Outside The Box

Confidence Is Key

2009-01-24T00:01:00.000-08:00

In case you are not aware, the MLB Front Office Dynasty League Inaugural Draft is underway. Bestowed upon me was the second overall pick. With the obvious choice in Hanley taken first, I was left with some interesting options. I could go with the conventional hitter--the one that would go second overall in a normal league such as Pujols or Alex Rodriguez; or even Wright or Reyes--but I chose instead a more, for lack of a better term, unconventional approach by selecting Tim Lincecum.

Lincecum certainly has his obvious good points: he is young, salary controlled for the next five years or so, and is dominant. While it was not completely unexpected, it was far from what was expected. It was a surprise.

Many times in a draft you will be forced to decide either to pick with conventional standings or with your own. Depending on the situation, sometimes I will make the "safe" selection, and other times I'll reach for my guy.

In this particular instance, the advantage I had was time. Pressured by a ticking clock I probably would have taken someone like David Wright, but with time I became convinced Lincecum is the best pick for my team, for my general strategy for this league.

In league with as many custom settings as this one, it is much easier to make that surprise selection. In a 5X5 roto league, however oftentimes you hesitate before taking the guy you want. And instead of taking Kevin Youkilis you wind up with Paul Konerko.

The key to being able to make surprise picks is confidence. You cannot be afraid of being criticized after the pick, and you have to know that the confidence stems from you doing your homework pre-draft. Confidence based on nothing is not the same.

I did my homework, and even though the pick brought out some warranted noise, I feel good about it. Without giving away of my strategy for the rest of this awesome draft, Tiny Tim allows me to keep many options open for later picks.

When you are in your draft this year and you are deciding between reaching for the player you want now, or taking a safe pick now and hoping your guy falls to the next round, in most instances I say reach for your player, but only if you are confident, and only you can know if you truly are.

The Importance of Distribution

2009-01-10T00:02:00.000-08:00

An important part of drafting is knowing which positions should be weighed more heavily because of positional scarcity. That is the only reason why catchers like Victor Martinez or Brian McCann get selected in the 3rd round with the sluggers. They most likely will put up worse numbers overall than their non-catching counterparts (i.e. other hitters taken in the third round) but still provide equal value because of the weaker catchers your opponents will be forced to choose from in the later rounds, while you can get better production from those leftover first basemen.

Obviously the crux of this whole operation is being able to determine which positions should be deemed scarce and which should be deep. First of all, this has to be a projection-based operation. Using the stats of last year won't do any good because the depth of positions change every year. People return from injury, people retire, and people break out; if you cannot at least attempt to take into account future production you will always be living a year behind. A simple spreadsheet of Marcel projections--or any other projection system's projections--will suffice.

So now that we have the projections all ready to go, but what do we do with them? A logical method seems to be to take the average wOBA (or OPS or WPA/LI, whatever) of all the players' projections in a given position and rank them in order, form best to worst. There you go, there are your scarcity rankings.

Hold on, there. You are forgetting something important. Average does not tell you the entire story. Consider this scenario:

There are two groups of three hitters. In group A the three batters' batting averages are 0.280, 0.300, and 0.320; and in group B the batting averages are 0.200, 0.300, and 0.400.

Both of the averages (means) of the (batting) averages are 0.300, but if you were to imagine the two groups of hitters are two different positions to draft from, it becomes apparent that selecting a player from group B is more valuable than one from group A.

Thus, it is also important to look at how the projections are distributed around the mean. It is a normal distribution or uneven distribution.

If two positions have relatively similar average levels of production, then taking a look at the distribution can be an important deciding factor. If the distribution involves a few outlying players far above the mean, a sharp drop off, and then a gathering of players slightly below the average, then drafting one of those few outliers should be a priority. And vice versa, if there is a significant bunching of players just above the average, and a subsequent grouping of players well below the average, then perhaps waiting to take a player from that position is ideal. The first player taken might not be much better than the tenth. Make sure to recognize where that sharp drop off is though, and make sure you err on the side of caution so that you do not end up having to select after it.

This is a similar concept to tiered rankings where players are not just ranked in order but also in separated grouping of players of comparable ability. Generally speaking, it is desirable to select players toward the bottom of their tiers because they put up similar numbers to players taken ahead of them. Of course the risk exists that all of the players in a tier get selected and you are forced to select from the next lower tier.

Overall, distribution of talent throughout a position is something important to take into consideration when it comes to the issue of position scarcity. Catchers may be relatively bad, but if they are all similarly bad then it makes no sense to draft one of the other. I'm not saying that this is the case with catchers this year for I have yet to run the numbers for 2009, something you can expect in future column.

Run Percentage, Run: Part II

2008-12-20T00:05:00.000-08:00

Back in September, I wrote an article about runs and basically created my own statistic, one that measures the ratio of how many times a player scored to the times he was on base. Today I am going to release the numbers-- not that you could not calculate them on your own--so you can peruse them yourself.

www.mlbfrontoffice.com/outsidethebox.htm/run_percentage/run%20percentage.xls

There is the file; click, download, and save if you wish.

I will admit that Run Percentage is not tremendously useful in its barest form as I have it now. Just looking at the player with the highest R%, Nick Swisher, will tell you why. While naturally you would expect a regression back to the average R% next year, you cannot expect that anymore because he is a Yankee.

Finding team average R% would help make this statistic more useful, especially for players that switch teams in the off season.

Most statistics in baseball have other statistics that attempt to quantify luck involved in the first statistic. ERA has LIPS ERA and FIP. Batting average has BABIP, Line Drive Percentage, and Contact Percentage. Runs has no such statistic.

Runs, however, are dependent on the other fantasy statistics like Batting Average and Home Runs. So even if Nick Swisher's Run Percentage is likely to regress in the future, I am still expecting his Run total to increase in 2009 because most people agree he was unlucky in the Batting Average and to a lesser extent the Home Run department. And, also because of the move to New York I mentioned before.

Run Percentage should be something to consider if you do try and predict run totals for next season, though. One of many.

Fenzy-less Free Agency

2008-12-06T08:36:00.000-08:00

In past years, the free agent signing period has been characterized by great players getting ceiling-breaking contracts and decent players getting undeserved contracts. Think Carlos Silva getting 4 years, $48 million, Barry Zito getting $126 million over 7 years, and even Eric Gagne getting $10 mil over 1 year (somehow).

This years free agency period, however, is shaping up a little differently than in the past. Not because the best players will not be getting ceiling-breaking contracts---Mark Teixeira and C.C. Sabathia will get the long-term, big-money deals we'd expect---but because those players that fall into the decent-to-good bracket are not getting the contracts received by their counterparts of years past.

Today the news came out that Rafael Furcal rejected a four year deal from the Athletics worth about $8-9 million a year. While Furcal is not coming off a tremendous season because of injuries, he is still the only decent shortstop available on the market.

Still, the A's were the only team offering a four year deal, but he had to reject it because it would have meant taking a 4 million dollar pay cut from a free agency contract. That was unheard of before this year (in the context of recent years) for a player of Furcal's caliber.

Other players like Bobby Abreu, Adam Dunn, and Pat Burrell are not being offered arbitration from their respective teams, because the Yankees, D'Backs, and Phillies were afraid the players would accept the deals offered to them.

Why would Adam Dunn accept a 1 year, $15 million arbitration offer in his free agent year? Because he knows that he would receive significantly less money in the free agent market, and he is willing to forgo the security of a multi-year contract for more money in 2009. Then he would become a free agent again in 2010, and from his perspective, hopefully the market will have reversed itself.

Personally, I do not see that happening. Players hitting their free agent year in 2010 will see much of the same compared to what is going on this year. Unfortunate, yes, for these players, but overall the sign of smarter front offices.

Well that and the economy, too.

'Perts Draft

2008-11-29T00:02:00.000-08:00

Tomorrow night I will be participating in an expert's mock draft over at Mock Draft Central hosted by Chris Mulligan of Behind the Plate Fantasy. While you most likely will not be able to participate in said draft (there remains the possibility that a few readers will sneak in if enough experts cannot make it) you can view the results.

I'm actually not sure if you can view them, so if you can't, I will definitely will post them here Monday and give my feelings on the draft next Saturday. There is a lot to be learned from the preliminary rankings expert's give in early mock drafts, even though our opinions will change significantly from now till the start of the season on a number of players.

Participating will also be MLBFO's own Kevin Orris so I'm excited about that. Check back Monday for results and Saturday for the commentary.

UPDATE: Monday - to see the results of the draft, click here. I'll be giving you my take this Saturday. Stay tuned, folks.

~~~

Commentary

I went into this draft without much of a strategy except my basic avoid pitching early strategy which I consider a given. Here we go:

I was surprised that A-Rod fell to me wit the fourth overall pick; I was expecting either Reyes or Wright to fall to me, but its no big deal. Alex is perfectly fine with me.

I was not sure what to do with my second round pick, and I sort of just took Berkman as a safe choice although I'm not particularly happy with the pick. You cannot be unhappy about Lance Berkman, but he does not get my excited either. Looking at the players drafted after him, though, I think I made the right selection.

Rounds 3 and 4 I was simply looking to add a few more sluggers and I certainly did that with Manny and Adrian. I was not drafting for a specific player per se, more for a type of player. I have not done my projections for next year yet, so it is not that I think Manny will be better than Markakis or Carlos Lee, it's more that he was just higher on the MDC draft window.

In a real draft I would never take Halladay, but I saw him sitting daintily out there in round 5 and decided to snatch him. Pitching is ridiculously deep this year (as it has been the past few years) and I might not take a pitcher in the first 12 rounds of some drafts. Who knows.

My pick of Rafael Furcal in round 6 is one of my favorites---the shortstop position is pretty shallow---and my selection of him kicked off a shortstop run that lasted until round 8. If you don't get your shortstop by the end of that run, you are in serious trouble. The next one selected was Miguel Tejada in round 11! Whether you want to kick off or finish that run is up to you, but I suggest being a part of it (or getting one of the Rollins, Reyes, Hanley). None of the shortstops picked later interest me.

Aubrey Huff was another solid pick in my opinion. If you look at some of the hitters drafted in front of (Ethier, Hardy) and behind him (Young, Atkins) I think he is the best of the bunch.

Chris Iannetta in round 8 was my first "risky" pick of the night, but I have no problem defending it. With two catchers spots to fill they were in short supply, so I was willing to err on the side of aggressiveness, even though it is possible I could have waited another round to select him. In future drafts I will most-likely target that 14-16th round group---Bengie Molina, Kurt Suzuki, and Dioner Navarro---which I think provides good value.

Three of my next four selections were pitchers in Felix, Wainwright, and Myers, and I selected them to fill space with quality arms. Right there in the middle however, is Pat Burrell, who somehow fell to me in round 11. Looking at some outfielders taken before him... Lastings Milledge and Brad Hawpe... I'll take Burrell anyday even with the fat paycheck that might cause a lack of motivation.

I would not look to deep into any picks I made after that because I have not decided exactly who my late round sleepers will be. Make of them what you will.

Okay, that's it! I hope you can take something away from this draft and start getting in on a few of your own. Drafting with such of great group of guys is always fun, even if the draft doesn't count for eggs.

The Beasts of Roto

2008-11-15T00:01:00.000-08:00

Every player contributes differently to your fantasy team. Some players contribute positively in some aspects and negatively or neutral in others.

Think of some players like Adam Dunn, Ichiro Suzuki, and Alex Rodriguez. Dunn is a two category contributor, supplying value in the RBI and Home Run categories. Ichiro is a three category contributor, giving value in Runs, Stolen Bases and Batting Average. Then there are the Alex Rodriguez' of fantasy baseball; the five category contributors; the Beasts of Roto.

How often does a player put up impressive numbers in all five major rotisserie categories? That is the question I plan on answering in this article.

The first step is to determine the bench marks of what is impressive in each category. I decided on a .300 average, 100 Runs and RBI, 20 Stolen Bases, and 30 Home Runs. Disagree with me on this if you want, it is still my study.

After searching through the numbers of the past eight seasons, all the way back to 2000, the answer is not many players achieve this level of versatility. Here is the chart with the results:

Year   Beasts
2000     1
2001     1
2002     2
2003     0
2004     1
2005     2
2006     0
2007     2
2008     0

As you can see of the nine years four of them had no "beasts" and the most in one year was only two. There were some players who would get fit the criteria in four of the five categories, but fall just short in one. Alex Rodriguez actually had at least a .300 average, 100 Runs and RBI, and over 30 home runs but only18 steals--two short-- twice!

Interestingly enough Alex Rodriguez also made the list of "beasts" twice in his career also, both in 2005 and 2007. For those interested, here are the rest of the beasts listed after the year they accomplished this feat:

2000: Andruw Jones (look where he is now)
2001: Vladimir Guerrero (A-Rod and Cliff Floyd both missed it by two steals)
2002: Alfonso Soriano and Vlad Guerrero (again)
2003: nobody, but Gary Sheffield missed by two steals
2004: Bobby Abreu
2005: Alex Rodriguez and Jason Bay
2006: nobody, but Carlos Lee missed it by one steal!
2007: David Wright and Alex Rodriguez
2008: nobody, but Lance Berkman was one Home Run and two steals shy.

What's important to take away from this for your fantasy team is how rare and valuable these 5X5 roto studs are. That means most of the players you will target are either stand-outs in one category or competent across several. I don't think you should necessarily target either type of these players.

Certain categories are better suited for each type of player, based on the distribution of the data for that specific category. Either the distribution is equal or unequal. Categories that have equal distribution (seen well in graph form) are best suited for competent players. Conversely, those with uneven distribution favor one-category wonders.

In a future article we will take a look at the distribution of fantasy stats in 2008. Keep in mind that it will not mean that the distribution for that stat will be the same in 2009, though.

The ADP Deviant Competition

2008-11-01T02:00:00.000-07:00

In last week's edition of Outside the Box, I made available for download the Average Draft Position numbers from both Yahoo and ESPN leagues. At the end of the article I said we'll compare the ADP numbers to the actual end of season ranks to see which site had better drafters. I was not lying, that is exactly what we are going to do this week.

Although finding out which site's ADP numbers are more accurate would not necessarily tell us which site had smarter people drafting on it, but rather which site had better preseason rankings. I brought this up in last Saturday's article and instead of paraphrasing myself, I'll just reprint what I wrote last week.

Although the results would not indicate which site had smarter people draft, but more so which site had better rankings. The order of available players in the drafting window probably influences the ADP numbers more than anything else.

So now we know what the results will tell us, but the question remains how to get the results. We could just look at the numbers and just tell by mental note which site seems to be doing better, or we can do it technically.

I'm in the mood for some number-crunching so I'm going to determine the better site by finding the standard deviation of each sites ADP numbers to final rankings. The lower the deviation, the better so whichever site checks in lower wins.

Standard deviation is a pretty common calculation in statistics classes, but I understand not of you have taken a statistics class or maybe you just didn't do very well in the subject. That's okay, I'll run through the operation quickly right now and also give you a link to a clear and concise Wikipedia page on Standard Deviation.

Here is the link to the Wikipedia page and for those too lazy or good for links, I'll do a quick rundown of the steps:

1) Find the mean (average) of the numbers
2) Subtract the mean from each number
3) Square the numbers resulted from Step 2
4) Find the mean (average) of the numbers resulted from Step 3
5) Take the square root of the mean calculated in Step 4

There you have it, the five steps to calculating Standard Deviation. Now let's move onward.

To save me some time, I'm only going to use the first 100 players drafted and for players like Victor Martinez whose rank is extremely bad because of injuries, I'll set their final rank at the somewhat arbitrary 400. Let's see those results!

~~~ Standard Deviation ~~~
+----------------------+
| Yahoo  ~~~~~~ ESPN   |
+----------------------+
| 123.24  ~~~~ 116.92  |
~+----------------------+~

As you can see from the spiffy chart I created, ESPN narrowly edged out Yahoo. The difference between the pre-season ADP rank and the final season rank based on stats was about 6 spots closer in ESPN leagues. Notice how off the ranks were, though.

I'm not saying these sites give bad advice because I don't believe any other drafting site has significantly better numbers, but just realize how difficult it is to predict future performance. Perhaps fantasy Baseball is not the best thing to put your money on.

ADP Data

2008-10-25T00:03:00.000-07:00

One of the best ways to find the perceived value of a player in fantasy baseball is not through looking at stats such as FIP or OPS, but rather though looking at a player's Average Draft Position (ADP).

In my first article for MLB Front Office, all the way back in the beginning of June, (which is really not that long ago) I discussed ways to determine how others value players. I suggested that the ProTrade market values are good for that purpose. ADP issimilar in that its real value comes from what it can tell you about what other people think, but can also be used as a tool to form your own opinions about players.

Finding ADP numbers for the current season is fairly easy; both Yahoo and ESPN have those numbers readily available. However the numbers for past seasons are near impossible to find, probably because they don't exist. (as in they get taken off the internet) Because of this, I've decided to start my own database of ADP numbers and I invite you to start one with me.

I've compiled the Yahoo and ESPN ADP numbers and put them into spreadsheets sorted by position. If you find this data useful or interesting (or both!) feel free to click the links below to download both the Yahoo and ESPN data.

www.mlbfrontoffice.com/outsidethebox.htm/Yahoo%20ADP%20Data.xls

www.mlbfrontoffice.com/outsidethebox.htm/ESPN%20ADP%20Data.xls

Maybe next week well compare the two sites and see which one drafted smarter. Although the results would not indicate which site had smarter people draft, but more so which site had better rankings. The order of available players in the drafting window probably influences the ADP numbers more than anything else.

Kleptomaniacs of 08

2008-10-18T13:46:00.000-07:00

Stealing bases is an important aspect of fantasy baseball. Duh, you know that. Regardless of the value of a stolen base in "real" baseball, in fantasy it is one-fifth of the hitting categories in standard leagues. Having the most steals in a league is worth the same as having the most home runs, the highest average, etc.

So let's take a look at the top base-stealers this year, not by total stolen bases, but by stolen base percentage, which is simply stolen bases/stolen base attempts. I set the minimum stolen base total at 15 because we don't want a guy who stolen seven bases in eight attempts to show up.

Here's a list of the top ten sorted by SB Efficiency:

Player       SB      CS      SB Efficiency
Jason Werth        20       1        95%
Dustin Pedroi      20       1        95%
Jimmy Rollins      47       3        94%
Matt Holliday      28       2        93%
Ian Kinsler        26       2        93%
Randy Winn         25       2        93%
Ichiro Suzuki      43       4        91%
Willy Taveras      68       7        91%
Luis Castillo      17       2        89%
Carlos Beltra      25       3        89%

This list certainly contains some of the elite base-stealers like Willy Taveras, Ichiro, and Jimmy Rollins, but how about Jason Werth and Dustin Pedroia finding their way to the top. Werth gets most of his attention from his power numbers, but 20 steals in just 21 attempts shows he has the speed to repeat that type of total.

Of course this is not the most accurate method--this probably is-- but I would think the player on this list will at least maintain their stolen base totals next season. I won't guarantee improvement because there are too many factors like managerial preference and opportunity I am not taking into account. Also, there is the rationality that teams will pay more attention to these players on the basepaths next year

For the players coming next, those that constitute the bottom 10 of the list above, I pretty much guarantee that their stolen base totals will not rise next season. They were given the green light plenty of times and did not follow through often. It would not surprise me if next season, mangers will be more hesitant to give the steal sign to these players. They are:

    Player       SB      CS   SB Efficiency
Ryan Theriot        22      13       63%
Bobby Abreu         22      11       67%
Brandon Philli      23      10       70%
Nick Punto          15       6       71%
Eugenio Velez       15       6       72%
Denard Span         18       7       72%
Chone Figgans       34      13       72%
Lastings Mille      24       9       73%
B.J. Upton          44      16       73%
Coco Crisp          20       7       74%

Take a look at these players and just keep an eye out for them on draft day. If your drafting Bobby Abreu for his hitting ability, that's fine. But don't expect the same stolen base production next year.

Fifth Time's the Charm?

2008-10-11T00:02:00.000-07:00

The MLB Draft is probably the most complained about aspect of major league baseball. There are many subtle quirks and loopholes that ultimately lead to confusion when they come into play. Take this year's Pedro Alvarez episode. The newly installed signing deadline for draft picks came into play when Pedro Alvarez's deal with the Pirates was reportedly submitted to the commissioner's office past the midnight deadline.

It was then decided the situation would be resolved through an arbiter, but no one knew if Alvarez would have to sign the original deal, be allowed to negotiate a new deal, or be forced to re-enter next year's draft. Skipping the gritty details, about a month later Alvarez and the Pirates were allowed to negotiate a new deal, which was basically the same as the old one.

Have I forgot to mention Scott Boras was involved in all of this? No one has taken advantage of the weak draft rules as much as Scott Boras, and in doing so has helped to highlight the many problems with the entire drafting system. I have many issues--from the compensatory picks to suggestive slotting to the international signing procedure with the drafting system myself.

I like to equate it to the nation's economy. To start off, neither is working very well. Bud Selig represents the incapable leaders in government who do not know how to correct the issues. Scott Boras is the corrupt CEOs and suits on Wall St. who take advantage of the system and as a byproduct point out its weaknesses. I feel like I could go farther with this metaphor but everyone gets the point so I'll stop.

I could talk all day about the drafting system and how I feel it should be fixed, but instead I'd like to talk about one player, Matt Harrington. Matt Harrington holds the MLB draft record of being selected in the most drafts at five. Here is the story of how that happened.

Matt Harrington was the seventh overall pick in the 2000 draft by the Colorado Rockies. His agent at the time was Tommy Tanzer, and Tanzer was asking for a ridiculous signing bonus of just under five million dollars. Josh Hamilton, the first overall pick of the year before received a four million dollar bonus, so clearly Tanzer's asking price was a bit high.

The Rockies' final offer ended up being four million dollars, which Tanzer rejected so Harrington would have to return to playing unprofessionally and entering the draft next year. Feeling they had been given terrible advice, Harrington and his family would fire Tanzer and even tried to sue him. To replace Tanzer the Harringtons would hire... you guessed it... Scott Boras.

In the 2001 draft, Harrington was selected 58th overall by the San Diego Padres. Fifty-eighth is still respectable, but far from last year's seventh overall. Regardless, Boras was confident he could garner Harrington a contract near last year's enticing four million, major league deal. The Padres were staunch negotiators and 1.2 million was the largest contract offered. Not surprisingly, Boras declined that offer and Harrington once again went through the draft unsigned. Just for perspective, Harrington was only 19 years old at the time of this draft.

Harrington would begin 2002 in the world of independent league baseball. In 32.1 innings he posted an unspectacular 6.68 ERA with just 25 strikeouts to 24 walks. Regardless of his struggles, Harrington was still selected in the 2002 draft, this time however in the 13th round (374 overall) by the Rays. The Rays offered average slot money, around 10,000 to 20,000 dollars. Harrington's stock was falling fast, but he still did not sign the contract. He would have to wait until next year.

In 2003, as a 21 year old, Harrington was running out of options. He was drafted in the 24th round--711th overall--by the Cincinatti Reds but failed to agree on terms to a contract. If they had come to agreement, the signing bonus would have been virtually non-existent, especially compared to the 4+ million dollar deal he was offered three years ago, or even the 1.2 million two years ago.

This is the part of the story where you start to feel bad for Matt Harrington, as his career is obviously circling the drain. He was drafted again in 2005--for the fifth time--by the Yankees in the 36th round or the 1,089th overall pick. They didn't even offer him a contract.

Despite having gone through all of this, Harrington was just 23 years old and was still determined to make it to the major leagues. Although his first obstacle was to at least make it into a minor league system. As per the prototypical Hollywood story, Harrington would experience a renaissance of sorts. In 2005 and 2006, Harrington would pitch with an Independent League team as a middle reliever. More than just pitching, he pitched well.

Well enough that in 2006 the Cubs were willing to give the now 24 year old Harrington a chance. They signed him over the 2006 offseason and gave him a shot to compete in their minor league system. However this is real life and not Hollywood, so the inevitable happy ending never came. Harrington was released by the Cubs early in 2007 and was forced again to play in Independent League baseball.

I am not sure of his current status, but I believe Harrington must have given up on trying to become a major leaguer. At 26 years old, he has passed the age when a player has the chance of becoming the next Brad Ziegler. It really is a shame to realize that Matt Harrington never received a signing bonus from any team over the course of everything. It is his fault he rejected the 4 million and 1 million dollar offers. I don't know if I could live with myself if I were him.

But hey, look on the bright side, now he gets an article written about him on MLB Front Office. So it's not all bad, although the MLB drafting system is.

First Round Success

2008-10-04T11:05:00.000-07:00

One of the things that bothers people most about baseball scouting is the unpredictability that comes with projections. Prospects pan out at a distressingly low rate, even top prospects like Homer Bailey (he still has a chance) or Bryan Bullington. Whereas in other sports, first-round draft picks have a good chance of becoming at the very minimum league-average players, in baseball first-round picks have a very low chance of even making the major leagues.

Let's take a look at some recent drafts to see exactly how many first-rounders have become at least average major leaguers. We will start with the 2000 draft. This draft was eight years ago, so any prospect that has not made the major leagues has a 0.1% chance of making it. Although ever once in a while you do get a Brad Ziegler or Chris Coste, but not often. Anyway, going down the list I crudely counted four players of the thirty to be at least average or above. They are Adrian Gonzalez (1st), Rocco Baldelli (6th), Chase Utley (15th), and Adam Wainwright (29th). Besides those four, the other 26 players have had embarrassingly bad major league stints, or have not been above embarrassingly low levels of the minor leagues. That is a 15% success rate. Not very good.

The 2001 draft did significantly better, producing 10 successful major leaguers for a 33% rate. And In 1999, nine players selected have become at least average for a 30% rate. Although my method has been extremely crude, I feel comfortable saying about 25-30% of first round picks pan out. That not only means that 8-9 of the first round picks of any given draft should become successful major leaguers, but also that every 3-4 years, one of a team's first-round selections should as well.

A team that has made it into the playoffs the past two years, has had fantastic success with first-round picks over the last some-odd years defying the "prospect odds". To be more specific, over a 6 year span from 1996-2002, the team drafted 5 successful major leaguers, four of which are important components of the team today.

Without further ado, the team is the Phillies of Philadelphia, and here are the players they selected:As you can see, the Phillies have enjoyed great success from their first-round selections over this six year period. Five of the players have become all-star caliber players, while the other two have at least played in the major leagues with some degree of success.

Pat Burrell carried the bulk of the offensive load for the Phillies in the beginning of the year when Ryan Howard was struggling. Although his bat cooled off as the season wore on, he still finished with a .250 average, 74 runs, 33 home runs, and 86 RBI.

Brett Myers had a 5.84 ERA through June 27th when the Phillies felt they had seen enough of him and sent him down to the minors for a month. After a month of reworking his game, Myers blasted back onto the big leagues going 7-4 with a 3.06 ERA. Over a stretch of eight consecutive starts from July 29 to September 5, Myers threw quality starts every time out.

Chase Utley has been an offensive force in the Phillies lineup for several years now, yet is also a player prone to having extreme hot/cold streaks. Regardless, when the streaks even out, Utley's end of season numbers always jump out for a second baseman and this year was no different. He batted .292, scored 113 times, hit 33 bombs, drove in 104 batters, and also tacked on 14 stolen bases.

Cole Hamels was by far the best starter for the Phillies this season and was also one of the best in the major leagues. He was a work-horse completing 227 innings, and also dominated batters with a 3.09 ERA and 196 strikeouts to just 53 walks.

So as you can see, drafting and developing first-round talent (not to forget Jimmy Rollins - 2nd round 1996 and Ryan Howard - 5th round 2001) has been monumental to the recent success of the Philadelphia Phillies franchise. When a first-round pick works out it is a great feeling--to have a team of homegrown talent like the Phillies do--but first-rounders can also cause the most distress.

First they take over a million dollars from your team in signing bonus. Then, they get promoted to higher levels of the organization, even if the promotion is not exactly deserved. And finally they continue to suck up playing time at Triple-A and hog a spot on the 40-man roster so the team loses John Santana in the Rule-4 Draft until five years later they sign with a team in Japan. Or, they get injured and always seem on the brink of breaking out, until getting injured again and blaming recent struggles on "nagging injuries". Or, they will finally get traded to another team (for next to nothing), where the "change of scenery" was all they needed to resurrect their career.

Whatever the case, it is usually not good.

No Longer the "Short"-Stops

2008-09-27T16:34:00.000-07:00

Back in the year 2000, there were basically 3-4 great hitting shortstops that carried the position into offensive respectability. Specifically Alex Rodriguez of the Mariners, Nomar Garciaparra of the Red Sox, and Derek Jeter of the Yankees. A-Rod hit 41 home runs that year, Nomar batted .372, and Jeter eclipsed the 200 hit mark with 201 (hits). Miguel Tejada of the Oakland Athletics would be the number four of that list with a solid 30 home runs, but he was clearly a notch below the top three because his WPA/LI was more than 2.00 points lower.

Over the next few years Nomar would inevitably get injured, Jeter would see a slight regression in his performance that brought him from elite to good, and A-Rod would move to third base in 2004. That year, 2004, only Miguel Tejada would break the 3.00 barrier in WPA/LI and in 2005 no short-stop did. The position had regressed to a weak position offensively speaking and fell into the class of second baseman and catchers.

Average SS OPS 
Year    OPS
2000    0.773
2001    0.746
2002    0.737
2003    0.740
2004    0.750
2005    0.751
2006    0.756
2007    0.755
2008    0.764

In 2006 some of the old, familiar faces filled the top of the short-stop ranks. Derek Jeter, Carlos Guillen, and Tejada being the three. But 2006 also saw the emergence of the future elite. In his second full season, Jose Reyes would post a .841 OPS after just a .687 OPS the year before. Although already established as a quick runner with gap-power, in 2006 Jimmy Rollins would also establish himself as a deep-power threat, doubling his home run total to 25. And after being traded from the Red Sox to the Marlins as part of the Beckett-Lowell deal, Hanley Ramirez, in his first full season, would blast onto the major league scene with a .292/.353/.480 slash line.

In 2007 all three short-stops would tally impressive numbers and bring the position back to the respectability it had 6-7 years ago. This led to, in 2008, the triumvirate of short-stops being taken on average in the first round of fantasy drafts. Ramirez, Reyes, Rollins was the pecking order, and after that Derek Jeter and Colorado's Troy Tulo were the next short-stops taken - albeit with a few rounds of gap in between.

Jumping now to the end of 2008, Ramirez, Reyes, and Rollins remain the top three short-stops in the game. They rank in the same order as they were drafted, but obviously a lot has changed. While Hanley and Reyes advanced their game, Rollins saw a huge drop in his production due mostly to a severe power outage. However, despite how much of a disappointment Rollins has been this year, he still was the third best short-stop and if you remember that he missed time early in the year with an ankle injury, his numbers don't look too far off from Reyes' comparatively.

Fantasy-wise, Rollins was still the third best short-stop in the game, helped mostly by his career-high 47 steals, but he wasn't ahead of a few other short-stops who will see their ADP (average draft position) rise significantly next year. The names with their ADP for 2008 in parentheses: J.J. Hardy (139), Jhonny Peralta (173), and Stephen Drew (210). I'm not going to give you their whole life story, but just a quick look at their past and what I expect from them next year.

Starting with J.J. Hardy, he was a 2nd round pick in the 2001 draft out of high school. He had a pretty steady path to the majors, which debuted in, in 2005. His 2006 was limited by a severe ankle sprain that kept him out most of the year, but finally in 2007 he was able to flash his talent. Hardy blasted 26 home runs in 2007, good for 4th of major league short-stops, and posted a respectable .786 OPS. Coming into 2008 however, there were still doubters of his ability and as a result he was the 12th SS taken in drafts. After a surprisingly good 2008, in which Hardy once again flexed his power muscles blasting 24 home runs, he also, more importantly, raised his batting average and OBP to .285 and .345 respectively. Any doubts remaining about Hardy were erased and I expect Hardy's 2009 season to be as good as his 2008 season, if not better.

Jhonny Peralta is very similar to Hardy in that in 2007, Peralta also kind of came out of nowhere to post a decent average and surprising 21 home runs. Coming into 2008, again similar to Hardy, most people weren't sure if 2007 was just a flash in the pan year for Peralta or if he was the "real deal". I probably should mention that in 2005, Peralta really experienced his breakout season, batting .292 with 24 home runs. Then came a down 2006, and then the solid 2007. As indicated by the 176 ADP previously mentioned, people still did not not believe in Peralta's .275 average, 20+ home run potential. That disbelief was unwarranted because in 2008 Peralta has performed admirably, and has been the 4th best SS in the game (fantasy-wise), just behind Rollins. Nothing about Peralta's game really blows you away, but I'll take a .275 batting, 22 home run mashing, and potentially 100 Run and RBI hitting short-stop in the 15th round of any draft. Do not expect to be able to take Peralta that late in 2009 drafts, as he won't be overlooked any longer.

Lastly, we'll take a look at Stephen Drew of the Diamondbacks. Drew is a left-handed batting short-stop (he throws righty), who was drafted 15th overall in the 2004 draft. His ascension to the majors was very quick, he took just 2 years, and was probably a bit rushed. Drew's first year in the majors was 2006 and in 225 major league PAs he performed spectacularly for a rookie with a .861 OPS. Because of that success, Drew was given the D'backs starting SS job for 2007. He. Played. Terribly. In 619(!) plate appearances, Drew hit .238 with 12 home runs and 60 Runs/RBI a piece. Talk about sophomore slumps. I believe this was the result of him being rushed to quickly to the majors, but that's just my opinion. Obviously after such an uninspiring season as 2007, there were many doubters heading into 2008. Everyone knew of his great talent and high ceiling, but people were afraid 2007 hurt his confidence. People were wrong. Maybe the D'backs brainwashed Drew to make him forget 2007, I don't know, but he has had one helluva 2008 season. Drew has posted 21 home runs, 91 runs and 65 RBI with a .292 average batting mostly lead off for a Arizona offense one would call lackluster. The talent and potential was realized into actual results and there should be no looking back for Drew in 2009.

So there you have it. In addition to the Big three of Ramirez (25) , Reyes (25), and ehhh yea I'll still include him, Rollins you have Hardy (26), Peralta (26), and Drew (25) establishing themselves as offensive forces in lineups. Not to mention Jeter is still playing, Michael Young had another solid season, and a player I briefly mentioned before, Troy Tulowitzki (24) looks to rebound from his abysmal 2008 and return to 2007 form. If you haven't figured out already, those numbers in the parentheses are the players' ages, so as you can see, the short-stop position has a wealth of young talent that figures to be around for quite some time.

References and Resources: I used a bunch of sites to get the stats for this article. Fangraphs was for the WPA/LI, and I also used their Leaderboards to look at the short-stops from year-to-year. I used Yahoo for the ADPs and also for some general player stats. For a quick check at minor league numbers I used The Baseball Cube.

Note: Just because the season is ending, does not mean my column will as well. Look forward to continued content throughout the entire offseason, every week. No, I don't get bored of this.

One Week

2008-09-20T00:01:00.000-07:00

How can I help it if I think you're funny when you're mad
Trying hard not to smile though I feel bad
I'm the kind of guy who laughs at a funeral
Can't understand what I mean?
Well, you soon will
I have a tendency to wear my mind on my sleeve
I have a history of taking off my shirt

Yes, those are the lyrics to the Barenaked Ladies song "One Week". Why I pasted them there, I don't know. I think the bridge is funny. There is about one week left in the baseball season, so I figured I'd paste the "One Week" lyrics there, that's the way my mind works.

This has definitely been the craziest baseball season for me personally. I went from almost nothing to an established fantasy baseball writer, and my Oakland A's went from decent to quite terrible.

I began by starting my own fantasy baseball blog, something I strongly recommend no one do unless they have some niche to exploit like PITCHf/x or injuries or something of the like. Whether it was some luck and mostly skill or mostly skill and some luck that got to me to where I am is still unclear to me, but the results are more important than the process to me.

In fantasy baseball terms, it was my worst year ever. I finished second-to-last in one league, something like 8-out-of-12 in another, and was in dead last on July 26th in a final league. I've heard of people making miraculous comebacks, but I've never made one myself until now. As of Saturday September 19 I am in second. Fueled by a surging-at-the-right-time Jimmy Rollins and Kelly Johnson, and boosted by the great pickups of Andre Ethier, Ian Stewart, and Chris Davis, my hitting was able to blast its way up the standings. It is quite an accomplishment, although my current second place seed is highly volatile, many stat categories are extremely close. Even still, I'm confident my team will come through in the end. I just have one of those feelings.

By established writer, I'm referring to writing for this site and also now the Hardball Times. For readers here, that means I now have access to a PITCHf/x database, thanks a trillion to Josh Kalk, so I'll be looking to include that data into my future editions of Outside the Box.

If you do wish to start your own fantasy baseball blog or blog of any sort, make sure you can write well, design a web page to stand out (notice the difference between MLBFO and "Blogspot" blogs), and have plenty of free time. If you do know somebody in baseball you can interview or if you played in the minor leagues or something like that, then all the better. Speaking of interviews, I do know a few people in the majors, so look forward to that this offseason.

Paradoxically, so far this looks to be a great fantasy football season for me. I'm in the top 3 in my three leagues. Aaron Rodgers is my QB in two leagues and Jay Cutler is mine in another. If you want my quick take on the fantasy football situation, a lot of people thought the RB-RB strategy was dead, something I am a huge supporter of. Get this, in one of my leagues I went RB-RB-RB-RB-RB, yes that's a first five rounds of S-Jax, Marshawn Lynch, B-Jacobs, Reggie Bush, and J-Stew. This league starts two RB's and two flex's so, yes, I can't start all of them but my RB depth is huge. What everyone thought to be relatively weak QBs in Eli and Rogers has turned out to be one of the best and my WR's are holding their own. I am currently in second and looking very strong. I would not want to play my team.

That is a good question to ask yourself of any of your fantasy teams, "Would I want to play against my team?" If the answer is truthfully "no" then good for you.

Transitioning back to baseball, with this increased readership comes some responsibility. If I write a good article, I barely get any recognition for it, but for whoever's sake, if I make an error or "stupid" prediction in one sentence of one article, I get jumped on pretty quickly. It's a tough crowd you guys are.

In a recent Hardball Times article, I linked to Razzball's rankings and then the next day or a few days after, they mentioned The Hardball Times (I) linked to them. They thought it was awesome. I thought it was awesome that they thought it was awesome. No, they are not paying me for any of this if you were wondering.

I'll conclude this personal piece by saying maybe starting a blog isn't such a bad thing. We're living in an age where creativity is highly valued. Work on some designs, write some creative articles, and interact with new people. These are good skills to have in today's world and practicing them is the best way to improve them.

This what I'm thinking about. Enjoy your weekend.

Run Percentage, Run

2008-09-13T00:05:00.000-07:00

I have never invented a baseball statistic before. I have come up with several fantasy baseball strategies, several of which I've talked about here, but never a baseball statistic. After not much time and several Cheez-Its later, I've come up with one...

I'm not going to pretend there is suspense and write the name of it 20 lines down so you have to scroll down in your browser to see it because I already ruined the suspense in the article title. The name of my "new" stat is run percentage, or R%

The key component of it is basic runs and although runs is not a great stat for valuating player performance, it does have its place in the world of fantasy baseball. There have been plenty of stats that try to separate the luck and skill for other stats, such as BABIP for batting average, but never anything for runs before.

Perhaps there is a significant amount of luck involved that is identifiable to an extent... that would certainly help you fantasy-wise. A guy who gets 100 runs is more valuable than a 85 run-guy, right? Fluctuations in runs totals from year-to-year commonly are 10-20 runs. What contributes to this?

The two factors that come to mind first are player performance (bating average, home runs, etc.) and the lineup surrounding the player. There are probably others besides those two, but we will address all of that stuff later.

Now I want to discuss the methodology behind my stat, R%. It is a percentage, meaning the formula will involve a fraction. Runs will be on top and will divided by something. I don't want at-bats or plate appearances or anything like that because it should be R divided by chances to score. That means the batter must have gotten on base somehow. So hits then. R/Hits.

Well hits works, but there are obviously other ways to get on base to put yourself in a scoring opportunity. Walks is the other big one. The next thing I'm thinking is that runs resulting from home runs should be left out, because the batter never really had the opportunity to score. Remember we're trying to determine how many times a batter scored out of the opportunities he had to score.

So as of now, the formula is R - HR/H + BB

That looks pretty good, but I think more tweaking is still necessary. The formula above is strictly Runs/Opportunity. What that assumes, is that all scoring opportunities are equal, which they are not. A runner on third has a much better chance of scoring than one on first. I'm not sure exactly how much larger that chance is--for the runner on third to score--so I'm gonna keep things simple and weight it 1, 2, 3.

That makes our formula R - HR/(singles) + (doubs * 2) + (trips * 3). Plug in the numbers, and you should get the percentage (after multiplying by 100) of Runs scored over opportunity to score those runs. The Run Percentage.

Let's test it out on two players for now, and I'll pick Jack Cust and Jose Reyes. Kind of opposite
type players, let's see what their R%'s are for 2007 and 2008:

I did the 2007 computations first and when I saw Reyes with the edge over Cust I thought, "Wow, that it showed the speedy player scoring a higher percentage of the time is pretty cool." Then about 30 seconds later I did the 2008 numbers and Reyes and Cust basically traded numbers. Neither player really sustained their percentage from 2007 to 2008, but even if they did it wouldn't show anything conclusive. We would obviously need to look at more players over more years before conclusions can be drawn.

Now I want to jump back to a statement I said earlier. The two big factors on a player's run total--performance and surrounding lineup. I feel there are two ways I can introduce these factors into my statistic to make it more useful.

The first would be to find out how much of a impact team Runs per Game affect the R%. On average, exactly how much higher of a R% would a Rangers player have this year than a Mariners player?
Secondly, I could account for Team R/G and position in batting order and then create a "context-neutral" version of R%. This would obviously take some time and math, we'll see if I ever get to that.

Okay, that about does it for this week. I'm not going to release any numbers just yet, this was more of a methodology article than anything else. If you feel I'm missing a component, let me know! Leave it in the comments or e-mail me.

Just a heads up, Brad Stewart is planning a really great 2008 season wrap-up. Perhaps you might find these R% numbers in there. Wink. Wink.

K/9 vs. K%

2008-09-06T21:35:00.001-07:00

For the edition of Outside the Box two weeks ago, I took a deeper look into Johan Santana. Instead of using the widely popular K/9, or strikeouts per 9 innings (formula below), I used what I called K/BF, or strikeouts per batters faced. I also told you I would give some context for the stat in the future. Well, the future is now.I will start off by saying that K/BF was slightly stupid. There is an stat already established that is the exact same thing, just only in a much more presentable format. It's called K%. It's the exact same formula (below again) but you take the decimal produced from the division of the K's into the BF and make it a percentage by multiplying it by 100.Really, the difference between the two, K/9 and K%, is very slight. Dividing by Innings Pitched or Batters Faced is what some would call nitpicking. Let me give you a situation that exaggerates the problem with K/9. You have two pitchers, Pitcher A and Pitcher B with the following stats:

Both pitchers have the same number of strikeouts and innings pitched, thus they have the same K/9. However, Pitcher A has faced a significantly more batters in the 100 innings he's thrown because he allows 1.5 baserunners an inning, vs. just the 1 Pitcher B faces. Assuming neither pitcher gets a double play, Pitcher A would face 450 batters and Pitcher B 400, as shown in the table. Obviously that makes Pitcher B's K% better, because he strikes out a higher percentage of batters that he faces.

Read that last line again, "he strikes out a higher percentage of batters that he faces. " Isn't that the purpose of K/9? To show not just the amount of strikeouts, but the efficiency that a pitcher gets them. Obviously a pitcher who strikes out 25% of his batters is better at striking out batters than one who only gets K's 22.2 percent of the time. However, K/9 doesn't show that difference. To K/9, these two pitchers are the same.

So when you're evaluating to pitchers for a trade in your league, K% is clearly the stat to use, if you can find it. Although the flaw in K/9 was apparent in my handpicked example, let's see how different the K/9 and K%'s are for actual pitchers this season. I made the list from pitchers who have at least 125 strikeouts this season, so that is why it ends at the seemingly random number of 43.

Name                Rank    K/9  Rank     K%
Tim Lincecum             1  10.23     1   27.7%
A.J. Burnett             2  10.02     2   26.6%
Ervin Santana            3   9.37     5   23.9%
Roy Halladay             4   9.21     6   23.9%
Dan Haren                5   9.11     3   24.9%
Chad Billingsley         6   9.09     8   23.6%
Javier Vasquez           7   9.00     9   23.4%
Edison Volquez           8   8.95     4   24.4%
Cole Hamels              9   8.88     7   23.7%
Johan Santana           10   8.81    11   22.7%
Ryan Dempster           11   8.64    12   22.5%
Matt Cain               12   8.48    15   21.6%
Ted Lilly               13   8.43    10   22.9%
Brandon Webb            14   8.22    19   21.2%
Zack Greinke            15   8.20    13   21.9%
Ricky Nolasco           16   8.13    17   21.3%
Felix Hernandez         17   8.09    23   20.8%
Randy Johnson           18   8.07    16   21.3%
Jake Peavy              19   8.06    20   21.0%
Josh Beckett            20   7.97    25   20.3%
Oliver Perez            21   7.88    24   20.5%
Cliff Lee               22   7.85    26   20.3%
Gil Meche               23   7.81    30   19.6%
Scott Kazmir            24   7.77    21   21.0%
Andy Pettitte           25   7.76    22   21.0%
Johnny Cueto            26   7.71    14   21.6%
Justin Verlander        27   7.64    18   21.2%
Ben Sheets              28   7.53    28   19.9%
Brett Myers             29   7.50    27   20.1%
Bronson Arroyo          30   7.44    35   18.9%
Ubaldo Jiminez          31   7.44    33   19.5%
James Shields           32   7.43    36   18.7%
Jonathen Sanchez        33   7.34    32   19.6%
Roy Oswalt              34   7.32    37   18.6%
John Danks              35   7.24    29   19.8%
Jered Weaver            36   7.21    34   18.9%
Manny Parra             27   6.99    39   18.1%
Derek Lowe              28   6.91    31   19.6%
Aaron Harang            39   6.84    38   18.5%
Daisuke Matsuzaka       40   6.67    41   17.1%
Jon Lester              41   6.41    42   17.0%
Jair Jurrjens           42   6.31    40   17.3%
Paul Maholm             43   6.28    43   16.9%

As you can see, there certainly is a difference between the order of pitchers based on their K/9 and K% numbers. The best example is probably Gil Meche. When I saw his name before Scott Kazmir's I thought "no way Meche is a better strikeout pitcher than Kazmir." Sure enough, when I took a look over at the K% column, Meche fell 7 spots down, and Kaz went up 3, showing Kazmir is clearly the better strikeout pitcher even though K/9 thinks otherwise.

Yes, I know what you may be thinking. Besides the Kazmir/Meche example, most of the pitchers are only 1 or 2 spots away in ranking for each stat. Though if K% is better, we should be using it, right? Still, most sites show K/9, something I hope will start to change soon. Even if it is just a "marginal revolution", a revolution it still is.

The last thing you'll probably want is the context for each stat, so here it is. League average K% is 17.01%, and K/9 is 6.93.

If you enjoyed this article, let me know!

Fantasy Etiquette: Intentional Benching

2008-08-30T00:02:00.000-07:00

In most formats of Head-to-Head leagues, this is the last week of regular season play before the seeds are set and the playoffs begin. In most leagues there one dominant team, a few great teams underneath, some lucky teams even lower, and depending on the number of teams that make the playoffs a few mediocre teams that have the chance to secure that last playoff spot. Of course the team that does sneak in will have to play the dominant team week 1, (unless top two seeds have a bye for the first round, a setting I advocate) however in a week's worth of games, any bad players can put up good numbers, and good players can put up bad ones, so playing the 1 seed is not an automatic loss. I've seen it happen, where the 8th Seed edges the One Seed in steals because Ryan Howard got his one Stolen base of the year that week. Although that's not what I'm here to talk about this week.

Intentional Benching is the subject of this week's discussion. Note that I'm not talking about cute, little benching like when you have a lead a WHIP and ERA and do not want to blow that by throwing Oliver Perez (5.56 ERA against sub-.500 teams, 2.36 ERA vs. above-.500 teams) out there against the Nationals. I will explain the more serious type of Intentional Benching after a quick note.

There is fantasy baseball etiquette, just as there is etiquette with everything else in life. On almost every issue, I disagree with the conventional fantasy etiquette. I believe you should exploit any exploitable setting in your league that allows you to win. That includes trying to trade Ryan Braun the Royal under the pretext it's his Milwaukee counterpart or starting only relievers in a league where the Min. Innings per Week Limit is too low (meaning anything under 20, I prefer 40-50 because it forces teams to build a strong, deep rotation of starters). Basically anything within league rules I consider fair, no matter how manipulative the maneuver may be. And obviously prior to the draft the league's rules must be precise to prevent moves and strategies too unfair, however if the league's rules suck, then make the league pay as best you can. But that's just me.

Nevertheless, there is one strategy an owner can use that even I cannot tolerate. As I mentioned before, it is Intentional Benching, and it would take place in the hypothetical league you see below:

This is the last week of the Regular Season before the Playoffs begin, and as indicated by the line, 6 teams get in with 1st playing 6th, 2nd vs. 5th, and 3rd vs. 4th for the first week of Post-Season play. The team names given are not random, they reflect the type of season the player has had. Obviously teams 1-3 are awesome, team 4 is very solid, team 5 might have gotten a bit lucky this year, team 6 struggled for most of the year, but is turning it up as of late, team 7 has also struggled, but still has a small chance to salvage a disappointing season, and team 8 has been flat-out garbage all year.

The conflict begins when Team Pujols begins to get picky about who he wants to face in the playoffs. He sees an easily defeated Team Bradley, and then a Team Rollins that is looking scarier by the minute. What does Team Pujols do? He intentionally benches his players the last week so that he drops into 2nd place, therefore playing Team Bradley the first week of the playoffs. To him, it is definitely worth it. But a team in this whole ordeal is going to get screwed over big time. Do you know which team it is?

Team Rollins. Look at who Team Pujols is playing. Team Fielder, who is only 2 games behind Team Rollins. Let's say after Team Pujols when benches all of his players he loses that week 10-0 or 9-1. That forces Team Rollins to win at least 7-3, or they drop out of the playoffs. Quite unfair in my opinion. Maybe Team Rollins will roll off another good week, but if they don't and fail to make the playoffs, they lost due to unfair manipulation of the league.

At this point in time, the Saturday of the last week, it is too late to pull off this strategy and I chose to put up this article one week too late for a reason - so nobody uses it. In an otherwise friendly league I was in last year, this exact situation unfolded and it caused some of the most heated arguments I've ever witnessed in fantasy sports. Luckily I wasn't involved, but it did leave a bad taste in everyone's mouth when the league was finally over.

Remember: taking advantage of crap league rules = good, intentionally benching = bad.

Supported By Pillars of Sand

2008-08-23T00:00:00.000-07:00

Flashback to January 29th, 2008 when the Twins agreed to trade Johan Santana to the Mets for minor leaguers, Phil Humber and Carlos Gomez among them. Jump back to the present and the Twins find themselves tied for the the division lead and half-a-game behind the Red Sox for the Wild Card. A quick check to Fangraphs shows Johan has contributed almost 3 context-neutral wins for the Mets this year. That's three wins that could belong to the Twins right now, putting them into first place. Of course you also must factor in Gomez' (negative) contribution to the Twins this year; he has netted minus 2 context-neutral wins. Then you have to consider, who would be playing center-field for the Twins right now if Gomez wasn't? Perhaps that player would have contributed minus 5 context-neutral wins, making Gomez a three win upgrade. We cannot determine those hypotheticals, including who would not be pitching for the Twins right now if Johan was? For this reason, I'll stick to a rough estimate and say this trade has cost the Twins 2-4 Wins this year. That is a lot when you consider how close the standings are right now.

In retrospect, do I think the Twins wish they could have this trade back? Ehhrrrmmm.... ehhhhh....hmmmmm.... possibly. In the playoffs anything can happen and I believe a team should never trade away its chances at a playoff birth for the future. Of course, the Twins probably never expected they would be in this situation come the end of August, so their process was definitely correct. Looking beyond this season and even the next, I believe this trade will help them long-term. That is not a compliment for any of the players the Twins received in the trade, rather a shot a Johan Santana.

Peripherals, stats like H/BF, K/BF, and BB/BF(BF = Batters Faced), show possible change in a pitcher's skills, sometimes even before his ERA shows it. Let's take a look Johan's peripheral stats over the last few years:

There is no column on this chart that is promising. Even though because the baseline is Batters Faced instead of the more commonly used Innings Pitched you have no context (I'll give context in a future article) on which to go from, it is apparent that everything is going in the wrong direction. Santana is giving up more Hits per Batter, more Walks per Batter, and striking out batters at a slower rate. His Walks + Hits per Batters Faced, which is the same concept as WHIP except with Batter's faced, steadily rose every year. And lastly Santana is having to face more batter's per IP than ever before, certainly not a way to lower your pitch count. One would think Santana's ERA (don't worry I'm not going to use ER/BF) would have risen a considerable amount since he Cy Young seasons of 04 and 06.

Actually, it turns out Johan's ERA is the lowest it has been since 2004. Although as indicated by his xFIP, clearly Santana's ERA should have been rising over the last two years. With the exception of 2007, it hasn't.

There are two explanations of how Santana has kept his ERA down despite his peripheral stats worsening. The first is an increased LOB%, or Strand Rate.

As the story has gone so far, the expected Left On Base Percentage says there should have been a decrease in effectiveness, meanwhile Santana's actual numbers remain stubborn, slowly widening the gap between expected and actual. Santana's "actual numbers" are about to learn that "expected numbers" do not compromise, do not bend, rather they force the "actual numbers" to follow them and follow they will.

Johan struggled mightily in 2007 to prevent flyballs and prevent flyballs from going over the fence. This dangerous combination caused Santana to give up 33 Home Runs on the year, third most in the Majors. This year both Santana's FB% and HR/FB% are down, meaning Santana is giving up significantly less Home Runs (twentieth in HRs allowed) and therefore runs.

The whole reason Santana had to be traded was because Johan is in his 5th season of service and therefore will become a free agent come the off season. The Twins reported offered him an extension, which he turned down and wisely too since he is getting much more money from the Mets now. However let's say Santana did not accept the extension and also did not get traded at the deadline, meaning he'd be free to become a free agent in the off season. He would remind of one player in particular, the only other pitcher with a contract worth more than 125 Mill, Barry Zito.

Barry Zito is another pitcher whose prime came well before his free-agent years (assuming Santana's does). I am going to put some graphs of Zito's and Santana's peripheral stats transposed on top of each other. Santana's 5-year window will remain from 2004-08 and Zito's will be from 2002-06, the equivalent years in his career.

Besides showing how ridiculously better a pitcher Santana is than Zito, these graphs show the similarities between Zito and Santana as they progressed in their careers. Both graphs follow the same basic trend, yes?. Do I think Santana will regress significantly in the next 2-3 years? Yes. Zito became a 4.50-5.00 ERA pitcher. Santana, clearly superior, should fall back to the 3.50-4.00 range. Hey, I'm not saying the guy is gonna crumble, he is just going to become slightly above-average. Is that worth 137.5 Million? The answer is Yes if the Mets win the World Series this year. If not, then Santana's contract will become one of the many others that are laughed at when a player is getting paid prime money when he's past his prime.

Yes, Santana is past his prime Mets fans, get over it. It is possible, unlikely, but possible that Johan will be able to reinvent himself in a Mussina-like fashion 3-4 years from now. PITCHf/x data will be required to view that transformation and if you would like to get a great PITCHf/x outlook on Santana, Derek Carty over at The Hardball Times did just that only a few days ago.

The Impact of Innings Pitched

2008-08-16T02:00:00.000-07:00

In the last edition of Outside the Box, I said we would perform a similar type of study as last week, except Innings Pitched would be the varying number, not ERA. What will this allow us to see? The difference between a 200-Inning starter and a 75-Inning reliever, both with the same ERA, how many more wins the starter contributes than the reliever. Exactly the same as last week, let's begin with that pretty ERA formula:Now let's begin with the complimentary example. Our two pitchers have a flat 3.00 ERA. Pitcher A has thrown 200 Innings and Pitcher B has 75. If you plug in the numbers; 3.00 ERA, 200 IP, then Pitcher A has allowed 67 Runs and Pitcher B has allowed 25 Runs.

Obviously these are pitchers and giving up runs is a negative thing, but in this case it tells us the magnitude of difference between them. The difference between 67 Runs and 25 is 42. Remember in last week's article I said 10-11 Runs is equal to about 1 Win. So if we take our 42 Run Difference, divide it by 10.5, we get our grand difference of exactly 4 Wins! A pitcher who pitches 200 Innings with a 3.00 ERA contributes 4 more Wins to his team than a pitcher with the same ERA in 75 Innings. Seems about right, doesn't it?

Let's check out the results from some different Inning Differences:

This table reads as follows --- for two pitchers with the same ERA, in the instance when one pitcher has thrown 100 more Innings than the other, the pitcher who has thrown more innings will have contributed approximately 3.1 more Wins than the other.

As exemplified by the table, for every 31.25 Innings of work completed, 1 more Win is contributed to the team. Divide 150 by 4.8 or 125 by 4 and you will figure out how I arrived at that ratio.

Okay that will wrap it up for this week's addition. See you next week.

The Impact of ERA

2008-08-09T10:05:00.000-07:00

Everybody knows that a pitcher with an ERA of 3.00 is better than a pitcher with a 3.50 ERA . We know the former pitcher is better, but by how much? How many more wins would a 3.00 ERA pitcher contribute to the team than a 3.50 ERA pitcher? These are questions I do not yet know the answer to, but I am interested to find out. Let's begin.

The first thing we must know to answer the presented questions is the formula for ERA, It is simple and most of you probably know what it is:A simple enough equation, if we know the ERA and the amount of innings pitched, we can determine the amount of total earned runs that were given up. Fill in different ERAs into the equation while keeping the IPs the same will tell us the difference in total Earned Runs given up.

It is widely accepted that 10-11 runs is about equal to one win, so that is the conversion factor I will use to convert runs to the desired metric wins. I have a feeling that the aforementioned conversion factor will be revised to be made more accurate in the future, but it will work for my purposes now.

Going back to the task at hand, let's find out the Earned Runs difference for a pitcher who has thrown 200 innings by plugging the numbers into the above equation.

We will begin with the original example of a 3.00 ERA and 3.50 ERA pitcher. For a 3.00 ERA and 200 innings, the amount of Earned Runs given up is 66.67. For the 3.50 ERA it is 77.78. The difference between the two is 11.11 Runs, a number close enough to ten to call it about 1 Wins difference.

The difference between the two ERAs was .50 points. I would like to find out if the 11.11 run difference appears with all ERAs .50 points apart accumulated over 200 innings. I will use the ERAs of 4.00 and 4.50 to test this out. Over the same 200 innings an ERA of 4.00 would mean 88.89 total Earned Runs given up. For a 4.50 ERA, exactly 100 Runs would be allowed. The difference is. . . . . 11.11 Runs! That means in our context-neutral study of ERA, the difference between a 2.00 and 3.00 ERA is exactly the same as the difference between a 5.00 and 6.00 ERA.

Now that you know the procedure, I'll just spit out the data tables:

These tables read as follows --- for two pitchers having thrown 75 Innings, with the difference between them in ERA 1.00 point of ERA, the difference in Earned Runs allowed is 8.34 Runs or about .8 Wins.

There are some interesting revelations from these tables. One I expected was that the run differentials and win values over 100 innings is exactly half of the run differentials and win values over 200 innings. I'll leave you to peruse over them and perhaps you will find something interesting yourself.

If you enjoyed this article, good news for you, next week I plan on doing something similar. Instead of keeping the Innings Pitched a constant and varying the difference in ERA, I'll do the exact opposite. By holding the difference in ERA constant and varying the Innings Pitched, you can determine exactly how much more value a 200-Inning starter gives a team than a 75-Inning reliever with the same ERA over a season. See you then.

Heading For the Home Stretch

2008-08-02T02:00:00.000-07:00

Although it may seem like the All-Star Break was only a few days ago, we really are coming into the home stretch of Head-2-Head leagues. In most leagues, you are finishing the 18th week of competition and there are only 4 more weeks left until the playoffs. They are sooner than you realized! Exactly, so what you should be doing now depends on where you stand in the standings. . .

Securely In Playoffs (Top 1-4) - Okay, good Job! You've accomplished your regular season goal and secured a high seed for the playoffs. Your not done working though. Look at the stats you've won in, the stats you've been neutral, and the couple of stats you have lost. Now, look at your current team. Is it going to keep producing at the same high level? Perhaps you have potential overachievers like Justin Duchscherer and Milton Bradley, who will see their stats regress over the final two months, or have traded away a category-wonder like Willy Taveras recently. In that case, you probably did well in stolen base category over the course of the season, but since the trade have lost the category each week. Even if you averaged 5 steals per week, you must project what your team will do going forward, not what it did in the past. If you no longer have Taveras, adjust your stolen base expectations accordingly.

Entertain offers that you think will improve your team, but understand that if you are dealing with a fringe-playoff team, you are in the position of power in the negotiations and thus should feel absolutely no sense of "I have to get a deal done". Remain skeptical of every offer, but jump on those you see are the act of a desperate team trying to make a desperate push into the playoffs. Overall, enjoy coasting into the playoffs stress-free and keep doing what you've been doing, it has obviously worked so far.

Insecurely In Playoffs (Top 4-6 [7-8 if 8 teams get in]) - Give yourself a pat on the back, you've had a solid fantasy season thus far, but the hardest four weeks have yet to come. Your team probably has plenty of areas it could improve on, so first identify them and second communicate with others in your league and try to get a late deal done. Look at the teams behind you vying for a spot; do you think they are for real or are they simply lucky to be in the mediocre position they are? Based on how secure you feel should determine how aggressively you should try to get a deal done. If you do not feel secure at all, meaning the team or teams behind you appear better than yours (that kind of honestly is better than denial) consider following the more desperate plan I advise fringe teams to follow.

Fringe (out of) Playoffs Team (Top 7-10) - So far your team has not lived up to expectations, but you can still get into the playoffs with a solid last month. Your probably gonna have to play the top team the first week if you get in (unless they get byes) but it will still be worth it. Hellooo upset possibilities! If you are only a few games out, strongly consider doing nothing if your team has underperformed and you feel it will play better in the future. Guys like Alex Rios, Prince Fielder, Jimmy Rollins, Javier Vazquez, and any other returning injurees would be on this team.

If you have review all of your players and feel that your current team most-likely will not make that push into the playoffs, I have a radical strategy for you to consider. I want you to trade away all of your starting pitchers of value. (What?) I want you to either trade them straight-up for hitters, or if you can, get 2-1 deals where you give up the pitcher and a starting hitter for a better hitter at that position. An example trade would be Cole Hamels and Kelly Johnson for Brandon Phillips, with you getting Phillips. Even though without context it appears like you are getting ripped off, and believe me you are, but in the end this trade will help your team.

Do this until you have a stacked lineup and no pitchers left except bad ones and any closers you have. Next, drop all of those bad pitchers you couldn't trade away. With this kind of team, you should expect to win a majority of the hitting categories, lose ERA and WHIP, but win K's, Wins, and possible Saves. If you haven't figured it out yet, you must stream pitchers, so if your in a weekly league your out of luck. Consider adding solid middle relievers like Taylor Buchholz or Chad Gaudin so that you do not have to stream as many pitchers every day. This strategy should net you at least 4 of the 5 hitting categories and 2 of the 5 (maybe 3) pitching categories. The strategy may seem a bit strange and desperate, but it could propel you into the playoffs, and it actually works frustratingly well. I have salvaged a season this way twice in my fantasy career. It may not be pretty, but it can get the job done with a mediocre team. Try it, but only if you need to.

No Chance Teams - You've looked at how many games you are back and realize it's basically impossible to get into the playoffs. Go sign up for a football league and read more of my advice next year.

Putting Bad To Good Use

2008-07-25T10:04:00.000-07:00

You step into the batter's box. Lay the bat down on the plate and adjust your batting gloves. Then you pick up the bat over your shoulder and slowly turn your head and face the pitcher. Jonathan Papelbon is staring back at you, his eyes just below the flat, pulled-down brim of his cap. Your grip on the bat tightens up as he starts his motion, you time his delivery perfectly taking a step as the ball releases and swinging immediately after. Your head jerks and your body rotates unnaturally after a swing that was two seconds too early since Papelbon threw a slider, not a fastball. That's strike one. Two pitches later and your walking back to the dugout after making a fool of yourself in front of 40,000+ people whom you've never met.

You step into the batter box. Pick up a yellow plastic bat between fingers and waggle the bat over your back should while simultaneously tapping your front foot in the freshly cut grass. Looking out you see your 11-year old son holding a big white wiffle ball in his hand. He begins his windup and throws you a meatball of a pitch, which you easily smash high into the air and over the bush that was designated beforehand as the home run marker. As you trot around the bases, to him, you appear the greatest ball player to ever walk the Earth.

Okay, my over-dramatic relativity example is over. But keep it in mind as I change the subject over towards streaming pitchers. Well not exactly streaming pitchers since that implies continued adding and dropping of pitchers, I'm talking more about getting a spot-start from a guy. Let's say its Saturday (today), your in a H2H league and you and your opponent are tied in wins. After checking his team, you see he has 3 total pitchers starting Saturday and Sunday and you have only a combined 2. Right now, odds are you are not going to win the Wins category. It's the perfect time to drop an expendable player from your team and add a pitcher simply because they are starting.

Using a real-time example, let's say this week (H2H league) your in a really close wins week. It's the perfect time to add a pitcher just because he's starting. Looking at your options you got the following: (note: these are the actual starting pitchers for Sunday so if you need a spot-start tomorrow, follow along closely)

Player	Wins	ERA	Opp
Zach Miner	4	3.73	CWS
Jason Bergmann	1	4.21	LAD
Randy Wolf	6	4.74	MIL
Jarrod Washburn	4	4.75	TOR

These four pitchers are our lovely choices. Despite how bad their numbers look, one of these pitchers is going to be starting for you tomorrow. Based on those numbers you could go with Miner's ERA or Washburn's experience and recent success, but the astute reader knows there are three more things to look at. First is the opposing teams' batting ability, second is the opposing pitcher's pitching ability, and last is the pitcher's own team's hitting ability. Remember that we are looking for a win so all of these factors beyond the pitcher's control do affect the ability for him to get a win. To determine the opposing team's ability to hit I simply used Runs/Game numbers courtesy of the Hardball Times. Here is that chart:

Team	R/G
SD	3.76
Was	3.82
Sea	3.91
SF	4.04
KC	4.17
OAK	4.22
LAD	4.22
TOR	4.24
HOU	4.28
LAA	4.44
ATL	4.45
CIN	4.45
ARI	4.48
TB	4.54
COL	4.58
CLE	4.61
NYY	4.69
STL	4.70
MIL	4.72
BAL	4.75
FLA	4.79
MIN	4.86
NYM	4.88
PIT	4.89
CWS	4.98
PHI	4.98
DET	5.02
BOS	5.02
CHC	5.25
TEX	5.46

Much like the activity series of metals, do not pay too much attention to small differences such as the difference between St. Louis and Baltimore. If one pitcher was facing Toronto and another facing the White Sox however, the difference in R/G between them, .74 R/G, is significant enough to decide not to spot-start the pitcher facing the White Sox. Looking back at our four possible candidates that puts a serious black-eye on Miner and Wolf, who are both facing significantly better offenses than Washburn and Bergman. Still, I would not eliminate anyone just yet because we have yet to look at the opposing pitchers. The matchups are as follows:

Miner vs J Vazquez - 4.57 ERA
Bergmann vs C Kershaw - 5.18 ERA
Wolf vs J Suppan - 4.65 ERA
Washburn vs S Marcum - 3.05 ERA

Obviously ERA does not tell you the whole story when it comes to a pitcher, since Marcum is not as dominant looking after getting rocked in his first start off the DL. Now in his second start off, who knows if Marcum can regain his pre-injury form. The one thing to note about all of the opposing pitchers is that none of them are doing well, so there is a good chance one of the pitchers we want to add is going to get the win. That is our goal.

As I previously stated, the last thing to look at is the pitcher's team's R/G. Simply refer back to the original chart we used for opposing team's hitting ability and we find that Miner gets a distinct edge from this with Detroit fourth in runs per game and anybody who has been watching baseball lately knows that the Tigers have been red-hot. Washington, Seattle, and Houston are 2nd, 3rd, and 9th worst respectively at scoring runs so that turns me away from those pitchers. Taking all three factors into account, I would pick up Miner for a spot start tomorrow if I was looking for a win mostly because of how dominating the Tigers offense has been lately.

Keep in mind that this system is only for spot-starting wins. If I was in a close ERA or K race, the pitcher's team's R/G would not matter and neither would the opposing pitcher. The opposing team's batting ability should still be taken into account though because obviously some teams are easier to hold to less runs and some teams have a tendency for striking out.

If you are worried about the ethics of streaming or spot-starting, worry not. There are simple league adjustments that could have been made pre-season that make streaming not valuable. If your league was not smart enough to make those adjustments, I say do whatever helps you win. Spot-starting requires you to have the roster spot available, and thus spot-starting is the result of wise strategy and good roster management, not cheating or taking advantage of the league. If anyone in your league calls you out for spot-starting, tell them Paul Singman said it was okay.

Contact, In and Out

2008-07-19T20:51:00.000-07:00

It is generally thought in the world of baseball that making contact with pitches outside of the strike zone is a bad thing. What was that, making contact is bad? Yes, well when the ball is out of the zone at least. Since in order to make contact with a ball off the plate requires the batter to reach, the power generated by the body from staying back is lost and the result is a weak arms and hands swing that is prone to weak dribblers and pop-outs. Some players like Vlad Guerrero and Ichiro are known to be able to hit the ball hard regardless of how ridiculously far the ball is off the plate. Are Vlad and Ichiro simply anomalies or is making contact with pitches out of the strike zone not as bad as generally thought? Are Vlad and Ichiro even the best at hitting out of the zone? That is what we will find out today.

To determine this, I will simply will use Fangraph's O-Contact% found in the plate discipline section and OPS. O-Contact% is (copied straight from Fangraph's definition) the percentage of pitches a batter makes contact with outside the strike zone when swinging the bat (Lg. Avg. is 61.33%), and OPS is OPS, not the best offensive metric but sufficient for my purposes. Now for the chart:

An R-Squared of .100 is relatively weak but considering the two stats I'm comparing, I found it surprisingly strong. A high O-Contact% has a noticeable affect on a player's OPS, enough that if a player is struggling and has a high O-Contact%, bringing that percentage down could be the necessary adjustment to break out of the slump.

If we take Vlad and Ichiro out the data, the R-Squared becomes .107, but surprisingly they are not the best at hitting out of the zone. Todd Helton is the king of hitting well out of the zone with his 2006 and 2007 seasons looking like this (he is also labeled on the first chart as TH):

2006 - 82.69% O-Contact%, .880 OPS
2007 - 83.86% O-Contact%, .928 OPS

Despite having the 5th and 6th highest O-Contact percentages looking at 06-07 numbers combined, Helton still managed great OPS', especially with a .928 OPS in 2007. Placido Polanco and Dustin Pedroia also get honorable mention for their hitting out of the zone abilities.

Using Josh Kalk's excellent Pitch F/X player cards we can see exactly how Helton managed what he did in '07:

Looking at them is revealing but disappointing in a way. He does make contact with a lot of fastballs up and in and change-ups outside, but gets out almost every time he makes contact. Helton is such a good hitter with pitches inside the zone that he makes up for it. However I was looking for someone who drives balls out of the zone, not one who gets outs. Perhaps Helton is not the king of hitting well out of the zone.

Looking at Vlad's player card, I guess he really is King when it comes to driving the ball out of the strike zone. He has hits in such ridiculous places, if it wasn't Vlad's card I was looking at, I would think they were mistakes. Sorry for demoting you for a few minutes there, Vlad.

Overall, contact with pitches out of the strike zone is undesirable as it correlates inversely with OPS. Also, Vlad is still King of hitting pitches out of the zone. View Ichiro's and other players' Pitch F/X cards here to decide who is queen.

Why Projection Systems Are Useless

2008-07-05T03:00:00.000-07:00

When someone says projection systems, I think of words like CHONE, Marcels, and ZiPS. A lot of baseball sites pridefully boast that they feature the new year's player projections from these systems. When I see this, I feel nothing inside.

The reason I dislike these systems is not because they are wrong. In fact, according to what I've heard, they are exceptionally accurate. The reason I dislike them is because the systems themselves are extremely predictable. As a hitter gets older, decrease his power and speed; as a pitcher gets older decrease his K rate. I don't need a projection system to tell me Carlos Lee's numbers will be around .290 AVG, 30 homers, 100 RBI/Runs, and 10 SB. When it comes to bold predictions, projection systems like CHONE and Marcels have none of them. For a fantasy owner, that makes them basically irrelevant.

Any moron can draft dependable players and finish respectably in a fantasy league. But if you have the desire to win, you must pick players with upside, the Ryan Brauns and Fausto Carmonas of last year. Those are obviously extreme examples, and those two were highly improbably; so improbable that in fact it would have been unwise to spend even a last round pick on them. Those players are the rewards for persistent owners that constantly check updates and are ready to pounce on the F/A market.

I'm talking about players this year like Frank Thomas, Jason Giambi, Troy Glaus, Clayton Kershaw, and Jay Bruce. There's a fair chance they do nothing or play mediocre, however there's that decent chance they play amazingly. It's those value picks that win you fantasy leagues. A quote from Matthew Berry puts it best, "You can't win the league in the first round but you certainly can lose it."

Notice how my player examples included both older veterans and rising stars. That’s not to say there are no high value picks coming from players in their prime, but those players are overall highly valued and thus get taken early in drafts. It’s difficult to find high-ceiling players in their prime that will fall to the late rounds of a draft, usually they are found through stats like BABIP and FIP, which determine unluckiness. However proven players, usually ones who have recently suffered injuries, often prove to be the best sleeper candidates. I'm not saying target players who were injured, that's stupid, but certain formerly talented players fall so far in drafts that they become worth a late round gamble. The young stars are becoming more and more overvalued, especially since the monster year of Ryan Braun in 2007. The result is Evan Longoria getting picked in the single-digit rounds of most drafts this year. Hyped prospects are no longer as valuable since they get picked higher in drafts, humorously higher because most people who pick them never check their minor league numbers.

The aforementioned quote by Mr. Berry leads me to my second point of this article; avoid players who have a high risk rate. That meant to not pick Albert Pujols in your draft this year! It's simply just not worth it. Your first/second round picks should have virtually no risk attached to them and even though Pujols has been dominant and even though his injury was unrelated to his concerning elbow, his upside was not so much greater than others picked around him, yet his downside was much worse. Avoiding was the best option.

Projection systems usually fail to recognize these types of players. Lists of break-out/collapsing candidates are much more valuable than viewing projection systems as a whole. Most of them just average a player's stats over the last few years, placing more weight on recent years. Again Although accurate, that isn't exactly useful so long as you are not a moron.

You will notice earlier in the article when I mentioned “useless” projection systems, I purposefully left out Baseball Prospectus’ PECOTA. PECOTA, unlike the other systems, costs money and has an improve/decline percentage system. Besides just simply projecting what it believes a player’s stats will be in future seasons, it lists the chance the player breaks out, improves, and collapses. This would have proved invaluable in last year’s draft with Jason Bay. As I’m sure you are aware, Jason Bay had a terrible season in 2007 and it came seemingly out of nowhere, not to PECOTA however. PECOTA did not predict that Bay would have a horrible season, but it did give him an unusually high collapse rate. That information is valuable and that’s why it costs money to see PECOTA’s predictions unlike CHONE and Marcels.

Targeting break out candidates and avoiding collapse candidates will do a great deal more to help you win your league over following the conservative projections of any projection system religiously.

Safe or Stranded On Base: Part II

2008-06-28T02:00:00.000-07:00

In Part 1 of my look into LOB%, the general conclusion was for every .005 of Batting Average Against added to the base of .265, the expected LOB% of a pitcher should go down .5%. To make this even easier, I've created a simple chart showing the rule:

BAA	.240	.245	.250	.255	.260	.265	.270	.275	.280
xLOB%	74.5%	74%	73.5%	73%	72.5%	72%	71.5%	71%	70.5%

Today we're going to look at LOB% from more of an individual standpoint. I'm going to take a look at pitchers' LOB percentages from 2005 to 2007 and more closely examine those pitchers whose LOB% either remained surprisingly consistent or varied greatly.

Starting with the most inconsistent LOB pitchers for the last three years, their names are: Bronson Arroyo, Jarrod Washburn, Jon Garland, Josh Fogg, and Tim Hudson. Some boring pitchers, some good pitchers, some despairingly average pitchers, this group has little consistency at all. I quickly checked these pitcher's ERA's and BAA's and found that they correlated almost exactly with the LOB%. How Boring! LOB% almost single-handedly explains why these pitchers had bad years.

Perusing through my data again, I found a prime example of someone to delve deeper into. Livan Hernandez would be his name, and his 2006 and 2007 seasons looked something like this:

2006: 4.83 ERA, 70.4 LOB%, .288 BAA
2007: 4.93 ERA, 76.0 LOB%, .308 BAA

Livan pitched overall poorly in 2006 and that led to a 4.83 ERA, although a deserved 4.83 ERA. In 2007 Livan pitched even worse; his WHIP, BAA, BB/9, HR/9, and LD% all went up, yet somehow he managed to keep his ERA under 5.00. Looking exactly 1 inch above where you are now, you'll find part of the answer, his LOB%. Despite having a higher BAA in 2007 than in 2006, Livan's LOB% skyrocketed up to 76.0%. Well how did that happen? The other part of the answer is not located somewhere above on the page, but rather in his performance with runners on base, or his "clutchiness". The first method to measure a pitcher's clutch performance is to check out his BAA with no runners on vs. either runners on or runners in scoring position and the second method is simply using Fangraph's Clutch score. In Livan's case, both methods would have worked. In 2007 Hernandez led all pitchers in the majors with a clutch score of 1.53 and a simple check to Yahoo's situational stats found on its player pages shows this:

Bases Empty: .333 BAA
Runners On: .274 BAA
RISP: .264 BAA

When a pitcher's LOB% and ERA do not match up, usually clutch performance is the reason behind the anomaly.

After doing a regression analysis, ERA and LOB% do correlate well with an R-Squared of .573, but as I pointed out with the Livan Hernandez example, anomalies exist and can be explained. Even though LOB% is a stat used to predict luck in a pitcher's ERA, LOB% itself can also be lucky. That's where Batting Average Against and Clutch Scores come in, to determine how lucky/unlucky a LOB% is. Of course, BAA and Clutch Scores have a certain amount of luck in them too, as does every stat and that is precisely why statistical research is limited in its reach. However it remains the best option available since stats are easily obtained and taught and video and mechanics are not so easily obtained and taught.

Obviously this article did not go exactly in the direction I planned it to go and I think that's more an example of the purity in my research - that I do not know what the conclusions will be when I begin and learn as you do. Just to give you the information you have not gotten, (although it really does not pertain to the overall conclusion) the pitchers with the most consistent LOB% over the last three years are Aaron Harang, Brandon Webb, Johan Santana, Tom Glavine, and John Smoltz. A pretty darn good bunch of pitchers, this group of five would make quite the rotation. Again, the most consistent and inconsistent LOB% pitchers turned out to be quite uninteresting and thus I changed the focus of the article to something hopefully more interesting and fruitful.

Safe or Stranded On Base: Part I

2008-06-21T01:30:00.000-07:00

The main goal for a pitcher to get batters out. And if a batter reaches base, then the goal becomes stranding the runner on base. A lot of things change for a pitcher when there is a runner on base compared to having nobody on. His entire delivery to the plate changes, his attention cannot focus solely on the batter, and there is an increased amount of pressure. Whether clutch hitting exists is debatable, but for pitchers there are certainly pitchers that have more skill than others in getting batters out with runners on base. I know from my personal pitching experience that pitching from the stretch is incredibly different than pitching from the windup, and checking the runner forces you to start your delivery without first getting settled in and focused on the strike zone. Note that I'm saying some pitchers are better at pitching with runners on base, not that some pitchers are more clutch than others. There is a difference.

In the baseball statistics world, the rate at which pitchers strand runners on base is referred to as strand rate or Left On Base Percentage, LOB%. The league average LOB% from 05-07 was 71.96%, so basically 72%. Any pitcher with an LOB% either over or under the 72% can be considered lucky or unlucky, sort of. If you think about it, a better pitcher should have a higher LOB% because a better pitcher gives up less hits, right? Determining how much to deviate from 72% is not an exact science, but my method is using Batting Average Against vs. LOB% and then finding the slope of the best fit line.

This graph shows pitchers' Batting Average Againsts versus their LOB% from the 2005 to 2007 season. Notice that I inverted the bottom axis so the LOB percentages go up, but the slope of the line is still negative meaning LOB% and BAA are inversely related. As a general rule, for every .005 of BAA added, take off .5 from the LOB%. First you should know that for the league-average LOB% of 72%, the expected BAA is .265. So for example, if a pitchers BAA is .275, then their LOB% should be 71%. Remember however, with the R-Squared only at .29 this is more a guideline than anything else. Don't follow this rule religiously.

If you are wondering why I chose BAA instead of other stats like ERA, FIP, and WHIP, all of these stats did not work for various reasons. ERA did correlate especially well with LOB% (.573 R-Squared) but I felt Era was too dependant on LOB% and was not a good predictor of it. FIP correlated surprisingly low, .092 correlation, so I decided not to use it. Lastly, WHIP is similar to BAA, yet just did not correlate as well (.239 R-Squared). My preference would have been to use OPS-against, but those numbers are not so easily available, we can only use what we have.

Overall LOB% is definitely a stat that is overlooked far to often when evaluating pitchers. However, it is tricky to use since not every pitcher should be expected to regress to the average. Until a better method is found, (maybe by me) my +.005/-.5 rule is more than adequate for determining xLOB%.

This is only part one of two of my series on strand rate, next time we'll examine individual pitchers' splits with nobody on/runners on base and see if any conclusions can be drawn from those.