Appellate Strategist Blog by Christina Imre

Governor Vetoes Punitive Damages Sharing Statute

2006-10-02T12:19:00.000-07:00

California embarked on a little punitive damages experiment about two years ago. Hidden in a 700-page budget passed (as usual) at the 13th hour was a provision enacting Civil Code section 3294.5, giving the State 75% of any punitive damages award. By its terms, the measure was scheduled to sunset on July 1, 2006. Fast forward two years. SB 832, passed at the end of August, 2006, would have extended the sunset.

Today, Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed SB 832 with the following comment:

"While I have been supportive of the policy in the past and signed [the original bill in 2004] this bill was amended late in the legislative session and did not provide an opportunity for sufficient hearings to determine whether this policy has been effective or not. I encourage the author to reintroduce the bill next year and allow a full debate on the effectiveness of the policy."

"Effectiveness" of this policy indeed. I'm willing to bet that the State has collected virtually no revenue in the two years the statute's been in effect. The provision applied only to lawsuits commenced after mid-August, 2004 and finally adjudicated (including trial and appeal) before July 1, 2006. In all my years of appellate and punitive damages practice, I have never seen a punitive damages appeal (let alone trial too) briefed, argued and decided in that short a time frame.

If anyone has seen statistics on 3294.5 revenue, I'd love to see them.

Dog Day Afternoon in California Supreme Court

2006-08-28T10:37:00.000-07:00

California's dog bite statute - Civil Code 3342 - makes the owner liable to the victim regardless of the animal's "former viciousness" or knowledge of same. But the so-called veterinarian's rule, a variation on the primary assumption of risk doctrine, says a dog owner who contracts with the vet to treat the dog is generally exempt from liability should the dog bite or injure the vet or an assistant during treatment. (See Nelson v. Hall (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 709, 710.)

So which controls when a vet assistant is injured while treating the animal: the statute imposing strict liability for a bite, or the primary assumption of risk doctrine that exempts the owner from liability? Under the California Supreme Court's opinion in Priebe v. Nelson, issued today, veterinarians assume the risk of bites by virtue of the job.

The court, however, offered one caveat: a common law strict liability cause of action may also be maintained if the owner of a domestic animal knew or had reason to know of the animal’s vicious propensities. The court remanded to the lower court to determine if the owner knew or should have known of his dog’s vicious propensities and failed to inform the vet; in that event the owner could have exposed the assistant to an unknown risk, and thereby be strictly liable at common law. Under such circumstances, the defense of primary assumption of risk would not bar the claim, since the assistant could not be found to assume a risk of which she was unaware.

California Grants & Holds Punitive Damages Opinion in Tobacco Case

2006-08-09T12:53:00.000-07:00

Punitive damages are, once, again, in the news. Last week, the California Supreme Court granted review in Bullock v. Philip Morris, a single plaintiff smoker case in which the court of appeal had affirmed $ 28 million in punitives. Philip Morris' petition presented two issues concerning the constitutionality of the punitive award: (1) does the 33:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages violate due process; and (2) should the jury have been instructed it can't impose punitives to punish the defendant for the effects of its conduct on non-parties. Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., formerly at 138 Cal.App.4th 1029, mod. 139 Cal.App.4th 588a, S143850, review granted 8/2/06.

However, the state high court will not be deciding these issues anytime soon. It deferred briefing pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Philip Morris USA v. Williams (Ore. 2005) 127 P3d 1165, cert. granted 5/30/06, No. 05-1256.

Employment: At Will Clauses Alive & Well in California

2006-08-09T11:14:00.000-07:00

California employers are breathing sighs of relief thanks to the state Supreme Court's decision, rendered late last week, upholding an at-will clause against a former employee's attack. Dore v. Arnold, opinion issued 8/3/06.

The former employee challenged the at will clause in his contract, claiming it impliedly conferred a right to be terminated only for cause. The contract provision said the relationship was "at will," and went on to explain this means either party may terminate the relationship "at any time." He argued that since the clause referred only to the time of termination ("at any time") and was silent on permissible causes for termination, it did not create a true at will relationship. The court of appeal agreed with his interpretation.

But the California Supreme Court did not. Resolving a conflict in the lower state courts of appeal, it held the contract plainly spelled out that the relationship was at will, and the reference to "time" of termination - without expressly using the words "with or without cause" - did not change that fact. The opinion observed that a clause stating the relationship "could be terminated at any time would make no sense if [its] true meaning was that [the] employment could be terminated only for cause. Thus, even though [the employer's] letter defined `at will' as meaning `at any time," without specifying it also meant without cause or for any or no reason, the letter's meaning was clear."

The court also rejected the employee's attempts to use extrinsic evidence - employer's pre-employment statements of wanting a "long-term fix" and to "build a relationship" - to make the provision ambiguous. Even if this extrinsic evidence were credited, it "would not support an inference that Dore reasonably understood [the] letter as consistent with a promise not to terminate him without cause." LINK TO SLIP OPINION: http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S124494.PDF

Applying The Class Action Fairness Act As Intended

2006-07-28T11:57:00.000-07:00

CAFA - the Class Action Fairness Act - was designed to allow federal courts to entertain more of the major class actions that have plagued big business in recent years. Good idea, but in California, the execution may be leaving something to be desired.

Thus far, the California data is anecdotal but troubling. A growing number of trial courts are remanding the class actions, relying on case law creating a "strong presumption" against and an "aversion" to finding federal removal jurisdiction. In particular, they are ruling that the defendant failed to prove that the amount in controversy exceeds CAFA's $5 million jurisdictional minimum. Ironically, with CAFA, Congress intended a presumption in favor of retaining federal jurisdiction of class actions.

And to date, the 9th Circuit apparently has declined to hear any interlocutory appeals from the remand orders. Unless it changes that tack, it could be years before we see an actual opinion from the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, how many cases Congress intended to be litigated in federal court are being bounced back to the state?

For more information, or cites to some of the split district court opinions, contact: christina.imre@sdma.com

Watershed Unfair Competition Decision

2006-07-12T12:47:00.000-07:00

July 12, 2006: Yesterday, the California Court of Appeal may have forever changed the world of state unfair competition and class action law. (Pfizer v. Superior Court, Case No. B188106, slip opinion available at: http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B188106.PDF

Pfizer it could well the biggest breakthrough for defendants in the long, tortured history of California's Business & Professions Code section 17200. The decision applies Proposition 64, the 2003 measure designed to reform some of the major abuses of 17200 suits, reinstating such long-absent requirements as: plaintiffs must have standing to sue, suffer actual harm, and have relied on the allegedly wrongful business practice.

1. The class members must have suffered injury in fact and actually lost money or property as a result of such violation. It is not enough that the class representative or named plaintiff satisfy this requirement.

2. The mere likelihood of harm to members of the public is no longer sufficient for standing to sue. Those who have suffered no injury in fact and who have not lost money or property from the business practice cannot state a cause of action based on the “likelihood” that members of the public will be deceived.

3. A plaintiff must have actually relied on the false or misleading misrepresentation or advertisement in entering into the transaction in issue.

A round of applause here to John Sullivan of the Civil Justice Association of California, and his dedicated staff, without whom there would be no Proposition 64.

UPDATE: the plaintiffs filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court on Aug. 11, 2006. The court has 60 days from date of filing to decide whether to grant review.

Insured May Assign Right To "Brandt" Attorney Fees

2006-07-11T11:14:00.000-07:00

In a unanimous opinion, the California Supreme Court held last week that when an insured assigns a claim for bad faith against the insurer, and the assignee brings a tort action against the insurer that includes a claim for wrongfully withheld policy benefits, the assignee may recover Brandt fees. (Essex Ins. Co. v. Five Star, S131992 - slip opinion available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/opinions/.cgi/)

Over 20 years ago, the high court gave the insured the right to attorney fees attributable to the insured's attempt to recover policy benefits tortiously withheld by the carrier. (Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813.) It reasoned that when an insurer has deprived the insured of policy benefits in bad faith, attorney fees the insured reasonably and necessarily incurs to obtain those policy benefits constitute an economic loss proximately caused by the insurer’s tort, and thus those attorney fees (now commonly referred to as Brandt fees) are recoverable as tort damages.

The court reasoned that disallowing recovery of Brandt fees incurred by assignees would also tend to discourage assignment of bad faith claims against insurance companies, contrary to the public policy favoring transferability of causes of action.

State High Court: Probate Code Requires Witnesses To Sign Will Before Testator's Death

2006-06-22T11:33:00.000-07:00

Today, the California Supreme Court held that when a witness signs a will after the testator's death, the will violates the Probate Code (section 6110). Declining to follow the trend of other jurisdictions, the court, in one of Justice Carol Corrigan's first opinions since her recent appointment, concluded that any other result would "allow the validity of a will to depend upon the will or caprice of one who had been requested to perform the very simple act of becoming a witness by allowing such a person to wait until after the testator’s death to decide whether or not to subscribe his or her signature to the will. Such an interpretation would invite fraud and subvert the basic intent of will authentication requirements." Estate of Saueresig, Case No. S129110.

Pleading Requirements in Child Abuse Cases Up For Grabs

2006-06-22T11:29:00.000-07:00

Yesterday, the California Supreme Court agreed to decide what a plaintiff claiming child abuse must plead regarding the defendant non-perpetrator's notice of the abuser's proclivities. Cal. CCP section 340.1 reinstates certain time-barred causes of action, by adult plaintiffs molested as children, against the abusers and those considered responsible for the abuser. Under the statute, the non-perpetrator must have had notice (actual knowledge ?) of the abuser's wrongful acts and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent a recurrence. The issue to be decided is what standard must the plaintiff meet in order to adequately allege the non-perpetrator defendant had the requisite notice. Doe v. City of Los Angeles, S142689, formerly at 137 Cal.App.4th 438, review granted 6/21/06.

Here are the issues, as described in the court's weekly summary:

"Were plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Los Angeles and the Boy Scouts of America for sexual abuse by a city police officer while they participated in police department programs in the 1970’s barred by the statute of limitations, or did plaintiffs sufficiently invoke the provisions of CCP 340.1 (b)(2), which permits the revival of certain claims of sexual abuse that would otherwise be barred where the defendant `knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person'”?

California: Major Indemnity Issue Up For Decision

2006-06-19T12:47:00.000-07:00

In late May, a great many contractors and their lawyers heaved a sigh of relief when the California Supreme Court granted review in Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg. There, in a published opinion with a vigorous dissent, the court of appeal had held that a subcontractor owes a present duty to defend the general contractor based only on allegations that the sub was negligent.

Here is the issue accepted for review, as described on the high court's website: did a contract under which a subcontractor agreed to "defend any suit or action" against a developer "founded upon" any claim "growing out of the execution of the work" require the subcontractor to provide a defense to a suit against the developer even if the subcontractor was not negligent? Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., S141541, formerly published at 136 Cal.App.4th 304, mod. 136 Cal.App.4th 1181e, review granted 5/24/06.

Cal. Supremes Accept Two More Employment Cases

2006-03-01T12:47:00.000-08:00

In its last conference of February, 2006, the California Supreme Court has added another two employment cases to the list of those it will decide in forthcoming months. This brings the current count to 14 employment matters accepted for review. The two latest are:

Reimbursement. May an employer comply with its Labor Code section 2802 duty, to indemnify employees for expenses they necessarily incur in the discharge of their duties, by paying the employees increased wages or commissions instead of reimbursing them for their actual expenses? Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc., S139555, review granted 2/22/06, formerly at 133 Cal.App.4th 985

Meal breaks. (1) Is a Labor Code section 226.7 claim for the required payment of “one additional hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of compensation” for each day that an employer fails to provide mandatory meal or rest periods to an employee (see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11010, subds. (11)(D), 12(B)) governed by the three-year statute of limitations for a claim for compensation (Code Civ. Proc., § 338) or the one-year statute of limitations for a claim for payment of a penalty (Code Civ. Proc., § 340)? (2) When an employee obtains an award on such a wage claim in administrative proceedings and the employer seeks de novo review in superior court, can the employee pursue additional wage claims not presented in the administrative proceedings? Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc., S140308, review granted 2/22/06, formerly at 134 Cal.App.4th 728.

California: Sophisticated User Doctrine On The Block

2006-01-23T16:57:00.000-08:00

In early January, the California Supreme Court agreed to hear an issue hotly debated in products cases around the country: (1) Does the sophisticated user doctrine apply in California? (2) If so, does it apply to strict liability causes of action, and who qualifies as a "sophisticated user?" Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., S139206, 133 Cal.App.4th 496, review granted 1/4/06.

Cal. Supreme Court Looking Into The New "SLAPPBack" Statute

2006-01-18T13:31:00.000-08:00

In October, 2005, Cal. CCP section 425.18 - the "SLAPPback" statute - became effective as emergency legislation. No, a "SLAPPback" is not some rule of tort or family law. It's any lawsuit (1) containing a cause of action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process, (2) that arises from a prior cause of action that has been dismissed pursuant to a special (anti-SLAPP) motion to strike under section 425.16. (CCP section 425.18, (b)(1).) This statute is like a foreign film: needs subtitles.

The new statute relaxes and eliminates some of the anti-SLAPP statute's (section 425.16's) reuirements in "SLAPPback" situations. For example, 425.18, subdivision (h) bars the defendant in the SLAPPback suit from filing an anti-SLAPP motion where the trial court granted an anti-SLAPP motion against the then-plaintiff, now defendant in the underlying action. English translation: if a party's original lawsuit has been dismissed by the granting of a special motion to strike, and the opposing party responds with an abuse of process or malicious prosecution action, the original plaintiff (now the defendant) cannot file an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the second, SLAPPback suit. Evidently the granting of the first motion to strike in the first action renders that lawsuit illegal as a matter of law.

The ink on the SLAPPback statute was barely dry when the California Supreme Court was requesting briefing on the effect of this statute to pending cases. The court had already granted review in three, fully-briefed anti-SLAPP cases: Soukup v. Stock, S126864, Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, S126715, and Flatley v. Mauro, S128429. Its early November order sought supplemental briefing on: (1) whether the new SLAPPback statute should be applied retroactively to pending cases, and (2) if so, what is the new statute's effect on the issues on which the court granted review in these three cases, particularly subdivision (h). Subdivision (h), for those of you who don't live and breathe this stuff, says: “A special motion to strike may not be filed against a SLAPPback by a party whose filing or maintenance of the prior cause of action from which the SLAPPback arises was illegal as a matter of law.”

The court heard argument at the end of May. Decisions are expected by late summer.

Review Granted: Standing to Bring Shareholder Derivative Action

2006-01-15T11:45:00.000-08:00

The California Supreme Court has agreed to review a case on whether shareholder standing to bring a derivative action is governed by the corporate internal affairs doctrine. Here is the issue, as framed by the court's "weekly summary."

(1) Does the question of standing to bring a shareholder’s derivative action based on share ownership involve the “internal affairs” of a corporation and thus invoke the internal affairs doctrine, under which matters regulating the internal affairs of a corporation are governed by the law of the state of incorporation (here Delaware)? (2) If not, did plaintiff retain standing under California law to prosecute a shareholder’s derivative action even though he lost his shares in the corporation while the action was pending, or does California, like Delaware, require stock ownership throughout the litigation?
Grosset v. Wenaas, S139285, formerly at 133 Cal.App.4th 710, review granted 1/4/06.

Review Granted in FEHA Case Redux.

2005-12-08T15:55:00.000-08:00

The California Supreme Court has granted review in yet another FEHA case. This one will no doubt make considerable waves well beyond the employment realm. The issue is whether an employee who uses marijuana off-duty for medical purposes under the Compassionate Use Act, has a FEHA claim for disability discrimination, or a common law tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Ross v. Ragingwire Telecommunications, Inc. formerly published at 132 Cal.App.4th 590, No. S138130, review granted 11/30/05.

9th Circuit Increasing Size of En Banc Panels

2005-11-20T11:03:00.000-08:00

Effective January 1, 2006, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals will up the number of judges participating in en banc rehearing panels from 11 to 15.

Federal appeals initially are decided by three judge panels. The en banc procedure, used to rehear certain decisions, was designed to maintain uniformity of decisions within a circuit and to resolve exceptionally important issues of law. As a result of this rule amendment, now a majority of Ninth Circuit judges - the Circuit has 28 judges in all - will be participating in en banc hearings.

In a news release, Chief Judge Mary M. Schroeder said the court has been pleased with the 11-judge panel, but this rule change is "intended to respond to criticism tthat we should have a majority of our active judges sitting on each en banc."

This is a positive step. Given its sheer size, it's not unheard of to see conflicting opinions on the same legal issue coming out of different three-judge panels. Now, with a majority of judges involved in the en banc rehearing process, that may change. It will be interesting to see if the new rule has any effect on the number of en banc requests that are granted. According to the news release, in 2004 the Ninth Circuit received 827 requests for rehearing en banc. It granted 22.

Cal. Supremes Review Granted: FEHA Disability Discrimination

2005-11-16T17:23:00.000-08:00

Adding to its already lengthy caseload of employment law matters, on November 16 the California Supreme Court granted review yet again, this time on the burden of proof in a FEHA disability discrimination case. As framed by the Court's online Weekly Summary, the issue is: to establish a prima facie case under the Fair Employment and Housing Act for employment discrimination based on disability, who bears the burden of proof? Does plaintiff bear the burden of proving that he or she is capable of performing the job's essential duties, or does the employer have the burden of proving plaintiff was not capable of performing those duties? Green v. State of California, formerly at 132 Cal.App.4th 97, S137770, review granted 11/16/05.

Link to U.S. Supreme Court Merits Briefs

2005-11-16T11:26:00.000-08:00

This may not be news to you, but it was to me. Merits briefs that have been filed in the U.S. Supreme Court are available online from the ABA. For link to this wonderful, wonderful and yet again wonderful resource, click here.

U.S. Supremes Resolve Circuit Split On Education Plans For Disabled Children

2005-11-16T07:49:00.000-08:00

On Monday, the Supreme Court ended the debate in the circuit courts of appeal on the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.A. section 1400, et seq. The IDEA - just think of the punning possibilities - requires school districts to design individual education plans for each disabled child. The circuits were split on who bears the burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing challenging if the plan meets the Act's requirement of a "free appropriate public education." Schaffer v. Weast held the party challenging the plan - typically the parent(s) - has the burden.

Schaffer invoked the general rule that where a statute is silent, the burden of persuasion typically rests with the challenging party. Any other rule would effectively mean the parents can make the plan presumptively invalid just by contesting it. (Neat trick.) Notably, the six justice majority observed that requiring schools to bear the burden of proving their plans are valid would drain "marginal dollars" out of the actual education budget and into the coffers of lawyers. Here's a link to the slip opinion.

Cal. Supremes' Audiocasts Available

2005-11-03T08:32:00.000-08:00

The Cal. Supreme Court website has a new feature, useful not only to law students but to any lawyer unfamiliar with supreme court practice. Audiocasts of oral argument are now available. Alas, so far only a handful of arguments have been put online. Click here for the link.

Cal. Supremes Grant Review In Another Arbitration Case

2005-11-03T07:48:00.000-08:00

Just last week, the California Supreme Court granted review on an arbitration question that has been plaguing litigants for years. Who decides - trial court or arbitrator - if the arbitration claim is barred by the arbitration statute of limitations?

As framed in the Court's online Weekly Summaries, the issue is: when a party seeks to compel arbitration, may the trial court decide if a claim is barred by a statute of limitations, as part of determining whether the party waived the right to arbitrate under CCP § 1281.2(a), or is application of a statute of limitations always resolved by the arbitrator? Wagner Construction Co. v. Pacific Mechanical Corp., S136255, unpublished opinion, review granted 10/26/05.

Issues Pending In The California Supreme Court

2005-09-18T15:59:00.000-07:00

The California Supreme Court's website is a veritable goldmine of information. Unfortunately, it's not organized in a way that allows lawyers and clients to easily track issues the court has accepted for decision. We're not aware of any site that regularly provides comprehenisve and up to date information on all civil cases.

Appellatestrategist.com has organized the pending issues according to subject matter. We will update periodically, as new reviews are granted, or opinions issued on old ones. Hope it's useful.

Employment

Insurance

Torts & Products

Health Care

ADR

Attorney-Related

Damages

Anti-SLAPP Procedure

B & P 17200/class actions/commercial

Other

What Is Appellate "Strategy?"

2005-09-09T13:14:00.000-07:00

Many clients – and lawyers – see an appeal as a stand-alone device, a bit of extra insurance should things go wrong at trial. Do discovery, try the case, and, if you get hit, call the appellate lawyer to draft a brief or two. That's a common misperception which, unfortunately, limits the power of an appeal to put things right.

Where huge dollars are at stake or a question important to an entire industry will be decided, clients and trial lawyers should be keeping an eye on the eventual appeal from day one. That’s the only way to maximize the chances of prevailing on appeal.

Identifying and framing issues. Unlike the trial lawyer, whose principal goal is persuading juries and trial judges, the hallmark of the good appellate lawyer is his or her ability to analyze, identify and craft legal issues. The courts of appeal have the power to make or change the law. The appellate strategist is trained not only in spotting and formulating issues to pique the panel's interest, but in providing persuasive reasons why the rule should be changed, limited or extended. They can help identify issues in your case, and assist in framing them, for maximum effect.

Consulting during trial. Appeals can be won or lost long before the notice of appeal is filed. The failure to object, preserve the record or raise an issue, can sink your chances of success . The appellate strategist can be invaluable in helping identify key issues, properly frame and preserve them, draft key dispositive motions, jury instructions, offers of proof and even trial briefs.

Grooming the test case. When the issue may affect an entire industry, or set the stage for other cases, corporate defendants should be looking for the proper case or cases to test the issue. Often, the goal is a published opinion, with precedential value, announcing to the world, e.g., that the defendant's product is defect free. Case selection can be critical. The test case must have the right kind of facts, with the minimum of procedural distractions. Venue - at trial and on appeal - should be considered, evaluated along with a host of other factors geared to maximizing chances on appeal. That's where the big picture appellate strategist comes in.

Preserving the record. Appellate courts live by two cardinal rules.

· They do not retry the case. They will not disturb the jury's fact and witness credibility findings. They look for prejudicial legal error, and typically apply presumptions in favor of the party who won below. The failure to object to an irrelevant, inflammatory piece of evidence will not be grounds for reversing the judgment. Not offering a proper jury instruction, or failing to propose corrections to incomplete or misleading ones, may limit the arguments for reversal available on appeal.

That's where the appellate strategist comes in, an insurance policy to button down issues of reversible error for appeal.

· If it's not in the record, it didn't happen. Take a photo with no film in the camera, and you have no picture. That’s also true of appellate courts. For example they will not even consider a critical ruling sabotaging your case, made at a sidebar conference with no reporter. The failure to make an offer of proof on what your excluded evidence would have shown typically sinks your chances to argue exclusion of evidence as a ground for reversal on appeal.

The appellate strategist knows when and how to assist in making the best possible record to maximize the chances of success should the need for an appeal arise.

Punitive Damages Corner

2005-08-24T06:35:00.000-07:00

Tina Imre Biography

2005-08-23T21:52:00.000-07:00

Tina Imre is a partner and head of the Los Angeles Appellate Department of Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold LLP. An appellate strategist, she specializes in representing corporate defendants in cases presenting institutional issues and punitive damages. But her practice isn't limited to appellate and supreme courts. She frequently consults during trial of complex matters, helping to craft legal arguments, properly posture the case and preserve the record for appeal. A recognized expert on punitive damages and high-exposure appeals, she is regularly interviewed and quoted by the national media.

In the last few years, Ms. Imre has

eliminated over half a billion dollars in verdicts against her clients
handled or consulted on cases in California, Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Kentucky, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Utah, Pennsylvania, New Mexico and Texas
been involved in 500 appeals and has dozens of published opinions on punitive damages, constitutional issues, insurance , class actions, mass or complex torts.

RECENT REPRESENTATIVE CLIENTS.
Selected as appellate counsel for: Goodrich v. Aetna, appeal from the largest judgment ever entered nationwide against an HMO; for the Catholic Church in coordinated punitive damages cases; appeal from a 200-plaintiff construction defect case

PUBLICATIONS.
100-page monograph on punitive damages after State Farm v. Campbell, available at wlf.org
writes a monthly column on the California Supreme Court
wrote three chapters of a major treatise on appellate practice,
contributing editor (six chapters) to the leading treatise on California Insurance Law,
numerous monographs and articles on punitive damages, insurance and appellate advocacy

RECENT LECTURES: Punitive Damages, Insurance, Appellate.

American Conference Institute (San Francisco and Miami);
Association of California Insurance Companies (Las Vegas);
Insurance Brokers & Agents of the West (Hawaii);
Cal. Continuing Education of the Bar (Los Angeles, Orange County);
Private insurer organizations (Continental U.S. & Bermuda)
Rutter Group (San Francisco)

SOME RECENT HONORS/AWARDS.

Voted by her peers a “Southern California Super Lawyer” for 2004 and 2005 by Los Angeles Magazine & Journal for Law & Politics
Named one of the “50 Most Powerful Women in Los Angeles Law” by the Los Angeles Business Journal
Fellow, California Academy of Appellate Lawyers
CEB Board of Governors and Advisory Committee