Bais Avraham

Sichos ha-Ran (Rabbi Nachman's Wisdom): Commentary to Simon 1

2009-11-13T15:22:00.003-05:00

I am currently writing a commentary to Rabbi Nachman of Breslov's Sichos ha-Ran, known is English as Rabbi Nachman's Wisdom. See here for the text of Sichos ha-Ran online. The Sefer is available here in English translation by Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan from Breslov Research Institute.

Once a week or so, I will post translations and excerpts from my commentary.Please note that all of these postings are of copyrighted materials. Please ascribe attribution where appropriate.

And now for the first Simon of Sefer Bais Avraham al Sichos ha-Ran:

Bais Avraham to Simon 1 -

The Rebbe opens with a quote from Dovid ha-Melech (Tehillim 135:5): כִּי אֲנִי יָדַעְתִּי   כִּי־גָדוֹל יְהֹוָה וַאֲדֹנֵינוּ מִכָּל־אֱלֹהִים, For I know that HaShem is great, and that our Lord is above all gods.

The immediate kasha here is that the Rebbe has favored this statement of Dovid ha-Melech over what appears to be a perfectly acceptable and similar statement in the Torah itself!

After hearing of the salvation of the Jewish people at the Yam Suf, Yisro exclaims (Shemos 18:11): עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי כִּי־גָדוֹל יְי מִכָּל־הָאֱלֹהִים כִּי בַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר זָדוּ עֲלֵיהֶם , Now I know that HaShem is greater than all gods, for in the matter that they conspired...!

Why did the Rebbe overlook Yisro’s statement in favor of that of Dovid ha-Melech? To answer this question, we must look deeper into the statement of Yisro: עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי כִּי־גָדוֹל יְי מִכָּל־הָאֱלֹהִים כִּי בַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר זָדוּ עֲלֵיהֶם. Now I know that HASHEM is greater than all gods, for in the matter that they conspired...!

Rashi explains that Yisro had known of HaShem before the exodus of the Jews from Egypt. However, following the Exodus he became convinced that HaShem was greater than all of the gods. What convinced Yisro that HaShem was the greatest? According to the understanding of Targum Onkeles, Yisro recognized in the events at the Yam Suf that HaShem not only punished the Egyptians midda keneged midda for what they had actually done to the Jews, but even punished the Egyptians for plans conspired yet not actually carried out against the Jews!

How could Yisro know what plans the Egyptians conspired yet failed to execute? The Gemora, Sotah 11a, tells us that Yisro had formerly been an advisor ( along with Iyuv and Bilaam) to Paroh and was consulted regarding the persecution of the Jews.

Thus, when Yisro declared עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי , Now I know..., he was referring to a type of knowledge shared by a very small group of people. Four people to be exact: Yisro, Paroh, Iyuv, and Bilaam.

Dovid HaMelech, however, phrases his praise of HaShem differently, stating אֲנִי יָדַעְתִּי, I, I, know... Dovid ha-Melech is thus describing a knowledge of HaShem that is different than that described by Yisro. Dovid is specifyi"ng that this is a knowledge that is held and understood only by himself and none other. As the Rebbe writes: .כי אני ידעתי - אני ידעתי דיקא... Furthermore, the Rebbe writes that this is a “knowledge” that every individual could have. Yet, it is a knowledge that is beyond words, that cannot be communicated.

We see that Daas Yisro - the knowledge of Yisro - is a knowledge of G-D that is factual and informational. However, it is not knowledge of G-d. Rather, Daas Yisro is factual knowledge about G-d.

However, Daas Dovid - the knowledge of Dovid - is a knowledge of G-d that is beyond mere facts about G-d. It is a vision, an experience of G-d that is beyond words, beyond communication.

Since it is knowledge that cannot be communicated, it is knowledge that cannot, by definition, be taught from one person to another. Rather, Daas Dovid must be cultivated within each person by himself. This knowledge, Daas Dovid, is knowledge that comes about only as a product of embracing Emunah .

In explaining this statement of Dovid, the Rebbe is teaching us that intellectual knowledge of G-d, Daas Yisro, is ultimately knowledge of facts about G-d. It is not knowledge of G-d himself.

The great mistake of the philosophers and academic theologians who try to understand G-d rationally or intellectually is that their conlclusions ultimately tell them nothing about G-d Himself. Rather, the material of all their inquiries and investigations is only in the realm of facts about G-d. Yet nothing of their questions or conclusions is relevant to understanding even the slightest about G-d Himself.

However, we see from the example of Yisro that intellectual knowledge of mere facts about G-d can assist us in making positive decisions that affect our relationship with G-d. However, this is only a lower level of knowledge. This level pales in contrast to true knowledge of HaShem, Daas Dovid, which is the product of emunah, faith, rather than intellectual or philosophical introspection.    It is only by emunah that we come to truly know HaShem and to come to true religious knowledge and understanding. Only by faith do we come to have true religious and godly experiences.

This is what is meant by the Rebbe’s closing remarks in this paragraph - "נודע ב'ערים בעלע" - 'כל חד לפום מה דמשער בלבה. Daas Yisro, intellectual brain-based knowledge of HaShem, can bring us to the gates of emunah, the gates of the heart. However, every individual must make the decision to step forward into the world of emunah, the world of faith. It is only then that one can come to actually know and experience HaShem.

Ok - I'm Back

2009-11-12T01:59:00.000-05:00

Well, it has been over a year... a BIG long year. The Bloomenstiel family is now living in a new city, living a new life, and , B"H loving it.

I am going to give this Blog project another go now that I have real time to do it and that I know am much more computer proficient than a year ago.

As part of this new attempt, absent my friend and student Dovi Meisel's assistance, I have decided to re-brand this site as BaisAvraham.com - after the first volume of my forthcoming sefer. Please let me know what you think and if you have any suggestions as to how to do things better.

- Thanks -
Avi Bloomentstiel

Tonight, the Night of the Ninth of Av...

2008-08-09T23:55:00.003-04:00

From the Kinnos (laments) read tonight...

On this night, weep and howl my children,

Upon this night was my holy house destroyed and my palaces burned!

And all the House of Israel shall mourn my agony,

And they shall cry for the conflagration lit by G-D.

On this night I was blackened and the sun, moon and stars darkened,

For the destruction of my holy house and the annulment of the watches!

Upon this night, torments surrounded and encircled me,

And He declared it a fixed time for the Five Decrees.

For on this night, they cried without cause and, lo,

It was fixed a night of weeping for all generations;

Thus HaShem caused it to happen so.

On this night, weep and howl my children,

Upon this night was my holy house destroyed and my palaces burned!

And all the House of Israel shall mourn my agony,

And they shall cry for the conflagration lit by G-D.

Bamidbar (Leviticus) 13:25 - 14:1 records that, upon the return of the spies to the people, they provided a slanderous and disparaging report of the Land of Israel. Rather than believe the promises of HaShem, of a land flowing with milk and honey, the Jewish people accepted the lashon ho-ra of the meraglim, the spies, and wept over it.

The Talmud in Taanis 29a records that, since we cried for no reason on the 9th of Av, G-d in turn decreed that this night would be cause for tears for all generations. The Talmud ibid. 26b records that five divine decrees were passed upon this date:

1) Those guilty of accepting the report of the meraglim were destined to die in the wilderness without entering the Land of Israel.

2) The First temple would be destroyed on the 9th of Av.

3) The Second temple would be destroyed on the 9th of Av.

4) Bar Kokhba's revolt would be crushed at Beitar on the 9th of Av. The Talmud in Gittin 57a records that the non-Jews fertilized their fields for 7 years with the blood of the Jews killed in this conflict.

5) The evil Roman prelate Turnus Rufus would have the entire city of Jerusalem razed and plowed over on this date.

To all of these events, the paytan, the poet, refers verses.

Preparing for the Nine Days...

2008-07-29T17:00:00.002-04:00

אונטער דער ערד
UNDER THE EARTH

Are there birds twittering under the earth
choking back holy tears in their thin necks,
or is that throbbing beneath the earth
once used words that only seem the sound of unseen birds?

Wherever my feet are wise to walk,
over snow, over hay, over drunken fire.
they feel words,
the souls of words,
it is a pity that my feet cannot hold a pencil...

Like a snake-charmer
I halt my feet in their going:
here and here and here
here they are, here.
Once used silence.
Once used places.
And I dig with my hands - my bony spades,
down to where the black palaces burst,
where words throb
hidden in the sound of violins.

- Avrom Sutzkever
1956

Translated from the original Yiddish
by A. C. Bloomenstiel

Question From a Simple Jew...

2008-07-28T15:59:00.002-04:00

See the discussion here and here regarding living in the land of Israel. This was the response from Rabbi Bloomenstiel to the discussion.

- DM

The nature of the mitzvah of living in Eretz Yisroel absent the Beis Mikdash is not a clear cut chiyuv. The earliest halachic (non-aggadic) reference is Ramban commenting on Bamidbar 33:53, which is the potential makor of the chiyuv. According to the Ramban, there is a chiyuv d’oraisa to pack up and move to Eretz Yisroel. However, later Rishonim and the Acharonim wrestle with the fact that the Rambam does not include this mitzvah in his enumeration of the 613 mitzvos.

Additionally, the Shulchan Aruch is mum on this issue. While the Mechaber paskens repeatedly that certain miztvos operate differently or apply differently in the Land, there is no actual statement that one must pack up and move there.

Many meforshim have tried to explain the omission in the Rambam. Some explain that yishuv Eretz Yisroel is only a hekhshar mitzvah (see Rashbam to Bava Basra 91a). Others explain that the mitzvah was abrogated with the destruction of the Beis Mikdash (see sefer Megillas Esther on the Rambam – I have several kashos on this deah, though). Then, of course, there is the aforementioned comment of the Tosafos to Kesubos 110b that there is no mitzvah due to the hardship associated with living in the land. Incidentally, this remark doesn’t actually state that there is no mitzvah, only that one is potur due to the hardship. In our days, however, we can legitimately question the applicability of this svora.

The le-maase question of whether one is obligated to pack up and move to Eretz Yisroel was the subject of Teshuvos from both Rav Moshe ztz”l (Igros Moshe, Even ha-Ezer I:102) and Rav Ovadia Yoseif, shlit”a (written in several places, and heard personally many times).

According to Rav Feinstein, the mitzvah of yishuv ha-aretz is a reshus, meaning that one is under no halachic obligation or pressure to make aliya. However, if one did, then he is praiseworthy and accredited a mitzvah. The understanding that there is no chiyuv of yishuv is found in many other Ashkenazi acharonim: see Rav Yaakov of Lissa to Kesuvos 110b and the Chofetz Chayim in his Mikhtavim. They both state the halacha is like the Rambam and that there is no chiyuv of yishuv in our days. Such appears to have been the interpretation of the majority of the Ashkenazi poskim.

Among the Sefardim, the poskim tended to read the Ramban literally and hold that the mitzvah of yishuv is a chiyuv. In the early 1980’s Rav Yoseif became the strongest proponent of this interpretation and has argued strongly against Rav Moshe.

All in all, that is the halachic baseline: for the Ashkenzaim, according to the rov, yishuv is at best a mitzvah reshus and not a chiyuv ( Rav Kook ztvk”l was a minority in his view). For the Sephardim, it is a chiyuv.

Knowing this, I read Rav Breiter hy”d (of whom I am a BIG fan) as stating that, while there is no halachic chiyuv of yishuv, one must do everything possible to go. In this sense it is a midda ha-chasidus, potentially akin to donning Rabbeinu Tam Tefillin, or going daily to the mikva. Note that he says “Every day of your life, yearn, pray and make a practical effort to live in Eretz Yisroel, or at the very least to walk four steps there.” If we were talking halachic chiyuv, then there would be no “at least.” A chiyuv d’oraisa is a chiyuv (in all honesty, though there is wiggle room to say that concepts of lechatchila & b’dieved do exist by d’oraisa’s that are halachos le-moshe misinai – see the Pri Megadim’s hakdama to hilchos shechita, however here we are talking about a d’oraisa she nikhtav be-kra). One may legitimately say, though, that this midda ha-chassidus is stronger than that of wearing Rabbeinu Tam since it has a makor be-kra, but it is very hard to split hairs in this area.

Practically, then, it means that if your are one who holds of the Breslov shitta (which is Rav Breiter) then you should always endeavor and make it your goal to live there. However, since it is a midda ha-chasidus, mitigating factors will be much more influential in creating leniencies.

Preparing for the Nine Days...

2008-07-27T03:42:00.004-04:00

As the nine days approaches, I commence a review of my learning of the events of the churban Beis Mikdash from the gemora and midrashim.

In recent years, though, I have found that poetry (both the kinnos and Yiddish poetry) helps to sharpen my emotional response to the time at hand. In particular, the writings of survivors of many of the major calamities that have befallen our people (i.e. the inquisition, the Holocaust, etc.) As we get closer to the 9^th of Av, I would like to share some of the most striking writings with you.

In Memoriam

Strangers’ eyes don’t see

how in my small room I open a door

and begin my nightly stroll among the graves.

(how much earth, if you can call it that, is enough to bury smoke?)

There are valleys and hills

and hidden twisted paths,

enough to last a whole night’s journey.

In the dark I see shining towards me

faces of epitaphs

wailing their songs.

Graves of the whole

vanished Jewish world

Blossom in the dalet-amos of my tent.

And I pray:

Be a father, a mother to me,

a sister, a brother

my own children, beloved kin,

real as pain,

from my own blood and flesh, be my own dead,

let me grasp and take-in

these destroyed millions.

At dawn I close the door

to the graveyard of my people.

I sit at the table and nod off

whilst humming a tune.

The enemy had no dominion over them.

Fathers, mothers, children from their cradles

encircled death and overcame him.

All the children, astounded,

ran to meet the fear of death

without tears, like little yiddishe ma’aselakh.

and they soon flickered in to flames

like small namesakes of G-D.

Who else, like me,

has in the nighttime his own

dead garden?

Who is destined for this as am I?

Who has so much dead earth awaiting him, as for me?

And when I die

Who will inherent my little graveyard,

And that shining gift,

an eternal yortzeit light,

forever flickering?

--Yaakov Gletshtein, 1961

--Translated from the original Yiddish by

--Avraham Chaim Bloomenstiel

The Post I Didn't Want to Write...

2008-07-24T21:25:00.003-04:00

A lot of e-mails came in about my post of a few days ago. Now, I know that people do not usually exercise their best critical reading skill when perusing blogs. But, this is simply silly.

One comment came in today that, rather than put in the comments section, I will post here.

The special beauty of this comment is that it exemplifies everything that I have written about thus far.

"Yeshivabochur" wrote:

Your suggestion that chazal could have ered [sic.] in their understanding of science and the natural world transgresses makchish meggeida. Do you understand the implications of that? There is no support for such a suggestion. Also, who are you to comment on issues of halacha and hashkofa? Do you have smicha? Even so, you have to be a poseik to do that... are you?

Them's fightin' words. Here is my response:

I absolutely do understand the implications of being over on makchish megideha (denying the authority of the Sages of the Talmud); Such a transgression is a halachic qualification of a min, a heretic. There is more to be written about this, but I will save it for the end of my response.

Now, where in the post did I suggest that chaza"l erred in their understanding of science? I wrote no such thing.

As to your claim that "there is no support for such a suggestion [that Chazal's understanding of the natural sciences was fallible]," you are completely, unequivocally, without a doubt, dead wrong.

First go see Brachos 44b, 58b, 59a; Shabbos 41a, 85a; Eiruvin 45b, 56a, 76a, 76b; Pesachim 93b - 94b; Succa 8a-b; Ta'anis 9b - 10a; Chagiga 12b; Nazir 52a; Sotah 3b - 4b; Sotah 10a; Sanhedrin 5a-5b; Makkos 5b; Avoda Zara 27b - 28a; Chullin 57a-57b, 59a-b, 63b, 77a; Bechoros 21b; Tomid 31b - 32a; Nidda 22b; Nidda 30b - 31b.

Then go look at the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim 3:14 & 2:8, in Hilchos Shechita 10:12,13, in Hilchos Kidush ha-Chodesh 9:1 & 17:24, and in the hakdama to his Peirush al ha-Mishnayos.

See R' Shereira Gaon in Otzar ha-Geonim to Gittin 68.

Now go look at the Ralbag in his Peirushei ha-Torah: Biur Divrei ha-Sofer on Bereishis 15:4. S See also his Peirush le-Iyuv: Biur Divreu ha-Ma'ane 38:18-20.

See the Rashba in Chiddushei al Shas to Eiruvin 76:2, Hullin 59:1, and in the Torah ha-Bayis 3:1.

See the Rosh (Tosafos ha-Rosh) on Eiruvin 76:2 & Succa 8:2; See Piskei ha-Rosh to Pesachim 2:30; and Shu"t ha-Rosh 14:2.

See the Ran in the Chiddushei al Shas to Eruvin 76:3 & Chullin 42:1. See also his peirush on the Rif to Chullin 20 (p. 1 in the Rif).

Don't forget the Shu"t ha-Radvaz IV:282. See also the first Drisha to Yoreh Deah 52.

Also, the third Pri Chadash to O.C. 454 and the second Pri Chadash to Y.D. 80.

See also the Shu"t Maharam Shick: Even ha-Ezer 7; R' Shimshon Raphael Hirsch in his letter to Rav Pinchas Wexler; R' Eliyahu Dessler in Michtav Mi-Eliyahu IV, p. 355, note 4; Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in in the introduction to Sefer Shemiras ha-Guf veha-Nefesh, perek 4; R' Aryeh Carmell in the Aruch Michtav mi-Eliyahu, "Freedom to Interpret," p. 13; R' Ephraim Greenblatt in the Revavos Ephraim.

And, don't overlook the Chazon Ish, Even ha-Ezer, Hilchos Ishus 27:3 which states that Chazal did not have a complete understanding of the sciences.

Know that these are just a sampling; I have almost three times as many mekoros in my notes. I am providing these sources only to prove that there is support for such a position; personally, I do not take that position (I don't necessarily take the alternative one either). Rather, I am just trying to inject some intellectual honesty into this discussion.

Now, let's return to your accusation of makchish meggideha (denial of the authority of the Sages). Makchish meggideha as a halachic qualification of a min, a heretic, was established by the Rambam in Hilchos Teshuva 3:8. The sweet irony is that Rambam himself also holds that Chaza"l were fallible in their scientific understanding of natural phenomena!

The solution to this apparent contradiction is in the Peirush ha-Mishnayos on Sanhedrin 11:3. There the Rambam explains that a makchish magideha is one who denies the concept or authority of the Oral Torah; not one who questions the scientific understanding of the Sages. This understanding that is relied upon in halacha le-ma'aseh.

Lastly, as for the last statement/question in your comment, the answer is "yes" on both counts. However, it is denigrating and insulting to imply that non-Rabbonim are not allowed to discuss halacha and hashkofa.

- Avi Bloomenstiel

Ha-Mavin Yavin

2008-07-24T13:20:00.002-04:00

אַ וועג.
אַ פעלד.
אַ צאַפּלדיקע לאָנקע.
געהיימע טריט
פון הונגעריקע וואָלקנס.
וואו זענען די הענט, וואָס שאַפן וואונדער?

A path.
A field.
A trembling meadow.
Hidden footprints
of hungering clouds.
Where are the hands that make miracles?

- Avrom Sutzkever
from אויף מיין וואַנדערפייפל

Faith and Exegesis, Dogma and Dialogue

2008-07-23T00:35:00.005-04:00

We have recently embarked upon an exploration of Jewish "faith" as connoted by the English term.

For this posting, I would like to offer something of a personal meditation on the idea of doctrine in Yiddishkeit.

About 18 months ago, while researching a knotty shailo as to the halachic status of a certain Christian sect, I had occasion to delve into some of the particulars of Christian theology and biblical Exegesis.

I am not an expert in this at all and will readily admit that my understanding is incomplete. However, I read enough to sense some large-scale perceptual distinctions in the exegetical process between "us" and "them."

In the Christian commentaries there is an overwhelming emphasis on narrative. The who's, where's, and what's are the most important elements of the interpretation. Ultimately, the interpretation of the narrative is geared toward the derivation or clarification of doctrine. For example: A said X. Let us examine when A said it in the order of the narrative, where he said it, to whom he said it, what was said before and after it, and, lastly, let us examine X itself. Ultimately, how does this understanding of the narrative feed into our formulation of doctrine.

In this sense, the broad view seems to be one of "narrative doxology." Complete understanding of the narrative is the vehicle for the codification of the doctrine. Again, I am not an expert at all. However, this trend seemed to be the main concern of the Christian commentaries that I perused.

While there are similar streams of narrative exegesis in the Torah commentaries, the bulk of the meforshim appear to emphasize an empirical reading of the text. For example, the definition of prohibited melachos on shabbos is derived by an empirical comparison of the term's use between the mitzvos of shabbos and the building of the mishkan. While the Christian commentaries work via narrative interpretation to codify doctrine, ours emphasizes an empirical exegesis in order to derive practice. Let's grant the Jewish view the unwieldy label of "empirical praxology."

What emerges from these two understandings are two separate intellectual mechanics. In Christianity, the narrative builds the retaining walls of doctrine. For, example the narrative states that G-d created the world as it was in six days. Evolution or any other extra-narrative concepts will thus be excluded from the final doctrine. While doctrine evolves into a rigid system, practice will remain vague and extremely subjective in that there is no empirical attempt to qualify it.

Ultimately, though, what happens when the narrative is challenged by scientific evidence? Well, you then have two options. One, is to oppose the science, thus casting your religion into a dark age and seriously impinging your credibility among thinking individual. Two, is to reinterpret the narrative as non-literal or metaphoric. This is the past that the church has often taken, yet with an unintended consequence. By reinventing these previously literal narratives as mere metaphores, the theological authority of the narrative is greatly eroded. Many Christian scholars have identified this trend as responsible for the creation of a "God of the Margins" theology which relegates the concept of a creator to only those areas which are inexplicable by science. For the church, this is a dire paradox.

Judaism, by emphasizing an empirical reading of the text to create a rigid system of practice, has ended up with fairly plastic boundaries when it comes to narrative/doctrinal interpretation. For example, although the Torah state that the world was created in six days, there are many meforshim who freely explore the literalness of this narrative (R' Yitzchok of Akko, Drush Ohr ha-Chaim from the Tiferes Yisroel, Sefer ha-Temunah, Livnas ha-Sapir, and many more). In fact, the Rambam in many places (i.e. Peirush ha-Mishnayos to Shavuos, and at the end of Makkos) states that psak, reaching a final scholarly and practical conclusion, only applies to halachic matters. In matters of hashkofa (doctrine), one cannot say "we do not pasken like that" with regard to an opinion posited by a valid Torah authority.

In this sense, Judaism has always retained a certain openness to reinterpretation and discussion of narrative and doctrine without the threat of weakening the pillars of halacha. After all, the action of Judaism is, in a sense, primary over the contemplation of Jewish doctrine (na'aseh ve-nishma).

However, something has happened in the past 6 years that utterly terrifies me. The banning of several of R' Nosson Slifkin's books and other similar events is evidence to me of the emergence of a new, inflexible conception of Jewish doctrine. More and more, I am hearing colleagues and gadolim speaking of hashkofa in the language of psak halacha. My fear is that, by tinkering with the intellectual structure of Jewish exegesis, we will eventually paint ourselves into a theological corner and fall victim to the same paradoxes of interpretation which trouble the Christians.

I apologize for the lack of citations or specific textual references in this post but, as I wrote above, this is much more of a personal musing/meditation/proposition than an academic exposition.

- Rabbi Avraham Bloomenstiel

Rav Nachman of Breslov on Today, Shiva Asur b'Tammuz

2008-07-20T19:48:00.003-04:00

The Novi (Malachi 3:22) orders us: Zichru Toras Moshe, “Remember the Torah of Moses.” Considering that this order is given as part of the Prophet’s discourse on the sechar (reward) for the mitzvos, the word zichru (remember) is odd. It would have made more sense for the Prophet to have said kiymu (fulfill) Toras Moshe or tishmeru (observe) Toras Moshe. Why did the Prophet elect the weaker language of zichru (remember)?

Rabbeinu za”l, Rabbi Nachman of Breslov, explains this language in Likutei Moharan I:217.

When HaShem gave the 1^stset of tablets, He Himself engraved the words upon the stones (Shmos 32:16). The Gemora (Eruvin 54a) and many meforshim understand that the words, engraved by divine hand, were supernaturally “engraved” upon the hearts and souls of all those who studied them. The presence of the divinely engraved tablets made the Torah indelible to all who learned it. However, with Moshe Rabbinu’s smashing of the tablets, Chaza”l tell us that forgetfulness entered the world. The Gemora (Yoma 4b) pinpoints the date upon which the tablets were shattered and that the ability to forget the Torah entered the world: the 17^th of Tammuz. If it were not for the destruction of the luchos on that day, it would be impossible to forget Torah.

The initial letters of the phrase Zichru Toras Moshe are those of the Hebrew month of Tammuz: TMZ. The prophet is intimating, by use of the word zichru (remember) and the initial letters TMZ, that we must specifically strive to remember our learning in order to rectify the blemish of shichicha (forgetfulness) which descended into the world as a result of the destruction of the 1^st tablets.

Now, you may notice that this spelling of Tammuz is choser, lacking the letter vav. Rabbi Nachman writes that, as a result of the shattering of the tablets, the vav “departed.” As is common in the writings of the Rebbe, the letter vav is understood to refer to the tablets which the sages tell us (Bava Basra 14a) were vav hand-breadths long and vav hand-breadths wide (6x6 – the letter vav is the number 6). Thus, Zichru Toras Moshe is an adjuration to us to remember, to review, and to cling to the Torah so that we may rectify the events of the month of Tammuz when the luchos (the vav) departed.

Furthermore, note that the breaking of the luchos occurred 40 days after the 6^th of Sivan, which is Shavuos. In davening we call Shavous Zman Matan Toroseinu, the initial letters of which also spell TMZ without the vav. So we see that on the holiday of Shavuos, which commemorates the giving of the Torah, we hint to the forgetfulness that was brought into the world and the need to rectify it by constantly rededicating ourselves to the study and remembrance of the Torah.

In this sense, the fast of the 17^th of Tammuz and the celebration of the giving of the Torah on Shavuos share a common element – the rectification of shichicha (forgetfulness) and the blemish of the shattering of the luchos.

Therefore, in Breslov there is a minhag held by many to rededicate oneself on this day to Torah learning; to adopt a new seder, or to begin a new masechta.

Guest Posting from Professor Marc Caplan: Faith and Emunah

2008-07-10T14:19:00.003-04:00

I don't think a question can be properly considered "Jewish" if there are not at least two answers to it.

One of the first and most meaningful philosophical discussions on faith I read as a (relatively) young adult is Kierkegaard's meditation on the akedah, "Fear and Trembling"; although it is a thoroughly Christian (specifically Protestant--and I think this distinction is significant here) work, his idea of the "leap of faith," an existential act more difficult and demanding than the certainty of science or reason, has always reminded me of the midrash about Nachshon jumping into the yam-suf. Christianity inherits--with distortions and appropriations, to be certain--its vocabulary of faith from Judaism, and Jewish philosophers in turn have continued to influence and be influenced by Christian thought.

On that score there is a great (and magnificently true!) story that the Latin tractate Fons Vitae, attributed for centuries to one Avicebron and considered a leading work of medieval Christian scholasticism, was determined in 1846 to be a translation from Hebrew of a work, Mekor Hayyim, by Solomon Ibn Gabirol! So clearly, there is a lot to be shared and a lot to be learned from one another.

Nonetheless, I think the primary distinction between Christian faith and Jewish emunah is a matter of reciprocity and mutual obligation. For Catholicism, for example, faith is primarily an act of external signification, demonstrated via confession, communion, sacraments, etc. For Protestantism, by contrast, faith is generally conceived as an internal conviction. In both denominations, there is an ongoing debate about the relative significance of "works" and "grace" in achieving salvation--a preoccupation in Christianity that as far as I can tell has no meaningful parallel in Jewish thought.

Judaism, l'havdil, emphasizes neither the external nor the internal, but the necessity of harmonizing the two. Concepts such as kashruth, shabbos, tehara, etc., cannot be segregated meaningfully into an external or internal component. "Faith" in Judaism is not expressed but is enacted through the Jew's conduct of everyday life. Therefore, faith, or emunah, in Judaism is not an end-in-itself as it is in Christianity; it is the means of establishing a reciprocal relationship with God, placing the burden on the believing Jew not in affirming faith, but in building on an eternal covenant to create a Jewish life, a Jewish family, a Jewish community, etc.

Dr. Caplan is a Yiddish language scholar and author currently residing in Baltimore Maryland. He is the Zelda and Myer Tandetnik Professor in Yiddish Language at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, MD.

Affirming the Faith...

2008-07-08T22:45:00.001-04:00

In light of my new association with the well known counter missionary organization Jews for Judaism, I have decided to veer away from the usual subject matter of these postings and, instead, spend some time dwelling on faith.

The English term “faith” isn’t one heard batted about much in traditional Jewish circles. You may think, “Of course it isn’t – we talk about emuna!” No. I’m not writing about emunah. I mean “faith,” - that English word laden as it may be with all its non-Judaic (X-tian) and often negative (e.g. blind faith) connotations.

What does it mean as a Jew to have “faith?” What is our “faith?” How is faith different than emunah? Are they actually different?

In the course of my life, I have always had “faith” and emunah presented to me as concepts associated with particular religious teams. For example, gentiles have “faith” while Jews have emunah. The goyim have “belief,” while the Yidden have “certainty.” To be frank, I have never fully understood the fine nuances between these terms or why one is necessarily “Jewish” while the other is not.

So here is my question for any who may be reading:

What is Jewish faith?

Let’s try to pin it down – please send your comments and suggestions. If anyone has a post they would like to offer, please e-mail it to Dovi (webmaster) at sfasblog@gmail.com. Please note that Dovi, as per my request, will not accept anonymous posts or posts written under pseudonyms. Likewise, I will not link to blogs which are owned by pseudonymic or anonymous bloggers. Everything here should be done face-to-face, so to speak.

Though pseudonymic, this site is linked to ASimpleJew.Blogspot.com because I have known this fellow personally for a few years now and understand something his hashkofa and what is trying to accomplish via his blog (which is one of my favorites… ooops… bias revealed!)

- Avraham Bloomenstiel

Organized Labor in Halacha Part III

2008-07-01T19:51:00.003-04:00

In this final installment, we will examine a miscellany of issues relating to organized labor in halacha.

Strike Breakers

What about strike breakers? Since there is a halachik justification for strikes, it is certainly not proper for the employer to attempt to block that right. All the more so, as Rav Moshe points out in Iggros Moshe Choshen Mishpot I:58, it is prohibited for the employer to do anything counter to Torah Law, such as hiring strikebreakers who use physical violence to force the employees back to work.

Paying Workers for Strike Days

On the issue of paying workers for strike days, Rav Kasriel Tschursh paskens that employees may demand back-pay for the period of a strike. According to Rav Tschursh, the validity of their claim is borne out by the Rosh’s comments to Bava Kamma 6:6, ruling that rehiring workers after they have been on strike constitutes an implicit agreement to pay them their back-wages. However, both Rav Tshurch and the Tashbatz I:64 appear to agree that they need not be paid their full wages, rather a slightly reduced wage is acceptable. This wage in halacha is called the sechar bateilah- essentially “wages of idleness” and is like a form of unemployment pay.

The Role of the Adam Chashuv

The halacha states that you only need the oversight of a halachic arbitrator, an adam chashuv, when there is such an adam chashuv in town. Absent the approval of this individual, the conditions and regulations of the union are unenforceable. Yet, if there is no such adam chashuv in the city, then the conditions of the union are fully enforceable. The Igros Moshe Choshen Misphot I:59 brings an interesting point on the role of the adam chashuv. He derives from language of the rishonim that this adam chasuv needn’t be a talmid chacham, dayan, or anyone in a rabbinic capacity. Rather, this person could be anyone in a position of communal authority and oversight whose purpose is to advocate on behalf of the public. Considering this definition, it appears that our government, who works to protect the rights and interests of consumers, would fulfill the position of adam chashuv. Furthermore, since the government grants labor unions the rights to regulate labor, then the Unions’ decrees and rules would be considered enforceable even under halacha!

Now, if the government fulfills the role of the adam chashuv in our countries, then the activities of the labor unions are only enforceable and halachically valid if the government approves of them. Therefore, we can say that since striking, collective bargaining, and other such things are approved by the government, then they are halachically valid as well.

All this having been said, let’s turn our attention to the situation of organized labor within sectors that directly impact the Jewish community. For the purposes of this writing, there are three general classes of occupations. First, there are those jobs which provide a religious service, yet the non-performance of this service will only cause inconvenience, not transgression. An example of such an occupation is that of the shochet. If all the schochtim were to go on strike, naturally we wouldn’t have any kosher meat. Though a clear inconvenience, we do not assume that it will lead anyone to transgress and, chas ve-shalom, eat non-kosher meat. There are many sheelos u-teshuvos that discuss the issue of shochtim strikes and it seems that they pose no issue.

The second category is those positions providing vital services. By vital, we mean that if that field’s practitioners were to strike the result would be transgression. For example, what would happen if all of the mohelim sent on strike? The halacha is that milah must be done on the eighth bay by a qualified mohel. What if all the kosher supervisors went on strike? Then there would be no guarantee as to the kashrus or validity of hekhsherim. In these cases there is leeway to permit a strike, yet only as a last resort. Furthermore, those who go on strike bear the responsibility of their actions. Meaning, that they must provide some sort of same guard to prevent foreseeable transgression that may result. For example, they must arrange for brining in subsititute mohelim from out of town even if these mohalim are much more expensive.

The third area of Jewish communal occupation is that of the Torah teacher - this deserves its own section.

Teachers of Torah

Lastly, we will examine the situation of Torah teachers, which is unique. First of all, under halacha it is not possible to receive payment for teaching torah. When a person sits and learns all day, or teaches Torah to children, they are performing a great mitzvah, a mitzvah beyond valuation. Thus, it is prohibited to pay someone for teaching Torah (incidentally this law applies primarily to those who teach Torah sh-ba’al peh; there is discussion amongst the poskim regarding those who teach Torah she bi-khsav). Rather, the view of halacha is that Torah teachers are basically paid to refrain from work. By this way, they are freed from having to earn a living. The result is that the obligation to learn and teach Torah full time devolves upon them automatically and immediately. This is the halachik reality of their situation.

Now, this construct is no legal fiction. One of the ramifications of this sort of payment arrangement is that Torah teachers cannot strike. After all, the teacher or Torah isn’t considered to have a trade to began with. Striking is therefore the abandoning of a Torah mitzvah of harbotzas ha-Torah.

Yet, Rav Feinstien acknowledged that there is a situation in which a “strike” by torah teachers is justified. If the wages-to-remain-idle paid to the Torah teachers is so low that things are not only financially difficult, but the pressures of poverty impact the teachers’ ability to do their work successfully, then the teachers may stop work. The operative logic here is that, since the quality of the instruction and Torah education is starting to suffer, then it is actually in the best interest of the school, the parents, and the children to help the teachers. Since the long-term gain is improving torah knowledge and preventing its decline, then they may stop work. Yet, Reb Moshe makes it clear that this is a last resort, only to be used after proper rabbinic consultation and investigation.

When teachers must strike, Reb Moshe mandates that they should be paid for the period of the work stoppage. This applies even when teachers engage in a strike that is not entirely sanctioned by halacha. The Rov’s reasoning is that, since the strike is motivated by financial tzoras and poverty, it is counterintuitive to allow the employer to penalize them by not paying them for their time.

Given the unique halachic considerations of Torah educators, it is advisable that they avoid membership in secular teachers’ unions. The tactics of such unions would often be in conflict with the halachik situation of Torah teachers. Indeed, a friend recently showed me a proclamation issued in November, 1980 by the oversight board of Torah u-Mesorah, the national organization of torah day schools. This kol koreh prohibited Torah teachers from joining national secular teachers’ unions and also called for the formation of an Irgun ha-Morim – a halachically administered union-of-sorts to to advocate on behalf of day schools teachers.

Halacha and Organized Labor Part II

2008-06-04T01:17:00.002-04:00

This is part II of Rabbi Bloomenstiel's most recent set of shiurim. There may be one or two more parts forthcoming. Enjoy - Dovid Meisels.

On it’s face, the halacha appears limited in that it only provides for the members of a specific group or trade to unionize for the purpose of self regulation. After all, the gemora in Bava Basra seems to be speaking of independent contractors and businessmen such as bakers, dyers, shochtim, etc. Considering these facts, the halacha doesn’t appear to address the general situation of labor unions in our times. Nowadays, labor unions and similar organizations work on behalf of their bargaining units; engaging in negotiations with their employer to maintain and improve worker rights, compensation, working conditions, etc. Yet, our halacha seems focused on the way that most trade-unions operated in the past. Centuries ago, most guild members were self-employed artisans and craftsmen who worked together to regulate competition and prices amongst themselves. Is there any way to apply our halacha to the modern situation?

In general the answer is “yes.” Let’s see an example: All the shoemakers in a certain city band together and stipulate that they will only work on such and such days. Let’s say that half of the shoemakers in the city work in big factory. Do they have the ability to state that they will only work Sunday through Thursday against the wishes of the employer? They are within the bounds of halacha. First of all, the factory manager is considered a shoemaker and thus part of the same community as the other shoemakers in as much that his work directly impacts and ensures the production of shoes. Thus, since the laborer shoemakers are the majority, they have the ability to set the policy and terms of their employment even though they are not working for themselves. In this case, I don’t bellieve that there is any difference based on whether the laborers are working for themselves of for others. The only questions is: Are they in the majority and are they and their employers members of the same working community? If these conditions are met then the workers retain the right to impose regulations, fines, set wages, and work schedules.

Knowing that the halacha has applications in our times, now let us examine some particular features of modern organized labor starting with the “strike.” We saw in the actual halacha that the Shulchan Aruch permits members of a union to impose fines upon those who transgress the “rules.” Most of the poskim (decisors of Jewish law) treat strikes as a form of a fine or penalty against the employer. Thus, strikes are permitted under Jewish law. However, as with all things halachik, there are qualifications.

Today's employers and employees usually have a contract detailing the responsibilities and expectations of both parties. What happens if an employer has blatantly violated this contract? There are two basic views of such a situation. According to many poskim, most notably Rav Kook ztz”l, if the employer has blatantly violated the contract the the parties must first go to a beis din (assuming all parties are Jews, of course). The beis din will then try the case as a contract violation. Now, should the employer refuse to come to beis din or adhere to the ruling of a beis din, only then are the workers justified in striking because it is only at that point that the issue becomes one of trampling on the regulatory power of the trade community. Once the employer rebels against the authority of the beis din, the issue becomes one of labor rights and not contract violations. At that point the workers may fine the renegade element of their community via a strike.

However, Rav Eliezer Yehuda Waldenburg ztz”l in his monumental 22 volume work Tzitz Eliezer ( II:23) makes no distinction between a contract dispute and a labor dispute. He holds that if an employer blatantly violates a labor agreement then the workers may bypass the beis din entirely and immediately strike. However, this is only so when there is a clear violation of the agreement. If there is any doubt as to whether or not a breach of the labor agreement has occurred, then a beis din must be consulted for a ruling prior to penalizing the employer.

Of course, going to beis din is only relevant to Jewish unions versus Jewish employers. Most unions and employers today are non-Jews. So what is the situation of a Jew who belongs to a labor union? Is this partnership at all halachically significant? Apparently, there is no issue joining with the non-Jews in such a partnership. Though the mechaber mentions that it is proper to be cautious of joining in joint partnerships with non-Jews, the Rama states explicitly in Shulchan Aruch O.C. 156 that here is no such problem in our days and that these partnerships are mutar bizman hazeh.

Now, there is another famous halachic question about striking This issue involves a contractual agreement, yet does not involve any actual violation of the agreement. The situation is one in which employees and an employer had worked out a contract at the time of hiring. However, after a year the employees became unhappy with the contract and asked to renegotiate the terms of the original contract. Such a move on the part of the employees calls into question whether or not they were ever negotiating in good faith to begin with. In Jewish law, this creates questions as to the validity of the original contract.

This exact query is discussed by Rabbi Yosef Molko in his sefer Ohel Yosef. In Europe, a certain slaughter house hired their slaughterers to schecht a set proportion of cows to chickens. The shochtim were paid based on the number of cattle that they schechted. Due to changes in the economy, the shochtim began slaughtering many more chickens than originally stipulated in their contract. They went to the employer, who refused to increase their wages. Rabbi Molko was asked to decide whether or not these employees could strike. His response was a “yes” that they could. The Rav’s reasoning was that, although the original agreement is still theoretically valid, practically speaking it is rendered unfair retroactively because of an unforeseen change in working conditions and expectations. The original contract was predicated on a certain reality, one that no longer exists. Thus, the workers are not bound by the original agreement and may assert their right to fine the employer.

As an aside, we should note that the actual techniques of the strike must, of course, be permissible under halacha. Therefore, a strike that involves not only a work stoppage but a riot too would be prohibited. A questionable strike would be something like a hunger strike. Rav Waldenburg in the Tzitz decided a sheela regarding hunger strikes and was unfavorably disposed to the idea.

In the next installment we will look at issues of pay for strike days, teacher’s unions, and contracting out labor.

New Post: Halacha and Organized Labor - Part I

2008-06-01T21:19:00.003-04:00

This past week a fellow in our beis medrash was complaining rather intensely about his run-ins with the labor unions where he works. I agreed with him that dealing with the unions could be frustrating. We nodded in sympathetic unison. He then asked: “What gives these people the right to say how this place runs?”

Although it was a rhetorical question, I innocently proffered an unexpected answer: “the Torah.”

He looked at me, confused, and said “Rabbi, with all due respect, what kind of narishkeit is that? Unionized labor is completely goyish, like lime jello or Barry Manilow goyish.” While I didn’t point out that Barry Manilow is Jewish, I did offer some background as to the halachic basis for organized labor.

While the fellow said that he understood the basis, he still had a hard time swallowing it. Like many in our world, my friend (who gave permission to post about this) harbored the common misconception that Orthodox Judaism = political conservativism. Truth be told, frumkeit doesn’t even remotely equal any political view out there. Yet, all too many take the stance that, if it is politically conservative, then it must be kosher. This is patently not true. Oh, well...fodder for a future post.

For this post, though, let us stick to organized labor.

The source for the Torah concept of unionized labor is a braisa found in the Gemora in Bava Basra 8b:

The inhabitants of a city are entitled to fix the measures, prices, and wages as they see fit and to enforce them with fines.

Such is the accepted halacha that communal leaders have the authority to regulate certain elements of commerce to assure that the communal economy is prosperous and sustainable.

Now, in the course of discussion, the gemora also brings the following:

There were these two butchers who made a pact to work on alternating days. If anyone breached the agreement, his hides would be torn [meaning his work would be destroyed]. Reuven worked on Shimon’s day, and Shimon tore Reuven’s skins. Rava ruled that Shimon must pay for the damage. Rav Yemar bar Shalmiya said “but the braisa teaches that people of the city may fix measures, prices, and wages as they see fit and to enforce them with fines.” Rava did not reply to this. Rav Papa said: Rava was correct in not answering. When there is a great person (adam gadol) in a city, then the fines must be enacted in front of him.

Now, we have a big problem here. First of all, Rav Yemar argues against Rava, saying that these butchers have the right to regulate elements of commerce and fine transgressors. He learns this rule out from our braisa on 8b. But how is this braisa a proof to the case of the butchers? The braisa writes only that the leaders of a community have the right to regulate certain aspects of commerce in their community. Here, we are talking about members of a common trade, not the population of a city! So, where does it come from that members of a given trade have the ability to regulate their internal practices?

The Rosh, writing on this passage of the gemora provides an answer for us. He explains that people working in a common trade are like a kehila, a community unto themselves, and thus they have the power to regulate their own affairs.

The Rambam and many other Rishonim pasken such that tradesman may indeed engage in such regulation However, they include the condition of the gemora on 9a that, should the community have must have an halachic arbitrator, an adam gadol, then his approval would be needed. The idea is that the involvement of such a person would balance the interests of the guild or union against those of the general community. Without the approval of such an arbitrator, any conditions made by the union are invalid and unenforceable. Additionally, there is some dispute amongst the Rishonim as to how many tradesman must be involved in a guild or union to grant the organization regulatory authority. The general trend in the literature is that the majority of those in a field must agree to the proposed regulations in order for them to carry any clout.

The final psak is brought in the Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpot 231:28:

Members of a common trade are entitled to (Rama – establish decrees regarding their labor, for example:) to set amongst themselves certain days upon which each will work and to punish any who transgress the rule. (Rama – This ability to establish rules amongst themselves is only when they all agree together. However, only two or three cannot set the rule for the many). What is the exact case in which this rule applies? In place where there is not a prominent person serving as an official of the community. If there is such an official, then the regulations and punishments must be made through him.

While the concept of organized labor is firmly established in Jewish law, the modern application of that idea is something else entirely. And so, we are left with many questions. For example, most modern labor unions are non-Jewish entities which, at best, are a partnership between Jews and non-Jews. What is the status of such a partnership? Furthermore, what is the halachic staus of strikes which, after all, cause losses to employers? While we’re asking about strikes, what is the situation of the strike breaker? Also, is it allowed for union members to impress non-union members into the union? What about those individuals whose professions serve the larger Jewish Community, such as shochtim, or teachers. Can day-school teachers unionize and go on strikes? Additionally, how the aforementioned question of Rabbinic oversight affect unions today?

These topics will be adressed in Part II.

- R' Avraham Chaim Bloomenstiel

Why Breslov? - Chassidus and Personal Value

2008-05-23T15:49:00.004-04:00

This post is a new one in response to a recent e-mail. - Dovid Meisels

Last week I posted a comment on a friend’s blog refuting an assertion by another reader. Part of the refutation was the point that one’s choice of derech is a matter of personal value. For example, I have learned Chabad, sat in Chabad shiurim, and davened for a many years at various Chabad houses and institutions. What did I get from it? Nothing. For me, personally, Chabad is empty. I don’t get a hislahavus or even a “spark” from the derech of Lubavtich.

READ CAREFULLY, THOUGH : These are statements of personal, not universal, value. While Chabad chassidus doesn’t stimulate me, I still see its gadlus. When I was teaching high school, I encouraged several of the bochrim interested in chassidus to go seek out Chabad. I thought it as the best derech for these boys. Additionally, I am a big fan of the Tanya - it is one of, if not the, greatest works of chassidus ever produced and one of the finest ever pieces of Torah scholarship. Everyone should learn it!

Nevertheless, Chabad is still a mode of yiddishket with which I cannot connect.

These statements drew a lot of criticism. I got at least 10 or 15 e-mails saying that my words were divisive and that I had no right to call Chabad worthless. Obviously, this isn’t what I wrote. I never said Chabad was worthless. Rather, Chabad just doesn’t do anything for me. I acknowledge that, for many others, the Torah of Chabad is shoresh ha-neshoma. Another example of the lack of critical reading that goes on in the blogosphere. Oh well.

At least one reader, though, did review the post carefully and understood what I was writing. This woman e-mailed me a with a very poignant question:

I understand that Chabad is not the derech for you. But what was your positive reason for choosing Breslov? It would be interesting to know, just for contrast, just what the ‘personal value’ is that Breslov holds for you.

Now, that is a good question.

The answer is: I don’t know. I think I am a Breslover because something deep down resonates with the Rebbe’s Torah. The Breslov weltanschauung rests very comfortably with me. Though there are many things that I do not understand in the Rebbe’s teachings, I have enough faith in the Rebbe’s daas to accept that the chesaron is in my understanding alone. Yet, these words don’t really answer the question posed above.

Indeed, it always seems easier to describe a lack of meaning than it does to actually qualify something’s positive personal value. Rabbi Nachman z”l wrote in Sichos ha-Ran 1 that it is impossible to properly communicate that which inspires us from day to day and even moment to moment. This is because these perceptions of G-dliness come from a place that is beyond words, as Dovid ha-Melech wrote:

כי אני ידעתי כי־גדול י ואדנינו מכל־אלהים

For I, I know that HaShem is great, and our G-d is above all others.
(Tehillim 135:5)

The Rebbe explains that in the dual language אני ידעתי, I, I know... Dovid ha-Melech is emphasizing that this perception of the greatness of G-d is his and his alone. While Dovid knows this greatness, it cannot be detailed to others. Such, as the Rebbe explains, is the nature of religious inspiration.

So, I have to accept as fact that I cannot explain exactly what it is that inspires me about Breslov. Maybe, I can offer a theory as to why Rabbi Nachman’s Torah captures my heart, yet it is only a theory at best:

More than the Rebbe’s understanding of G-d, I am impressed by the Rebbe’s understanding of the nature of being human and being a Jew. Specifically, we all carry internal struggles within ourselves: the struggle against apathy, against sadness, the contradictions and paradoxes between emotions and intellect and love and hate, for example. While difficult by nature for us to open up discuss such matters, the Rebbe delves into them without equivocating. His direct and practical approach to the problems of being human while simultaneously being a servant of the Divine is stunning. While the Rebbe writes about these matters more explicitly in Sichos ha-Ran, I also see them underlying Likutey Moharan, but on a more sophisticated level.

Coming from an entirely Yekkishe/Oberlanderish background in learning, Likutey Moharan definitely was not my thing. I struggled a lot to understand it. Several Rosh Ha-Shanna’s ago, I had a late night epiphany which has, for the past several years, guided my learning of the sefer. As of now, I view Likutey Moharan as an attempt to resolve the trauma of living in a “world of separateness.” As we know, all things emanate from the essential unity of HaShem, as it says in Tehillim: ain od milvado - there is nothing other than Him. Our souls are ultimately rooted in HaShem as is all of creation. So, at it’s supernal source, all things are really one. Yet, we live in a world which appears in conflict, where barriers exist between all of its disparate elements. There is strife, there is difference. The essential unity is not visible.

From this dissonance, the conflict between the knowing of the supernal unity of all things in HaShem versus the experience of living in a world of separateness, there emanates a certain amount of common human trauma. Resolving this trauma, piercing the illusions of the “world of separateness” appears to be the goal of Likutey Moharan. In each lesson, the Rebbe begins with the disparate elements of this world. He finds common features which express some ancient archetype of creation. These elements, or bechinos become the factors through which the Rebbe gradually leads these disparate elements them back to their source. As one learns a teaching, the barriers between various concepts break down. Multiple ideas become unified as part of a grand, overarching supernal archetype. However, the Rebbe never goes back all the way. There is a boundary, a limit beyond which words fail. The biographies of the Rebbe record instances when, during a teaching, the Rebbe would grasp his beard, unable to say anything because there were no words for what came next. I have thought, yet may be wrong, that the Sippurey Ma’asios were intended to express what lies beyond the boundary of words in Likutey Moharan. The Rebbe himself introduced the Ma’asios by saying that, since his teachings were not making the Chassidim into tzadikim, that he needed to begin telling tales.

All in all, that is about as much as I have to say about why I am a Breslover.

Yet, if you ask me in a month you will probably get a different answer.

Gut Shabbos!

Avraham Chaim Bloomenstiel

Ask the Rabbi 2: Shaimos and Wedding Invitations

2008-05-20T22:25:00.004-04:00

Here is another Ask the Rabbi. Rabbi Bloomenstiel is traveling right now and we are a bit backlogged. More to come soon.

- Dovi Meisels

QUESTION:

B"H

Dear Rabbi Bloomenstiel,

I have received a wedding invitation which includes the word "HaKeil" without a dash between the Aleph and the Lamed. If this card is ultimately disposed of, should it be placed in sheimos/genizah?

Kol Tuv,

Y
Great Britain

ANSWER:

The halachos of shaimos are derived from the verses of Devarim 12:3,4 which state:

ג: ונתצתם את־מזבחתם ושברתם את־מצבתם ואשריהם תשרפון באש ופסילי אלהיהם תגדעון ואבדתם את־שמם מן־המקום ההוא:

ד לא־תעשון כן ליי אלקיכם:

3. And you shall tear down their altars, smash their monuments, burn their idolotrous trees in fire, chop down the graven images of their gods, and destroy their name from that place.

4. You shall not do thus to the Lord, your God.

The gemora in Makkos 22a explains that included in the fourth verse is the prohibition of destroying HaShem’s name. This prohibition is brought in all of the early halachic literature and such is the psak of the Shulchan Aruch in YD 276:9.

While there are many names for the Holy One, the specific names to which the prohibition applies are the seven sanctified names enumerated in Shavuos 35a-b: YKVK, Keil, Eloka, Elokim, Shakai, Tzevakos, Adon (note that here I have only used the abbreviated forms of the names). The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) brings that there are those who are also strict with Ekyah Asher Ekyah as well. These names must be disposed of by placing them in shaimos. However, all other Hebrew references to HaShem are not true names and may be thrown away. These appellations include Chanon, Rachum, HaKasosh Boruch Hu, and even HaShem. However, a direct name of HaShem in another language, such as G-D spelled out in full, may very well require placement in shaimos. Yet, this is a dispute amongst the poskim and there are various understandings.^{^[1]}

The wedding invitation of which you write is a clear case of shaimos and should be placed in shaimos. At a minimum, the Holy names could be cut out and placed in shaimos while the rest of the invitation may be discarded. While there is a significant debate in the poskim as to whether the printed name of HaShem is treated with the same severity as a hand written name, the majority conclude that they are treated equally.^{^[2]}

I am surprised to hear that the invitations contained the name of HaShem. The consensus of most poskim is that one should not print pesukim or other words that could create a shaimos problems on wedding invitations since they are usually thrown out.^{^[3]} Yet, we commonly put kol sasson vekol simcha...etc. on invitations. Why is this mutar? First, there are poskim who are lenient with this verse provided it is printed on separate lines. However, Rav Moshe and others doubt the efficacy of multiple lines as a heter.^{^[4]} A second heter is to alter the verse slightly by changing a word from singular to plural or altering a case.^{^[5]} There are others though, such as Rav Moshe Heinemann^{^[6]}, shlita, and the Shevet ha-Levi^{^[7]}, who permit the posuk to be written because is is merely a melitza, a statement which is not intended or used as a posuk. However, Rav Chaim Kanievsky and other poskim disagree^{^[8]}.

- Rabbi Avraham Chaim Bloomenstiel

[1] Shach Y.D. 179:11, Pischei Teshuva 11, 19, Mishnah Berurah O.C. 85:10, Aruch Ha'shulchan Y.D. 276, C.M. 27:3

[2] Rav Poelim 2:24, Mishnah Berurah 40:4, Minchas Yitzchok 1:17:8, Be'er Moshe 3:174:4, 8:47, Shevet Ha'Levi Y.D. 5:163, Tzitz Eliezer 3:1

[3] Ginzei Hakodesh 9:5,

[4] Igros Moshe YD 2:135

[5] Halichos Shlomo, Tefilla 20; Ginzei Hakodesh 9, ha’ara 18.

[6] According to the the Star-K.

[7] Shevet ha-Levi 7:167

[8] See Ginzei Hakodesh 265:68

Ovens II: Practical Applications

2008-05-18T13:27:00.003-04:00

Based upon all of these aforementioned factors, the poskim have generally advocated three approaches to using ovens for dairy and meat. The most cautious of these is brought in the Chelkas Yaakov 2:136, Minchas Yitzchok 5:20, and the Badei ha-Shulchan 92 who, ab initio, advocate separate ovens.

On the other hand, though, the Aruch ha-Shulchan allows for the same oven to be used interchangeably for both meat and dairy as long as the oven remains clean. In practice, I know many rabbonim who will rely upon the Aruch ha-Shulchan provided that the oven rests for 24 hours or is kashered between uses.

A moderate opinion and, perhaps, the most commonly relied upon da’as in the US, is that of Rav Moshe Feinstein in his Igros Moshe YD I:40. This teshuvah came about after a colleague of Reb Moshe had thought to permit cooking meat and milk dishes consecutively and uncovered in the same oven for three reasons:

1. Because of the distance between the food and the interior surface of the oven, any zeya emitted would cool to below yad soledes bo before it reaches them.

2. Our household gas ovens are vented, thus allowing enough of the steam to escape.

3. The interior surfaces of the oven are sufficiently hot to either thoroughly desiccate or burn off any remaining material.

Reb Moshe felt that these three reasons are not strong enough to create a convincing heter. Addressing them one-by-one, Reb Moshe derives some practical halachik directives for using the same oven for both milk and meat. Here is the bulk of Rav Moshe’s analysis:

Regarding the Gas Oven, Common in Our Areas,

And the Problem of Steam (Zeya)

Tammuz 14, ‘714

[Thursday July 15^th, 1954]

To my most honorable friend, Rabbi Chayim Schloss, Shelit”a,

Shalom u-veracha,

Regarding the gas oven common in our countries and the problem of zeya when cooking uncovered dairy after having cooked uncovered meat, you wished to permit the food on account of three reasons. However, these reasons are somewhat weak.

The first rationale is that the distance between the cooking food and the walls of the oven is so much [that the zeya produced would not longer be yad soledes bo by the time it reached the walls or roof of the oven]. This cannot be relied upon. Even if we measured the distance and were certain that the steam could not be yad soledes bo, this knowledge would only help by a non-hot pot placed above the steam (as discussed by the Rama, Y.D. 92:8). In a gas oven though, all of the interior walls and the ceiling are yad soledes bo when the steam reaches there and the steam, in turn, will be heated to yad soledes bo. See Rabbi Akiva Eiger[1] in the name of the Maharai who write about a hot pot becoming osur even if the steam that reaches it is not hot. See also in the Pri Megadim M.Z. 92:29. Additionally, the possibility that the distance between the food and the interior surfaces is so great that the steam cannot travel to the walls is uncertain and difficult to prove.

The second possible reason to permit is that gas ovens have a side-vent for fumes. I have not seen gas ovens with such a vent. Even for those gas ovens that do posses a small side-vent, this vent would not help the problem of reicha (see the Shach 108:13)[2]. All the more so zeya would pose a problem and such a vent would be ineffective. Even if an oven was entirely open, having only a roof and no walls, zeya can ossur if the oven ceiling or the zeya itself is yad soledes bo.[3] The walls of a normal oven could also be affected as the steam rises throughout the oven on its way to the ceiling. This scenario is learned out from the mishna in Machshirin 2:2 which teaches that all zeya from a tamei bath can render tamei the walls and, eventually, the entire house. This mishna is the very source for the law of zeya – see the Pri Megadim and the Biurei ha-Gra 39. Additionally, we can learn from this mishna that it is not possible for all the steam to exit from a small side vent unless the complete side is open; even though the house discussed in our mishna undoubtedly has doorways and openings the mishna is nonetheless concerned about zeya.

The possible third reason to permit using an oven for milk and meat dishes cooked uncovered, one-after-another, is that any actual food material left on the interior surfaces of the oven would either be dried out or burned away by the heat. The only lingering concern would be that of blias, mere absorptions. Yet, this reasoning is hard to understand since the fundamental issue by zeya is one of blias! Actual food material that remains in the oven between cookings must be scrubbed off between uses. Also, it is hard to say with certainty that any dairy or milk matter that splashed inside the oven would be dried out to the point that the zeya of the second pot couldn’t soften it. We likewise cannot rely upon the assumption that any splashed food has been burned up. The interior surfaces of the oven, being located some distance from the main heat source, usually do not reach temperatures high enough to incinerate anything splashed upon them. See Yoreh Deah 92:6 that, even by a pot sitting right against a flame, we do not rely upon the assumption that the fire has burned off any splashes [unless the splashes are small and fall on the side directly in contact with the flame].

Therefore, if there is zeya it is not permitted to cook meat and dairy, both uncovered, one-after-the-other, for any period of time in the same oven. However, I am doubtful if we must be harbor a suspicion for zeya when we have not actually seen any. The Rama 108:1 writes: “However, if they were roasted one after the other we are not concerned as long as there was no zeya given off from both of them. If there is zeya, then the heter is ossur even though they were roasted one after the other [if they were uncovered].” This statement implies that, in the absence of proof, we do not suspect there is a zeya problem. Rather, zeya only becomes an issue when we know for a fact that it is present. However, perhaps in our ovens, which have closed ceilings and walls, zeya is certainly present or at least more likely to be present. Accordingly, it is proper to be strict and not to cook meat and milk dishes uncovered in the same oven, even one-after-the-other.

B’dieved, however, provided that 24 hours have passed and thus rendered pagum any blias involved, the food would be muter since it is a safek. Regarding the possibility that actual zeya condensed and fell into the food[4], perhaps the amount that fell in became batel[5]. Since this latter possibility also involves a safek, we can therefore construct a safek safeka: 1) Perhaps there was no zeya, and, 2) If there was zeya then perhaps only a minute amount of condensation fell back into the food such that it was batel in 60[6].

Another relevant factor is whether the food being cooked is wet or dry. In a situation where one is baking or cooking dry matter, the Pri Megadim, Hakdama,, Hanhagos ha-Shoel 2:37 writes that the zeya of solid foods is not prohibited and that there is a side to permit even the zeya of fats that have melted during cooking (this heter is based upon the Rambam, Hilkhot Tumas Ochlin 7:4). Yet, this opinion is written only as a possibility. The Pische Teshuva, in quoting the Pri Megadim, also states this heter only as a possibility[7]. However, by a totally dry food there is no doubt that zeya is not an issue.

So, it appears, based upon the Pri Megadim, that baking or cooking dry foods one-after-the-other may be permitted even if we see zeya. Practically speaking, though, when we see zeya it is proper to be strict. However, one does not need to worry initially about zeya by dry foods and may assume that dry foods will not produce zeya. Therefore one may cook dry foods one-after-the-other and zeya only becomes problematic if one actually sees it.

Reb Moshe’s concludes that one may not cook food containing liquid uncovered, one-after-the-other, in the same oven. However, one may cook very dry foods, such as bread, in such a matter and we do not need to worry about zeya. Yet, if you see actually steam shooting out of the food, then zeya is a problem. In a case of covered foods, then there is certainly no issue because there is no problem of zaia.

[1] To Y.D. 92:8. Some, the Yad Yehuda 92:55 in particular, do not agree with this idea.

[2] Since reicha is of less significance than zeya, we can say that if a small vent is ineffective by reicha then kol she-keyn it should be ineffective by zeya.

[3] After all, steam rises.

[4] There is some disagreement amongst the poskim as to when the concern for condensation applies. Some (i.e. Pri Megadim M.Z. 92:29, Yad Yehuda 92:52) hold that condensation is only an issue when we know for a fact that it fell into the food. Others (i.e. Dagul Mervava 92:8) maintain that one must assume that condensation fell into the food even if no one actually saw this occur.

[5] Similarly, see the Minchas Yitzchok 5:20;13 quoting the Shu”t Beis ha-Yotzer

[6] An additional leniency is that many authorities consider zeya itself to be only a Rabbinic prohibition. See the Minchas Yitzchok 5:20;10.

[7] Many poskim, most notably the Minchas Yitzchok and the Darke Teshuvah, disagree with and reject the possibility that zeya is only applicable to liquids. However, it appears they would agree that the amount of steam produced by solid foods is miniscule enough as to not be a significant factor. See Toras Chatas 35:6 and the Minchas Yaacov 35:21. This appears to be the general consensus as I have found it.

The Red Thread Part II

2008-05-15T22:24:00.007-04:00

Follow up to this post here...

A number of readers have inquired as to why R' Bloomenstiel cited the Tosefta Shabbos 7:1 which mentions the red string in connection with darkei ha-Emori. As many have rightly pointed out, the Tosefta refers to tying the string about the finger. Additionally, there exists an alternate text of this Tosefta which states "Ein darkei ha-emori," these are not the ways of the Emorites.

I forwarded these e-mails to R' Bloomenstiel and received the following response:

Both of these points about the Tosefta are correct [that it refers only to a red string on the finger and that there is an alternate reading]. Nevertheless, I still cited this Tosefta as a makor for the following reasons:

The custom of wearing a string on the hand or finger has not been observed amongst the Jewish people until fairly recently. Yet there was a prior custom to wrap a read thread from kever Rachel about the middle of a woman who wants to conceive or is expecting. If there was a prior accepted practice of wearing red threads about the hand or finger, then I would assume that the correct girsa of the Tosefta is "ain darkei ho-emori." However, we have no such prior custom. Therefore, there is no proof either way as to the correct girsa. Yet, since many other items in the tosefta are treated as darkei ha-Emori in parallel sources and, since we are dealing with d'oraisa issues, it is difficult to rely upon the more lenient text.

We must understand the boundaries of the Tosefta's prohibition. Perhaps the Tosefta only prohibits wearing a red string about the finger. On the other hand, wearing a red string as a segula may be a general prohibition. Perhaps the tosefta only chose the finger as its example because such was the prevalent way of wearing a red string at the time of the Tosefta.

I have seen and heard the common version of the Tosefta ( "darkei ha-Emori") quoted in teshuvos and piskei halacha. For example, one of our readers e-mailed me that Rav Hershel Schachter relies upon our girsa to pronounce the strings as ossur d'oraisa. This is also the understanding of Rav Y.S. Eliashiv as well.

Even without the tosefta as an asmachta (or proof) one can still make an argument that the bendel is darkei ha-Emori. It is too long to get into here, but from the Teshuvos ha-Rashba it appears to me that there are two species of segulos. The first are remedies that operate via natural, yet mysterious mechanisms. The Rashba uses magnets as an example. In his time everyone knew that magnets repel and retract other metals, yet no one knew why. See also the gemora in Shabbos 67a and Chullin 77b which distinguishes between segulos that operate via natural (yet mysterious) mechanisms and those that are "mystical" or “magical," which are darkei ha-Emori. The second type of segula is an action or item which invokes a specific hashgocha pratis. An example of this would be the nachash ha-nechoshes which healed the Jews from the poisonous serpents. See Rashi on Bamidbar 21:8 who writes that the serpent didn’t heal, rather it brought people close to HaShem and He healed them as a result. Eventually, the serpent came to be worshiped. The populace attributed its powers of healing to the serpent itself rather than to HaShem. In reaction, the serpent was then destroyed by Chizkiyah ha-melech. So the question is: how do we tell the difference between a segula which invokes hasgocha and one that is darkei ha-Emori? It seems to me that the difference is that a hasgocha-based segula is one from which we have a mesora from the rabbonim or daas Torah. After all, the nachoshes was transmitted to us by Moshe Rabbeinu. So, it appears that any segula or charm operating by "mystical" or "metaphysical" properties and for which we do not have a valid mesora must be suspect. Now, there was never a rabbinic or Torah-based mesora for wearing a red thread about the hand, wrist, or finger as a segula. The closest mention of such a thing is wearing a red thread about the finger-- yet this practice is identified as darkei ha-Emori by the Tosefta! This fact, combined with the evidence that it was worn by non-Jews long before Jews took on the practice, points strongly to darkei ha-Emori.

- Avi Bloomenstiel

Ovens I - Halachic Fundamentals

2008-05-14T23:29:00.003-04:00

Introduction

The Shulchan Aruch presents an array of halachos that affect how we use ovens for meat and dairy foods. The diversity of the material, however, makes it a challenge to derive practical guidelines for the ovens of today. The goal of this two-part series on ovens is to examine the fundamental halachic principles involved and how poskim have dealt with ovens in recent times[1] .

Foundational Principles

In the Sheelot u-Teshuvot literature the poskim adopt a three-part approach to deriving the halacha le-ma’aseh: 1) Metzius – the physical qualities of the oven, 2) Reicha – the question of aroma, and 3) Zeya – the issue of steam.

1) Metzius – The Shulchan Aruch, in presenting its rulings on ovens, tries to be as inclusive as possible with when it comes to oven designs and function, mentioning many different physical qualities ovens may possess (i.e. open, closed, vented, large, small, etc.). The first challenge is to determine the status of modern gas and electric ovens. Most poskim agree that our households ovens are considered “small[2]” and, though somewhat vented, “closed” for most purposes[3]. These designations do not allow us many of the leniencies attributed by the Shulchan Aruch to “large” or “open” ovens.

2) Reicha – In Pesachim 76b the gemora examines the case of non-kosher and kosher meat roasted together, albeit with out touching, in the same oven. According to Rav the aroma of the non-kosher meat has the power to assur the kosher meat. According to Levi, reicha lav milsa hi, aroma is insignificant. The Rif and Rambam pasken like Levi, however with the limitation that Levi is only speaking b’dieved. Le-chatchilah Levi and Rav would agree that we should worry about reicha. The Mechaber, Y.D. 108:1, paskens like the Rambam and Rif. The Rama, though agreeing Levi’s opinion is the fundamental one, nonetheless includes a number of stringencies in his psak that acknowledge concern for the position of Rav. Generally, reicha is only a concern when cooking two uncovered dishes simultaneously in an oven. According to all, such an arrangement would be prohibited le-chatchilah. Yet, reicha also has an indirect impact upon the halachos of zeya. Though zeya is the stricter of the two, reicha and zeya still have much in common. The poskim use this fact to make several kol she-keyns, saying “since reicha is a problem in this scenario, then kol she-keyn so is zeya.”

3) Zeya – The law of zeya is derived by the Rosh[4] from the mishna in Machshirin 2:2.[5] This mishna teaches that the steam from a tamei bath is also tamei and has the power to metamei an entire house. From here we see that steam retains the qualities of its source. Therefore, the steam emitted from milk, for example, retains a dairy status. Surprisingly, zeya is not mentioned on Pesachim 76b, which prohibits cooking treif and kosher together in the same oven due to reicha. This apparent omission begs to be explained. There are six main answers proposed by the poskim, all of which deeply influence the practical halachos of today’s ovens[6]:

§ Rosh[7] – Zeya cannot affect a hot surface, only a cool surface.[8] After all, the mishnaic source deals with hot tamei steam contaminating the cool walls of a house. Pesachim 76b, however, is discussing a case where everything is hot.

§ Chavas Da’as, Biurim 92:26 – Zeya is only a problem when cooking one food above another. Zeya, because it rises upward, does not have the ability to act horizontally. The case in the gemora is one of two items roasted side-by-side.

§ Pri Megadim, Hanhagos Hora’a Issur ve-Heter 2:37 – only steam that emerges from liquids has the power to carry over the qualities of its parent substance. Steam that emerges from solids does not have this power[9]. The gemora’s case was one of roasting solids while the mishna’s case was one of liquids.

§ Aruch ha-Shulchan 92:55 – Zeya is only problematic in a small, closed oven. In an open or large oven we don’t worry about it. Reicha, however, has broader applications and would even apply in a large oven. Pesachim 76b is describing kosher and treif cooked in an open or large area; zeya is not an issue, but reicha is.

§ Mishkenos Yaacov Y.D. 34 – The Mishkenos Yaacov takes a surprising view and disagrees with the whole inyan of zeya. He maintains that zeya is not significant and poses no halachik issue.[10]

§ Igros Moshe Y.D. I:40 – Assuming that the steam of solid foods can take-on qualities of its parent substance, Rav Moshe applies the Pri Megadim’s opinion to create an interesting leniency. In the case of liquids or wet foods we must assume that zeya is present and a problem. However, by solid dry food we do not assume that zeya is a problem unless we know for a fact that it is present[11]. In the gemora, we assume that no one actually saw zeya coming out of the roasting solid foods and, therefore, nothing was prohibited on its account.

Next Post: Ovens Part II - Contemporary Teshuvos

[1] The first successful gas stove/oven was patented by British inventor James Sharp in 1826. It wasn’t until the late 1920’s that the oven had become common in most households. The electric stove/oven was invented in 1891 by the Carpenter Electric Heating Manufacturing Co. By the 1930’s the electric oven was becoming standard and giving the Gas oven some stiff competition. The sheelos u-teshovos that apply to our ovens are almost all post-1950, when both gas and electric ovens developed into what is, generally, their present forms.

[2] The Binas Adam 62;81 cites two opinions as to what constitutes a “large” oven. Some define “large” as having an internal surface area of about 68 square amos (approximately 256 – 270 square feet). Others define “large” ovens as having an interior volume of 600 cubic tefachim (about 21 or 22 cubic feet). Our household ovens fall short of both sizes and must be considered “small.”

[3] Shach 108:3. The Shach maintains that reicha remains a problem unless the oven is completely open. There are many circumstances however, when the vents of our ovens does serve as a kula. We will discuss these situations in subsequent issues.

[4] Teshuvos ha-Rosh 20:26.

[5] Incidentally, the Vilna Gaon apparently disagrees with the Rosh’s derivation. See the Biur ha-Gra 92:39 where he offers a different source for the law of zeya.

[6] There is also much discussion about whether zeya is a din d’rabanon or d’oraisa. See Yebai Omer, Y.D. 5:7 and the Minchas Yitzchok 5:20

[7] Ibid.

[8] Similar opinions are mentioned in the Beis Shlomo Y.D. 162 and the Yad Yehuda 55. See also the Minchas Yitzchok 5:20; 11.

[9] This famous heter is strongly debated by the poskim. Some, like the Aruch ha-Shulchan 92:54 and the Chelkas Yaacov 2:136, reject it totally. Others use it as a mitigating factor to create other kula’s. The Darke Teshuva has an interesting approach, concluding that zeya by liquids is a din d’oraisa and zeya by solids is a din d’rabbanon.

[10] This is the most extreme of the six shitot and appears to be unique to the Mishkenos Yaacov alone.

[11] This is like the psak of the Darcei Teshuvah 108:49 in the name of the Yad Yehudah.

Some Thoughts on Charedi Moral Authority and Technology...

2008-05-11T17:14:00.006-04:00

A friend forwarded me this commercial a few months ago. After viewing it for the first time, I sat dumbfounded and open-mouthed for about 90 seconds. Was I supposed to be offended? Was I supposed to laugh? Should I write a letter to someone protesting this, a commercial whose entire gimmick revolves around people who look like me protesting?

For the next several days this advertisement haunted me. I couldn’t get it out of my head.

Now to shift gears. When I was learning in Israel I was an outsider with a party line. I was an American Yeshiva bochur supporting the charedi camp, yet not fully integrated into the complex web of politics/religion/power that is yiddishkeit in the medina. After a few months, I recognized that the clashes between religious and non-religious were not isolated events, but rather symptoms of a constant psychological tension churning just beneath the surface of “Israeli” society.

Because I was firmly in one of the categories (“charedi”) my objectivity was severely limited. Nevertheless, I wanted to understand the pathology of the conflict. If I understood the tensions, the fears of both sides, then perhaps I could use this understanding as a tool for kiruv. However, it was almost impossible to have an open discussion with anyone about the conflict. Both sides have deep issues with each other, yet they deal with the problems via a veil of intractable silence. It is like two brothers with long unsettled grudges who must now share a flat. They avoid the tough issues, dancing around them as a matter of practicality, until they can keep silent no longer. Then temperatures rise and things boil over. A few days later, they are back to status quo without having resolved anything.

In 2003 Noah Efron, a professor at Bar Ilan, published his book Real Jews. Secular academics are not usually the authors to whom I gravitate, but this book caught my interest. Real Jews is a pretty even-handed and frank (if not wholly unnerving) exploration of chareidi/chilloni tensions in Eretz Yisroel. What emerges from his account is much like my experience: the religious and secular worlds are separate universes wholly out of touch. However, each group believes that its understanding of the other is correct and resents the other based upon that belief.

Efron traces the current dynamic to some terrific political miscalculations in the early days of the medina. Assuming that the orthodox Jewish population would eventually dwindle and disappear, the early Zionist leaders granted charedim powers and concessions to garner their support in the creation of an essentially secular state. However, we haven’t disappeared. Over the past 6 decades, as we have grown, our relationship with secular Israeli society has become exceptionally convoluted. The result is a pathology of constant identity crisis/paranoia for both secular and religious Jews. This crisis is smeared across questions of national identity, religion, diet (kashrus), businesses (closed on Shabbos), and public transportation (Shabbos, separate seating on buses for men and women, etc).

Efron also addresses the secular perception of the charedi world as medieval, backward, and sinister. Although he touches upon it, I would have liked to have seen more about how the non-religious perceive charedi attitudes toward technology and scientific progress. Internally, we know that we are not technophobes. Nobody in the frum velt would assign himself such a label. We merely advocate responsible use of technology. Unfortunately, the rhetoric we employ is often misleading. I remember a shmuz from Yeshiva when one of my rebbeim spent 45 minutes blasting the microchip as a tool of the yetzer hora. All of the evils of today’s youth, he said, can be traced to electronics which have “distracted and drawn them away from the derech ho-emes.” What do all of these inventions have in common? The “maykro-tzip” which was “invented by atheists, by baboons in the shape of men who are devoid of wisdom and G-dliness.” He concluded that people should avoid their evil handiwork at all costs. As I left the shiur, I made a point of asking this Rabbi how he had been feeling since his bypass operation and pace-maker installation. He responded “it is k’mo nes [like a miracle].”

This point now takes us back to the commercial. As I said, I couldn’t get it out of my head and finally realized why: it is simply brilliant advertising. Whoever created this ad has put their finger right on the nerve of… well… something.

For the past several years we have seen a “banning trend.” Banned cell phones, banned internet, banned computers, banned PDA’s, etc. Recently, a colleague in my community announced in his shabbos drosha that blogs were assur and banned. What emerges from these bans is an aura of technophobia. Regardless of whether or not we, the religious, are technophobes, such is the perception. And, as such, we are reinforcing one of the stereotypes which alienate us from the non-religious: that of the medieval, superstitious, backward shtetl dweller. In many ways, publicly banning new technologies does as much for our image in the eyes of the chillonim as would us explaining away electricity as magic or sorcery.

Now, for those of you who like to post comments without reading carefully or investing much critical thought, note this: I don’t disagree with most of these bans. My concern is that we have publicly over-invested our moral authority in issues that only alienate and contort our mission and ideals in the eyes of the non-religious. As a consequence, we are suffering from a sort of “moral inflation” to the point where proclamations of right and wrong from the religious Jewish world carry zero value amongst the non-religious. Perhaps we need to place our public zeal behind issues which carry more universal Jewish relevance: caring for our children, combating domestic violence, drug abuse issues, etc. In these areas we can be mekarev the non-religious. In these areas we can agree with them and show them the positive value that our hashkofos and way of life have to offer. Perhaps we should move away from negatively asserting our identity and instead focus on creating a positive identity. Jews are compared to letters in the sefer Torah. Yet, by defining our identity via negation it is as if we have poured ink onto klaf and are now scratching away the surrounding ink to create our letters. However, a sefer Torah written in this manner is posul on account of chok tochos. The letters must be written in a positive fashion to be kosher.

The commercial successfully taps into and provides a release for secular frustration with many of the issues describe by Efron. It also fires an arrow into perceived charedi technophobia. To the non-religious, our perceived opposition to technological innovation (or innovation as a whole) has become a routine, a song-and-dance. Hafganos have become choreographed, costumed displays of righteous fervor and histrionic sobbing (see the commercial at 35 seconds in) over issues which the secular public perceives as trivial. In deconstructing this video, we also see that there is a suspicion of insincerity. The zeal of the charedim is viewed as a front which may hide or compensate for something else in a sexually repressed culture (hence the use of the Village People’s YMCA as the soundtrack). All of these perceptions and paranoias are part and parcel of the non-religious fear of the charedi world.

And here, someone has tapped into these demons which lie beneath the surface and channeled that energy into selling HD-TV. Brilliant advertising.

The real punchline of all of this was the charedi reaction: protest. In fact, so much protest that the commercial was eventually pulled. So, we protested a commercial criticizing our protesting. What is more, as an Israeli non-religious neighbor pointed out, secular Jews will ask: “How do charedim know about this commercial?” They will assume that someone in our world saw it on television. This assumption will only strengthen the suspicion of insincerity and hypocrisy. Perhaps righteous indignation was not the best instant response.

Just to reiterate: I don’t disagree with most of the bans or protests. Should TV in the home be opposed? Yes! Should we make people aware of the dangers of the internet? Yes! Should these issues be those in which we invest the bulk of our hislahavus and zeal? Should we define our Judaism in terms of protest and negation rather than positive assertions? Perhaps not.

Der Roite Bendel: The Red Thread

2008-05-05T02:36:00.007-04:00

First in our Ask the Rabbi Series:

Q: I was recently in Yerushalayim and gave tzedaka to a woman at the Kotel. She insisted that I give her my hand, which I did, and she then tied on a red thread about my wrist to "ward off the eyin hora." What is the source of this custom and where can I find more information on it?

- Alyssa
Montreal, Canada

A: This question comes up a few times each year and, unfortunately, the answer usually surprises: there is no source for it. I have combed the kabbalistic writings and cannot find anything that supports or endorses wearing a red string as a valid segula. In the more recent literature, I have only found two passing mentions of the thread. In the sefer Beer Moshe, Rov Stern mentions a custom in his father's home of winding a red thread about the crib of a newborn for protection. Similarly, the sefer Yesod Likra Ohel Rachel Imenu of the Apta rov also associates this custom with the protection of a newborn and Rachel Imenu. Yet, the Apta Rov also writes that he heard there were those in Jerusalem who wore red strings for all sorts of protections. Beyond these two seforim, there is no source for the custom of wearing a red thread about the wrist as a segula.

One may think, then, that the "roite bendel" (as it is called in Yiddish) should at least be permitted as an "old wives' custom." The Teshuvos ha-Rashba addresses such baseless practices and states that they should not be opposed provided that there is some rationale and that the custom is not problematic.

But, the red string is problematic. Very, very problematic. The Tosefta in Maseches Shabbos 7:1 states explicitly that a red thread worn about the hand or finger is prohibited as darkei ha-Emori. This would mean, according to most poskim, that wearing such a thread may be an issur d'oraisa akin to avoda zara. In fact, many cultures and religions share the concept of eyin ha-ra and, likewise, have superstitious charms and protections against it. In India and in Buddhist countries it is quite common that people even wear red strings on their wrists to protect against the "evil eye!"

Granted, the Tosefta may be speaking of something other wearing it specifically about the wrist. Others may argue from the Beis Yoseif that we do not pasken like this Tosefta since it is not cited by the Bavli. Additionally, there are pesukim which mention tying a read thread or that associate red cloth with protection. In Bereishis 38 we find that a red thread was tied about the wrist of Zerach as an identifier. Rachav in Yehoshua 2 tied a red thread or marker about her window so that she may be spared. Also, it states in Eyshes Chayil, Mishlei 31, that a woman has no fear of snow for her home is clothed in scarlet wool.

Nevertheless, there are many rishonim who do pasken from the Tosefta. Also, the above cited pesukim only mention tying the thread as a practical identifier (Zerach and Rachav) or as a fine form of insulation (Mishlei). None of these verses depict wearing scarlet cloth as a protective segula. Furthermore, we find that there are idolatrous religions which use a red thread about the wrist as a form of protection. For all of these reasons we must be concerned that wearing a red thread about the wrist for protection is darkei ha-Emori. Since darkei ha-Emori and Avodah Zara are areas in which we exercise extraordinary caution, we must prohibit the practice.

You may wonder then, why so many wear the strings? The Radak in his commentary to Yeshaya 40:21 explains that there are always practices people engage in that they believe have the power to save, heal, damage or sicken. However, many of these customs are without foundation or merit and, though having persisted through the generations, are nevertheless darkei ha-Emori and prohibited.

And for those who still need to believe that the string is a valid form of protection, see the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim 3 who writes that those who use darkei ha-Emori for protection will not only be unprotected, but will come to harm as a result of their transgression!

For all these reasons, I believe that the custom of wearing a red string about the wrist is non-Jewish in origin. With the steady Jewish immigration to Eretz Yisroel since the late 18th century, the bendel seems to have been innocently adopted as a superstition by the populace. Alternatively, wearing the bendel may have developed as a corruption of an earlier, possibly authentic custom of wrapping red thread about the cradle of a newborn.

To make matters worse, the red thread bracelet has become strongly associated with the "Kabbalah Center," an organization run by reshaim who, in my estimation, have pornographized and made a mockery of our holy mesora. They are the primary driving force behind the proliferation of the red thread, marketing it and other gimmicks at exorbitant prices to a public craving single-serve spiritual quick fixes.

For all these reasons one should definitely not wear such a thing and should tell others that wearing this thing is may be darkei ha-emori and an issur d'oraisa.

- Avraham Chaim Bloomenstiel.

Chalav Yisroel - Background and Contemporary Applications Part III

2008-05-02T02:31:00.006-04:00

In this final installment of our series on chalav Yisroel we will examine the application of chalav Yisroel to powdered milk and other dairy products as well as the diverse ways of observing the halacha...

V. Powdered Milk

Most of the usual questions regarding the observance of chalav Yisroel concern powdered milk. Many dairy products in the US are not produced with liquid milk, only powdered milk. A good example is milk chocolate. Milk chocolate must be made with powdered milk, not liquid milk, or else the chocolate will not solidify.

In 1944, Rabbi Tzvi Pesach Frank paskened it was mutar to consume non-chalav Yisroel powdered milk imported from the US. The Rav formulated his heter by comparing powdered milk production to butter production. Butter, as is well known, has numerous leniencies. For example, it does not need the same level of supervision as other dairy products and chalav Yisroel is not a major issue in butter kashrus. Rav Frank paskened that, while federal supervision was not enough to render actual milk chalav Yisroel, powdered milk was muter without Jewish supervision because it is halachically more similar to butter than to actual milk. He concludes that we can be lenient and rely on government supervision with certain milk by-products such as powdered milk and butter, but not by actual milk.

The Chazon Ish, however, vehemently disagreed with Rav Frank. Rav Karelitz explained that butter’s leniencies exist because, as the Rambam writes, an admixture of kosher milk and non-kosher milk cannot become butter. Since it cannot become butter, we are not concerned for about the addition of non-kosher milk. Chalav akum is simply not relevant to butter.

Powdered milk, though, according to the Chazon Ish, can be made regardless as to whether its source is tamei or tahor. Therefore, chalav akum remains an issue with powdered milk as well.

In defense of a powdered milk heter, the Tzitz Eliezer, Rav Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg ztz”l, offered a fascinating alternative to Rav Frank’s reasoning which circumvents the objections of the Chazon Ish. When a bottle of never-supervised non-Jewish milk is sitting in the store, it is not prohibited to a Jew. Likewise, there is no requirement for the milk to be chalav Yisroel. The requirement of chalav Yisroel only comes when the Jew is koneh the milk. At that point the prohibitions and requirements of cholov akum/chalav Yisroel become effective. However, when a Jew acquires powdered milk, there is no actual milk present upon which the prohibition can fall. The reason is that powdered milk is not nikhlal in the shem “chalav,” and therefore lies beyond the boundaries of the original rabbinic decree.

Practically speaking, these teshuvos only represent a fraction of the total discussion of the issue and the question remains debated even today. As a result, you have those in the US who are lenient and those in the US who are strict in the observance of chalav Yisroel by powdered milk.

VI. Other Dairy Products

What about chalav Yisroel and other dairy products? Due the numerous rulings of the contemporary poskim, there is much diversity in applying chalav Yisroel to modern dairy kashrus.

Butter – There are numerous leniencies enabling one to consume butter produced from non-chalav Yisroel milk. In fact, the custom for centuries was even to treat pure butter as 100% kosher without any supervision or hasgocha! As stated earlier, butter cannot be produced if kosher and non-kosher milks are mixed. However, the situation has changed today. Nowadays, many butter producers seek to enhance flavor by adding whey. More often than not, this whey is a by-product from the manufacture of non-kosher cheeses. The ramification is that butter must have a hekhsher nowadays, although many do not require it to be chalav Yisroel.

Cheese – Lechatchila, cheeses should be made with chalav Yisroel milk. But, why state “Lechatchila?” Shouldn’t we say that even b’dieved cheese must be produced from chalav Yisroel milk? The answer is that Rav Moshe’s kula, in combination with a statement of the Rama in Shulchan Aruch, combine to create a fascinating leniency by cheese. Rav Moshe would allow cheese to be produced with USDA supervised milk (which is chalav Yisroel according to his understanding). If we are to accept Rav Moshe’s ruling, then, naturally, the resulting cheese is chalav Yisroel. If we are to reject Rav Moshe’s rationale, we do not necessarily say that the cheese is, b’dieved, prohibited. The reason is that Rama paskens that b’dieved cheese made from chalav akum is kosher provided that a Jew was involved in the production of the cheese. Part of his rationale is that, again, non-kosher milk does not easily become cheese. Therefore, whether one relies upon Rav Moshe or not, there is some room for leniency with non-chalav Yisroel cheeses.

Milk Chocolate, Cereals, and Other Powdered Milk Products – If one holds of Rav Moshe, then all US dairy products, powdered or liquid are chalav Yisroel. However, there are authorities who, though they reject Rav Moshe’s kula for chalav Yisroel, nevertheless exempt powdered milk from the law. These authorities would require the observance of chalav Yisroel by all US liquid milk products, yet permit non-chalav Yisroel powdered milk.

VI. The Practical Observance of Chalav Yisroel

There are, roughly, six different methods by which one fulfills the mitzvah of avoiding chalav akum and consuming chalav Yisroel.

1. All US produced dairy products are considered chalav Yisroel. This approach is a complete acceptance of Rav Moshe’s kula. Though Rav Moshe accepts all US dairy products as chalav Yisroel, this is provided that the products are kosher to begin with. It is true that, at the time Rav Moshe authored these teshuvos, it would have been permissible to buy milk without a hekhsher. However the situation changed dramatically about 14 years ago. The cause of this change was a little known medical condition affecting many US dairy cows termed “left displaced abomasum.” Due a high carbohydrate diet and lack of exercise amongst American dairy cattle, these cows sometime develop tissue abnormalities in the wall of the abomasum, the fourth stomach. As the stomach fills with gas during digestion, it becomes distended and misplaced across the ventral line from the right to the left side of the animal. As the organ shifts it often introduces a fatal twist into the intestines. There are five procedures used to correct the condition if detected early enough. The most common treatment is to manipulate the stomach back into place and then secure it with a surgical staple through the body wall. While this certainly relieves the animal’s discomfort and saves its life, the procedure also renders the animal treif. Since the halacha is that anything which comes from a non-kosher animal is also non-kosher, the milk of these cows will also be treif. Initially, many rabbonim sought to permit the milk made from these animals via bittul. Yet, it quickly became apparent that this surgery had been executed on between 3% and 15% of the herds surveyed; far more than the 1.63% required to mevatel the treif milk. When this story broke, thanks to a perceptive mashgiach, kosher dairy production temporarily ground to a halt. The result is that all dairy produced in the US now requires a hekhsher to assure that cattle having undergone this corrective procedure have all been removed from the kosher milking herd.

2. Liquid milk must be chalav Yisroel, yet powdered milk, cheeses, and butter only require a hekhsher. This configuration holds like the numerous poskim who are doubtful of Rav Moshe’s reasoning. However, it also accepts the rulings of Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank and Rav Waldenberg that chalav Yisroel does not apply to powdered milk. Additionally, this position takes into account the Rama’s leniency that chalav Yisroel may not be required bdieved for cheeses and that the prohibition of chalav akum does not apply to butter.

3. Only milk and Cheese must be chalav Yisroel. This arrangement is similar to the previous with the exception that cheeses are required to be chalav Yisroel. The Rama’s heter to allow non-chalav Yisroel cheese is not universally relied upon in the Ashkenaz community. Therefore, there are many who will require both milk and cheese to be chalav Yisroel, yet will retain the aforementioned leniencies for butter and powdered milk.

4. All dairy products must be chalav Yisroel excluding powdered milk and/or butter. In the United States this approach covers most of the basics. The reason for many in the US to accept the heter of Rabbis Frank and Waldenberg is that it functions in combination with Rav Moshe’s leniency that American produced milk may be legitimate chalav Yisroel. Many as well exclude butter from the concern of chalav akum due to the opinion that butter cannot be produced from tamei milk. However, many only extend leniency to powdered milk and require that butter be produced from chalav Yisroel milk.

5. All dairy products must be chalav Yisroel. This approach is the strictest of the four aforementioned configurations. Though it removes any doubt as to transgression, this method of observance also rejects many customs and leniencies relied by pious Jews for centuries. Many who observe the halacha in this manner, are nevertheless lenient with the blias of chalav akum. This was the opinion of Rav Yaakov Kamanetsky and many other American gadolim who, though they only consumed only chalav Yisroel, were not strict about food cooking in pots previously used for non-chalav Yisroel dairy. Additionally, those who hold this way are willing to accept many of the leniencies we have discussed in cases of loss or difficulty.

6. All dairy must be from chalav Yisroel milk, the blias of non-chalav Yisroel milk are prohibited, and there are no acceptable leniencies. This stringent approach is usually associated with the Lubavitch chassidim. Curiously, Lubavitch does not base nor defend their approach from any halachic source. Rather, they have a tradition that one of their rebbes attributed the abandonment of Yiddishkeit by a certain chosid to his use of non-chalav Yisroel dairy. Accordingly, Lubavitch believes a metaphysical relationship exists between dairy kashrus and the level and purity of one’s emuna. For this reason, Chabad accepts no leniencies in their observance of chalav Yisroel.

VI. Conclusions

The applicability of chalav Yisroel/chalav akum in the USA has never been at issue; rather, the debate has focused on the definition of chalav Yisroel and the exact status of federally supervised milk.

However, the applicability of chalav Yisroel to other dairy products has been disputed. Historically, chalav Yisroel has never been a concern by butter, although some are strict. In recent times, several poskim have novated leniencies for powdered milk. While some accept these leniencies, others do not differentiate between powdered milk and liquid milk except in dire circumstances. Additionally, there are bidieved leniencies existing for cheeses that are relied upon by some.

The result of this diversity of rabbinic opinions is that there are several valid methods of fulfilling the requirement of chalav Yisroel, all of which can find endorsement amongst the greatest of halachic authorities. As we know, Torah lo bi-shamayim hi, and the deciding authority for halacha is in the hands of the Rabbis. One whose observance of chalav Yisroel is rooted in their da’as cannot, chas ve-shalom, be seen as a transgressor or in error.

Chalav Yisroel - Background and Contemporary Applications Part II

2008-04-30T19:32:00.007-04:00

In this continuation of our shuir, we will explore the famous kula of Rav Moshe Feinstein ztz"l and its impact on US dairy kasrus...

III. The Kula of Rav Moshe, ztz”l

As is commonly known, in the 1950’s Rav Moshe Feinstein, ztz”l authored a series of famous teshuvos (Igros Moshe YD I:47, 48, 49) which have had massive impact on the observance of chalav yisroel, gevinas yisroel, and other areas of dairy kashrus. Though brilliant and unique, these teshuvos are often misunderstood. The most common misunderstanding is that Rav Moshe paskened that chalav Yisroel does not apply in the US, or that Rav Moshe gave a heter for chalav stam/chalav akum. Neither of these assertions is accurate. Rav Moshe’s teshuva is not a “heter” which permits chalav akum and obviates the requirement for chalav Yisroel. Rather, it is a kula which seeks to define the boundaries of chalav yisroel milk in the United States. However, Rav Moshe clearly holds that American Jews are bound to the law and required to consume only chalav Yisroel products. The question is: What is chalav Yisroel?

There are two fundamental issues Rav Moshe addresses in his teshuva. The first is: If you could create a situation of mirsus, absent Jewish supervision, would the milk then be kosher? According to the Pri Chodosh, the whole problem is the possibility of tamei milk being added, a problem which is countered by mirsus. In our country the government, via the USDA, strictly regulates milk production and heavily penalizes anyone who vitiates cow milk with milk from other animals. This system of supervision would appear to create mirsus. Accordingly, Rav Moshe paskened in YD I:47 that the fear of government penalties is enough to permit the milk for Jewish consumption. This first point fundamentally satisfies the Pri Chodosh’s interpretation of the prohibition of chalav akum.

However, the second issue that the Rav has to address is according to the Chasam Sofer. If the issur of chalav akum is a davar shebi-minyan, then Jewish supervision will be required regardless of the probability of tamei milk being present. To ally this concern, Rav Moshe invokes the principle of anan sahadi. This Talmudic concept provides that, under certain limited circumstances, knowledge of an event is comparable to witnessing the event itself. In the case of milk production, since we all know that the government is supervising the production of milk, and since those producing the milk know they are being watched, and since the consumers know that the producers are being watched, then it is as if we are actually witnessing the milking ourselves. Rav Moshe writes that even the Chasam Sofer would accept this reasoning. Although such is Rav Moshe’s psak, he concludes that a ba’al nefesh should be strict and not rely upon federal supervision.

What emerges is that Rav Moshe is not giving a heter to exempt anyone from the requirement of chalav Yisroel. On the contrary, Rav Moshe is stating one must hold by chalav Yisroel. Rather, Rav Moshe is learning a kula that milk supervised by the government qualifies as chalav yisroel!

Accordingly, “Do you keep chalav Yisroel?” is really the wrong question in this country. The right question is “Do you hold that USDA supervised milk is acceptable as chalav Yisroel?”

IV. The Reaction to Rav Moshe’s Kula

To this teshuva, there was substantial agreement either in whole or in principle from several very prominent American gadolim including Rav Yosef Henkin, Rav Yaakov Kamanetsky, and many others.

Although Rav Moshe’s teshuva has had been widely accepted in the US and other countries with strict federal supervision, it does exhibit a potential vulnerability which has come under scrutiny.

A number of eminent poskim, including Rav Breish in the Chelkos Ya’akov, the Minchos Yitzchok, Rav Wozner in the Shevet ha-Levy and many others point out that, while Rav Moshe’s teshuva satisfies the Pri Chodosh, it fails to satisfy the Chasam Sofer. The problem, according to these dissenting authorities, is Rav Moshe understanding of anan sahadi. Anan sahadi is an abstract legal concept awarding certain common knowledge the status of legally valid testimony in the context of legal proceedings. A Jew’s watching of the milking isn’t a situation of bearing witness or testimony. Instead, it is intended to create mirsus or is a specific requirement of a davar shebi-minyan. According to the Chasam Sofer, you must have a Jew physically present and it is not possible that anan sahadi satisfies physical presence. This complaint is not limited to only Ashkenazi poskim; Rav Ovadya Yoseif in his Yechave Da’as and Rav Mordechai Eliyahu both state that Rav Moshe’s teshuva only successfully satisfies the Pri Chodosh, not the Chasam sofer.

Furthermore, Rav Ehud Bakshi Doron has explained that many hold the issur of chalav akum may well be to limit social interaction between Jews and non-Jews. According to these poskim, Rav Moshe’s kula cannot be relied upon.

Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, there were many great poskim who accepted Rav Moshe’s decision and who were of equal stature to his detractors. As a result the Rav’s teshuva is widely relied upon in the United States and in a few other English speaking countries.

Interestingly, support for Rav Moshe is found in the writings of the Chazon Ish. The Chazon Ish holds that the fundamental law of chalav Yisroel is according to the Pri Chodosh and not the Chasam Sofer. Accordingly then, Rav Moshe’s teshuva succeeds in satisfying the fundamental intent of the law. However those who knew the Chazon Ish, such as Rav Yakov Kanievsky and others, have stated that he personally only relied on this reasoning in very dire circumstances and even then for milk derivatives only. Normally, though, he only drank milk that was properly supervised. Nevertheless, that the Chazon Ish understood the Pri Chodosh as the ikkar is a support for Rav Moshe’s kula.

Coming soon: Part III - Chalav Yisroel, Powdered Milk and Other Dairy Products...

Chalav Yisroel - Background and Contemporary Applications Part I

2008-04-28T21:58:00.002-04:00

I. Introduction

The prohibition of chalav akum and its attending requirement of chalav Yisroel has become something of a touchy subject if not an outright neurosis for many North American kosher consumers. The angst appears to stem mostly from a misunderstanding of the halachic debate surrounding the prohibition and, in particular, Rav Moshe Feinstein’s ztz”l famous teshuvos on the topic. Another problem is that “keeping chalav Yisroel” and “not keeping chalav Yisroel” have taken on numerous unwarranted and erroneous connotations to the point that the observance of this halacha has become something of a litmus test of one’s religiosity. In truth, chalav Yisroel/chalav akum is nothing of the sort.

To confuse the issue even further, there are about six or seven different configurations by which one could observe chalav Yisroel. Some of these configurations contradict each other and even appear to harbor internal contradictions. Nevertheless, those who rely upon them have a basis and cannot be considered to be behaving in error.

In this shiur we are going to examine the issues surrounding the observance of this mitzvah, the differing standards that exist, and the ramifications of the varying halachic opinions on the modern situation.

II. Mekoros

The source for the prohibition of non-Jewish milk, chalav akum, is in the Mishna, tractate Avoda Zara 35b:

These are the items of idol worshipers that are prohibited, yet their prohibition is not a prohibition against benefit: Milk milked by an idolater without the oversight of a Jew, their bread, and their oil.

The Gemora explains that our concern is that the non-Jew may have mixed in non-kosher milk. Transporting, pouring, and jostling about fresh milk can have the effect of churning it, making it lumpy and buttery. Apparently, one could keep his milk-pail liquid with the addition of a minute amount of non-kosher milk.

Having just established the prohibition and that it is nullified by the oversight of a Jew, the Mishna appears to duplicate itself only a few pages later in the Gemora (ibid. 39b), stating:

These are permitted for consumption: Milk milked by an idolater whilst overseen by a Jew…

The obvious question is: Why does this Mishna bother to tell us this? Is not this fact evident from the prior Mishna? There must be something implied here that we could not have figured out previously. The Gemora in its analysis concludes the chiddush is that the Jew supervising the milking does not need to be watching the entire time; rather he could do random “spot checks.” Nevertheless, his visits need to be sufficiently frequent and random such that the non-Jew will experience a realistic fear of getting caught. That fear, or mirsus, is enough to for us to assume that he would not mix anything non-kosher into the milk.

The Gemora, however, contains an ambiguity. The recurring model situation referenced by the Gemora is that of a Jew who sits alongside a non-Jew’s herd. The Gemora states that he doesn’t need to constantly supervise the milk, rather it is sufficient that he just pop-in and out. However, it is unclear from the Gemora whether or not we are speaking of a herd of all kosher animals, or of a mixed herd with kosher and non-kosher animals. If we are talking about a mixed herd, then surely we must be concerned about non-kosher milk being mixed in. However, why should we worry if the non-Jew’s herd consists of all kosher animals? In that case, perhaps the likelihood of mixed milks is so low that we don’t have to worry about tamei milk being added to kosher milk?

The Mordechai 826, addresses this ambiguity, ruling that the gezeira against chalav akum applies even in a case where there are no non-kosher animals in the herd. Even then, a Jew must observe the milking in order for the milk to be kosher.

The questions which naturally follows is: What is the Mordechai’s rationale? Why require supervision and mirsus even when there are no non-kosher animals about?

There are two answers in the halachic literature which have become the pillars upon which rests the prohibition of chalav akum and the requirement of chalav Yisroel.

The first answer is that of the Pri Chodosh. According to him, the Mordechai holds that a Jew must be present in such a situation to ensure that the non-Jew doesn’t bring non-kosher milk from elsewhere. However, in a locale where non-kosher animals are not found at all, or where tamei milk is expensive, then even the Mordechai would agree that you do not need to have a Jew present for the milking. We find that, according to the Pri Chodosh, the requirement of Jewish supervision is dependant upon the probability of having non-kosher milk mixed in.

The second answer is that of the Chasam Sofer. His Shu”t YD 107 explains that the Mordechai requires Jewish supervision even when there are no tamei animals in the herd and even where there is no chance of there being tamei milk mixed into the kosher milk. According to the Chasam Sofer, the Mordechai interprets chalav Yisroel/chalav akum as a davar she-bi-minyan. A davar shebi-minyan is described in the Gemora in tractate Beitza as a decree passed by an official halachic court, such as the Sanhedrin. The law is that such a decree applies even when the exact reason for the decree is no longer applicable. A davar shebi-minyan may only be annulled by a beis din of comparable authority and/or wisdom to the beis din that originated the decree.

The Chasam Sofer’s explanation of the Mordechai is generally consistent with many other prohibitions on non-Jewish produced foods and, as such, is accepted by the majority of the acharonim (including the Aruch ha-Shulchan, the Chochmos Adam, the Mateh Yehonasan, and even Rav Moshe Feinstein ztz”l) as the primary answer to the difficulty in the Mordechai.

The question that began this discussion, whether chalav akum applies in a herd of only kosher animals, is analogous to industrial dairy production in the United States. Our dairies don’t have tamei animals in them and tamei milk isn’t produced or generally consumed in this country. Therefore, it appears that the Pri Chodosh would pasken that there is no requirement to observe chalav Yisroel in the US because the law doesn’t even apply. The Chasam Sofer, however, would explain that one is nevertheless required to keep chalav Yisroel and non-chalav Yisroel milk is not kosher.

Since the majority of the poskim hold the halacha is like the Chasam Sofer, then we must conclude that chalav Yisroel is in force in the

and every Jew is required to “keep chalav Yisroel.”

However, what constitutes "chalav yisroel" is the subject of an important teshuva authored by Rav Moshe Feinstein ztz"l in the 1950's.

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