spectators a wide range of artistic creation. Thus, Carthage goers were able to admire Myriam Makeba, Youssou Ndour, Dalida, James Brown, Louis Armstrong, Ray Charles, Johnny Clegg, Alpha Blondy and Joe Cocker whose performances were engraved in people's memories forever.

My name is Bond, Jane Bond

2008-08-01T14:13:00.002+02:00

Spy agency MI6 is on the lookout for women wanting jobs in technology, with the organisation saying it needs to diversify.
Speaking to the Associated Press (AP), the MI6's head of human resources said: "Government agencies have to show they're making positive efforts but for us it means much more." Also speaking to AP, the agency's chief recruiter added: "The perception is still that (the work) is for single men, but not all jobs are on the front line. "This said many of the women who join want to be on the front line." Their comments come a year after MI6 launched a massive recruitment drive aimed at encouraging women to sign up. Pola Uddin, the first Muslim woman in the House of Lords, told the news agency that people needed to loose the assumption that UK spies are all like James Bond. "We need less sexism and a symbol who doesn't always hold a martini glass," she said.

Its friday again!

2008-08-01T13:14:00.003+02:00

Liebe Brüder und Schwestern,
Salamu Alaykum wa Rahmatullahi wa Barakatuh
`Abdullah Ibn `Umar, Allahs Wohlgefallen auf ihm, berichtete:

„Der Gesandte Allahs, Allahs Segen und Friede auf ihm, hielt eine Ansprache auf dem Podest und erwähnte das Almosen, die Genügsamkeit und das Betteln er sagte: „Die obere Hand ist besser als die untere Hand denn die obere Hand ist die Spendende und die untere Hand ist die Bettelnde.“

Back to Beirut

2008-07-28T09:09:00.002+02:00

Lebanese-born London-based singer Mika performs at Martyr's Square in Beirut. Mika, whose real name is Michael Penniman and was born in Beirut from a Lebanese mother and an American father, returned to the city after he was forced to leave it at the outbreak of Lebanon's civil war in 1975-1990

It´s friday again

2008-07-25T13:18:00.002+02:00

Liebe Brüder und Schwestern,
Salamu Alaykum wa Rahmatullahi wa Barakatuh

Abu Huraira berichtete, daß der Gesandte Allahs, Allahs Segen und Friede auf ihm, sagte:

«Wer an Allah und den Jüngsten Tag glaubt, der soll seinem Nachbarn kein Übel zufügen. Und wer an Allah und den Jüngsten Tag glaubt, der soll seinem Gast Gastfreundschaft erweisen. Und wer an Allah und den Jüngsten Tag glaubt, der soll Gutes sprechen oder schweigen. »

[Sahih Al-Bucharyy Nr. 6018]

Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?

2008-07-24T17:29:00.002+02:00

Kabul/Brussels, 24 July 2008: The Karzai government and its international supporters must become much better at countering sophisticated Taliban propaganda if they are to defeat an insurgency that is driving a dangerous wedge between them and the Afghan people.

Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines the Taliban communication apparatus that is exploiting popular disillusionment with the government and the U.S. and other foreign troops. Using the full range of media, the Taliban is successfully tapping into strains of Afghan nationalism.

“Out of power and lacking control over territory, the Taliban has proved adept at projecting itself as stronger than it is in terms of numbers and resources”, says Joanna Nathan, Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for the South Asia Program. “Both Kabul and its international supporters need to respond in a timelier, coordinated manner if they are to effectively counter Taliban allegations”.

The Taliban has created a sophisticated communications apparatus that projects an increasingly confident movement. It tries to wear out its opponents. Influencing perceptions at home and abroad is a vital component of this strategy. The vast majority of the material is in Pashtu, and a shortage of language skills in the international community means much either passes unnoticed or is misunderstood. The Afghan and other governments engaged in Afghanistan have failed to communicate robustly and honestly with their populations in a way that would help build and sustain popular will for a long-term endeavour.

The Karzai government and its allies must make greater efforts, through word and deed, to address sources of alienation exploited in Taliban propaganda. By building institutions and offering the services that give the Afghan people a better life, the government can gain public support, thus denying the insurgents opportunities to exploit local grievances and thereby gain a modicum of legitimacy.

The international community must provide the necessary support and pressure for improved performance, while also examining its own actions. The governments of countries contributing international troops must improve communications with Afghans on the directions and activities of the international engagement, including doing more to avoid civilian casualties.

“The Taliban is not going to be defeated militarily”, says Samina Ahmed, Crisis Group’s South Asia Project Director. “Peace will only be possible if Kabul and the international community replace their fire-fighting approach with a long-term strategy of services and security”.