tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-637860671553455873.post7830846882071808633..comments2008-06-05T12:12:52.659-06:00Arihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17740793237376032860noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-637860671553455873.post-20722792925105563252008-06-05T10:40:00.000-06:002008-06-05T10:40:00.000-06:00oh yes, and the b part of the "throwing the switch" example was measuring the difference between throwing the switch to save the group rather than the one, and having to push someone off of a bridge into the path of the train to accomplish the same effect.Clayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01355381643953755204noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-637860671553455873.post-41570471840931658632008-06-05T10:38:00.000-06:002008-06-05T10:38:00.000-06:00I'm not sure that the point of the trainyard example was really understood. <BR/><BR/>These examples were part of a study that was attempting to "prove" that morality is in some way innate. The idea was to ask a large group of people what they would do under certain circumstances and thus attempt to find some sort of evolutionary element to morality. I have no doubt that the questioner didn't understand this or asked the question poorly, but Peikoff addressing the specific morality of the specific situations didn't really address the broader issue.<BR/><BR/>As far as thinking computers goes.. how different is it to have a brain that works a certain way as opposed to having a chip that works a certain way. Volition seems to be at the crux of it.. well if the factor(s) that give rise to the possibility of having a choice are themselves non-volitional causality, then perhaps we can duplicate them(by non-sexual means) and even create variants on the theme.Clayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01355381643953755204noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-637860671553455873.post-87277391169539053632008-06-04T13:04:00.000-06:002008-06-04T13:04:00.000-06:00Ari,<BR/><BR/>I think you are correct in your assessment of the train situation. It seems to be a close parallel to the case of an airplane pilot who encounters a catastrophic mechanical failure over a populated area. He is doing the moral thing to attempt to crash in the least populated area he can find rather than in a highly populated public place.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps some of the confusion in the train example is that it seems to imply an uninvolved bystander flips the switch. Instead imagine the train conductor sees the impending disaster and can control the switches. Is he being moral to switch to the less populated track? I think so.<BR/><BR/>And if the conductor is acting morally, what is the difference between the conductor's actions and that of a true bystander?<BR/><BR/>Doug.Doug Kreningnoreply@blogger.com