Polycentric Order

How to Argue for Libertarianism

2009-12-08T17:43:00.007-05:00

I have long pondered on how best to defend and advocate for liberty, to persuade my fellow human beings that they, too, should hold it and advocate on behalf of it. In Murray Rothbard's book "For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto," he identifies three philosophical foundations upon which the libertarian creed has been based: emotive, utilitarian, and natural rights.

I used to call myself a natural-rightist. However, I slowly moved towards the position that such a foundation was weak, simply due to scientific facts. The natural-rightist, says Rothbard, is one who advocates libertarianism on the basis of the self-ownership axiom: a person owns his or her physical body, just as one might own other tangible, material things in reality. The problem I have with this is it ignores the now obvious fact that the notion of "self" is brought about by the inter-working processes of the physical brain. Modern neuroscience has shown that human emotion is controlled by a set of brain structures called collectively the lymbic system, which is itself controlled (or regulated) by the more logic, future-projecting area of the brain: the frontal lobes. The sense of "self" has even been shown to originate predominately from a certain structure or region in the brain.

If the sense of "self" comes about by the physiological processes in the brain, how can one be said to own it in any true sense? What is owning what? Does the "self" come to own the physiological processes that bring it about as soon as it arises? This does not make sense on a fundamental level, but I won't go into the specific reasons for that here. Let me also note that I remain open to persuasion on this issue.

The main issue I have with Rothbard in his "For a New Liberty" is when he says the following:

The emotivists assert that they take liberty or nonaggression as their premise purely on subjective, emotional grounds. While their own intense emotion might seem a valid basis for their own political philosophy, this can scarcely convince anyone else. By taking themselves outside the realm of rational discourse, the emotivists thereby insure the lack of general success of their own cherished doctrine.

I think Rothbard overstates his own case against the emotivist's ability to convince anyone else of his doctrine. What I am fairly sure of is that morality is subjective. It is an opinion, a value. However, evolutionary psychology shows that the brain is equipped with some basic hardware that predisposes it to act morally towards certain people in a social context. In a sense, even chimpanzees are moral: they are documented to punish stealing, murder, etc., within their own social groups. The problem comes in when someone is viewed as an outsider, i.e. outside the social group one acts morally towards. This is true for humans and chimpanzees.

As an empirical matter, certain tenants of moral conduct (don't steal, don't murder, etc.) have been found present, in some form or another, in virtually every human culture on Earth. This moral predisposition is tempered, again, by the fact that it only extends so far: inside a given social group. And it may be cluttered with other unrealistic, culturally-based beliefs, like sacrificing infants to the gods to bring rain.

Given this and assuming morality is subjective, I still have an objective basis to appeal to within other members of my species: a basic moral sense that certain actions are bad within a social group. You can then argue for the expansion of the social group; that is, including more people (or even animals) within the realm of one's moral actions. You will find very few people willing to concede that they endorse aggression against innocent people without their consent. Instead, it's almost always maintained that it can't be avoided, or the people really do give some type of consent. Then the matter becomes one of showing how it can be avoided (leaving aside the notion of fiat justitia ruat caelum), or how it is not truly consent.

In short, I think emotivists do have an objective basis to appeal to in advocating liberty, and they could be very successful by appealing to peoples' basic moral intuitions alone, since such intuitions have a neurobiological basis. If large swaths of people intuitively hold the value that you should not hurt innocent people without their consent (even if it's only within the narrow range of a social group and even though it may be muddled by other predispositions), it seems very plausible that argumentation would be successful. If people want to hold a certain value, the task becomes showing how to be logically consistent; that is, how to truly hold it as a value.

"Soft" and "Hard" Arguments Against The State

2009-12-07T02:17:00.005-05:00

The point that I'm about to make has been brought up before in the context of critiqueing propertarianism (or absolutist propertarianism), but I'd like to highlight it more explicitly in the context of anti-state arguments. My tone and purpose here will hopefully be less confrontational and more constructive. There is what I call the "soft" and "hard" arguments against the state, both of which I consider to be legitimate arguments. The main difference between the "soft" and "hard" arguments is that the "hard" argument goes further and more explicitly identifies what the objection to the state is. Both arguments are valid responses to the "implicit consent" and "love it or leave it" defenses of the state, but I think that the "soft" argument is necessary but insufficient as a counter to authoritarian claims.

A good example of what I'm calling the "soft" argument would be this:

"I think that the person who makes this argument is already assuming that the government has some legitimate jurisdiction over this territory. And then they say, well, now, anyone who is in the territory is therefore agreeing to the prevailing rules. But they’re assuming the very thing they’re trying to prove – namely that this jurisdiction over the territory is legitimate. If it’s not, then the government is just one more group of people living in this broad general geographical territory. But I’ve got my property, and exactly what their arrangements are I don’t know, but here I am in my property and they don’t own it – at least they haven’t given me any argument that they do – and so, the fact that I am living in "this country" means I am living in a certain geographical region that they have certain pretensions over – but the question is whether those pretensions are legitimate. You can’t assume it as a means to proving it." -- Roderick Long, Libertarian Anarchism: Responses to 10 Objections

This is a valid argument. The person that is claiming that the state is legitimate because one implicitly consents to the rules established within its claimed territory is presupposing the legitimacy of the state's territorial claim to begin with, and this is something that they must prove. There is a burden of proof for the legitimacy of any territorial ownership claim. In the absence of a standard for the legitimacy for territorial ownership claims and in the absence of proof that a given claim meets that standard, an "implicit consent" or "love it or leave it" argument inherently fails. This inherently begs the question of what the standard is for the legitimacy of territorial ownership claims.

But this argument is "soft" for a number of reasons. For one thing, it leads to a meta-debate about the criteria for legitimate ownership, and the state can be either justified or unjustified depending on what criteria one uses. But, more importantly, I don't think that it adequately expresses what the problem with the state is. It gives the impression that if the state did meet the criteria for legitimate ownership, all of its powers would indeed be justified. In other words, it appears to unduly reduce the question of the state to one of legitimacy in land aquisition. But the problem with the state isn't simply that it doesn't legitimately own the territory that it claims power over, but extends further to the fact that there is something wrong with the arbitrary or unqualified kind of authority that it claims and exersizes in general. The "soft" argument is still functioning within a certain paradigm of "legitimacy" that is relative to "who is the owner?".

The "hard" argument against the state goes further than this: even if we do presume, for the sake of argument, that a given individual or group is a "legitimate" owner, this still would not justify the kind and scope of power of a state. There isn't only a burden of proof for the legitimacy of an ownership claim, but there is a burden of proof for the legitimacy of authority claims derived from ownership. This approach to the question inherently increases the burden of proof and implies a conceptual limit on "property rights", particularly as it relates to land, because it declares that the ownership of land in and of itself does not justify absolute, unqualified authority over other people. In constrast, the "soft" argument is open to being turned on its head as a re-legitimization of the state, dependant only on a norm for the legitimacy of property aquisition.

An analogy to a more small-scale context may drive the point home. For the sake of argument, let's presume that I legitimately own a home. Would it make sense for me to claim that by virtue of the fact that I own my home, anyone that visits must do literally whatever I tell them, and that I am justified in doing whatever I want to anyone that happens to occupy it at any given moment? Such a claim would be laughed out of court as a ridiculous propertarian justification for slavery and murder. But the state is just a large-scale embodyment of this. The members of the political class constitute the defacto "owners" of the territory that the state has jurisdiction over, and at the end of the day they have ultimate authority over the lives of everyone else within the territory. Asking "who is the legitimate owner?" isn't enough. One has to ask "what kind of authority should an owner really have?".

In short, the problem with the state is really just an application of a more general criticism of authoritarianism, and the state just happens to be a case of authoritarianism that is applied to the largest geographical area. This constitutes a certain form of "thickness" in which anti-statism is really just a part of a broader social philosophy. The burden of proof for an authority claim is higher than the "soft" anti-state argument suggests, since it is not simply relative to who is an owner. The "strong" anti-state argument proposes that it isn't a question of who has the authority, but a more general question about the rational limits of authority, and that "consent" is impossible in a context in which options are limited by the circumstances and assorted inherited power structures.

This also inherently raises the bar for what the necessary and sufficient conditions of a free society are. A free society isn't simply dependant on the right norm of property aquisition and a narrow, vague sense of "voluntaryism". "Voluntaryism" is effectively neutralized by the dominance of pre-existing authority structures and a social atmosphere that leaves little choice other than one of asqueisance. I don't think that the formula for a free society reduces to a redistribution of ownership claims while the general rubric of authoritarian norms that can be derived from ownership claims remain relatively unchallenged. An overly simplistic sense of propertarianism and voluntaryism seems to contain the seeds of its own dissolution, because it doesn't contain sufficient checks to avoid the re-justification and ultimately the re-emergence of the state from within its formula.

With this in mind, I urge libertarians to think more critically about their own arguments and be open to the prospect that there may be holes that need to be filled in order to avoid the possibility of their own concepts being used as justifications for precisely what they hopefully intend to be countering. We need a lot more ammunition than "but they didn't homestead this land!", and we should be cognizant of the dangers of certain overly zealous tendencies that exist within. There is much that can be done to strengthen our case and make us more internally consistent. I think that it's time to harden the arguments and steer clear of laying the foundation for one's own failure.

[Note: To be clear, none of this is particularly intended as an attack on Roderick Long, even though I quoted him as my example of the "soft" argument. I have a lot of respect for Roderick Long. I'm quite certain that, as exemplified in various other writtings of his, Roderick Long tends to have certain tendencies towards "thickness" that strengthen his anti-statism. However, I do think that the kind of argument that he presented in the quote is insufficient and open to valid objections by soft propertarians and anti-propertarians for the reasons gone into above.]

Social Evolution vs. "Social Darwinism"

2009-12-06T19:34:00.012-05:00

"Social Darwinism" is a term that is generally used to refer to a viewpoint arising in the 19th century that characterizes social relations in terms of a hobbesian struggle, a negative sense of "competition" in which the "the strong" overpower "the weak", combined with a prescriptive stance in favor of letting "the weak" die off in the name of fostering a superior gene pool. Sprinkle this with Malthus's theories of population and a rather vulgar creed can be formed. No doubt, positions along these lines did arise and influence racialist and eugenics movements. However, mainstream discourse on such matters often tends to conflate this with social evolutionary theory in general and mischaracterize figures such as Herbert Spencer as having a more vulgar view than is actually the case.

There are a number of things that are worth clarifying about this. The term "social darwinism" itself may be somewhat misleading in the sense that the kind of view being described here is, up to a point, more of a misinterpretation of Darwin himself than a logical extension of his views. While Darwin did talk about "the survival of the fittest" and a sense of "struggle for existence", by no means did he mean to imply that cooperation and empathy is excluded from his analysis. Furthermore, Darwin himself is not necessarily the sole or even main source for social evolutionary theories. Both Lamarkian and post-darwinian ideas have influenced various social evolutionary theories. The general rubric of "social evolution" should be distinguished from "darwinism".

When I think of social evolutionary theories, the first two names that pop into my mind are Herbert Spencer and Peter Kropotkin. Despite the ill reputation that Spencer has been given as a "social darwinist", he was a Lamarkian who theorized about evolution prior to Darwin and who thought of social evolution as moving in the direction of more cooperation and "beneficience". He was a radical classical liberal that was explicitly opposed to militaristic, violent, or conflictual tendencies. Those who characterize him as a "social darwinist" either misunderstand him or simply never read his work. Kropotkin was the father of anarcho-communism, who explicitly had the purpose of highlighting tendencies towards cooperation and empathy in both human and non-human life. While he certainly can be interpreted as a Rousseauan that romantisized "primitive" and medieval societies, the entire thrust of his work "Mutual Aid" is as a counter-balance to those very views that are commonly characterized as "social darwinism".

Social evolutionary theory, in the general sense, is simply an attempt to apply evolutionary concepts in a context beyond biology to things like culture, economics, and politics. In its backward-looking sense, it is simply an indispensible aspect of historical analysis. In its foreward-looking sense, it tends to entail some general conceptions of progress with respect to social interaction and organization. In and of itself, it does not entail the negative things associated with "social darwinism". It does not do justice to the general discourse on social evolution for it to be halted or polluted by associations with eugenics, racialism, and Mr. Scrooge bugaboos, or for many of its early proponents to be conflated with the Nazis, given the fact that liberalism and anarchism are involved. It would be best for people to try to look past their linguistic and socially inherited prejudices and judge the ideas of these thinkers on their own merits, while being cognizant of the much more broad scope of ideas that fall under the general umbrella of "social evolutionary theory".

Anti-Darwinian Societies?

2009-12-05T21:35:00.003-05:00

Anyone who keeps up with Richard Dawkins will have heard him mention that he thinks a society based on Darwinian principles would be vicious and contemptable. He goes further to state that Darwinian princples at the level of society would be an unhampered free market. He thinks society should be organized around anti-Darwinian principles, giving those who are destitute and impoverished a safety net in which to fall. I think this view is problematic.

The central fallacy in Dawkin's reasoning is his conflation of the free market with Darwinian principles. On this, I offer one large objection.

The law of association (also known as comparative advantage) makes clear that free trade is beneficial. It is beneficial because both parties gain during the exchange. That is, each party to the exchange values what he receives over and above what he gives up. The law of association also shows how the specialization and division of labor, with free trade as a backdrop, increases total productivity. Not only does it increase total productivity, but it even benefits the weaker party in terms of productivity. A simple example will illustrate this:

Imagine a world with two commodities: butter and bread. Amanda is best at producing bread, while David is best at producing butter. However, Amanda is absolutely better than David in producing bread and butter. In a day, Amanda can produce 20 loafs of bread if she concentrates solely on bread production, and she can produce 15 pounds of butter if she concentrates solely on butter production. David, on the other hand, can produce 15 pounds of butter if he concentrates solely on butter production, and he can produce 10 loafs of bread if he concentrates solely on bread production. On the other hand, if Amanda splits her time between bread and butter production, she can produce 10 loafs of bread and 7.5 pounds of butter, while David can produce 7.5 pounds of butter and 5 loafs of bread.

If Amanda produces that in which she is comparatively the best (bread) and David produces what he is comparatively the least disadvantaged (butter), overall production is higher than if each split their time between bread and butter. [Total production of 35 units versus 30 units.] The surplus can then be traded between the parties and each is better off. Expand this economic law across entire societies, with all of the goods and services produced therein, and the benefits of it become even more obvious.

I said all of that to point out the problem in Dawkins analysis of free markets: free markets do not impoverish the poor and inferior. As was shown, even if a person is superior in every way (at least when it comes to production), he will still be better off economically to trade with someone who is inferior in every way. In this way, the free market helps the poor and even those who may be genetically less gifted.

Thus, Dawkins contention that free markets are ruthless and have no regard for the poor is mistaken. You can be for the free market and be a champion of the least of those among us.

A Two-Sided Dillema

2009-10-24T21:19:00.002-04:00

There is a two-sided dillema that pops up in conflicts over issues of freedom and domination. One side of the dillema is the problem of "involuntary liberation", while the other side of the dillema is the problem of "voluntary authoritarianism". Both of these seem like bald-faced contradictions that throw a monkey wrench into any attempt to coherantly define freedom, but they actually pop up quite frequently in conflicts between various libertarians and anarchists. The begged questions that may clarify how such contradictions arise is "voluntary in what sense?" and "liberation in what sense?".

What do I mean by "voluntary authoritarianism"? I mean a situation that is predicated on something that is voluntary in some sense or aspect, and yet is ultimately authoritarian in nature. For example, let's assume that "homesteading", "exchange", and "inheritance" or "gift" are voluntary modes of aquiring property over a given geographical area. That is, it is "voluntary" in the way that it is obtained. But as a question aside from one of how territory is obtained, those that own the geographical area exersize essentially unlimited power over those that happen to occupy the area that they have voluntarily obtained. Hence, in spite of the fact that the area was aquired "voluntarily", there is an authoritarian relationship at play in which the individual or group that "voluntarily" obtained the territory theoretically make whatever rules they want while the non-owners must obey their rules.

Let's be clear about this: the scenario just described would be a state in the Weberian definition of the term (or at least involve a state-like entity), in spite of the "voluntary" nature of territorial aquisition. It constitutes a defacto "territorial monopoly of ultimate decision-making" relative to the geographical area in question. And yet it initially came about through "voluntary" means, in terms of the way in which the geographical area was obtained. This illustrates an important point: that the qualification or criteria that a given geographical area is aquired through "voluntary" means is insufficient as a condition for freedom. The excersize of "ultimate decision-making power" over a given geographical area does not suddenly cease to threaten people's freedom simply because the area was "homesteaded" or "exchanged for".

There is also a factor of time in situations of "voluntary authoritarianism". While the prior example shows how it possible in some sense for a "state" to arise out of an initially "voluntary" mode of property aquisition, the annoying issue of "voluntary" slavery is similar, except in the latter case it has more to do with contracts than direct modes of property aquisition. It is theoretically possible for someone to sign a contract stating that they will work for and obey the orders of another individual or group, for the rest of their lives even. In terms of the simple act of signing the contract without initially being threatened with aggression, such an act would indeed be "voluntary". But as soon as the person tries to opt out of the relationship and another party proactively threatens violence to make them continue following orders into the future, what started out as a "voluntary contract" has taken on the character of any old authoritarian relationship. The contract itself is irrelevant to what explicitly is "voluntary".

The knee-jerk response at this point is for the defender of "voluntary slavery" to object that "you can't force them to be free", since that would appear to be a contradiction in terms. This is misleading because the person in the scenario actually doesn't want to obey orders anymore or continue to be a part of the relationship. The entire point is that the relationship has explicitly ceased to be "voluntary", and to perpetually enforce the contract would be pure subjection at this point. If I defend a slave that is trying to flee their master, I'm not forcing anyone to be free. It's their master that is trying to force them into not being free. If the "voluntary slavery" notion is taken to its logical conclusion, one would have to defend any sort of authoritarian relationship as long as it is traceable back to a legally binding contract.

It seems like the fundamental error of such "voluntary authoritarianism" is that property and/or contract are treated as ends in themselves that override freedom, or freedom is defined as a derivative of them. As a consequence of this, everything that one would otherwise object to in the abscence of contracts and the proper modes of property aquisition is relegitimized in the framework of property and/or contract. Hence, slavery and the state remain in substance, and differ only in the form that they take in terms of how they initially come about, which may initially be voluntary in nature. This may seem counter-intuitive, but something can start out voluntarily (or at least with its foundational qualities not involving aggression) and become involuntary or authoritarian over time. It also leads to a conclusion that may offend the average market-libertarian ear: if we want to meaningfully favor freedom, we must realize that freedom inherently limits property and contracts.

With all of this being said, there is another side of the coin here. While there are specific problems with viewpoints that end up effectively leading to the contradiction of making people "free to be subjects", there are also certain viewpoints that end up leading to a genuine contradiction of "forcing people to be free". The most explicit example of this in large-scale politics is probably the neoconservative line on foreign policy, in which proactive aggression and nation-buiding is endorsed in the name of freeing people from the control of foreign governments and "keeping the world safe for democracy". The idea is that one is doing a benevolent service to the people living in those areas by stepping in fighting the organizations that more locally control them. There is often a humanitarian veneer to it that gives it a veil of legitimacy.

Upon reflection, it may initially seem like there is an element of sensibility to this if one thinks of it in terms of helping slaves flee their masters. But that isn't really how such policies really work. For one thing, who exactly belongs to "the enemy" to be fought is often unclear, and the general population ends up being either caught in the crossfire or feeling invaded, which leads them to defend themselves. And so, to some extent, one ends up in a conflict with the very people that one is claiming to be liberating. The very nature of large-scale warfare ends up doing damage that is well beyond the limits of explicitly governmental targets. Furthermore, even to the extent that what could be considered oppressors are being fought off, it is under the pretext of imposing a new group of oppressors.

It reaches a point at which one is actually subjugating and killing people in the name of liberating them. The "liberating force" makes a power grab of their own, either directly (in the form of running the government) or indirectly (in the form of establishing a new puppet/satellite regime). Even the mere motive of freeing people comes into question, and it ends up looking like the motive of the "liberating force" is to become masters themselves or impose a new set of authorities onto the people that are supposed to be "liberated". It's analagous to slavemaster A taking out slavemaster B only as a pretext to replacing them and gaining control over the other slavemaster's subjects. The claim to be freeing people, whether it is genuinely intended or not, is illusory in substance.

A similar issue is involved with opposition to standard wage labor. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that an anarcho-communist society was achieved. Noone works for wages under an employer. But let's suppose that, for one reason or another, a particular individual decided that they wanted to work for someone else and another individual was willing to be their employer. One can protest until one is blue in the face that noone would have any reason to do that in a communist society, since there is supposed to be post-scarcity conditions, but let's assume that some people do anyways. What can the anarcho-communist really do about it? Are they really going to try to universally ban all employment contracts, and how would they possibly do this without some degree of aggression at some point down the line?

I think that this scenario bumps into a genuine "force them to be free" dillema. It seems akward and counter-intuitive to try to proactively intervene to stop someone from initially entering into an employment contract, while that person protests the whole way and genuinely wants to enter into it. It seems like the anarcho-communist more or less has no choice but to tolerate it to some extent. To claim to be "liberating" someone while they emphatically don't want you to and while they persistently object doesn't make any sense. While the "voluntary slavery" proponent doesn't take freedom of exit into proper account, anyone that favors explicit "involuntary liberation" in this way seems to not take freedom of entry into proper account. If "freedom of association" is to mean anything at all, both entry and exit must be considered.

Anarcho-Capitalism Is Not A Form Of Libertarian Socialism

2009-10-15T11:48:00.009-04:00

Brad Spangler has recently been defending anarcho-capitalism as essentially being the same thing as libertarian socialism (see here and here). While I think that one-dimensional thinking can be misleading and there is an extent to which conflict about such questions can be based on semantics, I believe that Spangler is stretching it here and going too far in his own use of semantics and obfuscating certain distinctions between norms commonly held by the groups in question. The problem, as I see it, partially revolves around how he is defining his terms relative to other people that commonly apply those same terms to themselves.

Spangler holds up Murray Rothbard as a libertarian socialist. A number things must be noted that give this claim a context: Spangler is talking about a "left-rothbardian" interpretation of Rothbard that is not shared by the vast majority of "rothbardians" (particularly those associated with the Ludwig Von Mises Institute), this is only one era in Rothbard's thought that is being refered to (late 60's and early 70's), and Rothbard came to abandon that position. In fact, by the time we get to the 80's, it seems quite clear that Rothbard drifted (back?) "rightward" to a significant extent.

The early formation of agorism was partially based on a split between Rothbard and Konkin. Of course, Konkin viewed himself as "more rothbardian than rothbard", as merely taking Rothbard's premises to a more radical and logical conclusion. But even if one wants to think of it as having its roots in Rothbard's ideas, it still constitutes a deviation relative to the man's own views and the views of many of his adherants. Insofar as agorism is only thought of as a different strategic viewpoint for obtaining anarcho-capitalism, then I suppose there isn't much of a significant distinction. But insofar as it is based on a "left-rothbardian" interpretation of libertarianism, I think it must be admitted that it is a distinct system of thought from the "plumbline" of anarcho-capitalism.

With Rothbard and agorism aside, there are much more important reasons why I don't think it makes sense to pretend that the general paradigm of anarcho-capitalism is indistinguishable from libertarian socialism. Most fundamentally, they are very clearly distinguished in terms of their norms about property, and I don't think that such differences are trivial. Generally, anarcho-capitalism is based on a quite specific conception of property that essentially every libertarian socialist I've ever encountered rejects. Indeed, it is considered authoritarian. Likewise, the vast majority of anarcho-capitalists that I've encountered tend to consider the norms of libertarian socialists to inherently violate liberty.

Now, I'll be the first person to admit that sometimes these conflicts are based on mutual misunderstandings. I most certainly think that simple "pro-property" vs. "anti-property" is an oversimplification. But I do not think that it is entirely semantic in nature. I don't think that we can make such issues go away by playing with language. Libertarian socialists do not believe in non-proviso lockean property. One can come up with theories about how non-proviso lockean property can possibly include socialistic models of economic organization until one's brain explodes, but that would still be based on the overall framework of the property norm, which libertarian socialists reject.

One could say that "we all believe in non-aggression, so the distinctions are moot", but even non-aggression is going to be defined partially based on what property norm one assumes ahead of time. At the practical level, this means that it isn't even the same "non-aggression principle" being adhered to, since whether or not a given act is going to be considered offense or defense will vary. One could say that "we all oppose the state, so the distinctions are moot", but as long as one party considers the other's norms to justify or imply a state anyways, one group's "anti-statism" will be another group's "transition from one state to another" or "the establishment of a situation that is a sufficient condition for a new state forming". And that's exactly what the anarcho-capitalist's norms imply from a libertarian socialist perspective.

There are some people that could be said to occupy an ambiguous space that exists between the general paradigms of anarcho-capitalism and libertarian socialism, such as various elements within the Alliance of the Libertarian Left. But that's just the thing: the Alliance of the Libertarian Left and related tendencies are not representative of the norm in market anarchism. If anything, it has a certain heretical flavor relative to the orthodoxy of both anarcho-capitalism and social anarchism. On one hand, it can be considered reconciliationist or a mixture of ideas from both paradigms. But relative to the "hardline" of both paradigms, it very clearly is deviationist; it defies or breaks the norms.

Some market anarchists (particularly those with left-libertarian inclinations) think that if you get rid of the state, "capitalism" as we know it dissapears. To an extent, this makes sense if we understand "capitalism" to depend on state intervention in terms of property titles and an assortment of legal constructs that have had the function of restricting competition to the dominant "capitalist" models of economic organization. I'm sympathetic to this viewpoint myself. But the analysis could be taken further: if we still hold the same property norms in general(particularly with respect to land), then we haven't avoided the foundation of states. If we view the matter from another conceptual level, the dominant anarcho-capitalist position on land should logically justify if not consequentially lead to states or state-like entities.

This, I believe, cuts much deeper to the heart of what the issue of contention is all about. It isn't merely a matter of rejecting the current distribution of property titles and thinking that in the absence of a state such an arrangement could not sustain itself. It's a matter of how such an arrangement forms in the first place and the relationship between specific property norms and authority. By the very least, as long as anarcho-capitalists continue hold on to certain territorialist notions, they haven't overcome authoritarianism from a libertarian socialist perspective. The problem cannot be completely chalked up to the influence of already-existing states. It's not as if, regaurdless of norms about property, a given state falls and then everything just works itself out into libertopia.

The discussion is not merely about what one thinks the consequences of getting rid of currently existing states are, but what the consequences of various norms about property and liberty are, partially in relation to the question of state formation. It's a different level of analysis altogether. Considerations about this matter is part of why I think that "anti-statism" in the sense of calling for the abolition of currently existing states to be necessary but insufficient by itself to foster a free society. I don't believe that you automatically have a free society simply because a given state falls, I think that a free society will be contingent on a culture of freedom, and precisely what is involved in a culture of freedom (including norms about property) is up for debate.

Part of why I think that Spangler's claims are misleading is that he seems to think that if you think that the state intervenes to uphold an unjust allocation of property and that the consequences of abolishing the state naturally lead to a redistribution of property, this makes you a libertarian socialist, but that's not what libertarian socialism is defined by. It involves fairly specific notions about property at a different conceptual level, and it doesn't entail a reduction of the issue to the pre-existance of a state. This is why his statements confuse some people, both libertarian socialists and anarcho-capitalists, because we're not talking about the same thing here.

A reply to Buchanan's Article praising the Tariff on Chinese Tires.

2009-10-06T04:57:00.000-04:00

Here is Buchanan's article that was in the Lawton Constitution's opinion page last week:

http://buchanan.org/blog/globalism-vs-americanism-2192

Patrick Buchanan has come out in support of Obama’s tariff on tires, saying that its a good start. But Buchanan makes several mistakes throughout his column.

He starts off early in his article, blaming the Chinese tire industry for taking away market shares of the Cooper Tire company and causing the South Georgia tire plant to be shut down. But this isn’t at all the fault of the Chinese. It is the fault, if you could call it a fault, of the consumers. The consumers have let their preferences be known and have chosen Chinese tires over Cooper tires. Buchanan I know gives lip service to capitalism. And if it were not the Chinese, but Goodyear tires that were becoming more popular with consumers than Cooper tires, Buchanan wouldn’t bat an eye. He would rightly and logically conclude that Goodyear is producing a higher quality product at a lower price, and that the market has succeeded. But because it is not just the Lawton Goodyear plant that is producing more tires (producing about 2,000 tires a day) but also China producing more tires, Buchanan is crying foul, and throwing the concept of the free market under the bus. 2,100 men and women are out of work in Georgia, would it really help those people pay their mortgage if their job was replaced by men in Oklahoma rather than China?

Buchanan then looks at how the Chinese are able to produce a lower cost product; pointing out that workers are willing to work for much less in China, a result of the lack of labor unions, and government intervention in labor unions, since the plant he mentioned, in fact all tire plants in the United States, with the exception of the Goodyear Tire plant in Lawton, Oklahoma are union plants (though Buchanan fails to go into that), that the Chinese government does not meddle in the market by way of health and safety regulations, civil rights laws, and perhaps most damning, environmental regulations. But the problem here is not China, it is us, or more precisely our governments. To fix this the government should get out of the way and let the market operate, lift the crippling environmental regulations, and stop protecting labor unions.

But another factor is the Chinese Government, they do in fact, as Buchanan mentioned, manipulate their currency to benefit exporters and hurt importers, though this is also an example of government meddling in the market, the solution is not to have more government meddling, but for the United States to eliminate the Federal Reserve. It is quite easy for a government to manipulate its currency in regards to another fiat currency, it would be quite another thing however for China to attempt to manipulate its currency in relation to Gold, it would end in disaster for them, if they were foolish enough to try.

Buchanan goes on to blast Cooper Tires for moving plants to China. But why? does he consider Toyota as a traitor to Japan for building plants in the U.S.? (no one likes a traitor even if the traitor defects to his own side.) No, he doesn’t, It is the nature of men to act in a way that best serves their interests. Instead of spinning my own clothing or growing my own food, I turn to a cheaper alternative, the grocery store, and the mall. Labor is no different, or does Buchanan expect us to not hire the cheapest bid to cut our grass? Why shouldn’t Cooper move to China if they can get a better deal?

“ Welcome to 21st century America, where globalism has replaced patriotism as the civil religion of our corporate elites.”

But this is to confuse patriotism with nationalism. Patriotism is only the desire a man has for his country, his brethren, and himself to be free. Free from taxes, from extortion, crime, and perhaps most accurately, to be left alone. It is nationalism that insists that all consumer goods be made in his home country, that his government be powerful, that his government exert her will over other governments and people far and wide.

Yet even still I don’t know of any religion that our corporate elites hold, I can not even address this point except to say that all men, from the smallest child, to the most powerful corporate elite, act in his own self interest and in a way which, in his judgement will most benefit him.

Buchanan goes on to illustrate a lack of understanding of self sufficiency independence,

“What has this meant to the republic that was once the most self sufficient and independent in all of history?”

Being independent does not mean that I built my own house and car, that I spun my own clothing or created my own electricity for lighting, or even that I cut my own grass. Rather it is a matter of being able to produce something, or give some service in trade so others will be willing to provide those goods and services to me. if I were not self sufficient, I would not be able to supply myself with these goods, either directly or through trade. The same model that I put forward for an individual also applies to the aggregate of American individuals, i.e. to the country.

We are still independent, but Buchanan has confused political independence with economic independence. Under Buchanan’s concept, consider how utterly non self sufficient a brain surgeon must be, Who can not operate perform brain surgery on himself, and since that is his only talent, he can not change the oil on his porsche, pilot his private jet, sew his thousand dollar suits, or cut firewood to heat his 10,000 square foot home!

Addressing the “trade deficit” is the next leg of Buchanan’s article. But again one has to question the premise. What exactly is a trade deficit, perhaps more importantly, what is a trade? A trade, as it should be obvious to any 10 year old boy trading baseball cards, is exchanging what one values less for what one values more. Tom values Jim’s Nolan Ryan card more than he values his own Greg Maddox and Barry Bonds card, while Jim values the Maddox card Barry Bond’s card more than his Nolan Ryan. The two boys agree to a trade. And through my magic of deception, I have made the trade deficit disappear!
But there is no deception. That is what a trade is. Consider another example. your own “trade deficit” with your local grocery store. If you have never sold anything to your grocery store, Buchanan would say you are running a trade deficit in the amount of dollars that you spend annually at the store. But how preposterous is this? Would you really be better off eating a $100 bill each week than trading it for nourishing food? Of course not. There is no trade deficit here. The fact is that the act of trading negates a trade deficit.

As Buchanan raises the question of dependence on China again, think about your own dependence on your grocery store... Are you dependent on your grocery? No, you trade with him, but you are not dependent. If he goes out of business, or stops carrying the type of tea you prefer, you go to another store. Its that simple.

Now Buchanan gains strength towards the end, saying that we should reciprocate, that since they have tariffs on our goods, we should put tariffs on their goods. But this is probably not the way to go.

The fact is that besides hurting producers of another country, it also hurts consumers of the home country. This, more than any other issue is what lead to the war between the states. As the Confederate Constitution was ratified March 11th 1861, creating a virtual free trade zone by article one section eight of the new Constitution, in the north shortly before the Morrill tariff was passed, putting a tax of 47% on goods entering in the remaining United States. Naturally the monied elite could not stand to see a tariff of such magnitude put on them while the south would have a bare 10% tariff on goods entering the newly formed republic, and papers across the North changed their tune and called for blood.

Likewise WWI had at its root trade. and Woodrow Wilson admitted that the war was fought to prevent Germany from gaining economic supremacy.

It is admirable that Buchanan is such an outspoken opponent of unnecessary wars, yet it is sad he doesn’t realize that tariffs, and trade wars, are the leading cause of wars.

It does not help our case for China to remove its trade restrictions when we put our own on them. And the result, if we do so, is that the American consumer is the one who gets hurt.

Lastly I’ll address Buchanan’s view on taxes where he says, “ As they rebate value-added taxes on exports to us, and impose a value-added tax on our exports to them, let us reciprocate. Impose a border tax equal to a VAT on all their goods entering the United States, and use the hundreds of billions to cut corporate taxes on all manufacturing done here in the United States.”

Apparently Buchanan is not for cutting taxes, but transferring taxes from one group to another. He is right that corporate taxes should be cut, because they are passed on to the consumer, but does he fail to realize that taxes on foreign goods are also passed along to the consumer?

Questioning Hoppe's Premises

2009-10-02T09:58:00.003-04:00

The last argument presented against Hoppe's argument about democracy takes the form of assuming Hoppe's premises and demonstrating that they still don't necessarily lead to his conclusion, because even if we assume that the monarch does have a low time preference, this still doesn't prove that their treatment of their subjects will necessarily be more reserved or benevolent. A low time preference ruler is still a ruler, and them having a low time preference merely means that they will seek to maximize their inputs that they reap from the productivity of their subjects in the long-term - it's to treat the subject and the state as an investment.

But the problem with Hoppe's argument runs deeper than this, to the core of some of his assumptions. Does it really follow that just because something is an individual's "private" property, they will necessarily treat it better? I understand the typical use of tragedy of the commons by economists to argue for something along these lines by portraying more common ownership as leading to over-use of resources. But there is nothing about "private" ownership that inherently tends towards the opposite, especially if a "private" owner can externalize their costs. Why couldn't an individual owner "use and abuse" to a fault as well? They very well could.

Hoppe seems to assume that contemporary democracies actually are a commons, and in this sense he is buying into the democratic myth in his own attempt to argue against it. But let's be clear about this: even democratic states are, in some sense, still "private" institutions, they just have somewhat of a more inclusive membership than monarchies. They are still "private" oligarchies relative to the general population. Instead of having a single family or individual that owns the state, the state is effectively owned by a number of different families and a small oligarchy, who are more or less allied with and function on the behalf of pockets of "private" investors in "the market". It's almost as if the "democratic" state is a corporation, with a board of managers representing investors.

The historical reality of monarchies also flies in the face of Hoppe's premises. There are endless examples of monarchs being expansionist and using their power in extreme ways without any meaningful checks. Hoppe's unspoken assumption is that the monarch will be knowledgable about economics or a wise investor. But just because there is a "private" owner of the state does not necessitate that they will have a low time preference. This is particularly true considering the factor of inheritance. An inheritor can't even claim to have "earned" what they own in any meaningful sense, and hence in fact do not tend to treat it as if it was something that they worked for. It's theirs to "use and abuse" regardless.

There is a wiff of the "homo economicus" in this notion of monarch-as-wise-investor. People do not function solely on the basis of economic incentives. If someone is determined enough to pursue a given goal, they will try to pursue it regardless of how unwise it might be from a purely economic standpoint. In turn, if a king is determined enough to exercise power, they will excersize power even if it isn't the best course of action from the standpoint of being an investor in the state. Kings are not economic calculation automatons that are always working hard to maximize capital values. Just like any other ruler, the internal institutional incentives are for the perpetuation of the institution itself and the maximization of power.

Hoppe greatly underestimates the particular dangers of unilateral power. He essentially assumes that unilateral power is preferable to multilateral power because the unilateral decision-maker doesn't have to have their alleged economically-minded meanderings distracted from by other agents. But, if anything, this is a peculiar danger in monarchies: that the monarch has little to no multilateral checks on their power, and can therefore excersize it more easily and directly. This is the counter-point or downside to monarchy that isn't taken into account at all by his analysis. While a democracy at least tries (and, of course, fails) to separate powers so that a single individual or party cannot have all of it concentrated in them, monarchy doesn't even function on the pretense of trying.

Monarchy is, in fact, the most centralized form of government in this sense. It is only the most "small" form of government in the sense of its membership, while this exact same "smallness" is precisely where its power lies in terms of being densely concentrated in a certain spot. While democracy attempts to internally mimick decentralization, monarchy most blatantly places "ultimate decision-making power" in the hands of a single individual. It really shouldn't be too hard to see what might be particularly dangerous about a single individual having "ultimate decision-making power", yet Hoppe apparently thinks that it is a "lesser evil" than a system that attempts to place barriers to unilateral decision-making!

Critiqueing Hoppe's Monarchy-As-Lesser-Evil Argument From Another Angle

2009-10-01T03:32:00.008-04:00

Most market anarchists have mostly likely heard of Hans Hoppe's argument that monarchy is preferable to democracy because a "private" owner of the state has an incentive to preserve the "capital value" of the state, and will therefore allegedly be more restrained in their oppression of their subjects. Not long ago, Roderick Long brought up an interesting parallel to Hoppe's argument in the context of chattel slavery, and used it as a point against Hoppe's argument. In a nutshell, Hoppe's argument mirrors a paternalistic argument for chattel slavery, I.E. that a "private" slavemaster has an incentive to take care of their slave so that they are productive. All based on the general theory of time preference.

Let's think more deeply about this premise via a parasite metaphor. What is the interest of a parasite? To reap as much from their host as possible. However, the relationship between a parasite and its host has complications: if the parasite kills its host, it no longer has a source and dies if it doesn't find a new one. Hence, it is actually in the interest of the parasite to maintain a certain balance in which they are able to perpetually live off of the host without killing it. It against the long-term interest of the parasite to reap too much too quickly.

I maintain that this is analagous to both the "private slavery" and "private monarchy" questions. In the long-term, a conservative policy in which the subject is kept at a sufficient level of health necessary to continue being able to milk the most productivity from them is the most efficient and sustainable way to rule them. So what Hoppe ends up proving is not necessarily that a monarchy is inherently less exploitative than a democracy, but that a monarchy is actually the most efficient and sustainable form of rulership (which isn't a good thing if you want to oppose rulership). From the standpoint of the subject, they are only "taken care of" as a pretext to them providing productivity that will be seized from them in the future.

Stephan Molyneux, in one of his more interesting positions, once made a similar line of argument about minarchist capitalism (I don't recall exactly which podcast or video it is from). The idea is that the relative non-intervention of small/minarchist governments entails a period of productivity, that is generally a pretext to a later period of growth in government in which that productivity is seized to provide the resources necessary to maintain a large military-industrial-complex and welfare-state (it's interesting to note that in a strange roundabout way, Molyneux is actually fairly closely paralleling Marx here).

The common thread that runs through all of these examples is that a low time preference and conservative approach presents the conditions upon which to sustainably and efficiently milk the most out of the victims. This is actually a "smart" strategy for parasites/slavemasters/rulers, not something to hold up as a pragmatic lesser evil! The subject is only given more lenience earlier on so that it can be steadily taken away from them as time goes by and so that they function as a reliable source of input for the ruling individual or group. It does not prove as an apriori law of praxeology that a "private" and conservative form of domination is inherently more tolerable or less objectionable.

It should be noted that I am accepting Hoppe's own economic assumptions (namely, time preference) to refute the conclusion that he draws from them. Let's concede Hoppe's contention that the "private" owner of the state has an incentive towards a low time preference. The proper response is that what follows, by the very logic of time preference, is that they have a more vested personal interest in preserving the state, precisely because it is their property. And this doesn't really mean the well being of the subjects of the state, but the stability of the state itself. In a sense, Hoppe's theory refutes itself, since it's the "capital value" of the state that the owner is primarily interested in.

The notion that "private" forms of control are inherently a "lesser evil", or even a non-issue entirely, does not logically follow from accepting the general economic theory of time preference. If anything, Hoppe is abusing a valid economic conceptual tool to legitimize an ideological presupposition, out of a zeal to oppose democracy. Even if we grant him the benefit of the doubt and don't claim that he intends to legitimize monarchy (which isn't that much of a stretch given the context of his statements), the function of Hoppe's argument is a misleading pragmatic-propertarian argument in favor of monarchy. But it proves no such thing. If it proves that monarchy is preferable in any sense at all, it proves that it is preferable only from the standpoint of the monarch, who personally reaps the benefits of a thrifty investment strategy in the state.

Why I'm Not A Voluntaryist

2009-09-30T04:25:00.004-04:00

(This is commentary of mine taken from Mike Gogulsk's recent post at NoState.com, but also more generally targeted towards his move towards a version of "anarchism without adjectives" and his post on "why I'm not a voluntaryist", which I think completely misses what the problem with "voluntaryism" is).

Part of the problem with the relativist “can’t we all just put aside philophical differences and unite against the state” meme is that it seems to reduce to fake solidarity. It is usually predicated on the ancap’s bargaining power, or to put the matter more directly, on the assumption that it’s the ancap’s property framework in which the “pluralism” towards the socialist is supposed to be manifested.

Another issue is that saying that we should unite against the common enemy may very well be misleading, in that the qualitative analysis of what that common enemy is may very well be quite different. How can people unite against “the state” when they don’t exactly agree on what “the state” is? If I think that your property norms logically entail, by consequence, the sufficient conditions for a “state”, then pluralistic “anti-statism” between us is illusory.

To take the matter even deeper, whether or not anti-statism is fundamental is in question. For those leftists with very “thick” inclinations, it isn’t. The goal being sought isn’t merely negating “the state” (and only in the fairly narrow sense of the modern democratic nation-state to boot), it’s the movement towards a more just social order in general, of which anti-statism is only one conclusion that is part of a bigger picture. Simply because someone nominally opposes the state doesn’t necessarily mean that we ultimately have compatible goals in the long-run; they could be in favor of virtually everything that one objects to. Sacrificing all of one’s values at the altar of anti-statism is a problem with most of libertarianism.

I used to be of an “anarchist without adjectives” mindset (and, keep in mind, the open-ended interpretation of an w/o adj. being promoted is not what was intended by the initial an w/o adj.es), in which I essentially was apathetic towards inter-libertarian conflict and concluded that the conflict was irrelevant. The problem, in retrospect, is that this was a simplistic reaction in which I was valueing conflict resolution for its own sake, and as a sort of rationalization for the intellectual laziness involved in not deeply thinking through the philosophical conflicts inside of libertarianism.

I came to the realization that if you put aside essentially all of your values simply because of a nominally shared opposition to a single institution, and that if you form a completely open-ended broad coalition of self-proclaimed “anti-statists”, what you end up with is an unstable hodge-podge of people with completely different social goals that will inherently fragment as it plays out. Not only that, it conceptually devolves into absurdity, with things like monarchy and nationalism being snuck into anti-authoritarian movements on the grounds of an illusory “pluralism”. This attitude opens itself up to “entryism”.

What this kind of “voluntaryism” ends up doing is stretching the meaning of freedom to the point of absurdity out of its desire to be all-inclusive. Everything about “the state” that one may have initially set out to oppose can be repacked in a new, relativized framework, and libertarianism ends up looking like a shallow and hypocritical doctrine to the extent that it does this. And it often entails a strange line drawn in which anti-statism and non-aggression is treated as an absolute categorical imperative, while beyond this dividing line all questions of value are left to relativity. I’ve never seen a libertarian sensibly rationalize this line.

There are real conceptual and practical tensions involved here that I don’t think can be simply swept under the rug in the name of “pluralism”. Problems aren’t solved by ignoring them. There is a fundamental structural level of analysis that most libertarians, as well as the open-ended interpretation of anarchism without adjectives, does not take into account. If you think that a vague commitment to opposing the modern democratic nation-state is sufficient to produce a free and flourishing society, you’re wrong.

Democracy: Everywhere or Nowhere?

2009-09-28T07:27:00.009-04:00

I recently engaged in a discussion in which someone favored the premise that democracy is inescapable, that it is the default of all societies because everyone allegedly "consents" to the social order by virtue of participating in it to any extent whatsoever. My premise (which is part of a paradoxical formula: "democracy is tyranny, democracy is impossible, democracy is liberty") is the exact opposite of this: that democracy is either impossible or illusory, that there has never been such thing as a democracy in the literal sense of the term, because all forms of government in history have been either defacto oligarchies or monarchies.

The only sense in which I can agree that "the people" inherently are reflected in the social order is only in the most superfluous sense: that popular ideas tend to dominate the psyche of the multitude, and most people asquiesce to the power structures. This is all that I get out of Etienne La Boetie's piece on "Voluntary Servitude" - it does *not* mean that the population literally "consents" to all of the decisions that are made, it simply means that they asqueisce precisely because of their situation and options, and that there is an element of ideological legitimacy. It isn't explicitly "voluntary" - no more "voluntary" than having sex with someone under the threat of being evicted is. Yes, rulership isn't maintained by physical force alone - but that doesn't mean that whatever doesn't involve physical force is "voluntary" by default (a problematic assumption of what tends to pass for the "voluntaryist" philosophy these days).

It is quite clear to me that "the people" don't actually have decision-making power over the bulk of what goes on in the society or over how the social order is constituted. This has essentially always been done by a defacto oligarchy, or a multitude of oligarchies. Those that actually make the rules and enforce them constitute a fairly small group of people in comparison to the population as a whole. To imply that everyone "consents" is to essentially stretch the meaning of "consent" to meaninglessness by eliminating the social context in which decisions are made from one's analysis, I.E. the context of people's options being coercively limited and the pre-existing structures into which they are simply born.

Even behind the most inclusive and so-called "democratic" states, I see an oligarchy and a heirarchy. I see a multitude that is almost entirely alienated from the process in which the rules are determined and enforced, with the power to do so delegated to a political elite that acts on the behalf of an economic elite. If anything, it is precisely this notion that "democracy" exists that seems to be an ideological tool of legitimacy, by propogating the illusion that the social order is structured on the basis of the multitude's decisions. To be sure, the multitude do make decisions every day that effect the social order, but these are incredibly marginal decisions (like buying a loaf of bread). When it comes to the decisions that actually have a significant impact on everyone (I.E. the political realm), this power is in the hands of an exclusive elite.

Monarchy and Democracy

2009-09-05T14:12:00.004-04:00

There are some theories floating around in libertarian and anarchist circles, both new and not so new, that analize monarchy and democracy while ultimately maintaining that one is inherently superior to the other. For example, Hans Hoppe and the "Hoppeans" that follow in his footsteps argue that monarchy is inherently superior to democracy, while Noam Chomsky and the "Chomskyians" that follow in his footsteps argue that contemporary democracies are inherently more "accountable to the people" than any "private" alternative.

I think that the truth of the matter may be more subtle and complicated than the people in these various camps tend to make it out to be. On one hand, all of the formulations in question can be objected to for the same fundamental reasons, and hence the distinctions begin to break down or lose their relevancy. On the other hand, while one can likely find some legitimate senses in which one has an advantage over the other, one can just as easily find a counterpoint that immediately negates the premise that either of them are inherently superior.

In many ways, these questions and debates are not new; they can be traced back to the greeks, who played a signicant role in formulating the theories of governance in question. In the greeks we find classic democratic sentiments, monarchical sentiments, and various philosophers attempting to find a mean between them in the form of some sort of republic or an enlightened aristocracy. We even find primitive notions of communism. The fundamental debate has simply been elaborated upon as time has passed and experience has accumulated. Let us take a closer look at these theories and formulations of governance.

Democracy

The term democracy is generally understood to mean "rule by the people". In its most direct and literal form ("direct democracy" or "participatory democracy"), this means that everyone in society participates in the process of legislation, adjudication, and enforcement (although it is unclear if all of these branches of governance are supposed to be purely "democratic" rather than just the legislative branch or some combination of two branches while not with one of them). This may more specifically end up meaning "rule by the citizens", while those that are not officially citezens are not allowed to participate.

However, this more literal sense of democracy is not the sole form or manifestation that there is. There is also "representative democracy", which is the form of democracy that the west has come to generally adopt. In "representative democracy", the people or citizens do not directly participate in any of the processes of governance. Instead, there are indirect mechanisms through which they choose "representives" that participate in such processes and wield the governmental powers for them. In terms of the legislative branch, this group of representatives form into senates or "houses" that are constituted by a small portion of the population, and usually a single person in the case of the excecutive branch.

With this definition of democracy in mind, as well as the distinction between direct and representative forms of democracy, the classic questions and debates about democracy should become fairly obvious. Let's first take a look at direct democracy. One of the primary objections to direct democracy is that it seems inherently chaotic and inefficient. With so many people participating in the process, how is a decision ever to be made in the absence of unanimous consensus? Everyone would endlessly debate and nothing would get done; the government would just be frenzied debating society. Since unanimous consensus seems like a very high bar that would practically screech the process to a halt, some threshold of majoritarianism seems like the only way to get it to function.

Consequentially, "rule by the people" devolves into "rule by the majority" and is no longer a "pure" democracy. And majoritarianism, in turn, can be objected to on the grounds that it reduces politics to nothing but an ad populum fallacy that negates what sometimes might be a minority that is actually right. Furthermore, from a rights-based perspective, majoritarianism can override all individual rights as long as enough people agree on it. Hence, democracy appears to be arbitrary in this sense: it has no consistent or restraining principles, no "rule of law". It is simply a value-neutral process of decision-making that sanctions whatever is most popular, and is therefore subject to the problem of "the tyranny of the majority".

What's more, if we take an elitist perspective or simply have a rather pessemistic accessment of "human nature", the multitude tends to be stupid and emotional; the average person doesn't know what's best for themselves let alone anyone else. They have petty desires, are often swept up in fashionable crazes, and are naturally envious of those with more than them (insert Neitzschean or La Bonian talk of "the herd" here). The multitude are fundamentally "unfit to govern"; the art of governance requires one to have specially endowed wisdom or is a profession that one must have proper training and credentials to obtain.

For such reasons, philosophers are often tempted to either jump to the opposite extreme of monarchy or to propose a more limited form of democracy in which something along the lines of "constitutionalism" or a "democratic republic" is adopted. The idea is to preserve a limited sphere of freedom and decision-making power for "the people" while simultaneously restraining them from overstepping their "proper boundaries". Perhaps let them select their rulers, but their rulers must ultimately make the decisions for them from that point onwards. Let there be restrictions with respect to who is able to have political power in order to keep the multitude in check, and let the law be so written as to restrain "the republic" from devolving into a monarchy or encroaching too much upon "the people".

Here we have reached "representative democracy" and "constitutional republicanism". But is this really a solution? Perhaps representative democracy shouldn't even be called democracy, since it restricts political decision-making power to what constitutes a defacto oligarchy. It might not be quite as exclusive as a monarchy, but it ultimately places poliical power in the hands of a small few all the same. If the proponents of such a system wish to maintain the spirit and consent of "the people", such a model clearly fails. To claim that "the people" maintain their sovereignty while, as a matter of fact, an oligarchy rules over them, is surely a sick joke.

And what is to ensure that this oligarchy that rules in the name of "the people" will be constituted by people that are any better than the multitude? The only way to even attempt to solve this problem is to maintain an aristocratic sentiment in which only "philosopher kings" or those that happen to be specially endowed are allowed to hold political power; or at least to hope that such over-men will happen to be the ones that are selected for office. Such was the utopia of Plato: "the republic" will be ruled by brilliant philosophers who exclusively know what true virtue is and are uncorruptable by both military and economic influences.

But if we maintain a generally pessemistic accessment of the multitude in the first place, it makes no sense to suppose that they will choose those who are "best fit to govern", and if we consequentially severely restrict the people's decision-making power to select representatives, then we've essentially removed any last vestige of "democracy" from the system altogether. In effect, we're left with either a monarchy or an aristocratic oligarchy. And even under such a completely non-democratic system, why should we assume that those in power are going to be any better than the dull multitude? Are they not, afterall, human beings too? It seems that whatever generalizations we make about "human nature" must apply to humans vested with political power. Rulers are not deities.

The problem with representative democracy runs even deeper, at the very heart of the notion of "representation". As soon as someone delegates political power to a "representative", they cease to have any meaningful decision-making power from that point onwards. There is no cosmical gaurantee that their "representative" will enforce their wishes. Their "representative" could very well go against their wishes. It seems like saying that an individual, let alone an entire society of people, is "represented" by an individual or group that ultimately makes decisions on their behalf makes no sense. There is a sense in which only an individual can represent themselves, in that they quite literally have their own will that cannot be alienated from them.

The citizen is almost entirely alienated from the process of decision-making in so-called representative democracy. They only get to occasionally vote on who will be their master from an extremely limited scope of options that is predetermined for them. And does nominally selecting a new master mean that someone is really free? Most certainly not. A very obvious concern is that representative democracy reduces to a sort of game of musical chairs in which various members of an oligarchy function as demagogues to the masses as a means to power, only to do what is ultimately their own will or to serve the general purpose of the oligarchy to which they belong once political power is obtained. Once such power is obtained, the members of the oligarchy make decisions regaurdless of consent, and in this way representative democracy only has "the illusion of consent".

Politicians are definitely not "accountable to the people" in representative democracies. They might pander to the people and occasionally throw them some crumbs as an incentive to ideologically support them, but this doesn't mean that the people have any meaningful decision-making power over that which effects their own lives when it comes to the political process. They can occasionally be voted out of office, but this is a rare occurance and there are plenty of institutional barriers to such a thing happening; neither does it undo the damage done during the time that they are in office. Democracy is not a means of "accountability", it is a means of legitimization for political power and as what reduces to a feedback mechanism for an oligarchy.

The last hope for saving representative democracy lies in constitutionalism, I.E. a legal document that is supposed to restrain both the ruling oligarchy and the potential mob rule of the people. But the greatest experiment in constitutionalism, I.E. America, clearly demonstrates the failure of constitutionalism. Constitutions are a dead letter within a generation, if that. The courts that the oligarchy already controls will interpret the constitution to their benefit to the point of effectively nullifying its substance, original intention, and plain language. A piece of paper is not going to bind people with political power. It can be nullified by both democratic uprisings by the people and by the decisions that the oligarchy makes over the course of the political process.

What's more, constitutions do not even qualify as legitimate contracts by the basic standards of a what constitutes a contract. In normal contracts, noone in their right mind would accept the enforcement of a contract onto people that never signed it. The entire society never signed the constitution, only a handfull of men in a room did, men that just so happened to be either part of or closely linked with the ruling class. There is also a problem with the idea of a perpetual or permanent contract. Not only did not everyone that the constitution was enforced upon not sign it, but everyone that did sign it and everyone existing during the time that it was signed is now dead. It makes little sense to suppose that a document that was signed hundreds of years ago applies as absolute law indefinitely into the future.

One way to try to get around this issue is to propose that constitutions be changed or redrafted through constitutional conventions over and over again. But that in itself would seem to reduce right back to direct democracy if everyone involved participated in the process, and there still would be the lingering question of how it is to be enforced onto the entire society in the absence of unanimous consent. If the purpose of a constitution is, at least partially, as a constraint on absolute democracy, then it makes no sense to make the process of developing constitutions democratic; it would cease to meaningfully be a "rule of law" if it can be changed on a whim. And drafting a new form of government over and over again seems rather inefficient. It seems that written constitutions do very little to determine how a government is constituted; how they are constituted will depend on whatever processes occur and whoever happens to be in power.

Democracy appears to be fairly torn to shreds before us. But does it follow from any of this that what is considered to be the opposite of democracy, I.E. monarchy, is a preferable alternative? I most emphatically insist: No, No, No!

Monarchy

The term monarchy quite literally means "rule by one". In this sense, monarchy is the most "private" form of government in the sense of its extreme exclusivity. Ultimate decision-making power is held by a single individual or family, and in this sense monarchy represents the most dense concentration of political power possible. On a small scale, this is essentially what most tribal systems (other than the more egalitarian ones) are - the tribal chief is the defacto monarch of the tribe, and the tribe is more or less an extended family. On larger scales, it is constituted by "kingdoms" in which a single individual (a "king" or "queen") absolutely rules over an entire society. In the most unified form of monarchy, the king can simultaneously be both the political and religious leader of the society.

However, not all monarchies are "pure". One often finds that a king is in alliance with a landed oligarchy or with religious institutions. Sometimes monarchies have even had a smidgen of democracy added to them, such as a constitution or the coexistance of a parlaiment. But all monarchies tend to have the general supremacy of the monarch as a defining characteristic. Generally, monarchies are hereditary institutions in which a particular bloodline is associated with political power. Sometimes these bloodlines are overthrown by rival bloodlines or a particular bloodline is unable to adequately continue itself. Monarchies have a history of mixing bloodlines with foreign nations to continue themselves or maintain an aura of legitimacy.

To the extent that monarchies have traditionally been connected with religious institutions ("the union of church and state"), they have relied on notions such as "the divine right of kings" for their legitimacy. Of course, if one rejects the authority of the church to begin with or if one sees no particular reason why a particular bloodline should be favored by god any more than others, "the divine right of kings" immediately crumbles. In situations in which the union of church and state is so strong that the king is literally considered to be a deity themselves, an empirical investigation into the humanity of the king immediately crumbles their legitimacy. Kings are just flesh and blood human beings like everyone else.

More generally, monarchy tends to be defined by its hereditary aspect. Hereditary monarchy is essentially "rule by inheritance"; political power is simply inherited by being from the bloodline of the previous monarch. This offends democratic sensibilities because the people have no decision-making power in the process of selecting who has political power. But it also rubs up against aristocratic sentiments because an inherited position of power by no means implies a position of power that is held by someone with any particular merit or wisdom. Indeed, such a position of power is gained through sheer luck. The monarch could very well be a sluggard, an unvirtuous man, an unwise man. And their singlular position of power is all the more dangerous in the lack of merit. Why should an individual's mere bloodline constitute a measure of their worth? Let them demonstrate their intellect and worldlyness, then maybe the aristocrat will respect them.

But the monarch can be objected to from a more populist and societarian perspective in addition to considerations about merit. What makes them think that they are so special that only them alone should rule? Can't individuals potentially accomplish much more by forming into associations? Multiple people can potentially do greater things in concert. The monarch is likely to be horrible at making decisions all by themselves - they inherently need the help of professionals that actually have knowledge about various things (here enters the aristocracy). And what does a single individual in an ivory tower know about the world? He lives his life largely in alienation from the people. He doesn't know what their needs are, and he is a singular leech on the whole of society, gobbling up the resources of everyone only for his individual purposes. The commoner has no decision-making power over what affects their lives (here enters the call for democratic uprising).

Vesting so much power in a single person is dangerous, especially when the decisions of that single person can effect everyone else in society. No single individual deserves that much power. While democracy is at least theoretically predicated on the idea that the government should be the servant of the people, monarchy functions under no such pretense - the decree of so-and-so reigns, regaurdless of the input of anyone effected by it (save perhaps a handful of aristocratic advisors to the king). In terms of political power, monarchy is the most centralized and unilateral in the sense that the decision-making power is concentrated in the fewest possible people (theoretically one person or family). There is barely any semblance of a consensual process.

Some propose that monarchy is the best form of government precisely because it doesn't have to water itself down in any collective decision-making process, and in this sense it is "efficient". Yes, it is efficient - at ruling. But if one objects to being ruled in the first place, this hardly seems to be a talking point in favor of monarchy. It is the most sustainable form of government; democracies tend to be fleeting formulations that merely represent the change from one form of government to another, and in this sense democracy isn't even a form of government so much as a process of transition. And again, from an anti-rulership perspective, this isn't a talking point in monarchy's favor. A rigid, unadaptable government that rules with an iron fist isn't exactly a libertarian wet dream.

The largely economic arguments more recently presented by Hans Hoppe trying to make a case against democracy by comparatively touting the alleged virtues of monarchy seems misguided. Even if we largely take his premises for granted, we don't have to embrace the conclusion. Hoppe essentially argues, via time preferance theory, that the monarch has an incentive to preserve the "capital value" of the state precisely because the state is his "private property". But who cares about the "capital value" of the state - why would a libertarian want it to be preserved? This all seems to basically reduce to the notion that a "private" slave will be taken better care of by their master. That's just rank paternalism. There is no logical connection between the state being "privately" held by a single individual and their subjects being treated well. The entire thing is predicated on people being treated as property by virtue of being on the king's land.

There is no praxeological law of nature that makes it so that a king is inherently more lenient than a career politician, or that it is harder for a king to rule their subjects. If anything, it is easier for a king to rule their subjects in the sense that they do not even have to bother with the semblance of a political process, both internal and relational. And it seems like Hoppe is falling back on the fallacy of the homo economicus to sustain his point, I.E. by assuming that people make decisions based on economic incentives alone. But people don't make decisions based on economic incentives alone. A person that is strongly motivated by racism will discriminate regaurdless of the economic incentives against it; and likewise, a king that is strongly motivated to rule will rule regaurdless of the economic incentives against it.

It by no means inherently follows from the fact that the state is "privately" owned that it will be particularly restrained. "Ultimate decision-making power" is ultimate decision-making power, regaurdless of whether or not it's "private" or how many people wield that power. If anything, restricting such power to a single person merely removes multiliteral obstacles to directly excersizing it. Yes, perhaps a monarch is not as likely to develope a large welfare state since they don't even have to pretend to be "democratic", but welfare statism is hardly the be-all-end-all of the political problem. There are plenty of other projects that they can pursue in substitute of a welfare state - such as a nobility system, which is just a different kind of welfare state (an explicitly regressive one).

Ultimately, while kings do not have to pander to the people at large, they often do end up having to ally themselves with a landed oligarchy (and why a landed oligarchy is supposed to inherently be better than a modern welfare state is beyond me). They reinforce eachother - the king grants land titles to the duke of such and such, and the duke of such and such pledges loyalty to the king. This is the same kind of give-and-take that is involved in "democracy", only it is restricted to a smaller group. There is barely a semblance of a middle class other than areas *outside* of the king's reign (the middle classes formed out of independant cities and with the rise of democracies). Otherwise, there is essentially just a peasantry class, a landed oligarchy and the monarch.

As industrialization occurs, monarchies and the landed oligarchies often associated with them begin to crumble. They simple cannot handle the formation of meaningful middle classes, in which the rigid connection to the land is broken up by people's capacity to get their own piece of the pie and have greater access to the means of economically sustaining themselves independantly of any nobility. The intertia of history has clearly made monarchy archiac. They didn't dissapear simply because of some egalitarian conspiracy, or because democracy became popular as an ideology, but because it is a form of government that simply is not adapted for an industrial society with a middle class.

Conclusion

My suggestion is that both monarchy and democracy, defined as state systems, are (1) equally bad for the same fundamental reasons that any anti-statist would level against a state and (2) approximately equally bad in terms of the particular pros and cons of each. Monarchy is bad because its power is unilateral and concentrated in the fewest possible people - it is "limited government" in the conservative sense of political power being limited to the few and excersized over the many. Democracy is bad because it is ultimately an illusion that isn't that far from monarchy in reality - it is merely a process through which political power can be legitimized and transitioned, and even when it begins to come close to living up to its promise it ends up devolving into rank majoritarianism.

Ultimate Decision-making Power

2009-08-30T10:52:00.016-04:00

Francios Tremblay links to this article against anarcho-capitalism. I think that the article, while not perfect, makes a crucial point that solidifies something that I've been talking about recently (namely that if we do not object to the principle of absolute decision-making power derived from territorialism in general, then liberty is relativized to whatever a property owner allows and consequentially the "love it or leave it" problem persists). This is *not* a mere "anarcho-semantics" issue, it is a substantive one that strikes at the heart of how liberty and property are concieved of in relation to eachother.

The problem reduces to this: that anarcho-capitalism does not object to the principle of absolute/arbitrary authority over people that live in a given geographical area, it only objects to the means with which ownership over the geographical area is obtained. That is, it opposes the state only in the sense that it did not obtain ownership justly; if the geographical claim were obtained through homesteading or exchange, then the authority claim over those who live in the area would suddenly be treated as "legitimate". In effect, this means that everything about the state that anarcho-capitalists would otherwise object to can theoretically become legitimized using an anarcho-capitalist framework on the condition that the ownership claim is based on what is considered to be the right property norm.

Anarcho-capitalists will normally, and quite correctly, object to the "love it or leave it" argument for the state. But their grounds for objecting to "love it or leave it" is only based on the idea that it isn't the state's just property (and the implication of this is that it if *were* the state's just property, then the "love it or leave it" argument would suddenly be valid). What's more, they tend to neglect the failure of "love it or leave it" in any other context (such as that of an individual proprietor). From my perspective, the problem with "love it or leave it" does not merely reduce to the state not having a rightful claim to ownership, but it is problematic for the even more fundamental reason that arbitrary claims of absolute authority over others derived from territory are not justified in general. The problem with authority cannot simply be reduced to a question of who owns what.

Even if someone "homesteaded" or voluntarily traded for a given plot of land, this doesn't give them legitimate absolute authority to control the lives of whoever happens to occupy the area. This, to me, is the glaring contradiction in anarcho-capitalist political theory: that it objects to the state's absolute authority claim over those that occupy the territory while not objecting to any other claim of absolute authority over those that occupy a given territory. Or, to put the matter more bluntly, it objects to the state while simultaneously rationalizing the exact same thing as the state ("ultimate decision-making power" over others based on territory) on absolutist propertarian grounds. Indeed, one could make a justification for a state using absolutist propertarian arguments (which, applied to larger scales, can go something like this: "city X was voluntarily sold to person Y, therefore person Y has ultimate decision-making power over everyone in the city").

The issue, then, reduces to the pressing question of "ultimate decision-making power" in general, not the question of *who* should have "ultimate decision-making power". In relativizing and subordinating liberty to property, hardline anarcho-capitalism ends up looking like a rather hollow creed in the sense that it does not fundamentally object to authoritarianism. Rather, by implication of its own norms, whether intended or not, it ends up justifying authoritarianism on the grounds that it occurs on so-and-so's property and that it's the proprietor's "ultimate decision-making power". This blurs the line between liberty and authority by making it dependant on ownership - if you don't have ownership, you more or less are stuck submitting to the authority of those with ownership, and if you do have ownership, everyone else's liberty ends where your property lines begin.

If this is what the heart of the social anarchist critique of anarcho-capitalism is, then I must confess: I agree with the social anarchists on this general point (although when things get more specific, some notable disagreements emerge). Granted, some anarcho-capitalists tweak their theories to avoid such an authoritarian implication (and I would therefore want to avoid strawmanning at least to that extent), but this should be the logical implication of absolutist propertarianism and an indication of what happens when one fetishizes property and contracts to the point of absurdity and self-contradiction. And in the context of such an implication, combining absolutist propertarianism with anarchism is indeed a gross contradiction in terms and anarcho-capitalism deserves the derision that it normally gets from traditional anarchists.

On Libertarianism and Anarchism

2009-08-24T15:54:00.002-04:00

I'd like expand on some of my thoughts about libertarianism from my last post commenting on Stephan Kinsella's article defining libertarianism, and reiterate my general viewpoint about libertarianism and anarchism.

In terms of the relationship between libertarianism and anarchism, my view is actually rather subtle. I think that there are libertarians that are not anarchists (such as the various varieties of minarchy), anarchists that are not libertarians (such as certain amoral egoists and perhaps certain elements within social anarchism), and libertarian anarchists. This analysis makes sense if we use basic and minimalistic definitions for both libertarianism and anarchism: if by "anarchism" we simply mean any ideology that rejects the legitimacy of the state and by "libertarianism" we refer to a specific conception of justice (or a specific set of conceptions of justice that have a similar root).

Of course, things get even more complicated once we dig deeper into the multiple percieved meanings of both libertarianism and anarchism. Some define anarchism not as merely being a rejection of the state, but in terms of opposition to heirarchy or as a more holistic anti-authoritarianism. And some define libertarianism in a way that is ethically value-neutral, even in terms of conceptions of justice. There are also numerous specific strands of libertarianism that differ over the details of the conception of justice (such as geolibertarianism, paleo-libertarianism, left-libertarianism, libertarian socialism, etc.). While libertarianism may be somewhat less pluralistic than anarchism, it is also fragmented into numerous sub-categories.

Flavors and definitions of anarchism encompass a wide range of social, economic and political positions (anarcho-capitalism, anarcho-communism, anarcho-syndicalism, anarcho-primitivism, mutualism, anarcha-feminism, green anarchism, christian anarchism, anarcho-pacifism, etc.). If we define anarchism in the narrow sense of opposition to the state, then all of these ideologies potentially pass for forms of anarchism with a different emphasis and different social and economic positions. Using a narrow definition of anarchism, these are all secondary or "unessential" characteristics; a mere matter of "personal preferance".

However, if we use a broader definition of anarchism or if we define the state in a specific way, some of them are ruled out as constituting defacto forms of statism or as insufficiently anarchist in spite of their anti-statism. Even if we do define anarchism in terms of anti-statism, there are multiple viewpoints on precisely what the state is and what the preconditions for state formation are. For example, some would rule out anarcho-capitalism on the grounds that it either devolves into a defacto form of statism due to its property norms or it doesn't oppose authoritarianism or heirarchy and is consequentially insufficient to qualify as anarchism. On the other hand, some would rule out the models of social anarchists in the grounds that it reduces to defacto democracies.

On one hand, I think that the conflict among the different schools of self-styled anarchism sometimes involves a semantical wall in which people have more compatible positions than they think they do but are unable to see it due to their word-association tendencies. But, on the other hand, I don't think that the issue can be completely reduced to semantics and "personal preferance" in that certain normative positions are undeniably irreconcilable and some normative positions either devolve into some form of statism (based on a certain understanding of what states are) or are insufficient to qualify as fully supporting freedom given a more holistic anti-authoritarian definition of anarchism, in spite of them being nominally anti-statist.

From a more holistic perspective, it is possible for a society to not have a state in the modern or common sense of a state, while not being free (or maybe even being less free than certain societies that do have "states"). It could be said that political freedom is only one type or definition of freedom, or that "the state" in a modern or common sense is only one blockade to freedom out of many. From this perspective, anti-statism is necessary but not sufficient to produce a free society. This could even possibly be argued from a certain libertarian perspective in which certain ethical norms that apply beyond anti-statism are a necessary condition for a society to be free. Indeed, libertarianism fits into this in the sense that it provides, by the very least, a particular view or set of views on ethics.

I sympathize most with libertarian anarchism for this reason: that it provides at least some sort of context for a stateless society. But I also object to a narrow sense of libertarianism that tends to be neutral towards authoritarianism in a way that I think undermines itself and ultimately could be said to provide a basis for conditions that reduce to a defacto form of statism (which it is supposed to be against in the first place). This is where how libertarianism is defined or concieved of in terms of one's broader social philosophy starts to become particularly important, because it may end up being incoherant if it does not give itself a strong foundation and oppose authoritarianism in a more general sense. If everything that libertarians claim to oppose can be snuck back in under the banner of a certain conception of libertarianism, then some reconceptualization is needed.

The Definition and Scope of Libertarianism

2009-08-22T11:30:00.003-04:00

Stephan Kinsella recently wrote a piece at mises.org that functions as a basic exposition of what he thinks libertarianism is by definition. I'd like to add some commentary and criticism in response to this article, because I think that it overlooks some fundamental issues and attempts to establish a definition for libertarianism that is too narrow in some ways. It seems like Kinsella is ultimately conflating a particular formulation of libertarianism with libertarianism as a whole.

Various formulations abound. It is said that libertarianism is about individual rights, property rights, the free market, capitalism, justice, or the nonaggression principle. Not just any of these will do, however. Capitalism and the free market describe the catallactic conditions that arise or are permitted in a libertarian society, but do not encompass other aspects of libertarianism. And individual rights, justice, and aggression collapse into property rights. As Murray Rothbard explained, individual rights are property rights. And justice is just giving someone his due, which depends on what his rights are.

There are two basic issues with this paragraph, which I've highlighted in italics.

The first issue is that it is not at all clear that "capitalism" (or at least, the particular norms that tend to be associated with "capitalism") inherently arises as the only economic system or forms of economic organization that can coherently be derived from libertarianism. Of course, this also depends on how "capitalism" is defined. If "capitalism" is merely being used to mean "whatever results from voluntary interaction", then there is no reason why the norms of libertaran socialism couldn't concievably arise as a particular manifestation of "capitalism" - which is confusing language. Presumably, these things (such as worker's cooperatives and mutual aid organizations) are technically "permitted" in a libertarian society.

However, the use of the term "capitalism" among many libertarians tends to conceal the implicit assumption that a certain specific set of modes of economic organization are inherent to it (such as the corporation, traditional wage labor, and so on). This is a conflation of voluntary interaction in general with a particular type of organization or interaction. What's more, various libertarians have put foreward a criticism of them on the grounds that their relative dominance is within the context of an already-existing non-libertarian social order or political system, and that there are certain reasons for postulating that people would have an incentive to choose alternatives to them in a libertarian social order.

The second issue is that it is not at all clear that all libertarians agree with Murray Rothbard that "all rights are property rights", or that this view is a necessary component of being a libertarian. Many libertarians with a neo-aristotilean temperment (and not just those with a left-libertarian temperment as well), for example, tend to have a view more along the lines that property rights are an entailment of a more general right of liberty. In this sense, liberty can be thought of as providing a context for property rights, and not the other way around. In fact, if we want to take the premise that liberty is defined by property rights quite literally, a reductio ad absurdum of immense proportions should immediately pop out at us: that one's liberty is entirely dependant on whatever the will of a land owner is and completely goes away as soon as one is on someone else's land.

In effect, this would mean that liberty is constrained by property and contracts, potentially to the point of being completely nullified (I.E. "you're on my land, therefore I can do whatever I want to you" or "you signed this contract, therefore you have to do whatever I tell you to do for the rest of your life"). This is precisely why liberty as a general principle is actually over and above property and contracts in a certain sense, and property and contracts are in fact not involiable. And, despite his insistance that all rights are property rights, Rothbard himself aknowledged this in the sense that he considered liberty inalienable (and, quite rightly, opposed all slavery contracts). This is basically an admission to a way in which all rights can be said to not be property rights in an alienable sense.

Kinsella goes on to remark about property in relation to aggression:

The nonaggression principle is also dependent on property rights, since what aggression is depends on what our (property) rights are. If you hit me, it is aggression because I have a property right in my body. If I take from you the apple you possess, this is trespass — aggression — only because you own the apple. One cannot identify an act of aggression without implicitly assigning a corresponding property right to the victim.

The basic premise highlighted in italics is important. This is where I think that things start to get especially murky. If the non-aggression principle is dependant on how one defines property rights to begin with, which seems true enough, then this opens a huge philosophical can of worms. This, at least descriptively, relativizes non-aggression. We bump into the problem that when an act of physical violence can be considered either aggression or defense will vary widely depending on (1) what basis we have for property and (2) consequentially, how property titles are allocated. And it is therefore not at all clear that (1) libertarians in general are the only group that can claim to consistently favor non-aggression and (2) that Kinsella's particular formulation of libertarianism is by definition the only one that can claim to consistently favor non-aggression.

If we don't accept Kinsella's particular formulation of libertarianism, we could concievably accuse it of condoning aggression. On the other hand and more generally speaking, if we assume a particular criteria for property ownership and if we assume a particular allocation of property titles, we could concievably accuse anyone that doesn't share our concept of property or anyone that doesn't agree with the particular allocation of property titles that we favor of inherently condoning aggression. And this is, in fact, what some libertarians end up doing: accusing anyone that doesn't share their property conventions (particularly, a non-proviso lockean conception of property) of condoning aggression by definition. It seems like this can be rather unfair; a conflation of one's property conventions with non-aggression and a conflation of all alternative property conventions with aggression.

As an additional note that may be worth considering, on the flip side of the matter, there is a sense in which would could say that property rights are dependant on the non-aggression principle, in that not aggressing against others is a norm with respect to the process of aquiring property. The very nature of trading and gift-giving is that of a non-aggressive process of action. One could therefore coherantly say that this works in both directions: there is a sense in which what constitutes aggression with respect to property is dependant on how property rights are defined to begin with, and there is a sense in which how property rights are defined to begin with is dependant on a question about aggression. This isn't as simple as it may initially appear to be.

Kinsella specifies what is meant by "property rights" a little more here:

Property rights specify which persons own — that is, have the right to control — various scarce resources in a given region or jurisdiction. Yet everyone and every political theory advance some theory of property. None of the various forms of socialism deny property rights; each version will specify an owner for every scarce resource. If the state nationalizes an industry, it is asserting ownership of these means of production. If the state taxes you, it is implicitly asserting ownership of the funds taken. If my land is transferred to a private developer by eminent domain statutes, the developer is now the owner. If the law allows a recipient of racial discrimination to sue his employer for a sum of money, he is the owner of the money.

Protection of and respect for property rights is thus not unique to libertarianism. What is distinctive about libertarianism is its particular property assignment rules: its view concerning who is the owner of each contestable resource, and how to determine this.

The parts that I highlighted in italics are of particular interest to me. Kinsella makes a valid point in that, if by "property rights" we generally mean the question of who controls what (at a minimum), then all political theories have some conception of property rights, even if they do not explicitly use the term "property" or "property rights". In this sense, it doesn't make sense to say that anyone is "against property" or "pro-property" in any absolute manner because this is rather vague. We should always keep in mind that we are dealing with specific conceptions of property and property rights.

But where I begin to disagree with Kinsella is that, in my understanding, it is not all the case that there is a single set of libertarian "property assignment rules", other than a commitment to non-aggression that can sometimes be rather vague. Non-proviso lockeans, proviso lockeans, geoists and mutualists are all different types of libertarians, whether Kinsella wants to admit this or not. It is not the case that one has to be a non-proviso lockean to be a libertarian, there is no absolute consensus among libertarians about property and even non-proviso lockeans don't completely agree with eachother with respect to what their property theory entails or is compatible with (for example, Roderick Long seems to think that non-proviso lockeanism can potentially be compatibalized with geoism and mutualism, while others take a much more rigid line about the matter).

Kinsella proceeds to talk about "self-ownership":

A system of property rights assigns a particular owner to every scarce resource. These resources obviously include natural resources such as land, fruits of trees, and so on. Objects found in nature are not the only scarce resources, however. Each human actor has, controls, and is identified and associated with a unique human body, which is also a scarce resource. Both human bodies and nonhuman, scarce resources are desired for use as means by actors in the pursuit of various goals.

Accordingly, any political theory or system must assign ownership rights in human bodies as well as in external things. Let us consider first the libertarian property assignment rules with respect to human bodies, and the corresponding notion of aggression as it pertains to bodies. Libertarians often vigorously assert the "nonaggression principle." As Ayn Rand said, "So long as men desire to live together, no man may initiate — do you hear me? No man may start — the use of physical force against others."

I highlighted the statement about any political theory having to assign ownership rights in bodies as well as in external things because I think part of the problem is that libertarians often do not make it clear that their notion of "self-ownership" does not function exactly the same as property rights in external objects. That is, when we think of ownership over external objects, we normally think of them as exchangable (or givable) commodities. However, this is not the same sense of "ownership" that most libertarians mean by "self-ownership" in that it is not concieving of one's body as an exchangable commodity, it is inalienable. It is a claim of autonomy or individual sovereignty. The problem with murdering and assaulting people need not be concieved of in a propertarian manner or using propertarian language.

Kinsella goes on to talk about the relation between "self-ownership" and non-aggression.

In other words, libertarians maintain that the only way to violate rights is by initiating force — that is, by committing aggression. (Libertarianism also holds that, while the initiation of force against another person's body is impermissible, force used in response to aggression — such as defensive, restitutive, or retaliatory/punitive force — is justified.)

Now in the case of the body, it is clear what aggression is: invading the borders of someone's body, commonly called battery, or, more generally, using the body of another without his or her consent. The very notion of interpersonal aggression presupposes property rights in bodies — more particularly, that each person is, at least prima facie, the owner of his own body.

The highlighted qualifier about defense and retaliation is not as cut and dry as it may initially seem. Libertarians have all sorts of internal disputes about precisely what constitutes defense, and most libertarians have a different view on "retaliation" than ARI Objectivists do. ARI Objectivists tend to justify many wars on the grounds of "retaliation" that most libertarians would object to as initiations of force. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that pacifists don't qualify as libertarians. If a commitment to the non-initiation of force is a prequisite to being a libertarian, then pacifists not only qualify as libertarians, they exceed the qualification. I therefore think it makes sense to maintain that pacifists are actually defacto libertarians.

Libertarians, even those who are not absolute pacifists, also have internal disputes about violent punishment. Some libertarians take a "maximalist position" in which physical violence is supposed to be justified in response to minor property transgressions, some libertarians take a "proportionality" position in which "maximalism" is ruled out as an unproportionate response to the initial crime, and some libertarians categorically reject all violent punishment as an inherent violation of the non-aggression principle. Libertarians are also split on the death penalty. Rothbard restricted the death penalty to cases of murder, but some libertarians support either a broader death penalty or no death penalty at all.

Considerations like this demonstrate that libertarianism cannot be so easily simplified and that the non-aggression principle cannot merely be stated as some sort of single-line maxim without begging a whole host of important questions with respect to how aggression is defined and the context that the non-aggression principle can be said to have. Libertarians don't even all agree with eachother on whether or not the non-aggression principle genuinely can be said to have axoimatic status (indeed, while Kinsella quotes Rand, she did not consider it to be a contextless axoim) and there are endless disagreements about what its foundations and implications are.

The article continues with an explaination trying to distinguish libertarians from others:

The libertarian says that each person is the full owner of his body: he has the right to control his body, to decide whether or not he ingests narcotics, joins an army, and so on. Those various nonlibertarians who endorse any such state prohibitions, however, necessarily maintain that the state, or society, is at least a partial owner of the body of those subject to such laws — or even a complete owner in the case of conscriptees or nonaggressor "criminals" incarcerated for life. Libertarians believe in self-ownership. Nonlibertarians — statists — of all stripes advocate some form of slavery.

There are two main issues with the implication of the part in italics. The first issue is that it seems unfair and oversimplistic to claim that minarchists are not libertarians. The very person who the site that this article was written for is named after was a minarchist: is Kinsella going to claim that Mises was not a libertarian? While I'm a libertarian anarchist myself, as a matter of categorization I fully grant minarchists the status of "libertarian". Generally, what distinguishes minarchists from libertarian anarchists is a matter of what one thinks the logical implications of libertarianism are. Minarchists tend to believe that the state is necessary to enforce the non-aggression principle. They may be wrong about this and there may be an internal contradiction within minarchism in which the state itself is dependant on aggression, but this doesn't make them non-libertarians by definition. The libertarian vs. statist dichotomy seems oversimplified.

The second issue is that, even among self-proclaimed libertarian anarchists, there is no uniform opposition to slavery to be found. In fact, Walter Block and numerous individuals following in his footsteps or who take a similar view, think that slavery contracts can potentially be legitimate if they are initially voluntarily entered into. Consequentially, there have been "voluntary slavery" debates within libertarian discourse. One side maintains that such cases of slavery cannot be objected to because it's an initially "voluntary contract", while another side generally upholds the notion of inalienability of rights and considers such a contract to inherently be null and void - or at least, opt-outable at any time. There are also disputes over debt peonage or involuntary-servitude-as-punishment as a form of "voluntary slavery".

Moving on to property in external things, Kinsella states:

Libertarians apply similar reasoning in the case of other scarce resources — namely, external objects in the world that, unlike bodies, were at one point unowned. In the case of bodies, the idea of aggression being impermissible immediately implies self-ownership. In the case of external objects, however, we must identify who the owner is before we can determine what constitutes aggression.

I'm going to try to make a clarification with respect to the part in italics in the sense that I find it to be necessary but not sufficient. I've expressed this viewpoint before. The problem is that what constitutes aggression is not merely dependant on the question of "who is the owner?", it is also dependant on the question of "even assuming the legitimacy of a given person's ownership, what type of scope of decision-making power does ownership legitimately allow for?". And to this question, my answer is that the decision-making power is actually non-absolute precisely because it comes into conflict with people's right to life and liberty if it is treated as absolute. For example, if I'm the legitimate owner of my home, this doesn't mean that I can do whatever I want to whoever is in my home at a given time; I can't just assault and murder people and then appeal to the fact that it's my home and say "love it or leave it". In this sense, what constitutes aggression is a much broader issue than property in external things.

Kinsella goes on to get into the neo-lockean conception of ownership:

Unlike human bodies, however, external objects are not parts of one's identity, are not directly controlled by one's will, and — significantly — they are initially unowned. Here, the libertarian realizes that the relevant objective link is appropriation — the transformation or embordering of a previously unowned resource, Lockean homesteading, the first use or possession of the thing.[19] Under this approach, the first (prior) user of a previously unowned thing has a prima facie better claim than a second (later) claimant, solely by virtue of his being earlier.

I must repeat that it is not at all fair for Kinsella to be defining non-proviso lockeanism as a rigid requirement for one to be a libertarian. Geolibertarians and proviso lockeans are not non-libertarians for not accepting the anarcho-capitalist hardline on land property - unless Kinsella wishes to denounce sacred cows such as Albert Jay Nock and Frank Chodorov for the sin of geoism. I'd also like to point out that the question of "original appropriation", at least in the context of modern industrial areas, has little to no relevance in the sense that we're mostly dealing with property that has long since already been originally appropriated, and it largely reduces to a question of title-transfer of already-owned property and the issue of abandonment. The question of "homesteading" in the sense of original appropriation has no relevance with respect to the question of who owns the roads, the houses, the factories, the parks, the schools, city hall, and so on.

Furthermore, even if we agree with the general notion of original appropriation, we do not necessarily have to agree that the original appropriator legitimately maintains ownership forever and ever from that point onwards (or until they die). Hence the notion of abandonment (and abandonment is not based on the mere "intent" to abandon), which is really what the "occupancy and use" qualification that some people have for property reduces to: a more stringent notion of abandonment than that which is commonly held by anarcho-capitalists and non-proviso lockeans. And both the notion of "occupancy and use" and property "returning to the commons" is not a quantative timeline that functions as some sort of arbitrary regulation, it is a qualatative matter.

Kinsella goes into more depth about the property issue:

Why is appropriation the relevant link for determination of ownership? First, keep in mind that the question with respect to such scarce resources is: who is the resource's owner? Recall that ownership is the right to control, use, or possess, while possession is actual control — "the factual authority that a person exercises over a corporeal thing." The question is not who has physical possession; it is who has ownership.

Thus, asking who is the owner of a resource presupposes a distinction between ownership and possession — between the right to control, and actual control. And the answer has to take into account the nature of previously unowned things — namely, that they must at some point become owned by a first owner.

The answer must also take into account the presupposed goals of those seeking this answer: rules that permit conflict-free use of resources. For this reason, the answer cannot be whoever has the resource or whoever is able to take it is its owner. To hold such a view is to adopt a might-makes-right system, where ownership collapses into possession for want of a distinction. Such a system, far from avoiding conflict, makes conflict inevitable.

It appears obvious to me that Kinsella is conflating the "occupancy and use" qualification for property with a Max Stirner amoralist style position. The "occupancy and use" qualification for property is not the claim that "whatever I can take and can maintain is mine". If anything, it is the exact same thing as what Kinsella himself is trying to defend in a certain sense: that claims to ownership have to be traceable back to an objective criteria that demonstrates some sort of meaningful connection between the claimant and the property. The main difference is that the "occupancy and use" qualification is more open to the possibility that an "original appropriator" can become so disconnected from the property that they are claiming that their "ownership" become dubious. And a mere legal title to the property is not sufficient as an objective criteria connecting someone with the property; in fact, it can be completely arbitrary, and Rothbard himself actually went out of his way to make this point in "The Ethics of Liberty".

Instead of a might-makes-right approach, from the insights noted above it is obvious that ownership presupposes the prior-later distinction: whoever any given system specifies as the owner of a resource, he has a better claim than latecomers. If he does not, then he is not an owner, but merely the current user or possessor. If he is supposed an owner on the might-makes-right principle, in which there is no such thing as ownership, it contradicts the presuppositions of the inquiry itself. If the first owner does not have a better claim than latecomers, then he is not an owner, but merely a possessor, and there is no such thing as ownership.

More generally, latecomers' claims are inferior to those of prior possessors or claimants, who either homesteaded the resource or who can trace their title back to the homesteader or earlier owner. The crucial importance of the prior-later distinction to libertarian theory is why Professor Hoppe repeatedly emphasizes it in his writing.

What I would like for Kinsella to entertain is the possibility that the claim of the "latecomer" is not always wrong by definition, that there can be circumstances in which the "prior comer" has become so disconnected from the property and that the "latecomer" has established a significant connection to the property that the "prior comer's" claim is actually the one that is nullified. There may be at least some cases in which the "first owner" actually doesn't have a "better claim", and is indeed nothing but a "possessor" without a legitimate claim to the property anymore. I would also like to point out that if we adopt as an absolute rule that the "late comer" is always in the wrong and the prior possessor is always the legitimate owner, then this justifies the state, because the state is the defacto prior owner of the land in the societies that we are simply born into. In fact, this is a huge hole in anarcho-capitalism, in which the very arguent that anarcho-capitalists give in favor of land owners can just as easily be applied as a defense of any state and as an explaination for state formation.

Conclusions of Materialism

2009-08-18T22:13:00.004-04:00

I've noticed a tendency of some materialists to completely dismiss the moral perspective and the aesthetic perspective (and even the epistemological perspective) out of hand, leading to a certain kind of scientistic (and not scientific) nihilism. I think that this is a non-sequitor from materialism in which context is dropped. By materialism I refer to the basic naturalistic notion that matter is the only thing that exists, which is generally understood to be in opposition to idealism and supernaturalism. By all accounts, I am a materialist myself, but I object to the conclusions that some people reach from materialism.

Materialism can sometimes lead people to adopt what might be called a "concrete-bound" or "anti-conceptual" mentality in which the role or power of concepts is neglected, taken to the point of dismissing various abstractions as if they necessarily are "floating" or completely unrelated to reality. This can be manifested as a reductionism taken too far or a sort of vulgar atomism in which aggregates or higher-level properties are said to not exist. It also can be manifested as a crude view in which conciousness practically dissapears. But, given a sensible philosophy of mind (hint: John Searle?), such views are indefensible.

Materialism has also lead some people to adopt a pessimistic nihilism in terms of the viewpoint that life is just a pointless cycle of consumption and reproduction, the continual fruitless striving to avoid pain and the purely malevolent play of volatile physical forces. This is basically what happens when we project a pessimistic value judgement onto determinism that downplays what we can potentially make out of life while we're here. But I don't think that any of this necessarily follows from materialism. It seems like one could just as easily find meaning in life as an individual in a more existentialist sense. The fact that I'm a biological being doesn't have to negate my individuality and the various goals and things that make me happy in life. Such a nihilism is a non-sequitor; materialism does not negate the realm of experience.

Another issue is the use of scientific descriptions as if they override morality and aesthetics. For example, suppose someone is playing a piece of music on a guitar. A materialist can lecture us about how the sound waves coming from the guitar technically work. But from a musical perspective, that is irrelevant - what matters is how it sounds, how that makes us feel and values that it could represent. It seems like both the scientific and the aesthetic perspective are valid, it's just that they're different contexts. The scientific description of sound waves doesn't negate the aesthetic value of the music and the aesthetic value of the music doesn't make the scientific description of how it's produced false either. In this sense, perspectivism (or a vibrant contextualism) makes sense to me.

Or let's use a flower as an example. A scientist can lecture us about the "brute facts" of the flower, the description of its physical composition. On the other hand, someone can consider the flower in terms of its beauty or in terms of the particular function that it may have in a given context (for example, perhaps the flower was given to them as a gift and they view it as a token of appriciation). It seems clear to me that both perspectives can be valid without contradicting eachother. The "brute facts" about the flower don't negate its aesthetic value or its "use value", and its aesthetic value and "use value" don't negate its physical nature as an object. One could concievably entertain both aspects of the flower at the same time. To use materialism to negate aesthetic value and "use value" seems rather vulgar and misses the point.

Independence of Thought

2009-08-16T20:00:00.004-04:00

As a virtue, independence of thought is roughly an extension of the virtue of rationality. Rationality (as a virtue) is a general personal policy of applying reason to the evidence available to you and to your decision making. The codified, explicit discipline underlying rationality is logic; and the target of logic is the evidence of the senses.

By its very nature, rationality is not contingent on consensus or the opinions of others but on reality and actual objective means towards the end of acquiring knowledge. The old expression "Four million Frenchman can't be wrong" is not correct; there's nothing about the nature of consensus that transforms reality to conform with opinion.

Once a group of people begin to realize that they share certain premises, it becomes clear that they can benefit through a mutually arranged allegiance for the sake of elaborating upon and spreading those premises. This is particularly true of political premises, since politics are essentially contingent on the thinking and behavior of the majority of other people.

This group of people will develop additional premises through interaction and discussion, leading to the development of an othodoxy of generally accepted ideas within this group. This marks the creation of an ideology, which is a bundle of premises identified with a specific label. Examples include Christianity, socialism, science, and even libertarianism.

Ideologies can be both very useful and very dangerous. They are useful in that exposure usually leads to a solid increase in knowledge from exposure to a large bundle of interrelated premises. Even if someone does not accept an ideology as a whole, in all likelihood they will still retain some useful premises from it.

Ideologies are also useful because they enable people to interact with the types of other people that they want to interact with more easily. The label becomes a tag that functions as an identifier for social interaction. Someone with a strong distaste of religion might, for example, seek out others that bear the label "freethinker" or "Bright."

The social nature of ideologies is also what makes them dangerous. In its most extreme forms, dissenters among the group can be killed or tortured, which was a common occurence among many religious ideologies throughout history. In more common and less extreme forms, dissenters might be excommunicated or otherwise banned from interaction with members of the ideology.

Individuals that are seeking to escape from independent thinking often flock to ideologies as a means of delegating the task to others. An ideology provides a group of people that will warmly accept an individual in the event that they submit their will to the members. This is very appealing to individuals with no sense of self.

Members of an ideology who are not without a sense of self may still feel pressured to openly accept ideas or premises that they think are wrong. Once one has established their social network deep within an ideology, breaking free becomes painful and possibly even devastating, and can put someone in a position of basically having to "start over" socially.

This creates an incentive structure centered around collectivism and herd mentality. Once people with the courage to leave sense what is happening, they do leave. The remainder consists of submissive types that seek acceptance, being largely controlled by the power hungry that also have no sense of self and define themselves by conquering others.

A cult, in essense, is an ideology that has evolved along these lines to the point that the original ideas that spawned the ideology are little more than a smokescreen for hiding a systemic master/slave relationship between individuals. Ideology can lead to hierarchy in the most unpleasant sense of the term.

Adopting independence of thought as a major virtue and social custom is, as far as I'm aware, the only thing preventing the above mentioned travesties. For the sake of preserving rationality, It has to be understood that disagreement alone is not a criminal or immoral act or a reason to cast someone out from your social circle.

This is not to say that I advocate a philosophy of total inclusion. If someone is so far off the mark from how you think that neither of you stands to gain from interacting, then there is no reason to interact. This is far different, however, than the many small disagreements that often lead to ideological schisms.

In the end, you can't escape the consequences of submission to an ideology. Always think for yourself. There's no other way to retain yourself.

"The individual has always had to struggle to keep from being overwhelmed by the tribe. If you try it, you will be lonely often, and sometimes frightened. But no price is too high to pay for the privilege of owning yourself." - Friedrich Nietzsche

On The Performative Contradiction

2009-08-15T15:12:00.006-04:00

In the past, I have expressed a rejection of Hans Hoppe's "argumentation ethics" argument for libertarianism, in which libertarianism is supposed to be proven through demonstration in the very act of discourse through the alleged inherent negation of people's propositions arising from a contradiction between their proposition and the very act of making the proposition. I still stand by my rejection of this argument, as well as all arguments that take a similar form (such as Stephan Kinsella's "estoppel argument" and Stefan Molyneux's "self-detonating argument" concept that is part of his "universally preferable behavior").

As an initial clarification, allow me to say that there is a sense in which I think that there is such thing as a "performative contradiction" that can be pointed out in a valid way to justify certain propositions. For example, if I shout in your ear that sound does not exist, this seems to inherently be empirically disproven by the very act of me shouting (assuming that you are not deaf). In this context, I think that a "performative contradiction" argument is valid because the act of making the argument literally does disprove the argument. And the argument isn't disproven because you "presuppose" the opposite of what you're saying, but because what you are saying is empirically falsified by your very attempt to say it.

However, my problem with the "performative contradiction" argument as it is normally used by libertarians is that this is clearly not the context in which they use it. They try to use it with respect to perscriptive statements which are actually not inherently falsified by the act of argueing for or against them. The problem is that in this context the contradiction is not a formal or logical contradiction, it is only a contradiction between one's theory and one's behavior at best, and even that isn't necessarily the case because it is simply not true that everyone already presupposes the same normative ethic as you. It only works if we conflate normative ethics ("people should not initiate force") with metaphysical categories ("it is the essence of man that he does not initiate force"; which would be a falsehood in either case). To argue against a normative ethic is *not* to implicitly assume or prove that normative ethic, and it is misleading to respond to people's ethical statements as if they are making a metaphysical claim.

Furthermore, even if there is a contradiction between someone's theory and their behavior, that does not constitute a logical proof of the theory, it can only demonstrate personal hypocrisy at best. This is why argumentation ethics completely fails, because the statement "people should not have property rights" (as a normative ethic) is *not* inherently falsified by someone, in fact, controlling things - because "property rights" does not refer to the mere fact that people control things. "People should not have property rights" cannot reasonably be conflated with "people do not control things", and argumentation ethics can only work if we engage in such a conflation. Hoppe's "argumentation ethics", Kinsella's "estoppel argument" and Molyneux's "universally preferable behavior" all suffer from these same basic philosophical problems: the conflation of prescriptive statements with descriptive statements, the conflation of normative ethics with metaphysics, the conflation of acts of personal hypocrisy with logical contradictions and the conflation of falsifications with positive proofs.

If someone says, "I don't own myself", this is not inherently disproven by the fact that they purposefully act, because "ownership" does not mean "physiological autonomy". If a slave says, "I am free", this is not inherently disproven by the fact that they purposefully act, because "freedom" in the normative ethical sense does not mean "the capacity to purposefully act or make a statement"; the slave is in fact not free. If an average middle-class person says, "the normative ethic of private property rights is false", this is not inherently disproven by the fact that they actually own a lot of things, because "property rights" does not merely mean "the fact that people own things"; at best, all you can point out using this method is that they are being hypocrits. In short, there are no formal logical contradictions in the mere act of making these statements and the assertion that there is reduces to plain old sophistry of an obvious sort.

Even going by a hypocrisy criteria, the revelation of someone's hypocrisy by itself does absolutely nothing to prove or disprove either side of the formula. For example, if a pacifist supports the state, yes, this makes them a hypocrit, but pointing this out in no way constitutes a logical disproof of either pacifism or statism. One would need independant grounds for rejecting either pacifism or statism; the fact that they contradict eachother is not a case for or against either of them. So my point still stands that other people's hypocrisy doesn't make a logical proof for libertarianism, let alone anything else. At best, pointing it out may create the cognitive dissonance necessary to get them to more consistently apply certain principles that they already had or to hash out inconsistencies between different principles that they already have. But it is not a knock-down case for libertarianism.

On Slavery

2009-08-14T15:53:00.000-04:00

preface,
the following may not be the most eloquent or stylish expression of ideas, but the ideas are inspired from the last 2 centuries greatest minds and I believe God himself. saying this puts all the more pressure on me for the following to be smooth and flawless on the technical side. But I have finally caved and conceded to the fact that I am not a good enough writer to do the ideas justice, but the weight of the idea is such that it must be brought fourth no matter how badly the quality of its expression is lacking.

PART I
Writing in 2008, it is easy to find people who are absolutely opposed to slavery, but I have not had such luck finding people who are opposed to 50% slavery, or 35% slavery, or even 10% slavery. The concept of slavery is that man “A” works, and the fruits of his labor are taken against his will by man “B.” Does it matter if only half of his fruits are taken, or maybe only a fifth? Would there be an abolition movement today if slavery only existed on one day of the week, while the remainder of the week slaves were free to leave the farms and plantations and work for themselves?
I know it is coming, so let me put to rest the socialist complaint of our current system right now. The socialist would complain about the capitalist system where a man works for a company producing $2,000 dollars of profit but only getting $700 in his paycheck. The socialist might complain that this is partial (or fractional, if you will) slavery, but I must point out that it is not, because chains are necessary for slavery. Under the capitalist system there is no force compelling man “A” to work for man “B,“ nor is there a law fixing the price for which man “A” must work -- except for the current minimum wage laws. “A” is free to work for “B” and can quit at anytime under most circumstances to work for “C,” unless there is a contract stating otherwise.
A more accurate way of looking at the employer-employee relationship is to see it as a partnership. The employer provides the business plan and the means of production and whatever other details are necessary, and the employee provides the labor. If I were better at math I’m sure I would be able to find some kind of 10/90 or 15/85 split in the business between the employee and employer, where each is able to terminate the partnership at will.

Under a slave system the servant is not at liberty to quit or to negotiate the split of the profit. There is coercion and a threat of violence in slavery. With 100% slavery, the slave must work and produce, and the master will take all the profits. In a 50% slave system there is coercion to force the slave to give 50% of his production to the master. In either case the slave has no choice, but must yield to the demands of the master or else face punishment.
Now we must come to the question as to whether or not a man who is coerced into working for free for the master only on Monday is really a slave or not. If not, where is the line drawn? If he is forced to work for the master Monday and Tuesday, would that count as slavery? And if not, can it be considered freedom in either case? Where shall the line between freedom and slavery be drawn? I am of the school of thought that if a man is not 100% free (allowed to act without coercion), then he is a slave.
But can slavery actually be justified? Would it be acceptable to own a slave and to say to him, “You will give me all you earn from Monday’s work each week and keep the rest when the profits from Tuesday through Friday’s labors are enough to provide you with a mansion, luxuries, and comforts equal to or surpassing mine.”? For a person to nod in agreement is to not oppose slavery at all as an institution, but to only oppose the condition of a slave. Thus it would also be fine to hold a slave in bondage all week long so long as his material condition were at some acceptable level. I would have to disagree. I do not put such high and weighty value on material possessions, but in the spirit and in the freedom to choose. Even if the slave has a mansion and all the latest technologies and greatest comforts of the age, it is not acceptable that his will be negated or that his labor or wages be confiscated. Under a “Monday Only” slave system the slave is unable to keep that profit made on Monday. If he is sick Monday and unable to work, his labor will be confiscated from the following day’s work whether the slave wants to give those profits up or not.
I have been flirting with, and will now discuss, the old defense of the brutish institute of slavery. The defenders of the institution would defend slavery on the grounds that the slave was better off as a slave than as a free man. They would say that the master provides the slave with the necessities of everyday life (food, clothing, shelter, basic medical care, etc.), and if the slave were free he would not be able to provide those things independent of his master. If a reader is only interested in the end condition of the slave he might come to the same conclusion and agree that slavery is justified. He would certainly have to agree that “Monday Only” slavery, where the labor and production of a man is bound and confiscated for the first day of the week, but the production of the slave the other four days is enough to provide him with all those aforementioned luxuries, is justifiable and even preferable to no slavery where the man’s labor is never confiscated, but is only enough to give him a humble means of existence.
As I have said above, I cannot support these ideas and all I can say to those who do is that they have an inflated value of material well being and a deficiency in regards to the value of free choice. As far as I am concerned, it is not the hard work involved in picking cotton, or the deplorable conditions that slaves endured in the 19th century, but the confiscation of their labor and deprivation of the choice to do with that labor what they would like that is the evil of slavery. It would make no difference to me if a slave were put up in the best hotel in Las Vegas and required to count the stitches in the carpet and then given access to the best spa at the end of the day, it would be slavery nonetheless and equally as wrong.
It is for this reason that I oppose the Income Tax System and look forward to the day when a man’s wages are his own to do with as he sees fit. The income tax is the reincarnation of slavery, though it may only be “Monday Slavery” or “All of January and Half of February Slavery,” it is slavery nevertheless. The income tax is the most direct form of slavery in America today, as it directly takes away a person’s labor against his will. This should be abolished.
It is not only morally wrong, but also a form of slavery to take a man’s paycheck by force, never mind taking it before he even has it in his hand. Money is labor. No matter how it is reduced, some sort of physical activity had to be done to produce an income. It is a very direct conversion for most of us; we work and, in exchange for that work, we are paid money. But even for the landlord or the heir, money is still backed by labor -- no one gets rent property for nothing, it must be bought. It is bought with money that was earned through labor, either that or was given as a gift or in the will of a relative. In either case, labor is being confiscated. I can not say for sure because I am not in the position to know, but it would seem that it is less painful when the labor confiscated is removed through the years in the case of the landlord or through the labor of a parent, but it is still confiscation and, though it is not direct, it is enslavement. However, there is another reason to do away with the income tax in the case of wealthy business owners and landlords; people are both smart and inclined to make more rather than less money. In the case of a landlord, for example, the landlord does not pay taxes, but becomes a tax collector; raising the price of rent and adding “taxes” into his expense list to be covered by the renter just as he would “new carpet” or a “new door.” The same principal can be applied to corporate income tax, where the expense of the tax, like all business expenses, is passed on to the consumer.
Indeed, all taxation is the coercive deprivation of labor, whether it is the income tax or more subtle forms of partial slavery like the sales tax, property tax, tariffs, or others. But my superior moral fiber only extends so far, and being human, there is a hint of despotism in me. Government, though it is evil, is necessary, and must be funded. This funding is going to come from taxation. Therefore, while fractional slavery is condemnable on moral grounds, it can be justified at a very limited level, to provide those functions that, it could be said, could not be adequately provided for by the private sector. (Such as roads, emergency services, and defense.)
Due to both the necessity of taxation to fund our government and the nature of taxation itself, we should be very stringent with our government’s fiscal policy. Though we might like the idea of government undertaking an action which we may believe will have a positive impact on society, we should keep in mind that it takes funding and that the funding will not come from only those who support that particular action of government, but also coercively from those who do not support that action.
When we vote for government functions that are not absolutely essential and that private enterprises could, if given half the chance, handle sufficiently, we are subjecting our fellow citizens to unnecessary confiscation of their labor and fractional slavery. It is also imperative to realize that our fellow citizens may, in turn, use this as license to commit the very same atrocity to us somewhere down the line, for the sake of "providing" for society.

Rights and Morality, Political and Social

2009-08-11T06:18:00.006-04:00

“I may not agree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” - Voltaire

A lot of confusion seems to pop up in political discourse due to either a conflation or out of context separation between the political and the social. One of the most common of these confusions is over the relationship between what one thinks people have a "right to do" and what one thinks people "ought to do". For example, someone could think that one has a "right to discriminate based on presupposed racial categorizations" while simultaneously thinking that one "ought not to discriminate based on presupposed racial categorizations", grounded by an epistemological (or even ontological) objection to presupposed racial categorizations.

In this particular example, one's notion of "rights" is more inclusive then what one's social goals actually are, and it would be fallacious to act either as if supporting one's "right" to do something means that one actually supports the thing in question or as if supporting one's "right" to do something inherently implies some sort of neutrality towards the thing in question. This seems to be a problem that "thin" libertarianism has, in that only the question of rights tends to be focused on, taken to the point of expressing a neutralist attitude towards the more fundamental issue of social goals and outcomes. But just because I think that someone has a right to do something does not necessarily mean that I will not object to the thing in question or advocate against it.

On the flip side of things, it does not necessarily follow from the fact that one thinks that one "ought not" to do something that one thinks that people don't have a "right" to do it or that one is advocating the use of aggression to oppose the thing in question. For example, someone could think that one "ought not to do heroine" without believing that "heroine should be illegal" or that "force should be initiated against those who do heroine". Neither does it necessarily follow from the fact that one thinks that a particular social goal is desirable in the broadest or most all-encompassing sense possible that one advocates the use of aggression, and hence it would simply be a non-sequitor to object to the social goals of "thick" libertarians by implying that they want to "force their preferences on others".

The problem with "thin" libertarianism should be clear here: it only concentrates on the narrow question of legality and the use of force. In debates among libertarians, this can manifest itself in some fairly shoddy arguments in which it is unfairly implied that libertarians with certain social goals are for "forcing their preferences on others", or when a standoffish attitude is given in which social concerns are dismissed as irrelevant because all that matters is legality and rights. Of course, this is rarely done in a consistent way. Usually, it's social goals which are generally concieved of as being "left-wing" (such as anti-racism, anti-patriarchy, feminism, any sense of economic egalitarianism, etc.) that are accused of being authoritarian, while things like racism, nationalism, patriarchy and corporatism are given the "so long as it's voluntary" treatment.

In either case, what I wish to illustrate with these examples and points is a certain distinction between the social and political spheres, since it appears that a confusing conflation often occurs between the two. Just because something is (at least nominally) voluntary does not necessarily mean that it is good, that it is just as good as anything else or that it should be treated as irrelevant, and just because a given social goal happens pursued by aggression in a given context does not mean that that social goal is inherently aggressive or bad. The legal is not necessarily the moral, and the moral is not necessarily the legal. The political is not necessarily the social, and the social is not necessarily the political. To always conflate these things is to create a lot of confusion.

On the other hand, it seems reasonable to grant a certain sense in which there may be an overlap between the two at least in one area: the use of force. Afterall, questions of the use of force are moral questions in and of themselves, and non-aggression is a "social preference" too. It seems like "politics" is where the two meet. But I don't think that this point bolsters "thin" libertarianism at all, because those who express the attitude that "social preferences are subjective" or a relativistic attitude towards them seem to overlook the fact that their commitment to non-aggression is not outside of the realm of moral discourse, since it is a moral premise. And it is definitely in this sense that morality and politics are one and the same thing in libertarianism, in that politics is concieved of as being bound by the moral constraint of non-aggression.

But noone is literally only a libertarian (in the strict sense of a commitment to non-aggression). Everyone has social goals other than those directly pertaining to the use of aggression. While aggression and non-aggression are ends, they are ends that are simultaneously means. And it is rather nonsensical to adhere to a social philosophy in which only certain ends which are means (I.E. aggression and non-aggression) matter, while all other ends are conceptualized in a completely relativistic manner (despite the fact that various ends that don't directly pertain to the question of aggression are held by everyone, including those who argue from a "thin" libertarian standpoint). This is why I think that it is counter-productive to continue to treat libertarianism as a stand-alone philosophy, isolated from the broader bundle of values that it is only a part of.

Falsifiability

2009-08-10T13:16:00.004-04:00

One thing I hear a lot from people in the atheist community, mainly those guilty of scientism, is the idea that any claim must be falsifiable in order to be worth considering. Unfalsifiable claims are rejected outright, regardless of the nature of the claim itself.

First, I will briefly explain what falsifiability is. A falsifiable claim is a claim that can be empirically tested. An example of a falsifiable claim would be "The Earth orbits the Sun." One can make observations, do calculations, etc. to demonstrate this claim to be true or false.

An unfalsifiable claim is a claim that cannot be empirically tested. An example of an unfalsifiable claim would be "There is an invisible unicorn following you, but he runs away anytime you try to prove he is there." Since the so-called invisible unicorn runs away when you attempt any tests, this claim is not testable and is not falsifiable. There is no way to prove it true or false.

Now in the realm of scientific claims, falsifiability is very important. Science hinges on the ability to test claims, so an untestable claim is an unscientific one. If the claim itself is an empirical one, such as the existence of the aforementioned invisible unicorn, then a lack of falsifiability means that the claim can be rejected as unimportant, since the claim has no testable impact on the empirical world.

Not all claims are fundamentally scientific or empirical in nature. One of the key errors of those who unwittingly engage in scientism is the assumption that all valid claims are scientific or empirical in nature. This naturally leads to the assumption that all valid claims must be falsifiable. This kind of "hard" materialism quickly unravels itself under philosophical scrutiny, which I will show below.

Basic logical principles underpin science. For example, the laws of identity, causality (identity over time), and noncontradiction are fundamental assumptions of all scientific activity. For any scientific claim to be testable, it has to be assumed that the universe itself operates in a rational and predictable manner.

Fundamental laws of logic, however, are not falsifiable. It is not possible to falsify, for example, the law of noncontradiction. I will demonstrate this with an example.

In classical physics, it was assumed that all matter was either waves or particles. Observation had led scientists to believe that these were basically two fundamentally different kinds of matter; all matter was one or the other, and whether the matter in question was a wave or a particle had ramifications on how that matter behaved.

Then some brilliant scientists came along and shattered this assumption. They were able to demonstrate, through mathematics and scientific testing and observation, that all matter was effectively both a wave and a particle. All matter had the traits of both and this was measurable and demonstrable.

Now, after this discovery, did scientists declare that the law of noncontradiction had been disproven? Since waves and particles were supposed to be exclusive traits, didn't the fact that matter could be (and always is) both mean that the universe could contain contradictions?

Of course not. The claim that "all matter is either waves or particles" was falsified. But the important point here is that it is simply assumed, by scientific standards of falsifiability, that the law of noncontradiction is true and could not be falsified by the test. This assumption is present in every scientific test.

Attempts to openly disprove the law of noncontradiction fail because any attempt to disprove anything requires the implicit assumption that basic laws of logic are valid and applicable in all contexts. What would "disprove" even mean if no standard existed by which to prove and disprove claims?

The law of noncontradiction is, for all intents and purposes, unfalsifiable. Yet it is an implicit assumption behind all rational claims, scientific and otherwise. This is far from the only philosophical claim that is both true and scientifically unfalsifiable, but it demonstrates the crucial point that there are claims that are true but cannot be falsified.

Political Quizes and the Political Spectrum

2009-08-06T11:27:00.011-04:00

Austro-libertarian recently linked to this political quiz in a blogpost making some commentary on the tenability of such quizes. After taking the quiz and being somewhat displeased with the result, I'd like to go over the objections I have to such a quiz and some of the thoughts that I have about such a political spectrum.

I do think that a two-dimensional political spectrum of this sort is better than the more typical one-dimensional spectrum, and this quiz even went beyond the normal two-dimensional spectrum or "nolan chart" by trying to track "culture" and "foreign policy" as their own sub-spectrums. Nonetheless, I think that the "nolan chart" is insufficient in the way that it completely splits up the "economic" and "social" or "political" spheres. In particlar, it is not at all clear to me that supporting "economic freedom" inherently is a "right-wing" tendency. It doesn't seem to be the case that certain views that might be tagged as "left-wing" on economic issues necessarily imply a lack of economic freedom. This gets a bit more into the way in which one's answers to certain questions are categorized on the "economic" axis. There is also an issue with how "the social" and "the political" are dealt with.

Let me give some examples from this quiz.

"2. Unions were indispensible in establishing the middle class."

I found giving a straight answer to this question to be somewhat difficult. For one thing, I'm not entirely sure precisely what is meant by "unions", and I don't think that a union qua union necessarily has to be a governmental entity or a governmentally legislated entity. There is an extent to which, at least earlier in the history of unions, they did play a role in establishing the middle class in terms of being a mechanism of bargaining power for workers.

On the other hand, an "agree" answer to this may be construed to imply the merits of the current system of unions, which I consider to be largely corrupt and hardly distinguishable from corporations. And I would not want to endorse contemporary "liberal" dogmas about labor legislation, in which we're presented with an either/or choice between supporting the current system of governmentally privileged union status and being corporatists.

"3. In nearly every instance, the free market allocates resources most efficiently."

I essentially agree with this statement. However, it may have somewhat different meanings depending on what one assumes "the free market" to be. One could think that "the free market allocates resources most efficiently" as a defense of the current system, with the implicit assumption that it is more or less a free market. On the other hand, one could think that "capitalism" as we know it in fact does not allocate resources efficiently, and that it is worlds apart from a free market.

"8. Sċhool science classes should teach intelligent design."

Statements like this are also somewhat ambiguous. On a personal level, I completely disagree with this, because I don't consider intelligent design to be a tenable notion and would prefer that it not be part of school curiculums. Yet at the same time, I support the right of people to voluntarily teach false views all they want. So there is a distinction between supporting the right to do something and necessarily being in support of the thing in question. Of course, I reject the statist model of education to begin with, so the meta-question is left out of this.

"22. It is wrong to enforce moral behavior through the law because this infringes upon an individual's freedom."

I also found this statement to be somewhat ambiguous, depending on what one means by "moral behavior". If this is meant to imply that "vices are not crimes", then I strongly agree. On the other hand, even something as simple as murder laws are within the sphere of "moral behavior". Would I therefore oppose "the enforcement of moral behavior through the law" (although I would question what's meant by "enforcement", because I don't think that "the law" predetermines behavior for the most part) when it comes to such things? No!

"25. Whatever maximizes economic growth is good for the people."

I do not exactly agree with this. I do not think that the emphasis on "growth" for the sake of "growth" is necessarily a good thing, and this still begs the question of precisely what "maximizes economic growth". Monetarists and Keynsians may think that monetary inflation "maximizes economic growth", but it certainly isn't "good for the people" and it isn't consistent with a free market. I also resent that anyone who doesn't agree with this is going to be placed further away from "economic freedom", when one's answer to this question in no way necessarily implies whether or not one thinks the state should be involved in the economy.

"35. It makes sense and is fair that some people make much more money than others."

This statement is ambiguous in that it does not specify the means with which "people make much more money than others". Furthermore, it is unclear whether or not this statement is meant to be a defense of plutocracy. I do not consider a society in which the vast majority of people are just above substinence levels while most of the wealth is concentrated in the hands of a small elite to be a good thing. And I resent that I will have to be placed further away from "economic freedom" for not enthusiastically marking this statement with "strongly agree".

"44. It is not our place to condemn other cultures as backwards or barbaric."

One's answer to this may misleadingly create a dichotomy between cultural conservatism and cultural liberalism. I reject cultural relativism, but I don't think that should place me closer to cultural conservatism. In fact, cultural conservatism would be precisely one of those cultural tendencies that I'd question. Furthermore, sometimes relativism has been used to justify cultural conservatism, while a culturally liberal standpoint has sometimes been approached in a non-relativistic manner. So I'm not sure how such a statement should be approached.

"50. A person's morality is between that person and God only. Government should not get involved."

This one seems like a package deal. I strongly disagree with the premise that morality, properly construed, has anything to do with "god". But I don't think that "government should get involved" in terms of people's expression of religious views and non-violent practises. And, like the previous statement about the relationship between morality and the law, it is unclear exactly what kind of relationship is implied by one's response to this statement. I'm for the complete separation of religion and state, but I also object to religion for non-political reasons.

Summary Of Objection To Quiz

There are two main issues I have with this test. The first issue is that "economic freedom" is sometimes conflated with either support for or opposition to certain social outcomes that are not themselves necessarily intrinsic to a free market. In this way, certain egalitarian social views are conflated with opposition to economic freedom, while certain views that could be interpreted as plutocratic are conflated with support for economic freedom. The second issue is what appears to be problems sorting out "the social" and "the political". Certain social views may not necessarily imply support for an official political policy, and certain political views may not necessarily imply support for a certain social custom. There is a danger of "what is legal" and "what is moral" being both conflated and separated in a way that is misleading, and this begs questions at the meta level.

As for ultimate results on such a quiz, the issue I have with it is two-fold. On one hand, depending on how I answer, I feel like I am pushed further "rightward" than I actually am because of the implicit assumption that "economic freedom" is a "right-wing" thing. On the other hand, I resent being placed further away from "economic freedom" if I concentrate on my views on social outcomes. It seems like a series of package deals and false dichotomies in this sense. Ideally, I'd like to end up somewhere around "the libertarian center" or perhaps even "left of the libertarian center" on such a spectrum, but I'm usually pushed too far "rightward". This is part of why I find the nolan chart to be insufficient as a political spectrum, but it's also a matter of the assumptions that one builds into the statements or questions.

Name-Based Political Marketing

2009-08-05T13:51:00.007-04:00

One of the most irritating things about politics is how different political agendas and policies are marketed. In particular, the names of many policies are deliberately biased in order to convince people to accept them. Below I will discuss a few of these and the name I think libertarians should use for these policies. Note that I am not claiming to have invented the alternate names provided.

Affirmative Action
This is a particularly good example. What on Earth does the name “Affirmative Action” have to do with requiring that employers maintain race-based quotas when they hire people? This name has nothing to do with the content of the political agenda or policy at all; the goal is clearly to just sound good.

Libertarians should probably refer to this as racial preference legislation, or race-based hiring quotas. The key here is to not let people hide the fact that the state is requiring employers to engage in racism.

Gun Control
Fortunately for everyone, guns are not self-willed beings that just go crazy at the drop of a hat. Guns are always being controlled by someone. The name “Gun Control” gives the impression that guns are just firing willy nilly and, golly, we need to do something!

Libertarians should properly refer to this as civilian disarmament. This reflects the fact that such legislation does not disarm soldiers, police, etc. and that it's not about “controlling guns” but limiting arms possession.

Pro-Life
The obvious goal of someone labeling themselves as “Pro-Life” is to subtly smear one's opponents as being anti-life or pro-death. It's very obvious that most people who want abortion to be legal/allowed are in no way anti-life, or even pro-abortion in and of itself.

Libertarians should refer to “Pro-Life” individuals as being in favor of abortion criminalization. This description is less emotionally driven and more accurately describes their position; these are individuals that wish to make abortion illegal e.g. to make it a criminal activity.

Universal Health Care
Consider the implications of the word universal. The premise hidden in the name is that it's possible to make health care a non-scarce commodity that everyone can have as much of as they want. I'm going to assume that the audience that I am writing this for needs no explanation on why this makes no economic sense whatsoever.

Libertarians should refer to this as government-imposed collectivized health care, or just collectivized health care once context is established. This more accurately reflects the fact that, essentially, the idea is to apply communist ideas to health care, and removes the implication that any sort of universal, non-scarce health care system is a possibility.

The Market and Anti-statism Does Not Intrinsically Solve Social Problems

2009-08-04T06:33:00.005-04:00

One idea that floats around is the notion that whatever is best will inherently be chosen on the free market. But this isn't exactly true. To be more accurate, whatever is in the highest demand will be the most likely to be chosen on the free market. And this should make it rather clear that the establishment of competition and the free flow of the forces of supply and demand, while this may be necessary, is not sufficient alone to produce the best social outcome. It is concievable that what people demand is in fact harmful or of low quality. It is thus simply not the case that whatever happens to "emerge" from the market will be the best thing.

To be clear, this is not a problem with free markets, but a problem with the values of people. Free markets, in this sense, is merely a mechanism of decision-making rather than a system of values in and of itself; just like democracy. Indeed, this is one of the major problems with majoritarian democracy, in that it sanctions whatever the majority happens to vote for, which does not necessarily mean that the results will be the best. But the exact same thing is true of "the market" (which could be construed as an economic type of democracy in terms of demand), in that if the values of the people with demands are questionable (and I'm not refering to economic value here in terms of prices, but value in the more general sense of what people prefer), the supply that "emerges" will not necessarily be the best.

Of course, there is a sense in which "the market" is being used by people as a catch-all metaphor for social organization in general. And what I'm basically saying is that it is not at all clear that after the elimination of the current state, whatever form of social organization that happens to "emerge" will inherently be better, let alone not be a state. Basically, I'm saying that whether or not what "emerges" is better, and whether or not a new state will arise, will be dependant on the values that people have. To expect things to be fundamentally different or necessarily better without any real change in people's values is naive, and it is for precisely this reason that I find anti-statism conceptualized as something to be pursued for its own sake, completely divorced from any sort of social context, to be problematic. The "value-neutral" approach to anarchism fails.

Let's be frank about this: anarchism, without any sort of reasonable social context of values to ground itself, actually does reduce to a void that can be filled by any concievable form of authoritarianism. It is a completely vacuous concept, a purely floating abstraction, without at least some basic principles of social organization (such as libertarianism, at a minimum) to back it up. This is precisely why people are libertarian anarchists in the first place, and by libertarian I mean a social philosophy with certain principles of social organization that provides a context for anarchism; certain values of liberty. In the abscence of such a context, "anarchism" could function as a completely open-ended vacuum that could be the starting point and legitimization for literally anything, including fascism; a transition from one authoritarian state to another.

This is why, for good reason, most anarchists throughout history have not defined anarchism as simply being the abolition of a given state. In this sense, the "social anarchists" deserve some credit in that they tend to realize that a more holistic sense of anti-authoritarianism is necessary to produce the end of a flourishing and sustainable free society (although some of their conceptions of exactly what the basis for that is may be debatable). The goal of anarchists should be a flourishing free society, not just the abolition of the current state and then a "who cares? whatever the market decides will arise" attitude about whatever "emerges" from that point onwards. It simply is not the case that whatever "emerges" after the fall of a given state will be a free society irrespective of the values of the people in it and how social organization is approached "after the revolution".

Politics Is Inherently Linked With Interpersonal Morality

2009-08-04T03:07:00.004-04:00

There has been a recent trend, particularly among certain youtube market anarchists, of a certain distain for moral discourse. Associated with a particular trend towards a certain kind of amoralism (one that largely seems to be the remnants of logical positivism), some have been construeing themselves as anti-perscriptive, as if they do not engage in perscription. However, I find this to either be dishonest or confused, because these very same people continue to rely on normative ethical premises to argue for anti-statism, and hence it doesn't make sense to be dismissive when other people talk about morality while continueing to (at least implicitly) make use of interpersonal moral concepts oneself.

It should be quite clear that noone is above perscription. The moment that one talks about politics, one is inherently caught up in questions of interpersonal morality, because politics *is* interpersonal morality at an institutional level. Everyone, including those who claim to be above morality, is dealing with the question of how society should be organized. Even anti-statism, in the most narrow sense possible, is a perscription about how society should be organized. Libertarianism, at the most basic level, is a political theory (or a set of political theories) about how society should be organized. The value of non-aggression is a normative ethical premise about how society should be organized. It therefore seems disingenous to continue making use of these concepts (such as non-aggression, private property and freedom of association) while claiming to be above perscription.

Taking things further, it is not at all clear that the question of how society should be organized ends upon the establishment of the value of non-aggression or the conclusion of anti-statism. The negation of politics in the narrow sense of questions of state policy does not by itself solve the problem or end the debate over how society should be organized, nor does a completely relativistic attitude in which all forms of social organization are treated as just as good as any other logically follow from such a negation. Furthermore, anti-statism actually self-detonates as soon as one's basis for how society should be organized ends up leading to more or less the exact same thing that one initially set out to negate. In this sense, the negation of the current state rings rather hollow if what one wishes to replace it with is either not fundamentally different or arguably worse.

Just because the current state is done away with does not inherently mean that whatever happens to "emerge" henceforth is better, or is not a state for that matter. In the absence of a decent enough interpersonal morality, liberty is a completely vacuous concept. In the libertarian senses of the term, liberty is inherently an interpersonal normative ethic that places certain constraints on what is morally permissible. "Freedom" in the broadest sense of "whatever people happen to do" is not liberty, it is compatible with any political ideology and any form of social organization. When libertarians speak of liberty, they generally are not refering to the notion that "I can do whatever I want to other people" or that "all interpersonal norms are equally valid". The moment that one debates politics, one implies the favorability of certain interpersonal norms over others.

So some people should really drop the talk of morality being somehow irrelevant or transcended. There is a very relevant and serious discussion and debate to be had about how liberty is concieved of and what values are most conductive to liberty, as well as what values liberty is most conductive towards, and amoralist memes do not get around this. Market anarchists who lay claim to amoralism have not actually transcended the discussion of values, even if they distain the word "morality" and are under the illusion that "practicality" is somehow completely divorced from it. "Practicality" is always a matter of "practical" towards an end, and hence it inherently begs the question of value. The question is not nullified simply because one nominally rejects the state, and it would be more intellectually honest if the amoralists stopped acting like it is.