Military History and Warfare

Military History and Warfare: Alamo Village, Brackettville: Texan War of Independence

2009-02-03T13:39:00.000-08:00

I apologise for not adding new material to this site for over a month. However, the good news is that having been away travelling over December and January, I have now accumulated lots of new material for 2009.

This week we will be having a look at the Alamo Village, located some 130 miles from the site of the real Alamo in San Antonio. Somewhat 'off the beaten track', the Alamo village was originally constructed for the 1960 John Wayne epic 'The Alamo'. The village consists of the full-scale film set used for the film, including a full-scale replica of both San Antonio and the Alamo compound circa. 1836. The village is unique in that its building have no false fronts. All are fully functional, thus allowing Brackettville to boast Texas' first permanant outdoor movie set. Since 1960, the set has been in some 200 different productions.

For the military historian, the Alamo village also presents the opportunity to look at (and run around in) a recreation of one of the most famous battles in history. Of course, the value of any such exercise is entirely dependent upon the accuracy of the recreation. Whilst it is impossible to judge with any certainty as the accuracy of the set it can be said that the carpenters and set designers were working from a map which is widely believed to accurately represent the true state of affairs at the mission in 1836. At the very least, the set gives us an appreciation of some of the challenges facing the Texian defenders as well as their Mexican attackers.

The Alamo garrison had access to at least eighteen pieces of artillery (and possibly twenty-one according to some sources). In order to equip each one with a full firing team, half of the garrison would have to have been deployed manning cannons. Assuming that each gun team was therefore under strength, this still leaves very few men for protecting the compound perimeter. The complex itself sprawled over 3 acres with almost 1,320 feet of perimeter to defend. With fewer than two-hundred men, the Alamo desperately needed reinforcements.

The final Mexican assault occured on March 6 and consisted of four columns. Despite their advantage in numbers, the advancing Mexicans were extremely vulnerable to cannon shot. Only the first few ranks of soldiers were able to fire without hitting the men in front. The cannons of the defenders were therefore able to tear holes through the tightly packed columns of attacking infantry. However, once over the wall, the Mexicans were able to use their weight in numbers to overwhelm individual groups of defenders. As the photos demonstrate, once the walls had been breached, the inner compound was simply too large to prevent the defenders from being overwhelmed.

Section of the wall defended by Crockett.

Front gate

Cross section of the southern defences.

Military History and Warfare: 19th Military History Blog Carnival

2008-12-14T09:38:00.000-08:00

Hello and welcome to the 19th Military History Blog Carnival!

This month we have a variety of interesting submissions.

First up we have an interesting article from Ross Mahoney's Thoughts on Military History blog which examines some of the economic and operational issues that faced the Royal Air Force during the inter-war years. By explaining these problems Ross shows the role of the RAF in helping to develop Combined Operations doctrine.

Mark Grimsley at War Historian presents an excellent article examining the possible consequences for prolonging the Pacific war had a Japanese military coup against the Emperor been successful just days before the surrender.

Penny Richards' brings us the story of World War II vetern Bob Metcalf. Penny reflects on Mr. Metcalf's time in the seventy-sixth infantry division and later civilian life.

On a similar theme of personal histories, we a have a new blog from Rich Landers entitled Soldier's Mail. The blog features the writings home of Sgt. Samuel Avery during the time of the First World War from 1916-1919 while first serving with the 8th Mass. Infantry during the Mexican Border Campaign (1916) and then with the 103rd U.S. Infantry (26th Division) in France as part of the American Expeditionary Force (1917-1919).

This World War I blog is publishing the letters of William Lamin exactly 90 years after they were written. Read each posting week by week to follow his life.

Not so much a blog but an archive, Kimberley Linder's The Flight Officer brings us the life of Joseph H Noyes. Joseph participated in the aerial campaign against Germany before being shot down and killed at the age of 22. His story and personal history provides a window into World War II.

This month Airminded brings us an interesting discussion (and map) of Britain's air defence network during the First World War when Zepplins and Gotha Bombers pounded London.

Terry Tucker draws on his own experiences in the field of counterinsurgency bringing us a fascinating article on the Lessons of History

For something a little different, we have a review of the the film Passchendale. The writer is pleasantly surprised that a big screen epic featuring the story of Canadian soldiers has finally made it to cinemas! You might also like to look at a trailer for the film on the official site.

History is Elementary examines the film 1968 film 'Beach Red' and tells the story of the battle for the island of Tarawa when US marines took heavy casualties attempting to dislodge the Japanese. The article looks at the number of dead and recent efforts to locate their remains.

From me, we have an article on the American Civil War. I've tried to explore the various strengths and weaknesses of the Union and Confederacy at the outbreak of the war.

Lastly, we have an article looking at the Welsh castle of Aberystwyth. There are some great pictures as well as interesting facts!

Unfortunately, this is it for submissions for December.

We are also looking for a host for January's blog. Please contact Gavin Robinson (saber'at'4-lom.com)

I hope you have enjoyed this month's carnival. Please continue to support the carnival by writing and submitting your articles. Until January, have a good Christmas and New Year.

Alex

Military History and Warfare: Notices: Upcoming Military History Blog Carnival

2008-12-03T01:03:00.000-08:00

As Christmas approaches, I'm pleased to announce that 'Military History and Warfare' will be hosting the 19th Military History Blog Carnival.

If you would like to submit an article, please e-mail me at alexanderclark999'at'gmail.com. Alternatively, use this handy tool to submit your article.

I have decided to leave the carnival theme open to all submissions. However, given that we have just marked the 90th Anniversary of the end of World War I, it would be good to see some articles on the subject.

The Carnival will be up and running on Sunday 14th December. Join the blog mailing list (box on the right hand side of this page) to ensure that you don't miss this edition!

Military History and Warfare: American Civil War: Logistics, Railroads and Strategy

2008-11-13T01:26:00.000-08:00

Commanders throughout history have grappled with the problems of integrating logistics and strategy. A witty little military logistician dictum known to particularly rile those in the combat branches goes: “If logistics’ was easy it would be called tactics”. With all of our modern technology, scalable processes, and mass transportation it is easy to forget the difficulty with which armies of the past had to struggle in order to provide the right amount of men and material at precisely the right time.

Let us consider the following. Up until about 1830, armies either marched on foot or rode on horses and wagons. Every weapon, round of ammunition, pound of food and sack of oats was carried by man, beast, or both. Roughly, half of the supplies carried were used to sustain the horses themselves. For much of the nineteenth century, North America remained largely wild, undeveloped, and lacking in infrastructure. However by 1861 important developments had been made with the advent of railroad.

For comparison, a six mule team drawing a wagon of 1.5 tons of food could travel approximately 500 miles on that 1.5 ton of food; a locomotive carrying a ton of fuel could only travel about 30 or 35 miles but could carry a payload of 150 tons.

Soldiers traveling by train could arrive at their destination in better shape physically and materially. Logistical difficulties were now reduced to maneuvering this quantity of men and material any distance from the railhead. The improved speed of movement allowed supplies to arrive in better, condition.

By surveying a map of the United States the sheer scale of the battles and campaigns of the Civil War becomes fully apparent:

http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/AtlasesTableOfContents.html

As an example, Sherman’s 1864 Atlanta Campaign essentially followed a logistical life line of 473 miles of rail line from Louisville, Nashville, Chattanooga and then Atlanta. The campaign included approximately 100,000 men and 35,000 animals. Sherman estimated that the rail line did the work of approximately 36,000 wagons and 220,000 mules; the use of the railroad not only expanded the scale of warfare it is also hotly debated that it may also have contributed to prolonging the war as well.

One of the foremost Napoleonic concepts of war, modeled by the Commanders of the Civil War, was the concept of “Interior Lines”; simply meaning that, a group of units or armies cooperating on the inside of a curved front could mass and maneuver more quickly than there opponents on the outside, or “Exterior Lines” of the curve because they had less far to travel.

As an example, in 1863 at the Battle Chickamauga, LTG Longstreet moved 12,000 men, 800 miles in 12 days from Virginia to Tennessee to reinforce Braxton Bragg. Two weeks later the Union XI and XII Corp’s moved 25,000 men, 1200 Miles in 12 days, from Virginia to Chattanooga to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland. Union forces moved twice as many troops in the same number of days using exterior lines of communication. Seemingly, the concept of Interior lines had been nullified and railroads seem to make geographical disposition a lot less relevant.

In 1863, fighting revolved mainly around the Culpepper Court House and Fredericksburg primarily because those were the two main Union Army Railheads; the union was averaging approximately 800 tons of material supplies a day to the Falmouth Railhead opposite Fredericksburg.

In essence railroad technology would drive the strategic considerations of war planning, and, intrusions and interdictions of rail lines would impact operations. The railroad expanded the scale of warfare materially and geographically. But most clearly, the railroad logistics shaped the strategies of Civil War Commanders and became a vital element of Military Science; some scholars have argued that railroad science was no longer an element of strategy; it had become the strategy and would thus change the face of war.

- Terry Tucker

The American Civil War: The Military Balance sheet of 1861: Strengths and Weaknesses of the Union and Confederacy

2008-11-03T04:56:00.000-08:00

With the benefit of historical hindsight, it seems almost impossible to think that the Confederacy could have won the war against the Union. By surveying the balance sheet of both sides, it is possible to assess how far the Confederacy lagged behind the Union in both resources and economic development.

In terms of population, for every inhabitant of the Confederate States there were more than two Americans who lived in the Union. In addition, the Confederacy had more than three and half million slaves and 130,000 freed blacks. Slave labour also allowed white men to serve in the Confederate army, allowing for more than 80% of the military age population to be mobilised.

Economically, the North surpassed the South in almost every measure. Prior to the war, the South had relied upon the northern states and Britain for the iron and steel imports necessary for railroad construction. The North possessed 110,000 some factories and workshops of various sizes. By comparison, the South possessed barely a tenth of that number. Statistics for industrial workers further demonstrate that the American industrial basin was clearly concentrated in the Northern states. 1,300,000 workers in the North were employed in industry. By comparison, the south had only 110,000 workers. The predominance of manufacturing in the northern states gave the Union a huge advantage. In 1860, the North produced fifteen times the level of iron manufactured in the South. The arms industry was also concentrated in the North with 97% of all firearms produced north of the Mason-Dixie line.

Despite these massive material advantages, the war would be won by the side that could best concentrate their resources overwhelmingly against the enemy. Total war is only possible with the support of a banking and credit system to support the costs of war. It was in this field that the North excelled over the Confederacy. With 85% of all capital and 80% of all bank deposits, the North had a banking and credit system vastly more developed than anything in the South. The Federal government was therefore able to draw upon loans from private financiers in quantities which was simply impossible for the Confederacy.

Although many Southern politicians believed they had a predominance in agriculture (especially cotton, which they attempted to leverage to gain diplomatic recognition from Britain and France), the reality was that here too, the North had a clear advantage. The failure of Missouri and Kentucky to secede had deprived the Confederacy of another important agricultural basin that could have supplied the Confederate army. The South had also hoped to use cotton exports to obtain credit on the European markets. However, New Orleans, the largest port in the Confederacy fell into Union hands early in the war. The remaining important cities of Charleston, Galveston, Mobile and Wilmington were all vulnerable to naval and land attack.

Despite these inherent disadvantages, the South possessed strengths that they hoped would ultimately win them the war. In order to conquer the South, Federal armies would have to subdue an area the size of Western Europe. In 1860, the Federal army was only 14,000 strong. Those few troops were scattered across various parts of the continental United States. Both North and South would therefore have to start from scratch in raising the large armies that would ultimately be required to fight the war. It was hoped that the Confederacy would therefore have sufficient time to make allies and involve international powers such as Britain to turn the tide against the Union. Furthermore, Federal troops advancing into the South would have to deal with the problems of over-extended lines of communication and the estimated thirty or so supply wagons required for every thousand troops. Countryside and enemy strongholds would need to be pacified, drawing yet more troops away from the front. If the Confederacy could drag out the fighting for long enough, they hoped to be able to tire out the Union, just as the American colonists had tired out a militarily superior British force ninety years before. Although the North had a larger population, one in five (four million people) were foreign immigrants. Such a large diverse population might be more difficult to keep together in comparison to the more homogeneous Southern population.

Given the weaknesses of the South, the historian must ask how the Confederates could have rationally believed that they could make and win a war against the Union?
The answer lies perhaps in the fact that many of the technologies and tactics of Total War later seen in the US Civil War were not immediately apparent to commanders on both sides. The potential of railway to change the nature of battlefield logistics had yet be discovered. It is important to remember that many of the relative strengths and weaknesses of both sides were only fully realised later in the war.

Adam I.P. Smith, ‘The American Civil War’, (New York, 2007)

Mark E. Neely, ‘Was the Civil War a Total War?’, Civil War History 37 (1991)

Ronald N. Current, ‘God and the Strongest Battalions’ in David Hubere Donald, ed, ‘Why the North won the Civil War’ (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1960)

James M. McPherson, ‘Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction’ (New York 1982)

James Huston, ‘Calculating the value of the Union: Slavery, Property Rights and the Economic Origins of the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003)

Military History and Warfare: Counter-insurgency: Lessons of History

2008-10-24T07:04:00.000-07:00

Counter-insurgency: How Do We Choose Which Lessons of History are Applicable?

This brief essay attempts to address the problems of identifying relevant historical lessons to countering an insurgency.

The illustrations most often used to describe success in counterinsurgency are the British experience in Malaya and the American experience in the Philippines. Conversely, the French experiences in Vietnam and Algeria, aside from some tactical innovations, are considered to be cautionary tales in how not to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

When one reads the myriad of news reports and analysis, it is easy to get the impression that by making (what we believe to be) correct historical similarities, we can therefore correctly identify and isolate both the components of the insurgency and the correct methodology for countering it (as opposed to “combating” it).

The British example in Malaya is clear example of precision labeling in identifying the “kind of war” that one is fighting (notice the inference to Clausewitz?). The British used the term “Emergency” to mobilize the desired government agencies, police and military organizations to prosecute the counterinsurgency effort. ‘Prosecute’ appears to be the best description of events because of the British emphasis on the rule of law and the heavy use and primacy of police in all its operations and engagement strategies. This is not to say that the military was not used, on the contrary, they were; however, they played a secondary role and were subordinate in many cases to other agencies and departments.

The American experience in the Philippines can primarily be attributed to Magsaysay through his effective leadership, military and governmental reforms. Military operations were subordinate to the goal of winning the support of the people, not only in tactics, but in behavior. A detail often overlooked by US analysts, is the fact that the Philippine Army had not been created entirely in the image of the US Army. Thus it was not indoctrinated with conventional US solutions, tactical doctrine and organizations. All of these “force multipliers” were never fully understood by US Commanders that believed in large full scale military operations that depended heavily on the use of superior firepower and felt that the best model for success was the historical examples of WW II.

What does this mean for those that intend to use the historical lessons learned? The first question that must be asked is what is unique about the kind of insurgency being faced? What kind of insurgency is this? Where is the “white noise” that seemingly distracts one’s ability to root out and identify the root cause? Once both the kind of war that being fought and the factors that make the particular counterinsurgency unique have been identified, questions can be asked of what lessons are transferable from previous experiences to this new situation.

In essence, some general lessons of success from the Malayan Experience and the Philippine experience can be articulated as follows:

· Military operations are subordinate to and dominated by political objectives; this includes behavior and tactics

· Solid intelligence from the civilian sources that is vetted and validated by multiple sources drives military operations if those operations support political objectives

· Small unit tactics reign supreme; small unit night patrols, ambushes, long range reconnaissance and commando squads, combined with a careful targeting of psychological warfare and information operations based on solid intelligence.

· Live with and mingle with the population; leaders must constantly review the element of risk to the force. “Going Native” early and quickly will mitigate that risk.

· Avoid the pitfalls’ of “do-goodism”; throwing resources and “largess” at a problem without participation and support of the people/government/population in the entire decision making process creates no confidence or support in the reforms or programs.

Lastly, remember that these are general historical lessons and estimates. How and if these lessons can be applied to say Iraq or Afghanistan needs to be carefully weighed against the questions we posed earlier: What is unique about this new and particular situation? What experience and lessons can be transferred? How do we adapt the appropriate general lessons to a unique situation?

Terry Tucker

The Bone Yard. Old Afghan Army equipment. There are many such bone yards like this throughout the country. Left center in this picture is a BM-21, 122mm Rocket launcher and just to the right of it is a piece of towed artillery.

For comparison; the two tanks in the middle are cold war era soviet tanks. The tank facing you on the right is a Soviet T54/55 series tank. The bore evacuator is at the end of the gun tube. The tank on the left is a soviet T-62. There are many variants of both vehicles and sometimes the location of the bore evacuator is not a good indication that you have correctly identified the tank. Other considerations include road wheel spacing, machine gun type mounted on the turret, location of infra-red lights, search lights and other equipment fixed on the hull or turret

Military History and Warfare: Counter-insurgency: Urban Operations

2008-10-17T01:29:00.001-07:00

Counterinsurgency, Urban Operations and Lessons Learned

Urban operations are an increasing aspect of modern day conflicts. Urban operations are also essential because of the many considerations that result in the decision to conduct an urban operation, for instance; Political considerations, Psychological considerations, Operational Considerations, Potential Center of gravity. The 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict reflects at least two of the above considerations, as does the decision of US Forces to seize Kabul and Kandahar early in the Afghan war.

If one assumes that doctrine is the key element of training and that this training is the key to a unit's ability to execute an operation, and successful execution in turn results in a succession of operational successes, and even perhaps a decisive strategic success, then there are two predominate themes that are linked.

First the basic tactic’s techniques and procedures (TTP’s) remain unchanged: these are to Suppress, Breach, Attack/Assault and Defend. Second, a defender and attacker make critical assumptions about the population when they make the decision to conduct urban operations. This decision and the size of the force to use are directly dependent on the commander’s mission analysis. The operation is then conducted by a number of units; the key factor being each squad, platoon and company and how well trained they are to conduct urban operations; the training is derived from an understanding of doctrine and an emphasis placed on that doctrine.
Three key failures across the spectrum of urban operations include:

· Complacency
· A lack of specialization of units and Techniques, Tactics and Procedures or (Drills)
· Refugee’s and Internally Displaced Persons.

Cities are resilient and infrastructure generally continues to operate despite conflict. The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli conflict demonstrates that urban combat is still crucial and will be a center of gravity that will disrupt operations and affect political and operational considerations. An analysis of urban operations between WW II and 1998 for urban operations in Stalingrad, Aachen, Manilla, Hue, Singapore, Beirut, Mogadishu, Grozny and Sarajevo, reveals a number of themes and lessons learned. These themes and lessons that are recurrent include:
[i]

· Complacency of your enemies resolve – Stalingrad, Mogadishu, Grozny (Iraq)
· Overestimating your ability
· No contingency planning –Stalingrad, Grozny
· Destruction/turning the city into rubble - Stalingrad, Aachen, Grozny
· Coalition soldiers operationally weak - Stalingrad, Hue, Mogadishu (Iraq and Afghanistan)
· Casualty rates high
· Misuse of armor- Stalingrad, Grozny,
· Chicanery/Deception/Ruses (Tactical) Seek to devise tactics and methods that put your opponent at a disadvantage
· AdHoc Task Organization (Small mobile teams work best) (3 x 25 man teams) squad composition is also changed NO COMPOSITE UNITS
· Improvisation of weapons and tactics (hugging techniques, weapon for multiple uses, ie RPG’s or Recoiless Rifles)
· Infantry team re-organizations
· Specialized urban training and specialized training to work with armor.
· Published doctrine is of little help except for pointers on defense
· Methodical and firepower intensive operations
· Battlefield is not linear and clean
· Snipers, mines and communications are your most important assets
· Urban structure and architecture is important
· ROE/ROI (Rules of Engagement/ Rules of Interaction
· Units do not plan or implement security measures
· No logistics plan
· Information/Psyops war: Discrepancies between Official sources and News Media (Public Opinion is extremely important; prepare provocations to destabilize along ethnic lines) Grozny, Israeli-Hezbollah, Iraq, Afghanistan
· Extensive use of Electronic Counter Measures and satellite blocking
· Assaults uncoordinated; Lack of coordination between units, agencies and police.
· Technology is ineffective when the soldier or user is untrained, confused and afraid to use it.
· The capacity of clans, culture and social traditions goes far beyond surface discipline
· Force ratios not adhered to
· The decision to fight in successive cities (this is a critical failure in decision making)
· Preparation for urban combat has to begin in peacetime

Increasingly, urban operations are a requirement of counterinsurgency. Generally speaking the area known as the Middle East is comprised of 18 Nations; is 4.3 million square miles, had a population of 326 million in 2002and 57% of this population resides in urban areas. For comparison, 25% of the population was urban in 1960 and current projections indicate that by the year 2015 that 70% of the population will be urban.[ii] Increasingly, military operations and or counter-insurgency operations within urban areas means that operations will increasingly include a succession of urban operations that literally will cross ethnic and cultural boundaries from one street to the next and will increase the complexity of operations. Of particular importance is the fact that Middle Eastern cities are unique and different from Western and European urban design. Despite the fact that some Middle Eastern cities are changing and may begin to resemble Western design as a result of sprawl and growth, the city center in Middle Eastern cities still has a significant religious, political and social influence and Middle Eastern urban design is also a physical reflection of tribal, clan and community separation that only the locals will know and understand, thus adding another layer of complexity to the hearts and minds campaign.

- Terry Tucker

[i] Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century’s End, Roger J. Spiller, US Army Command and General Staff College Press; Block by Block: The Challenge of Urban Operations, William G Robertson, Lawrence A. Yates, US Army Command and General Staff College Press.
[ii] Population Resource Center; prc@prcnj.org.

A View from the Rampart: A mine clearing training session south of our camp. French and US Demolition Experts train Afghan students the art and science of mine clearance.

Urban Terrain: Every alley, door, window and crevice offers defensible advantage and can become a dangerous trap. Rubble and city composition can also add to the complexity.

Military History and Warfare: Counter-insurgency: Classical or Modern Counterinsurgency

2008-10-10T00:48:00.000-07:00

Tactical Lessons, Strategic Success and Counterinsurgency Operations Classical or Modern Counterinsurgency?

Counterinsurgency has not received this much attention since the 1960’s and President Kennedy’s implementation of the US Army Special Warfare Center. Our renewed interest in the art of insurgency and counterinsurgency has sparked fierce debate over the kind of war we are fighting: terrorism, irregular warfare or an asymmetrical war. When we label a war a counterinsurgency, by definition, it means that we are fully aware of the type of insurgency we are fighting; do we really? Is terrorism a type of war or a tactic? What do we really mean when we use the term irregular warfare? And What exactly is an Asymmetrical War?

My education in military studies began with a healthy dose of Clausewitz, Jomini, and Mahan. I studied Patton, Guderian, Rommel, and a host of other famous conventional war practitioners. As my warrior education progressed, I was taught the “classics”; T.E. Lawrence, C.E. Callwell, David Galula, and, Frank Kitson. I also became familiar with, Mao Zedong and Che Guevara.

The US Army released its new counterinsurgency manual in Dec 2007. It is heavily steeped in the theories of classical counterinsurgency (COIN). Classical counterinsurgency places a heavy emphasis on maximizing the legitimacy of the Host Government; US Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, also does the same. Yet as a trainer and practitioner of counterinsurgency attempting to implement the newest doctrine, something is amiss between the classical textbook approach and what appears to be actually happening on the ground.

Classical counterinsurgency is based on lessons learned between the 1940’s and the 1970’s. These lessons were gleaned from places like Algeria, Malaysia, Central America, and Vietnam. Most of the insurgencies during this period were based on either Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism or both. As a result, the strategies and lessons learned focused on how an already established, legitimate, yet, weak government could re-assert itself and maintain the status quo; including the minority or opposition group backed by a Western Power.

The counterinsurgency we are experiencing in Afghanistan is not nationalistic or anti-colonial. Insurgents today are following in failed States or States bordering between weak and failed. In classical counterinsurgency the insurgent takes the initiative and initiates the campaign. Some examples include: Algeria, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Columbia, and Rhodesia. Over the last couple of years Coalition forces or weak governments have initiated the campaign and the insurgent is now in a position to be strategically reactive, think Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the covert war for sanctuary and financial support in places like Saudi Arabia, Europe, and the Arab Emirates.

Today the paradox of modern counterinsurgency might be explained as: Classical insurgencies usually were started to disrupt the status quo and to overthrow existing governments. The insurgents had a strategy and a political agenda that was Nationalistic in its nature. Modern insurgents, on the other hand, are now attempting to preserve the status quo where a weak government or foreign invaders represent revolutionary change. Today’s insurgent does not always seek to gain control of the State. Think Kurds and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area of the North West Territories and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

The modern insurgent does not always want to succeed from the State but rather control portions of it; they could care less if the State collapses, as long as they are in control of their area of interest. Modern insurgents, unlike the Nationalists of yore, really have not stipulated how and what would replace the existing structure or government, or, articulated a “National” Strategy. Even bin Laden’s alleged strategy is more akin to the structure of the Pasha’s and Bey’s of the Ottoman Empire, a strategy that espouses an adherence to an ideology subject to local interpretation, refinement and enforcement, and, no real unified plan on how to implement it.Consequently, counterinsurgency becomes very dynamic and very complex, especially when the insurgent you’re fighting only cares about curing God’s favor through countless individual acts with the hope of eventually gaining paradise and ultimate victory.

The modern insurgent is fighting a “resistance” type of war and seeks to wear down the effort by constantly attacking soft targets. He thinks that we will just leave if he can continue this tactic. On the other hand, Coalition Forces collateral damage and mis-managed information operations continue to erode Coalition credibility, create a wave of new recruits and, more importantly, erode world and general public opinion of our ability to wage a successful counterinsurgency.Thus, the lessons learned here include: Understanding that cultural differences define Jus in Bello. Western Standards are not necessarily agreed to by all others. Understanding these cultural differences in “who” is defining the “just war” will help us understand the domestic and local origins of what constitutes defiance and how it might escalate. Understanding this process helps to define the political-military engagement strategy and process. Remember, diplomacy and politics first.

Other lessons include: Countermeasures designed to fight the enemy strategy and not his ideology; carefully managing the use of force and insuring that your media message is precise and attains the moral high ground in the language of the local cultural area. In essence you have to develop the media message for the local and not just your audience at home. Furthermore this message “branding” so to speak, must be precise for the regional area. Messages devised for Afghanistan might not be well received in Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Information operations are complex and need to be “Targeted”. Think commercial branding here. A commercial message designed for an English speaking audience may fail miserably with your French or German speaking audience, same goes for the Middle East and Golden Crescent. Syrian and Saudi audiences are not the same as Egyptian, Afghani or Turkish audiences. One size does not fit all and the only real commonality among them all is the religion of Islam, and even that is further divided by those that adhere to a particular branch. Despite the fact that popular or unpopular domestic support will either make or break your strategy; information operations must be layered to target specific audiences.

Patrolling and raiding are still critical, but, this technique, tactic and procedure (TTP) has required adjustment and we are finding that more snipers, more observation posts and more surveillance must be increasingly incorporated into the intelligence plan to pre-empt the insurgent’s intentions.

Lastly, at risk of sounding cliché, Intelligence is critical to operations. It is especially critical in counterinsurgency because intelligence drives operations, but, intelligence preparation of the battlefield is also being modified to account for the complex dynamics of modern insurgencies

Terry Tucker

Convoy: A convoy heads towards downtown Mazer-e-Sharif. You can see the “Blue Mosque” faintly in the background

The Blue Mosque: The Blue Mosque in the heart of Mazar-e-Sharif; This is a very famous and historical landmark in Afghan History.

Rockets; After we received an evening shelling, search teams look for the point of origin and attempt to track down the guilty. Here are two rockets that were recovered that did not ignite. This is an example of how primitive, yet effective some of the enemy techniques can be

Military History and Warfare: Counter-insurgency: The Birth of Air Assault: LZ X-Ray, Ia Drang 1965

2008-10-04T05:49:00.000-07:00

Counterinsurgency and The Development of Airmobility Doctrine

The US Army defines the gestation of Airmobility as the mid 1950’s. A tactical doctrine manual, Field Manual 57-35, "Army Transport Aviation-Combat Operations” was written and a provisional sky cav platoon was formed which essentially, through extensive experimentation, eventually became the nucleus of the 792d Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Company (Provisional).[i] One of the first official steps to transformation occurred on 15 January 1960 with the formation of the Rodgers Board. The Rodgers board made several recommendations regarding helicopter type, design, funding and policy. One of its most important recommendations was the recommendation to “prepare an in depth study to determine whether the concept of air fighting units was practical and if an experimental unit should be activated to test its feasibility”. [ii] Although the scope of review of the Rodgers Board was limited, it provided the beginning’s of essential guidance for development and procurement and was indicative of the vision of transformation that was in its embryonic stage. [iii] As airmobility experimentation proceeded, the Howze board was officially appointed on 25 April 1962 [iv]. The board had an extremely demanding schedule and was required to submit its final report by 24 Aug 1962. General Howze, was given wide latitude in which to convene the board to include dealing directly with the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, other military services, government agencies, civilian industry and to convene the board at other installations as he saw fit[v].

The Howze Board final report was submitted on 20 August 1962, 4 days ahead of schedule, and the formation of the “air assault division was the principal tactical innovation”[vi]. Although many had recognized that change was essential, the recommendations from the Rodgers report, the interim field testing and subsequent Howze Board Report, was, that the Army would enhance combat effectiveness in both conventional and counter-guerrilla actions and could accomplish other tasks with smaller forces in shorter campaigns.[vii] The new tactical innovations, by inference and implication, were supposed to support operational and strategic objectives and were focused on combining all the elements of combat power, maneuver forces, reconnaissance, communications and service support. The formation of the air assault division and the air cavalry combat brigade was to combine the classical functions of cavalry operations with the air assault division’s role of closing with and destroying the enemy on the ground. In essence the new innovations provided the mobility to move maneuver forces quickly, provide organic and immediate fire power through aerial weapons platforms to provide and perform the traditional indirect fire role that had previously been dominated by the Artillery and Air Forces close air support roles. Additionally, the aerial weapons platforms provided enhanced standoff, and, support by fire positions from the realm of the 2nd dimension; the air. In hindsight, although these tactical innovations provided an enormous amount of mobility and inherent firepower, they also contributed to the idea that tasks and campaigns could be effectively shorter and or shortened, and again, by implication, the speed of which maneuver delivers superior firepower would be the capstone of doctrine.[viii] Although the innovation of airmobility was to enhance the counter-guerrilla operations in Vietnam, the development of doctrine proceeded along conventional thinking and the doctrine of airmobility received its baptism by fire in the Ia Drang Valley at LZ X-RAY when the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division conducted air assault operations into the area with the specific mission of Search and Destroy Operations.[ix] LTC Moore, would change his tactics, techniques and procedures slightly based on the intelligence estimate he received and directed that all units use the same landing zone instead of separate landing zones for each company. Further, the timing and synchronization of the air assault with the artillery was timed to within H -1 minute, not much room for error.

The United States Army would continue to emphasize that airmobility doctrine was nothing short of a doctrine that was a subset of conventional warfighting, albeit adapted to the Vietnam War. Additionally, US Army Capstone Doctrine essentially remained unchanged from the 1941 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations; and Airmobility doctrine helped to further reinforce the notions of short sharp campaigns of short duration that were characterized by overwhelming firepower and an increase in mobility. It is extremely hard not to draw the correlation or similarity that American Airmobility doctrine was looking at ways to emulate and exceed the “gold standard” of maneuver warfare in the integration of firepower and mobility; the German experience of WW II, or more specifically, the German campaigns in Poland, France and the Low Countries. Never the less, US Army doctrine would experience its next major change 10 years later in 1976.

- Terry Tucker -

[i] Airmobility in Vietnam, 1961-1971, pgs 3-8
[ii] Ibid page 8-9
[iii] Ibid
[iv] Ibid page 20; Secretary McNamara, much like Donald Rumsfeld of today, had serious reservations about the Army’s ability to produce a reexamination of the transformation or modernization concepts that would produce fresh, unorthodox concepts. See page 19 of Airmobility, 1961-1971
[v] Ibid
[vi] Ibid page 22
[vii] Authors Italics
[viii] Ibid, page 20-24
[ix] The source documents for this are the US Army, Center for Military History; Seven Firefights in Vietnam and Airmobile Operations. Increasingly, the US Army used helicopters in its missions and mission support. The largest airmobile operation in the early years occurred in June of 1964 with the airlift of 1300 Vietnamese Marines. In June 1965, 2000 Vietnamese marines used helicopters to Air Assault positions. The 1/7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division would conduct search and destroy mission in the Ia Drang less than 6 months later in Nov 1965. In the words of the Center for Military History;1/7 Cav was going to Air Assault in to “develop there targets” based on intelligence estimates. The new Air Assault techniques gave them a “quick strike” capability. Airmobility operation was adapting the use of conventional infantry tactics and was primarily a weapons platform and a movement platform.

A CH-53 Heavy Lift Helicopter making a sling load.

A team on board the aircraft waiting to take off, The aircraft is a UH-1H Model and was commonly called a Huey or a Slick

Captured enemy equipment: a 51 caliber MG and a two recoilless rifles, compliments of the Special Forces and 75th Ranger Battalion, Republic of Vietnam

Pictures courtesy of Earl S. Wemple III, Major, US Army Special Forces, Retired

Military History and Warfare: Counter-insurgency: Counter-insurgency Operations

2008-09-24T12:19:00.000-07:00

This week I'm very pleased to introduce a brand new series of articles written by a new guest writer, Terry Tucker. Terry is currently on the ground in Afghanisatan and will be writing on the topic of counter-insurgency operations based upon both his own experiences and the study of military history.

Tactical Lessons, Strategic Success and Counter-insurgency Operations: The Historical and Military Element

The Global War on Terror offers a glimpse of how the lessons of insurgency and counterinsurgency are problematic. [i] Building the operational capacity and capabilities of a counterinsurgent security force, to include police, offer lessons in how difficult it is to develop an integrated civil-military approach to combating an insurgency.

Likewise a study of the problems associated with how insurgencies arise is also important and prudent in understanding the lessons of the past. Some might believe that the past is only intelligible from the present. This gives short shrift to the lessons of history and how the present conditions are a result of that past.

In attempting to overcome these problematic conditions, there are several components that affect the overall civil-military engagement strategy that are used to integrate this approach. Some examples of these components include training the indigenous force, and, of course, the elements of politics, diplomacy, geo-politics, global opinion and fully integrated civil-military operations under a unified command.

Lessons can be learned from any type of war, conflict or military operation but assuming that those lessons will also be similar in the next conflict is a serious mistake. Sometimes these lessons learned can constrain thinking about the future, especially when one assumes that past lessons will be similarly duplicated. In this same regard combining lessons learned with planning usually has more to do with what happened in the past rather than how one can affect the future.
With this in mind, how does one determine if the past is an adequate guide for the future?

After seven years the United States is still involved in a global counterinsurgency effort; a counterinsurgency against fundamentalists that adhere to a particularly violent strain of religious ideology. The tone and tempo of news reports from the myriad news sources would lead one to believe that 5 years is an extraordinarily long time to secure a victory. The history of insurgency indicates that 5 years is just the beginning[ii].
Likewise the global war on terror has been classified as a war against ideas, religion and ideology.

[iii] How is one to determine if there are lessons learned from the past if there is a lack of consensus on the type of conflict we are waging? This is rather problematic as diversity of the origin of the problem does not obstruct the singularity of the mission for the insurgent; for instance, look at the uneasy yet cooperative alliance of Iran/Hezbollah and Syria/Fatah Their brand of radical Islam preaches a complete intolerance and all that is antithetical to Western values; they seek to completely replace Western codes with an extreme code of Islam. There current uneasy alliance is more like a temporary marriage of convenience.

The diversity of these sects does not detract them (relatively speaking) from the singularity of their mission; to use violence and terrorism to achieve there ultimate aims. The mixture of subversion, propaganda and violent pressure coupled to an ideological strategy is there idea of a recipe to success.

The First Intifada was a great case of exploiting these principles, the 2nd Intifada was a disaster and the Aug 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict ended with both sides declaring victory, yet the general consensus seems to be that Hezbollah gained the upper hand. In both cases, as insurgent or counterinsurgent, it is the management of the narrative with moral attributes (think David vs Goliath here) tied to the strategy. In essence it requires more than just an adherence to the traditional principles of war when defining the strategy.

Increasingly, there must be complete integration of multiple military and non military agencies to the strategy and more importantly a corresponding change in mindset within these players as well.[iv] This is not easy considering that most militaries are taught that victory comes through the pursuit of aggressive offensive operations. Sometimes in a counterinsurgency it might be better to do nothing at all.

With this in mind, here is a sample of a few of the military historical lessons learned from past counterinsurgency and stability operations.

1) Politics and diplomacy must have primacy
2)Discipline, firepower and organization coupled with small unit tactics are key to military success

3) Centralized planning, decentralized execution within the commanders mission intent or end state must be tied to the political/diplomatic effort Draw distinction between bandits, rebels, thieves, and insurgents, etc, etc.
4) Creation of special units such as recon and tracking units
5) Doctrine and techniques, tactics and procedures are codified thru lessons learned; this pseudo doctrine fills emerging and existing gaps in methodology.
6) Learning to fail fast and adapt quickly.
7) Public critical of operations; so manage the information war ahead of the press and be sure that your “message” has the “moral” high ground.
8) Good deeds insufficient to counteract collateral damage, mistrust or other stupid actions by self

Watch for the continuation of this topic in the next issue as we briefly examine other critical elements such as urban operations and civil considerations critical to success.

[i] The term problematic was used in a conversation by an US Army Officer to describe the difficult conditions in accomplishing training with the Afghan National Army and Police.
[ii] Consider such examples as Vietnam, Algeria, Rhodesia, Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, Afghanistan, The Arab-Israeli conflict and The Maccabees
[iii] See Countering a Global Insurgency A Strategy for the War on Terrorism, LTC (Dr.) David Kilcullen; Waging the War of Idea’s, William Rosenau, Ph.D, RAND Corp; Terrorism in the Name of Religion, Dr. Magnus Ranstorp, St Andrews University, Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence.
[iv] My personal observations of Police and Army Mentors in the Kunduz and Northern Region area of Afghanistan confirm this when we attended a meeting at the Konduz Provincial Reconstruction Team HQ’s on Thursday morning the 3rd of April. In attendance where the German Police mentors, American Police mentors and a US State Department Representative to the PRT. The US Army Major that led the meeting was ill-equipped to lead the meeting; the meeting devolved to a finger pointing session; in one case a German police team had been on the ground more than 17 days and still had not received its orders for its training mission to train the Afghan Police.

Afghan sand storm just moments before it hits the camp. The Afghan’s call It “the wind of 120 days” the wind is roughly a constant 22 knots from May to Sept.

The airfield at Feyzabad; cargo and people are lifted in and out; for this trip it was a US Air National Guard Unit from Baltimore Maryland providing the Heavy lift.

German Provincial Reconstruction Team in Feyzabad, soldiers stop to watch a German CH-53, Heavy Lift Helicopter take off

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Terry Tucker retired from the US Army after 23 years of active duty. He has served in Long Range Reconnaissance, Infantry, Cavalry, Staff and various leadership positions. His civilian and military experience and assignments include US Fortune 50’s and the US Department of Defense. He has over 10 years experience in the Middle East and has trained soldiers and clients in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Afghanistan. He is currently in Afghanistan on a training team that is training the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. He has contributed articles in the US Army Infantry Magazine, a professional journal of the US Army Infantry School and he is the author of a book; U.S. Counterinsurgency Methods and The Global War on Terror.

Military History and Warfare: Castles: Hadrian's Wall

2008-09-22T13:10:00.000-07:00

This week, a trip to Scotland gave me the opportunity to have a look at the remnants of the mighty Hadrian’s wall. In 122AD the Emperor Hadrian visited Britain. Finding the northern border ill-defined and under almost continuous attack, he ordered a wall to be built across England from the Tyne estuary to the Solway Firth. This covered a distance of 73 miles (117km) and represents a massive feat of Roman engineering and design skill.

Although these pictures no longer convey the original size of the wall, it was built of stone 10ft (3m) wide and 15ft (5m) high with a protective ditch 4m deep in front. Garrisons across the wall would be stationed in castles set at one mile intervals and in turrets and towers in between. A further set of forts located behind the wall would reinforce and support the garrisons as and when required. The whole project involved quarrying some 27 million cubic feet of stone. Amazingly, construction was completed in just seven years. The skill and speed of the wall’s construction had much to do with its building force. Hadrian’s wall was not built by slave labour, but by legionaries of the Roman army.

However, when completed the wall was manned by auxiliary troops who garrisoned its 79 milecastles and 16 forts. The auxiliaries acted as both guard troops and frontier police. The fully-fledged legions (of which there were three stationed in Roman Britain consisting of 5000 men each) were used only in major campaigns or to repel invaders.

Birdsowald

During my visit to Hadrian’s wall, I got to survey the remains of ‘Banna’, known today as ‘Birdsowald’. The site contains a semi-excavated Roman fort positioned on the wall.

When the Roman builders arrived they had found a wooded area on a boggy piece of land. The wood had to be cleared and the bog drained before construction of the fort could begin. When completed, it would have housed 1,000 Roman soldiers. The fort was originally built from turf and timber. Soon the foundations were laid for a permanent stone fort with six gates. It is these outlines that remain today. When completed, the fort had consisted of towers, barracks, officer’s quarters and a storeroom. In the centre lay the command headquarters for the area.

A reconstruction of the fort.

The above picture shows the remains of the only known drill and exercise hall to be found in any auxiliary fort of the Roman Empire.

The Roman Empire came under increasing attack in the fourth and fifth centuries. From 155AD to 410AD, Hadrian's Wall was breached four times by invading Barbarians. Towards the beginning of the fifth century, Rome's power began to wane and troops were pulled out of Britain. With no one left to maintain it, sections of the wall began to fall into disrepair. Much of the stone from both the wall and its forts were later removed and reused in the early medieval period.

Nonetheless, enough remains of the wall for it rightly to be considered one of the great engineering projects of pre-modern Britain.

Military History and Warfare: 17th Military History Blog Carnival

2008-09-12T15:20:00.000-07:00

Welcome to September's edition of the Military History Blog Carnival.

One of the great things that I love about the military history carnival is the broad range of topics that are covered by bloggers throughout the blogosphere. This month is no exception.

Beginning with a boyhood hero of my own, Naomi Stevens' Diary from England blog tells us that Admiral Nelson has been named the greatest British military hero of all time. She also briefly outlines the background to Nelson's fame.

Staying with the nautical theme, Rich over at Chronologi Cogitatones presents an interesting article on an joint Anglo-Dutch naval battle against the Spanish in 1602. Its worth pointing out that this is the third post in a series following the career of Sir Robert Mansell. The other two articles can also be found on Rich's blog.

A very interesting and slightly unusual post can be found on Potential2success.com. Here, the Emperor Napoleon's career is analysed in the context of his leadership skills. The article is well worth a read.

Over at The Whited Sepulchre, Allen describes the French 'Maginot line'. He also manages to throw in a quick cost comparison to the US/Mexico border fence which makes the Maginot line look like a bargain!

Covering similar ground, I too have submitted a post on the Maginot line. This can be found here

Gavin at Investigations of a Dog presents us with a very interesting comparison of the careers of Cromwell and Balfour. Both where cavalry commanders who made a major impact on the English Civil War. Whilst Cromwell went on to run England as Lord Protector, Balfour faded into obscurity. Gavin argues that Balfour's career is worthy of a little more attention.

Gabriele at The Lost Fort has some great pictures and material on a medievel German castle which used the natural rocky landscape as the bulk of its structure.

Finally, Ken Reynolds gives us a collection of biographies of soldiers from the 38th Battalion of the Canadian Expeditionary force during the First World War. Ken has clearly spent a great deal of time researching these biographies and it is well worth having a look around the blog.

I hope you have enjoyed this month's edition of the Military History carnival.

If you are interested in hosting October's edition (or any other month), please drop an e-mail here

Military History and Warfare: The Thirty Years War: The 'Vasa' Part II

2008-09-02T10:15:00.000-07:00

This week, due to popular demand, I shall be taking another look at the recovered warship 'Vasa' with more pictures of the ship and its museum. However, before that I would like to remind you about the 17th Military History Carnival being hosted on this site on the 14th September.

The handy submission form can be accessed here .

In my previous post on the Vasa, I examined some of the historical background to the ship and the events leading up to its sinking. This week, I shall be focusing on the recovery operation and some of the archaeological finds discovered in the wreckage.

In the decades that followed after the sinking of the ship in 1628, efforts were begun to salvage the valuable cannons and provisions that could still be recovered and reused. This explains why out of the original complement of sixty-four cannons, only three were recovered with the wreckage in 1961.

Knowledge of the ship's location was then lost for three hundred years. In the twentieth century, it was thanks to the determination of a Swedish marine technican, Anders Franzen that the ship was again located Using a homemade coring probe, he found a large wooden object near Beckholmen in Stockholm. After identifying the ship, the Swedish navy was brought in (along with National Heritage Board) to form the Vasa committe. Together, they made plans to raise the Vasa.

In order to even have a chance to raise the ship, divers were required to use pressure hoses to dig six tunnels underneath the wreck. This was dangerous work. There was a strong possibility that the wreck could shift as the mud was being excavated, trapping the diver. Fortunately, no one was injured in the process. Once the tunnels were complete, steel cables were run underneath and attached to a pair of lifting pontoons on the surface. The ship was then raised in a series of eighteen lifts bringing her from a depth of 33 metres to 16. Over the next year and a half, debris and mud were cleared from the ship in the hopes of lightening the load. The gunports were temporally plugged and iron bolts that had rusted away were replaced.

On the morning of April 24th 1961, the Vasa broke surface and once again floated in Stockholm harbour. She was then towed to a dry dock and works were begun. Although a museum was established for members of the public to visit whilst the ship was being excavated, it was not until 1990 that the Vasamuseet we see today was completed.

Unlike the old museum, Vasa museet has three levels of viewing galleries. This allows us to view the ship from above:

Having learnt valuable lessons from the Vasa's maiden voyage these cannon ports were sealed as the ship was raised to the surface.

Thirty to fifty men, women and children died during the sinking in 1628. Some were below decks when the ship keeled over trapping them, others may have been unable to swim. As a result, several skeletons have been recovered from the site.

Using DNA tests on the remains, scientists have been able to determine the age, sex and relative health of crew. The ability to gather this vast amount of detail, gives the historian an incredible insight into the lives of ordinary people in the seventeenth century. Look here for some recontructions of how the crew may have looked.

It is important to remember that although the Vasa has been largely reconstructed, large parts of the ship were originally painted in bright decorative colours.

The Vasa was as much a work of art as she was a warship.

I hope you have enjoyed this series of posts on the Vasa! I strongly encourage you to go to Stockholm and take a look for yourselves.

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Military History and Warfare: Castles: Uffington Castle

2008-08-26T14:56:00.000-07:00

This week I will be examining a completely different type of castle. Although described as a castle, Uffington is really an ancient hill-fort. Located two miles south of the village of Uffington in Oxfordshire, England, archaeologists have traced the earthworks to the late Bronze/early Iron age.

The castle we see today is an eight-acre double walled hillfort in roughly the shape of a pentagon. There is a north-west facing entrance protected by the curing outwards of the bank along both sides and around the ditch. The information board in the car park helpfully told me that the fort’s early use was as a religious site or meeting point. It was later occupied by the Romans and Saxons. Although we are unlikely to ever discover who originally occupied the site, the coins of the Dobunni tribe have been found in the area. Large amounts of pottery and animal bones have also been excavated, leading archaeologists to suggest that the castle was more of a spiritual centre than defensive structure. This is supported by the presence of ‘The White Horse’. A large chalk monument cut into the side of the hill. Strangely, ‘The White Horse’ can only be fully viewed from the air.

The hillfort commanded excellent views of the surrounding countryside. A perfect place to construct a castle.

Originally the steep ramparts (which would have been 3 metres deeper than they now appear) would have been bare white chalk with a surrounding timber fence.

A view of the White Horse (Click to enlarge).

Uffington castle is a good example of a defensive construction that served a purpose beyond that of providing a local stronghold in an area.

Military History and Warfare: Castles: A few thoughts on the Maginot Line

2008-08-20T14:50:00.000-07:00

In military history, the ‘Maginot line’ has become a byword for expensive and inadequate war preparations. The defences themselves are usually associated with the fortifications constructed by France along its Eastern border with Germany in the 1930s. Less well known to historians are the completely separate line of heavy fortifications that ran along the frontiers with Switzerland and Italy. In addition, the line also consisted of less extensive fortifications along the Belgium and Luxembourg borders. Collectively, these three segments of fortifications were designed to guarantee French security in the event of a German invasion. In total, they cost three billion French francs.

Historical background to the Maginot Line

The decision to construct new fortifications was not a particularly radical change in French military planning. Since the seventeenth century, French military planners had relied upon forts and defensive concentrations to secure strongholds along the nation’s vast borders. The utter failure of Plan XVII in 1914 to win the war through a great offensive had seemed to suggest that only a campaign of attrition would ensure victory in future wars. This was supported by France’s experience during the rest of the First World War. For much of the conflict, successful offensive operations were almost impossible to achieve without huge casualties. As such, French military planners in the 1920s and 30s had to take into account the lower birth-rate during the years 1914-1918. They calculated that in 1935, a numerically much inferior age group would arrive at conscription age. By contrast, Germany’s population outnumbered France by twenty million. Germany’s manpower resources would remain significantly higher than France. By constructing a system of large defensive fortifications, the French military hoped to negate the effects of future manpower shortages.

It was at the Battle of Verdun (1916) that the design of the Maginot line had its origins. During the battle, the French forts had proved their value in withstanding massive artillery bombardments. Therefore large parts of the Maginot line were based upon the use of forts which would provide and be exposed to direct fire in order to give close and medium fire support. Around these forts were lesser positions which would assist in a close combat role.

Design of the Maginot Line

The French forts of the Maginot line were designated as ouverages. There were two types: the gros ouverage and the petit ouverage. The gros ouverage was designated as an artillery fort whilst the smaller variant consisted of nothing large than an artillery mortar. The gros ouverages became the centrepiece of the Maginot line and mounted artillery pieces consisting of 75mm guns and 81mm mortars. Some also included 135mm and 95mm guns. None of these weapons had a particularly long range. It was therefore the job of these forts to provide support fire and together with other ouverages inhibit the enemy advance. Surprisingly the ouverages were not protected by minefields, since only the Germans had developed this technology and put it into large-scale use. Apart from a few booby traps and anti-tank mines, the Maginot forts were only protected by wire obstacles and anti-tank rails. The main defensive element was the firepower which could be laid down by each fort and those supporting it. Behind the Maginot line was the support line which included communications and logistical areas.

Of particular interest to the military historian was the deliberate ‘Achilles Heel’ built into the rear of the ouverages. In 1916, the French had unexpectedly lost Fort Douaumont to the Germans. The subsequent attempt to recapture the position took months and cost thousands of lives. Much of the damage seen today was caused by French heavy artillery. However, the fort was so well constructed that much of the surface damage was superficial. Realising that a fort lost to the enemy could be used to help maintain a permanent breach in the defences, the French ensured that parts of the Maginot line could not be captured and then turned against them.

In front of the line were advanced positions which were intended to provide early warning and delay the enemy. These fortified houses and positions were called avant-postes. In the Maginot line proper, these formed a useful network of advanced outposts. However, in the north (the area known as the Maginot Extension covering the frontier between Longuyon and Sedan) these lower level fortifications were the only defences covering the region. These were clearly not up to the standards of the rest of the line. Unsurprisingly, it was here that the Germans broke through in 1940.

Conclusion

Although the Maginot line has been widely criticised for failing to prevent a German invasion, it did fulfil its primary objective. The main German blow fell away from the bulk of the line. The French High Command had expected this and were able to deploy the majority of their forces on the Belgian frontier. It was the French field army that failed to keep the Germans out. By contrast, the Maginot line completely repulsed an Italian invasion in the south of France. After the war the Maginot line was reoccupied by France and remained in use until the 1960s when parts were sold off to the public. Despite its reputation, the Maginot line was a highly formidable set of defences which the German army took very seriously in 1940.

Enno Kraehe, ‘The Motives behind the Maginot Line’, Military affairs, 8 (1944)

J.E. Kaufmann, ‘Unusual aspects of a unique fortification: the Maginot Line, Military affairs, 52:2 (1988:Apr.)

Military History and Warfare: The Crusades: The Battle of Hattin 1187

2008-08-12T14:54:00.001-07:00

For nearly ninety years, the Franks had held the Holy Land for Western Christendom. The Kingdom of Jerusalem had formed the centrepiece of the Frankish settlements known collectively as ‘Outremer’. However, on the 4th July 1187 the Kingdom was shattered and its army slaughtered in the space of a few hours. The Battle of Hattin represents a decisive moment in both Islamic history and that of the Christendom. United under the banner of the Kurdish sultan Saladin, the armies of Islam dealt the Western colonies a crippling blow from which they never truly recovered.

Repeated violations of the truce made between Saladin and King Guy (in particular an especially ferocious attack upon a Muslim caravan led by Reynald of Chatillon) led Saladin to begin preparations for war in 1187. He ordered troops from throughout his empire to gather at the frontier town of Hauran and assembled the largest army that he had ever commanded. Meanwhile on the Frankish side, equally large preparations for war were also underway. By June some 1,200 fully equipped knights along with ten thousand infantry had been assembled at Acre. Saladin’s forces are believed to have been slightly larger.

Invasion

On the 1st July, Saladin’s forces crossed the River Jordan into Frankish territory and lay siege to the city of Tiberias. When news came of the invasion, King Guy held counsel with the leading figures of the land. He was advised By Raymond of Tripoli that in the heat of summer, the attacking force would be at a major disadvantage. Therefore the best strategy would be for the Christian army to remain purely on the defensive. This was good sound advice and most of the knights were inclined to accept this strategy. However, King Guy was not a wise man. His ascent to the throne had been opposed by many of the leading barons of the kingdom. His only supporters had been Reynald of Chatillon and Grand Master Gerard of the Knights Templar. They advised that the army should seek out and attack Saladin.

Therefore on the morning of the 3rd July, the Christian army left its comfortable well-supplied camp at Sephoria and marched into the hills. The Bishop of Acre accompanied them bearing pieces of the ‘True Cross’, upon which Jesus was said to have been crucified. Had the army remained at Sephoria, Saladin would probably not have risked an attack. The air was hot and dry with no water supplies along the road. Soon both men and horses were suffering from thirst and exhaustion. Muslim skirmishers were also continuously attacking both the rearguard and vanguard with ‘hit and run’ archers on horseback. By the afternoon, the Franks had reached the plateau immediately above Hattin. Ahead of the Franks lay a rocky hill with two summits known as the Horns of Hattin. Beyond this lay a village and lake. By the afternoon the army could go no further and made camp on the slopes of the hill. The site was supposed to have a well. Unfortunately for the Franks, this well was dried up.

The Battle

That night Saladin’s men surrounded the Christian army and set fire to the dry scrub that covered the hill. The Franks, already suffering from thirst were further tormented by the hot smoke now pouring over their camp. The Muslim attack began soon after daybreak on the 4th July. They had successfully formed a cordon around the entire Christian army. Desperate for water, the Frankish infantry surged forward down the slope towards the lake. Many were slaughtered or taken prisoner by Saladin’s massed forces. Only the Christian cavalry could hope to turn the tide against the Muslim forces. Saladin ordered his cavalry to assault the hill where King Guy’s red tent remained clearly visible. Despite overwhelming odds, the remaining Frankish horseman on the hill beat back wave after wave of Muslim cavalry. Raymond of Tripoli led his knights in a desperate attempt to break through the surrounding Muslim army. When his men charged, the forces opposing them opened up their ranks to allow them to pass harmlessly. Unable to rejoin the battle, Raymond and his knights withdrew to Tripoli.

With the infantry now largely out of the battle and both horses and men suffering from thirst and heat exhaustion, the remaining Franks fought on. The King’s tent was moved to the summit and his knights gathered around him for a last stand. It was soon over. The Bishop of Acre had been killed and the Holy Cross was in the hands of a Muslim. The surviving Franks were exhausted. Then King Guy and the surviving leading men of the Kingdom were presented before Saladin.

Saladin’s tent had been erected on the battlefield and in it he received King Guy and Reynald. He greeted them graciously and offered the King a goblet of rose-water, cooled with ice brought from Mount Hermon. Guy drank it and passed it to Reynald. By the laws of Arab hospitality to give food or drink to a captive ensured that his life would be safe. Saladin had made no such gesture towards Reynald. Saladin reminded Reynald of his crimes and truce violations. When Reynald replied with insolence, Saladin took a sword and struck off his head. He then reassured Guy that ‘A king does not kill a king’.

Aftermath

Whilst Saladin spared the lives of the Barons of the kingdom, the Templar and Hospitaller prisoners were considered too dangerous to live. Fanatical Muslim ‘sufis’ carried out the executions of the surviving members of the Military Orders. Shortly afterwards, Saladin’s forces began the systematic conquest of the now heavily depleted castles across the Holy Land. After a five-day siege, Jerusalem itself fell to Saladin’s army. The damage was almost complete. If not for the fortunate arrival of groups of Westerners on pilgrimage, all the Crusaders lands would have been conquered. Although King Richard’s Crusade allowed a smaller reconstituted Kingdom to continue, the position of the Franks in the Holy Land was more precarious than ever. Saladin had managed to wipe out the bulk of the Kingdom’s defences in a matter of hours. Despite repeated attempts to rebuild the Christian position in the East, the Battle of Hattin proved to be a blow from which the Kingdom of Jerusalem never recovered.

If you are interested in reading more about the Battle of Hattin have a look at these books;

Malcolm Barber, ‘The Two Cities: Medieval Europe 1050-1320 (London and New York, 1993)

Jean Richard, ‘The Crusades c.1071-c.1291 (Cambridge, 1999)

Carole Hillenbrand, ‘The Crusades: Islamic perspectives’ (Edinburgh, 1999)

P.M. Holt, ‘The Age of the Crusades: The near east from the eleventh century to 1517’ (London, 1986)

Alan V. Murray, The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: A Dynastic history 1097-1125 (Oxford, 2000)

Jonathan Philips, The Crusades (Harlow, 2002)

Sir Steven Runciman, ‘A History of the Crusades: The Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Frankish East 1100-1187’ (Cambridge, 2002)

Hans Eberhard Meyer, ‘The Crusades’ (Oxford, 1988)

Military History and Warfare: Castles: Läckö castle

2008-08-05T14:30:00.000-07:00

This is the first in a new series of articles which I will be writing over the coming months, dealing exclusively with the subject of castles.

The first of these articles begins with a look at Läckö Castle in south-west Sweden. Läckö Castle was originally built in 1298 by the of Bishop of Skara, Brynolf Algotsson. Strategically located in the centre of his diocese, the position was ideal for command and control of the area. Läckö was situated on a peninsula in Lake Vänern (a major source of commerce and trade in the area in one of Europe’s largest freshwater lakes). The position gave the occupants a complete overview of the lake for many miles The original medieval foundations of the castle were fortified. Defences were especially important given that the region was surrounded by powerful threatening kingdoms such as Denmark.

After the reformation in 1527, the Swedish Crown took possession of the property. It then passed through the hands of various nobles until 1615, when Field Marshal Jacob Pontusson de la Gardie was granted Läckö as a reward for services to the crown. Although the military element of the castle continued with a permanent guard detachment stationed, the Field Marshal also embarked on major improvements to the existing structure. Interestingly thou, none of these improvements were military in nature. They included adding a portal to the main courtyard and constructing a third story above the keep.

Note the privy sticking out of the wall!

However, these improvement works were minimal in comparison to those made by the next occupant. Magnus Gabriel de la Garde was only thirty when he took over the castle. He had already had a highly successful career as a diplomat. Sweden’s success in the Thirty Years War had propelled the country from the fringes of European politics to ‘Great Power’ status. Sweden was now dealing with countries such as France and the Habsburg dominions as equals. This new era, known as the ‘Age of Greatness’ was an age of prosperity and growth for Sweden. Nobles such as Magnus Gabriel were now regularly travelling into the heart of Europe and bringing back new ideas and wealth to the country. In 1654, he constructed new rooms for the staff, a kitchen wing, a chapel and a fourth floor for the keep. The castle you see in these pictures are the final product of Magnus Gabriel’s building work.

In four centuries, the castle had changed from being a semi-militarised settlement, into a grand stately home. Looking at the castle now, it is clear that the military functions of the original structure have long receded into the background of the architecture. Two seventeenth century cannons and a handful of arrow slits in the castle turrets hint that Läckö could once also have had military purpose.

Nevertheless, the structure itself is an excellent example of how the purpose of buildings can gradually change as security and prosperity start to replace disorder and fear. In the age of gunpowder, a castle served its owner better as a stately residence, rather than as fortified military base. The wealth generated by Magnus Gabriel whilst travelling abroad, gave him the money necessary to decorate the interior with the latest baroque furniture and paintings.

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Military History and Warfare: Medieval: English rebellions after the Norman Conquest 1067-1075

2008-07-28T14:40:00.000-07:00

Victory over King Harold at the Battle of Hastings in 1066 should be considered as the beginning of a lengthy process of Norman conquest rather than viewed as an isolated event, followed by a complete takeover of England.

Initially, the surviving English nobles hesitated to submit to William. It was only after reinforcements arrived from overseas that William was able to advance to London. The surviving nobles either submitted to William or went into exile. For the next few years, the Normans found themselves in the position of an occupying army in the south of England. In the north they faced uneasy co-operation with powerful English earls who retained a strong sense of identity and Englishness. The western borders were vulnerable to attack from Welsh princes. In addition, the coastlines were vulnerable to raiding from Danes and renegade English.

As a first step, the newly crowed King William consolidated the land around the south-east of England. This was particularly important as it was the easiest route for reinforcements to arrive from Normandy. Edwin, Morcar and Waltheof retained their positions as earls of Mercia, Northumbria and the southern-midland shires respectively.

However, it was not long before the first rebellion broke out. In 1067, a major uprising occurred in Kent, largely in response to the harshness of William’s brother Odo’s oppressive rule. The revolt was supported by a noble from France called Eustace of Boulogne who had grown dissatisfied with William. Eustace sent troops to assist the rebels in attempting to seize Dover Castle. However, the rebellion failed and Eustace’s lands were forfeited by William.

Much more serious was a revolt in Exeter in 1068 led by the former King Harold’s mother, Gytha. This rebellion was co-ordinated with a raid on the south-west launched by three of Harold’s sons from their base in Ireland. Harold’s sons were then defeated by the local Norman forces in the area. Exeter continued to resist through an 18 day siege. Gytha eventually fled to Flanders with a large store of wealth. In 1069, the sons of Harold returned with sixty ships and attacked Devonshire. However, their forces were only sufficient for raiding rather than invasion purposes.

The rebellions/invasions of 1068/69 were all led by members of Harold’s own family. They attempted to co-ordinate resistance across the region but failed to gain universal support. William consolidated his victories by building and garrisoning castles in vulnerable places. This enabled him to retain a core base in each region for command and control of an area.

In 1068, Norman rule over England faced its most serious challenge yet. Realising that in the long-term their positions were threatened by the increasingly aggressive acquisitions of the Normans, earls Edwin and Morcar rose in revolt. They formed an alliance with Bleddyn of Gwynedd and Malcolm, King of the Scots (of ‘Macbeth’ fame). William struck quickly and advanced northwards building castles at Warwick and Nottingham intimidating the Mercians into submission. Both Edwin and Morcar surrendered and Malcolm was forced to sign a peace treaty and return to Scotland.

However, the revolt of 1068 was merely a prequel to a much larger northern rebellion the following year. In 1069, the new commander at Durham, Robert of Comines and the Castellan of York were massacred alongside a large force of Norman knights. This time the rebels included the native Northumbrian aristocracy, King Malcolm of Scotland and King Swegn of Denmark. The coalition focused around Edgar Aetheling, the last male member of the West Saxon house of Cerdic. Edgar had a legitimacy over the throne of England which William had only been able gain through force. The arrival of a Danish fleet in support of the revolt allowed the northern rebels to besiege and devastate the city of York. Unfortunately for the rebels, the Danes were more interested in plundering the countryside. Their army dispersed, allowing William to reoccupy York and destroy the English rebels. Edgar went into exile abroad and another treaty was agreed between Malcolm and William.

The Danes were allowed to plunder the coastal regions in exchange for peace and eventual withdrawal from England. The plunder and devastation wrought by the Normans afterwards became known as the ‘Harrying of the North’. The economic infrastructure of the north of England was shattered for generations. The extent of the damage can be shown through the low geld yields of the area as recorded by the Doomsday Book, twenty years later.

By 1070 William had seen off the most serious threats to his rule. The Danes had been bought off, Edwin had been betrayed by his own men and killed in an ambush and Morcar was imprisoned. However, the final rebellion of 1075 involved some of William’s own most trusted men. Ralph of de Gael, Earl of Norfolk, Roger de Breteuil, earl of Hereford and Waltheof, earl of Northumbria (Norman, Breton and English malcontents) made a secret alliance against William. Yet they too found that they were unable to achieve much more than limited local support and as a result the rebellion failed. William then had Waltheof executed for his role in the revolt.

Waltheof was the last of the significant English leaders who was potentially strong enough to lead a rebellion against the Normans. By 1076, William no longer faced any major potential rivals. The past decade of resistance had been unable to dislodge William. The revolts had been ill-co-ordinated and failed to unify the majority of the population. Throughout the period of rebellions, there were minor English nobles who were prepared to stay loyal to the new regime. The foreign powers that intervened often had a completely different agenda than merely restoring the House of Wessex to the throne. For these reasons, William was able to recover even when the situation had initially turned against him.

William’s rapid responses to rebellions over 1067-1075 resembled a fire fighting exercise followed by a period of consolidation through castle-building. Over the years that followed until his death in 1087, William continued the process of pacifying the Scots and Welsh. By the time his son William Rufus took over, the Norman conquest of England was complete.

If you are interested in finding out more about the Norman Conquest of England, have a look at these books;

Majorie Chibnall, Anglo-Saxon England 1066-1166 (Oxford, 1986)

Brian Golding, Conquest and Colonization: The Normans in Britain, 1066-1100 (London, 1994)

H.R. Loyn, Anglo-Saxon England and the Norman Conquest (London, 1962)

David Bates, William the Conqueror (London, 1989)

Military History and Warfare: The Thirty Years War: The Warship 'Vasa'

2008-07-23T13:55:00.000-07:00

A recent trip to Sweden gave me the opportunity to revisit one of my favourite museums, 'Vasamuseet'. The museum is unique in that it contains the world's only completely intact surviving seventeenth century warship. Designed for the Swedish navy by the Dutch ship builder Henrik Hybertsson, ships like the 'Vasa' were essential in Sweden's attempts to dominate the Baltic area prior to its involvement in the Thirty Years War in Germany. The Vasa museum in the picture was purpose built in the twentieth century.

The 'Vasa' was launched in 1628 and designed to be one of the most powerful warships afloat. Equipped with 64 guns and carrying a complement of 300 sailors and marines, the Vasa represents a link between ships designed for traditional naval tactics of boarding and capturing enemy warships and those designed for tactics employed later in the seventeenth century and throughout the age of sail. Improvements in cannon design allowed later ships to fight in line formation and exchange shots with the enemy at a distance rather than engage in close combat. The Vasa's large crew complement and array of heavy twenty-four pounder guns seems to suggest a vessel designed to both fight at close quarters and at a distance.

Unlike many other vessels launched by Sweden, the Vasa's career as a fighting ship lasted barely a few hours. On Sunday August 10th, 1628 the ship had its official launch ceremony. The launch of such a powerful vessel was a major propaganda opportunity for King Gustavus Adolphus. Therefore foreign diplomats were brought to watch (along with hundreds of other spectators) as the ship began its maiden voyage from Stockholm. The 'Vasa' drew anchor, set sail and fired a salute. A few minutes later a gust of wind blew across the harbour causing the ship to begin to keel over. The 'Vasa' corrected itself for a moment and then began to keel over again towards its sides. The crew had failed to close the gunports, thus water began to pour in and fill the ship. A few minutes later the ship had toppled over and sunk. 30-50 people were trapped and drowned in the vessel. Gustavus Adolphus, away campaigning in Poland, had been awaiting the arrival of his new ship. Instead he received a message reporting the disaster. An immediate inquiry was begun into the cause of the sinking.

In the seventeenth century, application of mathematics to ship building still remained somewhat haphazard. Ship builders worked on the basis of recorded ship measurements that had been tried and tested on previous ships. Unlike merchant ships, warships had a large amount of weight placed higher up on their decks (the guns). This made them much more vulnerable to tipping over and sinking. Previous ship designs worked on the assumption of having the heavy guns on the lower decks and the lighter guns on top. Gustavus Adolphus had insisted that his new ship have both decks filled with heavy guns. The design of the 'Vasa' did not take into account this extra weight. As a result the ballast at the bottom of the ship counter balancing the weight of the guns was not sufficient for the new design.

These beautiful carvings on the back of the 'Vasa' would have been exquisitely painted.

For three hundred years, the ship lay at the bottom of the harbour in Stockholm. In 1956 a determined ship-wreck specialist, Anders Franzén found the ship and began lobbying for an expedition to recover it. In 1961 the 'Vasa' was pulled off the sea bed and brought to the surface. Unlike the Tudor warship, 'Mary Rose' in England, the 'Vasa' was discovered almost completely intact. Thanks to a lucky combination of fresh and salt water found in the area, the ship had not suffered the kind of disintegration that normally occurs in the wood of sunken ships.

As the ship began to dry, a substance called polyethylenglycol was used to replace the water in the wood and preserve it from destruction. Thus, a tragic accident three-hundred years ago has brought us this fine example of seventeenth century ship design. Anyone visiting Stockholm would be well-advised to visit this museum.

Military History and Warfare: The American War of Independence: Saratoga 1777

2008-07-03T13:46:00.000-07:00

The American victory at Saratoga was arguably the most important battle of the American Revolution. It simultaneously reduced the British presence to the north of the thirteen colonies and gave the American rebels a much needed victory in a set piece battle. Most importantly, it triggered the French government to recognize the United States as an independent country. This would have important political ramifications in later ensuring French military support.

During the early days of the war, the British hoped for a climatic battle that would dishearten the revolutionaries and crush the rebellion. General John Burgoyne (popularly known as ‘Gentleman Johnny’) led an army of six thousand regulars from the British base in Montreal. He planned to march south and join up with the New York garrison and disrupt rebel communications between New England and Pennsylvania – the very heart of the Revolution. Success would depend upon a high level of co-ordination between Burgoyne’s forces striking from Canada and the main British army attacking from New York under General Sir William Howe and Henry Clinton. Burgoyne was a popular general and had several notable sub-ordinates commanders in his army. These included Major-General Phillips of the Royal Artillery, Brigadier-General Simon Fraser and Major-General Riedesel, commanding the German contingent. The army itself was a mixed force of 8000 men consisting of British regulars, Canadian militia and German mercenaries.

Little did Burgoyne realise that whilst he had been preparing his campaign to attack southwards, events were being decided in London by the Secretary of State for America, Lord George Germain. Howe had requested permission to move his forces towards Philadelphia. Incredibly, Germain approved Howe’s plan within a week of giving precise orders to Burgoyne to carry out a separate plan to attack in the opposite direction. Although Burgoyne was not to realise this until later, the decision to divert troops to Philadelphia allowed Washington to redeploy thousands of troops to stop him.

The start of the campaign went well, with Burgoyne’s troops capturing Fort Ticonderoga on the 6th July. However, this also meant that he had to leave troops behind to hold the newly captured fort. Hoping to reach Albany and link up with Henry Clinton’s troops from New York, the British found themselves under constant fire from American snipers. Using the terrain to their advantage, American troops blocked roads with fallen trees and flooded the trails upon which the British advance depended. It did not help that the British were also carrying a large baggage train. Burgoyne’s alone filled thirty carts, including his library, wardrobe and liquor. The Americans also adopted scorched earth tactics leaving little in the way of supplies for the lumbering British.

By July, Burgoyne’s force found itself at Saratoga short on supplies. Hearing of an American depot of horses and cattle twenty miles away at Bennington, Burgoyne dispatched a force of four-hundred men to seize it. Learning of Americans forces operating in the area, he dispatched another five-hundred men in support. Both forces were surrounded and destroyed by American militia reinforced by Colonel Seth Warner’s ‘Green Mountain Boys’. More bad news followed in August as a separate British divisionary force also (striking from Canada) was soundly beaten by Benedict Arnold and forced to retreat.

By the 13th September, Burgoyne marched his army out of Saratoga with the aim of linking up with General’s Howe’s forces. Burgoyne’s own force was by now reduced to only 5000 men. Against him, the American rebels had assembled 14,000 Continentals under Horatio Gates. Gates drew up his force at a position called Bemis Heights, overlooking the Hudson River. This enabled him to control the road upon which the British would have to pass. Burgoyne was quick to note the terrain. On the 19th September he divided his army into three columns in an attempt to turn the American position by its left. On the American side, Benedict Arnold saw the danger of the flanking movement and sent forward the light infantry along with Colonel Daniel Morgan’s corps of rifleman. Arnold’s troops then proceeded to fight the British to a standstill in the centre.

By nightfall the British had lost 600 men. The Americans had lost 300, but still had 9,000 in reserve. That night Burgoyne’s men camped on the field, whilst the Americans prepared themselves for more British attacks. However, Burgoyne had found out that Clinton had at last set out to support him. He therefore ordered his men to dig in and await the arrival of reinforcements. Although Clinton’s army made some progress working its way on the lower Hudson, his forces were not sufficient to fight their way to Burgoyne. Burgoyne therefore waited for weeks unable to advance. Supplies of flour and salt pork began to run out. Forage for the horses was all but gone and the General began to suspect he and his men had been deliberately sacrificed.

On the 7th October, Burgoyne attempted to advance again. However, this time he was only able to put some 1,500 men into the field. With the odds so heavily stacked against the British, the battle was a foregone conclusion. American troops led by Arnold drove the British back to their camp with heavy losses. A week later, with nowhere left to go, Burgoyne decided to abandon his guns and attempt an escape. It was already too late. On the 17th October, Burgoyne surrendered 5,721 troops, seven generals and twenty-seven guns. However, such was the repute of the British force and its commander that they were allowed to surrender on the understanding that they would be given parole and passage back to Great Britain. Later the U.S. Congress repudiated the Saratoga Convention. Burgoyne’s men were not repatriated and many died in captivity in miserable conditions.

The Battle of Saratoga was a crucial turning point for the American rebellion. Their victory over one of Britain’s top commanders encouraged France to recognise the infant ‘United States’ as an independent country. France, Spain and Holland all joined the war on the side of the Americans, turning what had been a rebellion in the American colonies, into a world war. By 1780, almost 12,000 French soldiers and sailors had arrived in America to support the Revolution. Therefore arguably, Saratoga was not only the most significant battle of the War of Independence, but probably in the history of the United States.

If you are interested in reading more about the Battle of Saratoga, have a look at these books;

Philip J. Haythornwaite, ‘Invincible Generals’ (Poole, 1991)

Holger Herwig, Christian Archer, Timothy Travers, John Ferris, ‘Cassell’s World History of Warfare’ (London, 2003)

Richard Worth, ‘Saratoga (Battles that changed the world)’ (2002)

Rupert Furneaux, ‘Saratoga: the Decisive Battle’ (1971)

Military History and Warfare: The Crusades: How were the Crusaders able to get to conquer, and establish themselves in the East?

2008-06-23T14:04:00.000-07:00

I was very fortunate to sit through Christopher Tyerman’s lecture series on the Crusades as a undergraduate. Although I greatly enjoyed his lectures, one particular remark has always stuck with me above everything else. At the beginning of the first week, there were some fifty students in the lecture theatre. As the weeks continued (and it being the summer term with exams on the way) numbers began to dwindle. Eight weeks later, at the start of the final lecture, few of us remained of the original fifty. Dr. Tyerman surveyed the rows of empty chairs and counted eight of us left. “Well” he said. “I suppose this is about the right proportion who would have survived a crusade.” We burst into laughter.

Given the incredible hazards of the journey to the Holy Land and the low survival rate of the average Crusader, it is interesting to consider how exactly westerners were able to establish themselves and even thrive in Palestine in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The likelihood of an expedition succeeding was not very high. This is supported when one looks at the failures of the other Crusades to the East. In comparison to the First Crusade, the Second Crusade in 1147 was almost a total failure.

Byzantine support

Despite attempts by Latin Chroniclers such as Fulcher of Chartres to discredit the Byzantines, the First Crusade owed much to the active co-operation of Alexius Comnenus. The Crusaders rendezvoused at Constantinople before embarking on their quest. They would have had little knowledge of the ‘lay of the land’ in the territories to which they would be crossing. Even Fulcher highlights the necessity of securing Greek counsel and assistance. It was they who controlled communications and would have to keep supply lines open for the main crusading army. Proof of the necessity of Byzantine support can be offered through looking at the results of the Second Crusade. The First Crusaders had the knowledge and experience of Tactikus, an old soldier with long familiarity of warfare in Anatolia. The Second Crusaders did not receive the level of assistance that Alexius I had provided to their predecessors because Manuel had made long-term truce arrangements with the Seljuk Turks. Consequently, the expedition was largely conducted without any real knowledge of the dangers ahead. The First Crusaders may have felt abandoned after reaching Antioch, but that had been supplied and escorted on their journey by experienced troops provided by Byzantium.

Weaknesses in the Islamic world

The work of Carole Hillenbrand has done much to open up the Islamic perspective to western scholars concerning the arrival of the first crusaders. She argues that the Islamic world went through a series of catastrophic events during the last decades of the eleventh century, and as a result, the Crusaders were able to force their way into the East and establish states in hostile lands. In the space of less than two years, beginning in the 1092 there was a total sweep of all the major political pieces in the Islamic world. Nizam al-Mulk, the ruler of the Seljuks was murdered leading to a spiral of fratricide and power struggles. This diverted resources away from fighting western invaders. The disparate nature of the Seljuk army (consisting of standing troops, nomadic Turcomans, and groups of soldiers under provincial commanders) made strong military leadership under a Sultan essential for victory. This had been the case at Manzikert when the Turks had been led to victory under Alp-Arslan. In 1094, the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt, al-Mutansir died. This succession of deaths in both the key power centres of the Islamic world led to disorientation and anarchy. This made the First Crusade all the more likely to succeed.

More significantly, to the survival of the Crusader states was the religious schism that had developed within the Islamic word. The Fatimid Ismaili shi’ites of Egypt shared a political enmity with the Seljuk Sunnis in Anatolia. Indeed the Crusaders would be able to play these groups off one another. In addition to this, the Fatimid Egyptians suffered further religious schism after the death of al-Mutansir in 1094 with the breakaway group known as ‘Assassins’. The concept of ‘Jihad’ had also become a rhetorical term and was not revived until later in the Middle Ages. Jerusalem in 1095 was not yet considered as important in the Muslim world as it would become in the build up to 1187 (the Fall of Jerusalem to Saladin). Economically in the period of the First Crusade, Egypt was suffering from famine and plague. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Muslim world was unable to offer serious concerted opposition to the arrival of Western armies.

Strong political leadership of the Crusader states

The establishment of the Crusader territories was vitally dependent upon the implementation of strong political leadership. Crucially, the first issue that had to be dealt with was the question of the political status of the territory surrounding the Holy places. Was it to be a state of the church governed by a papal legate, or simply a Christian kingdom in the Holy Land? The death of Adhemer of Le Puy had removed the legitimate channel of papal authority. Godfrey of Bouillon decided to take the title of ‘advocatus’, meaning a layman who protected and administered Church estates. This situation changed after Godfrey’s death in 1100 and the new ruler was able to assert his strength and become Baldwin I. The papal legate, Daimbert was slowly undermined until 1102, when he was sent into exile. The establishment of a king gave the opportunity for the practice of feudal forms of government already in operation in Europe at this time. The other three territories acknowledged the leadership of the kingdom of Jerusalem as shown by the high degree of co-operation between the Frankish states.

Co-operation of the Crusader kingdoms

In 1118, the forces of Jerusalem, Antioch and Tripoli combined to meet an army from Egypt and Damascus that was threatening the kingdom of Jerusalem. Roger of Antioch campaigned for three months with the king and gave the king three hundred of his own soldiers to strengthen the royal army. In addition, the traditional marriage alliances also helped to strengthen the solidarity of the Crusader states. At first the Crusaders were ill-equipped for the task of establishing themselves and securing territory. They lacked manpower and had suffered huge losses during the First Crusade. This was made worse by the departure of some of the most important magnates and their companies after Jerusalem had been taken (such as the Counts of Flanders and Normandy). The historian Malcolm Barber has gone so far to say that the major reason for the success of the kingdom was that the Muslims were in an even worse condition that the Crusaders, disunited and lacking a sense of unity.

Control of the coast

Control of the coast was essential in sustaining Crusader power. The ports gave the merchants a trading post and opened up the supply route to the west. Therefore the co-operation of the Italian city-states of Venice, Pisa and Genoa was crucial in maintaining operations in the Levant. In 1104 a fleet of Genoese ships had enabled Baldwin to capture the important port city of Acre and Genoa had received extensive trading privileges in return. Later the Venetians assisted with the blockade and capture of Tyre in 1124. The terms of their support gave the Venetians 1/3 of the city and made them almost entirely exempt from the payment of customs. The consequences of this and other grants was the establishment of autonomous Italian settlements in the trading cities of the Frankish states. They formed enclaves, under their own jurisdiction and administered by officials appointed by their mother-cities in Italy. The Italian fleets were essential in securing the Eastern Mediterranean from Muslim counter-attack, as well as successfully besieging coastal cities.

Contribution of the military orders

The chronic shortages of manpower would have proved fatal, if not for the establishment of the religious military orders. I have explored their contribution to defence of the Crusader States in more detail in earlier posts on this blog, but to summarise, the military orders provided much needed manpower to the Christian armies. The orders were an elite fighting force, dedicated to the defence of the Christian holy places in the Crusader states. Their network of financial resources in Europe enabled them to build castles and garrison strategic frontier areas on the borders of Muslim kingdoms and princedoms.

The disunity of the Muslim world was arguably the single largest factor in maintaining the western presence in the Levant. Although it took nearly ninety years for the Muslim world to organise itself effectively, they could afford to squabble during that time. For the westerners trying to establish themselves, disunity would have been disastrous.

If you are interested in reading more about the Crusader kingdoms, have a look at these books;

Malcolm Barber, ‘The Two Cities: Medieval Europe 1050-1320 (London and New York, 1993)

Jean Richard, ‘The Crusades c.1071-c.1291 (Cambridge, 1999)

Carole Hillenbrand, ‘The Crusades: Islamic perspectives (Edinburgh, 1999)

P.M. Holt, ‘The Age of the Crusades: The near east from the eleventh century to 1517 (London, 1986)

Alan V. Murray, The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: A Dynastic history 1097-1125 (Oxford, 2000)

Military History and Warfare: The American War of Independence: Bunker Hill

2008-06-16T13:44:00.000-07:00

By the spring of 1775, tensions between the British government and the American colonists had reached boiling point. For months, provincial militias had been drilling on village greens and hoarding stocks of gunpowder. The first clash had occurred when British General Thomas Gage had sent a military force to the villages of Lexington and Concord on the 18th April to seize local munitions and supplies. Whilst negotiations continued between the British government and colonists, Gage gathered what reinforcements he could into Boston. By the end of May it was becoming increasingly clear that further conflict was inevitable. As such, the British government dispatched three additional generals to support Gage. Generals William Howe, Henry Clinton and John Burgoyne had all been hand picked for their experience.

The Plan

It seemed intolerable to the British commanders that an army of regulars should be bottled up in Boston by mere militia. They therefore conceived an elaborate plan to occupy the Charlestown promontory to the north and the Dorchester Heights to the south-east with token forces and draw the American flanks. In the meantime, the main British force would storm through the narrow Boston neck and across the Charles River to attack the main American concentration centred around Cambridge.

Opposing the British was Artemas Ward, the American Commander-in-Chief. Although his troops outnumbered the British, they were ill-equipped, ill-disciplined and lacking in coherent leadership. Command of the American regiments was exercised by competing Colonels, Israel Putnam, Colonel William Prescott, and Dr. Joseph Warren. They decided that a challenge must be made to disrupt British preparations. Three regiments were therefore marched onto the Charlestown Peninsula during the night of the 16th June. Digging with shovels, the Americans threw up fortifications on Bunker Hill. Four hours after arriving, the militiamen had constructed a shoulder-high earthen fort which offered protection from both musket fire and long-range cannon. This gave the Americans control of the heights overlooking Boston and therefore the potential to bombard the city with cannon. The British decided that the threat of bombardment must be dealt with before their own plan could be put into action. Crucially, however, they choose to wait until the next morning before taking any action. This gave the Americans further time to organise reinforcements and improve the fort.

The British landing

General Howe decided that the best means of dealing with the earthen fort would be by landing at the Charlestown neck and cutting them off. At 1:30 p.m. the first British assault barges set off loaded with ten light infantry and ten grenadier companies. Their landing was completely unopposed. Howe was so confident of success that he had his men pile arms and eat lunch whilst the landing barges went back for the second wave of troops. In the meantime, the Americans in the fort had been joined by another thousand militiamen. Further reinforcements also arrived in the form of John Starks’ New Hampshire regiment. These men were probably the best marksmen in the American army. Two hundred of them were sent into Charlestown to provide harassing fire on any passing British troops.

Howe had by now, assembled his forces at the bottom of Bunker Hill. However, they could not have been worse dressed for the ordeal that would follow. Their brilliant red coats made them ideal targets. Furthermore, each British grenadier carried a heavy load of 125 pounds with their muskets weighing an additional 10 pounds.

The Assault

Slowly three red lines of British soldiers began to move up the hill. The advance soon ran into difficulties caused by the terrain. The British line became badly broken up as the soldiers hacked away at the waist high grass and low stone walls and fences. By contrast, on the northern side of the hill, British light infantry quickly advanced up the hill. The militiamen were ready for them. The American commander had hammered a stake into the earth 40 yards from the stonewall his men were defending. He ordered his men to hold their fire until the British and passed the post. The first volley thundered down the hill and completely halted the advancing wave of infantry. As more troops passed over their bodies, two further volleys inflicted the same results. Howe’s infantry at the centre took the fire of 1,500 men firing in unison. All across the line, the British were suffering heavy losses. There was nothing to do except for them to retreat and reform for another attempt.

The British advance up the hill under heavy fire

Howe led his men for a second assault. Three times, he found himself entirely alone, with everybody around him killed or wounded. A third attack was then organised. By now many of the British units were down to just a quarter, or even a tenth of their original strength. Fortunately for the attackers, General Clinton had been watching the events from afar and arrived with further reinforcements. Howe’s artillery had also now been brought up with the forward troops. He quickly devised a new plan of leaving the surviving light infantry to act as a skirmishing force whilst the rest of his men took the breastwork in the flank. At this moment American supplies of ammunition and gunpowder also ran out. Howe’s plan succeeded and British bayonets were suddenly amongst the Americans manning the earthen works. It was at this stage that the Americans suffered most of their casualties as they began to retreat.

Conclusion and Aftermath

Although the British had taken the hill, their losses were staggering at nearly fifty percent. 226 were killed with 828 wounded. Casualties were particularly high amongst the officers, with 27 killed and 828 wounded. By contrast, the Americans lost 450 men. However, their relatively untrained forces had stood up to professionals and inflicted massive losses. It was a sign of things to come and was arguably a turning point in the morale of the American revolutionaries. Although the Americans had technically lost the battle, their actions helped to serve as a recruiting agent amongst other colonists still undecided as to the chances of success against the British army.

Taking Bunker Hill brought no long term advantage to the British. It had almost been a pyrrhic victory. The loss of so many men made any future actions untenable for the time being. The following March, the Americans seized the Dorchester Heights and constructed an even larger fort. The entire British force and a thousand American loyalists boarded the ships in the harbour for Halifax and left Boston.

If you are interested in finding out more about the Battle of Bunker Hill, have a look at these books;

Mary Englar, ‘The Battle of Bunker Hill (We the People: Revolution and the New Nation)’ (2007)

William Weir, ‘Fatal Victories: From the Crusades to Bunker Hill to the Vietnam War: History's Most Tragic Military Triumphs and the High Cost of Victory’ (2006)

Richard M. Ketchum, ‘Decisive Day: The Battle for Bunker Hill’ (1999)

Victor Brooks, ‘The Boston Campaign: April 1775-March 1776 (Great Campaigns): April 1775-March 1776 (Great Campaigns)’ (1999)

Military History and Warfare: World War II: Arnhem Bridge ‘A Bridge too Far’

2008-06-11T13:56:00.000-07:00

The Allied land and airborne operation of September 1944, codenamed ‘Market Garden’ was an ambitious plan to end the war quickly by dropping 30,000 paratroopers into Holland. The paratroopers would seize and hold a series of bridges whilst the British XXX Corps would follow behind and advance into Germany. The battle at Arnhem bridge was only one battle in a series of engagements on the sixty-four mile road from the Meuse-Escaut Canal to the Neder Rijn. However, since the success of the whole operation depended upon seizing this bridge, it was also the most important.

I do not intend to dwell too much upon the entire operation, or indeed the entire British 1st Airborne Division, who quickly found themselves scattered around Arnhem and fighting for their lives. Instead I intend to focus on the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Parachute Brigade commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Frost. This was the sole battalion to reach its objective. Alone and cut-off they held the bridge for four days awaiting reinforcements that never came.

Seven hours after landing on the 17th September, Frost and his men got within sight of Arnhem bridge. A whole Brigade had initially been dispatched, but when Frost counted the number of troops with him that evening, he had just over 700. The battalion were able to seize one end of the bridge almost immediately. However, the other end was held by the Germans. That evening Frost’s men made two attempts to get across the bridge. Both attacks were beaten back by heavy fire from a German pillbox in the centre and an armoured car at the southern end. German trucks that tried to cross the bridge were destroyed, thus discouraging further attempts by the enemy to cross the bridge under the cover of darkness. Unable to contact Brigade HQ, Frost ordered his men to deploy in defensive positions in houses at the north end of the bridge and await reinforcements. However, the Germans reacted quickly and brought in nearby SS infantry and tank units to reinforce their end of the bridge. The only good news for Frost during the night of the 17-18th September was the arrival of most of the Brigade HQ along with a captured German truck loaded with ammunition from the original drop zone.

Frost and his men did not realise that the rest of the division were by now pinned down in desperate little battles all across Arnhem. By the early hours of the 18th September, the 1st Airborne division were fragmented all over Arnhem. Just a few hours after the landing, individual groups of paratroopers were engaged in private battles with whatever local forces they encountered. The breakdown in communications added to the general confusion and chaos. The Germans were well aware of the importance of the bridge. Thanks to the capture of Allied plans carelessly left in a glider, German Field Marshal Model was fully aware of the intention of Operation Market Garden. Whilst the British fought at Arnhem, the American 82nd and 101st were fighting to take the bridges at Nijmegan and Eindhoven. As long as Frost as his men held the North end of Arnhem Bridge, German armoured reinforcements to Nijmegan would be delayed.

British paratroopers landing at Arnhem

German counterattacks began as soon as sufficient forces were assembled on the German side of the bridge early in the morning of the 18th. These attacks continued throughout the day and were beaten back by the British without great loss. Despite these early successes, the growing number of casualties and shortages in ammunition made it imperative that additional units from 1st Airborne or XXX Corps broke through as soon as possible. By early afternoon of Tuesday the 18th, ammunition supplies were so low that it was necessary to stop any sniping and only open fire when an attack was actually in progress. The units of 9th SS Panzer facing them made full use of the lull in shooting to find better positions from which to fire onto the battalion. Half-tracks from 10th SS Panzer soon joined them and were deployed on the south bank. The balance of firepower and armour was rapidly turning against the paratroopers as the Germans launched intermittent assualts on the bridge. Every German fighting vehicle capable of withstanding small-arms fire became a threat to the beleaguered paratroopers. The British forces on the bridge had only hand-held PIATs with which to counter German armour. This spring loaded weapon was the British equivalent of the American bazooka or German Panzerfaust. Unfortunately it was considerably inferior to its counterparts in those armies. Despite this, Frost's men were able to repel multiple attacks, leaving a trail of wrecked German vehicles on the bridge.

Later on the 18th, a captured British paratrooper was sent back to the British side to convey a German request for the British to surrender. With the radio now picking up signals from the British spearheads further down at Nijmegan, Frost still had every reason to believe that XXX Corps would be arriving at any moment. The messenger did not bother to convey Frost’s decline of the German offer and instead took his place back in the line with the rest of his unit.

By Wednesday morning, the Germans were demolishing British defences one building at a time. German tanks fired phosphorus shells to force the paratroopers out of each shelter. Movement between buildings was also fraught with danger as the Germans had now covered the area with machine gun positions and snipers. Casualties were starting to fill the cellars underneath the buildings. Worse still, Frost himself was injured when a mortar exploded next to him. He handed over command to Major Gough of the Reconnaissance squadron, but insisted on being consulted on all major decisions.

With their ammunition almost gone, Frost's men found themselves fixing bayonets and engaging in hand to hand combat. Groups of two or three paratroopers would leave the shelter of the houses they were hiding in to attack Tiger tanks with their PIATs. In the midst of all the fighting, the battalion medical officers convinced Frost to ask the Germans for a two hour truce, during which the wounded would be taken into German hospitals. Following the resumption of fighting, the Germans launched a concentrated mortar barrage on the remaining British positions. Refusing to surrender, groups of paratroopers were simply overrun by superior German manpower backed up with fire support. Despite horrendous conditions, the battalion had managed to hold on to the bridge for three days and four nights. By the fourth day at 9:00, 21st September, all resistance on the bridge had ceased. Eight-one paratroopers had been killed, with many of the others wounded. Frost and the remnants of the battalion were marched off into captivity. They had held a difficult position against overwhelming odds with minimal resources. Their tenacity denied German forces in Nijmegan reinforcements that could have helped stem the Allied advance. Whilst Market Garden ultimately failed to achieve its objectives, the actions of the 2nd Battalion at Arnhem Bridge became legendary.

If you interested in reading more about Operation Market Garden, have a look at these books;

David Bennett, Magnificent Disaster: The Failure of the Market Garden, The Arnhem Operation, September 1944 (2008)

Robin Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944 (London, 2005)

John Keegan, The Second World War (London, 1997)

Max Hastings, Armageddon: the Battle for Germany 1944-45 (London, 2004)

Military History and Warfare: The Thirty Years War: The military reforms of Gustavus Adolphus

2008-06-04T14:03:00.000-07:00

By 1630 the Thirty Years War was in its twelfth year. Fearful of the creeping Habsburg encroachment into the Baltic, King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden landed a small Swedish army of thirteen thousand men on the shores of Germany. For the next eighteen years, Swedish forces would play a key role in maintaining the Protestant cause. They were fortunate to be led by a man that would come to be known as the father of modern warfare.

Gustavus Adolphus

Gustavus Adolphus ascended to the throne of Sweden in 1611. In an age of religious extremism, he grew into a powerful advocate of the Protestant cause. As a child he had been well-tutored in military classics, as well as the works of Caesar and Vegetius. Crucially, he understood the organisational reforms introduced by Maurice of Nassau into the Dutch army early in the seventeenth century. Unlike many other rulers of the age, Gustavus had a firsthand understanding of the battlefield and of weapons. Early campaigns against the Poles and Russians in the 1620s gave him invaluable military experience. When he succeeded to the throne, Swedish forces were understrength, poorly organised and generally unprofessional. His reforms turned Sweden and the Swedish army into a first rate force that would later help determine the future of Europe.

Creation of a national army

In the early seventeenth century, most armies were heterogeneous compositions of various mercenary groups of different nationalities and ethnic groups. Maurice of Nassau had been one of the first to recognise that a truly professional army needed to be homogeneous. Gustavus decided to create an army that would remain Swedish at its core, but retain mercenaries in order to supplement numbers. To ensure that the mercenaries would be of high quality, he tried to retain forces that already had a proven track record of success. One of the best infantry regiments in the Swedish army was the Green Brigade, made up almost entirely of Scots.

To create the national army, he regulated the conscription process which had been gradually introduced in Sweden during the previous half-century. Drafts to supply men to the army were taken from existing militia units. He also made gifts of land for soldiers who had served for twenty years and set up administrative systems to ensure they were paid regularly whilst on active service. In order to support these military reforms, the king had to implement economic reforms at the same time. Gustavus expanded Swedish commerce, developing existing industries and natural resources. This allowed the state to operate on a regular annual budget and pay for its army.

Infantry tactics

Like Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus employed linear formations against the infantry tercios used by the Habsburg forces. He increased the number of musketeers and reduced the combat line to six ranks rather than the usual ten used by other armies. In addition, Swedish troops were equipped with the new, more reliable matchlock muskets. Gustavus also introduced packaged paper cartridges containing gunpowder and a ball. The system saved each musketeer considerable time in no longer having to worry about pouring the correct amount of powder under battlefield conditions.

The King’s reforms centred on working out effective tactics for attacking enemy infantry squares and heavy lines presenting a solid front of musket and pike. Swedish musketeers were trained to fire by volley of ranks so that continuous fire could be maintained. In preparing to receive an enemy charge, the musketeers formed up with the frontline kneeling so that they could fire a simultaneous volley. Once the enemy attack had been broken, pikeman and cavalry would advance.

Whilst pikeman were originally solely for defence (protecting the musketeers while they were reloading), Gustavus transformed them from being a purely defensive force into a means of offence. By removing most of their armour, pikeman were now able to charge across the battlefield. This aggressive use of the pike was innovative in an era where gunpowder was starting to dominate.

Reorganisation of cavalry

Gustavus made important contributions to the use of cavalry on the battlefield. His objective was to enable the cavalry to utilise its speed and impetus through a well-disciplined charge. Squadrons were eventually arrayed three ranks deep, fighting in the style of the Poles. Instead of merely harassing the enemy with pistol-fire, Swedish cavalry would now charge with swords at full speed. Only the first one or two ranks would fire their pistols, and only then before immediately attacking with their swords. Gustavus also equipped the dragoons with shorter versions of muskets, thus enabling them to fire from the saddle.

Artillery

The King’s early experiences of war in the 1620s had given him valuable insights into the science of artillery. Gustavus understood that the expert use of artillery on the battlefield would enable him to pierce enemy lines, rather than simply bombard them. Therefore the calibre of guns in the Swedish artillery train were reduced to just three varieties, the 24-pounder, the 12-pounder and the 3-pounder. Each would have a specific role. Gustavus used the 3-pound guns as light field pieces for use directly as support for the infantry and cavalry units. Each infantry regiment was assigned two of these light guns. To make these guns more mobile, lighter gun carriages were employed along with shortened gun barrels and a reduction in the thickness of metal used in the artillery tubes. This resulted in fewer wagons and horses being required to pull the artillery. In 1625 the army’s 36-gun train needed over 1000 horses and 220 wagons. By 1630, the Swedish artillery-train of 80 guns required only 1000 horses and 100 wagons.

These changes required radical technological improvements in the areas of design, casting and metallurgy. Sweden’s vast natural mineral resources made the creation of a large artillery force a realistic possibility. Through experimentation and the employment of foreign experts, Sweden artillery became the finest in Europe. Accuracy was insisted upon and gunners were given regular practice. At the Battle of Breitenfeld in 1631, Swedish gunners were able to fire three shots to every one of the enemy.

Conclusion

Arguably King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden was the first great modern military commander. His battlefield innovations were copied, but never bettered, by his opponents in the Thirty Years War. He took three distinctive units of the battlefield and moulded them into a force of combined arms. Arguable these tactics had not been seen in Europe since the Roman army. His contribution to military thinking and strategy dominated the age of gunpowder and pike and beyond.

Gary Dean Peterson, ‘The rise of an Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: warrior Kings of Sweden’ (Jefferson, 2007)

Lars Ericson, Martin Hårdstet, Per Iko, Ingvar Sjöblom, Gunnar Asellius, Svenska Slagfält (Värname, 2004)

Philip J. Haythornwaite, ‘Invincible Generals’ (Poole, 1991)

Herman Lindqvist, ‘A History of Sweden’ (Värnamo, 2006)

Holger Herwig, Christian Archer, Timothy Travers, John Ferris, ‘Cassell’s World History of Warfare’ (London, 2003)

Military History and Warfare: The Texan War of Independence: Musings on the Alamo

2008-05-29T14:29:00.000-07:00

Last year I had the opportunity to re-visit the Alamo in San Antonio. I had been there once before as a child and the visit helped to spark a lifelong love of history. Situated in the heart of heavily built-up San Antonio, the interior of the Alamo is an island of calm. This seems remarkable given that for thirteen days between February 23rd - March 6th 1836 it was subject to a siege followed by a bloody massacre. The Alamo itself has existed since the 1700s. It was originally established as a missionary post by Spanish monks. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Spanish troops occupied it and used it as their base for operations in the area. After the Mexican revolution, Mexican troops took over garrison duties. It was therefore not surprising that the Texan colonists chose to fortify the Alamo in 1835/36 as a key part of the defences of the settlements further north.

Surveying the Alamo now, there is little to suggest that it would have made a good defensive position. Nonetheless, there were good arguments in 1835 for attempting to hold it against the Mexican army. There were two roads that led into the Texan interior from Mexico. The first was the Atascosito Road, stretching northward from Matamoros on the Rio Grande through Goliad and leading straight into the Texan settlements. The second was the Old San Antonio Road and wound north-eastward through San Antonio. Guarding both these roads and simultaneously acting as an early warning system for the colonies, there were forts at Goliad and San Antonio. Initially, General Sam Houston had ordered that the Alamo be razed to the ground and the position abandoned. This was rejected and Colonel James Neil (initially commanding the troops at the Alamo) instructed his engineers to begin constructing fortifications. By February, twenty-one pieces of captured Mexican artillery had been mounted on the walls and concentrated into batteries and a palisade wall had been constructed. Neil is often forgotten in retellings of the story of the Alamo, but it was thanks to his efforts that the Alamo was reconstituted into a defensible fortress.

Plans of the Alamo in 1836

Today the Alamo is garrisoned by an army of tourists and tour guides. And rightly so, the old mission station is well worth a visit by anyone with the any interest in military history or Texas history in general. The site was used again for military purposes during the American Civil War, but was abandoned shortly afterwards. Fortunately, an organisation calling itself 'the daughters of the Republic of Texas' formed and took it upon themselves to maintain and safeguard the Alamo as an historic site for future generations. International visitors to the site might be surprised to learn that the garrison of the Alamo did not consist entirely of Americans led by John Wayne Indeed, the Alamo Museum within the compound shows how diverse the settler population was in Texas during the early nineteenth century. Apart from settlers from across the United States, the defenders of the Alamo consisted of Hispanic 'Texicans', Englishmen, Irishman, Scotsman and Germans.

Surrounded by seven thousand Mexican soldiers, the one-hundred and eighty-seven defenders of the Alamo stayed at their posts. This is not to say that they were suicidal. Indeed, the commanding officer, Colonel Travis sent repeated messages requesting reinforcements throughout the siege. Unfortunately, none were available in time to come to the relief of the Alamo. On the thirteenth day, the Mexican army stormed the bastion and killed every last defender. The women and children were spared and set on their way to report what they had seen as a warning to other potential rebels against Mexico.

Other items of interest on display in the Alamo museum, include a bible owned by Jim Bowie and a rifle said to have belonged to Davy Crockett. The bible is particularly indicative of the kind of life Jim Bowie led prior to his death at the Alamo. Its sole distinguishing feature is the large gash running through its centre. This was apparently the result of an attempted murder by an Indian that Bowie had upset. The Bible sat in Bowie's pocket and took the impact of the knife, thus allowing him to escape and fight another day. Apart from the displays within the surviving buildings of the Alamo compound, there is an excellent film telling the story of the Alamo and the thirteen day siege. To its great credit, the museum emphasis both perspectives from the conflict. The Mexican government had encouraged immigration into Texas from the United States in order to increase the population of the state. The white settlers were primarily interested in Texas because of the land opportunities it offered. However, the large influx of white settlers began to cause the Mexican government concern. They feared that this far-flung Mexican province would become culturally and politically dominated by the settlers. When the Mexican government introduced legislation to limit the numbers of immigrants, tensions began to rise which would eventually culminate in the Texan revolution of 1835.

The centrepiece of any visit to the Alamo is the lecture tour conducted by one of the museum's enthusiastic guides. It is clear how important the Alamo is to many Texans and indeed Americans as a whole. Setting aside historical bias for a moment, the Alamo is far more than an old church-turned-fort. It is considered by many as a shrine to Texas independence. The heroic behaviour of the defenders in refusing to give in epitomizes the Texan ideals of self-determination and love of freedom. As such there is a statue outside the walls to commemorate all those who lost their lives defending the Alamo. The guides and museum are excellent and make the Alamo a ‘must see’ destination for anyone visiting the lone star state.