kenodoxia

Ends in themselves

2008-08-14T20:09:00.003+01:00

I'm enjoying watching the Olympics, particularly the sports that don't get so much TV time otherwise. (Why bother watching Olympic football when you can get into the judo?) And I think there's something rather admirable about these people who have dedicated a great deal of time and effort to doing their best at these various sports. True, I don't think I personally would find a great deal of satisfaction in hour after hour of weight training in preparation for 22 seconds of a 50m freestyle swim. And true, some of these people have been using a relatively large amount of state subsidy (though less than many other countries, I suspect) in order to come relatively low down the eventual list in the Olympic competition.

But good for them all the same. I reckon few people share my personal priorities and might (indeed do) occasionally object to state funding of someone to spend a large proportion of time researching ancient philosophy. 'What good is that?', a hard-nosed (hard-headed?) politician might ask. No more and no less good, I suspect, than someone being given assistance by the state to try to be the best they can be at, say, diving. Perhaps it will inspire some more people to take up sport. No doubt it will entertain and excite a few people this summer. Both good things.

There are doubtless limits to the kinds of ends to which people might dedicate themselves and the pursuit of which they take to be constituent of a good and fulfilled life which the state might be obliged to fund. (There certainly are limits to the kinds of ends which some people take to be constituent of a good life which we ought as a society to agree even to tolerate, let alone promote.) On the other hand, I think we should recognise a plurality of things people might take to be ends in themselves and worth pursuing. (Winning, at least attempting to win is clearly part of the goal of athletic competition, but is surely not all there is to it, so just becauce people might lose we ought not to discount this as a reasonably attainable goal.) So, softie that I am, despite the evident professionalism (which seems to me to be a curious thing to object to...), commercialism (which is probably instrumentally necessary these days to some extent at least), and nationalistic posturing, I think these sorts of sporting events are overall a good thing. That's why I find something admirable in the focus and drive of these people. It doesn't matter that I don't share their priorities; I'm pretty sure they don't share mine. Yet I am prepared to think that their choice is neither crazy and nor overly damaging to others' choices. I hope they would think the same about mine.

And I am genuinely excited about London 2012... Provided we don't cock it up, of course. Not sure what I'll go and watch, though. Rowing, perhaps...

2 films

2008-08-10T18:16:00.003+01:00

1. We went to see Wall-E today and we all loved it. For my money, it's not so good as soon as the two robots end up back on the ship full of fatty humans, but it's still a lot of fun. Good for Pixar. And they even give you a little short cartoon to start with like in the olden days you'd get a short film before the main feature.

2. I'm reading Watchmen for the first time and loving it. I know it's probably a bit geeky and the superhero thing is not usually my cup of tea, - even if very few of these guys are heroic or super, for that matter, but the story is good and fits perfectly with the medium. It is evidently the source of all the good stuff in this genre in the last 20 years and shows Heroes, for example, to be the mere derivative frothy soap opera it surely is. And, what's very exciting, the film (due next year) looks like it is going to capture the feel and look of the book very nicely.

Deep summer

2008-08-04T19:05:00.003+01:00

Sorry not to have posted for a bit (though, come to think of it, I wonder if anyone really minds). I will get back to Aristotle NE 10.4 and Plato Philebus soon, at least when I have something constructive worked out to say. But for now I thought it might be interesting (for me, at least) to catalogue what I'm up to at the moment.

Big job #1 is putting together the Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism. At the moment I'm putting together the big bibliography at the end and being surprised by how tricky it is to get the formatting right and how common it is to get two contributors citing the same thing but assigning different years of publication or some such. It's boring stuff but the end is in sight. Then I have to go back through the chapters and make sure the 'Bloggs (2001a)'s are right and the 'Bloggs (2001b)'s are right. And then it's on to getting the references to papyri all sorted... I think it will be a good volume when it's done.

Big job #2 is examining a PhD. I end up writing long reports - perhaps too long - but I find that the best way to make sure I'm thinking properly about what I'm reading.

Then, not yet underway, big job #3 is writing new lectures for next academic year. The major set that's new next year will be 4 lectures on Plato's Crito. I read this as a starting Greek text in my first year as an undergraduate and it's good to look back at it. I'm also going to try to introduce some more general philosophical questions about disobedience, the extent to which people are obliged to obey the law, and what the obligations are if a citizen objects to a law.

Smaller jobs include #4 finishing a paper on Cicero's first Tusculan disputation and #5 polishing my paper on Plutarch's Non posse after I gave it in Oxford. The first of these is, I hope, going to appear in a collection of interesting things on the philosophy of death. Not sure what will happen to the second, but while I still have some thoughts about it I had better get them incorporated.

A-level results are out soon so I will start to think about organising college teaching next year, and I in any case had better get going with arranging teaching for my returning students. Then there are always graduate students around and interesting books to read and thoughts buzzing about other things. These are not so much jobs, though, so I had better list them differently:

Indulgence #6 is a developing paper on Sextus M 10 and an argument about why god cannot be wise and yet not feel pain (and therefore be perishable). This is tricky and has got me reading round other arguments over the necessity of first-person experience for certain kinds of knowledge, particularly what it is like to experience pain. The indulgence #7 is my very early-days thoughts about NE 10.4 and the Philebus.

Now I think about it, putting this list together is a useful way of working out what to do first... And then again, there is always failblog to waste my time for me. This is my recent favourite (click for a clearer image):

Aristotle NE 1174b31–3

2008-07-29T14:26:00.002+01:00

In Nicomachean Ethics 10.4 Aristotle uses a somewhat cryptic analogy as a way of illustrating what he takes to be the proper relationship between activity and pleasure. He is trying to make clear what he takes to be the correct way to understand how pleasure ‘supervenes’ on an activity, and to do so he uses a simile taken from the common rhetoric of praise for beautiful male youths. He writes at 1174b31–3:

τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα.

Christopher Rowe translates as follows:

Pleasure completes the activity, not in the way the disposition present in the subject completes it, but as a sort of supervenient end, like the bloom of manhood on those in their prime.

Certainly, this has proved to be somewhat puzzling to commentators, and not only because of the difficulty of understanding the claim in the first part of the sentence about the contrast between the ‘disposition present in the subject’ and the proper way in which pleasure completes an activity. What is the force of the simile at the end?

My current hunch is that Aristotle is in all likelihood using this particular analogy because it answers a Platonic ancestor and, in turn, further explains the difference in opinion between Plato and Aristotle on the correct understanding of the nature of pleasure. The Platonic ancestor is an equally cryptic comment at Philebus 53d3–e1:

ΣΩ. Ἐστὸν δή τινε δύο, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό, τὸ δ’ ἀεὶ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς τούτω καὶ τίνε λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν σεμνότατον ἀεὶ πεφυκός, τὸ δ’ ἐλλιπὲς ἐκείνου.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγ’ ἔτι σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Παιδικά που καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τεθεωρήκαμεν ἅμα καὶ ἐραστὰς ἀνδρείους αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ Τούτοις τοίνυν ἐοικότα δυοῖν οὖσι δύο ἄλλα ζήτει κατὰ πάνθ’ ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι.

Soc. Let there be this pair: what is itself, by itself, and what is always aiming at something else.

Prot. What are these two you are talking about and what are they like?

Soc. The one is always by nature the most holy and the other lacks it.

Prot. Be clearer still, please.

Soc. I suppose we have seen beautiful and good young boys together with their brave lovers.

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. So now look for another pair of things that are like these two in all the ways we are mentioning.

There is, I think, at least a prima facie case for thinking that Aristotle’s comment in NE 10.4 is in some way related to Socrates’ comment here in the Philebus. Not only do both texts reach for a comparison rooted in the language of male-male courtship during their explanation of the nature of pleasure, but those two explanations are themselves in any case engaging in a clear dialogue with one another. On the one side, Socrates’ kompsoi are offering a metaphysical classification of pleasure with ranks all pleasure along with processes of coming-to-be while, on the other side, Aristotle is concerned in NE 10.4 to reject the classification of all pleasures as processes (kinēseis) and instead wants to suggest that there is a class of pleasures instead associated with activities (energeiai) which are ends-in-themselves. As he says at 1174b9–10: ‘From these considerations it is clear also that they do not correctly describe pleasure as a change (kinēsis) or a coming-to-be (genesis)’. The people he refers to here as having this mistaken view may not be exclusively the kompsoi of the Philebus, but they are surely included in the group and will in all likelihood be the most prominent and explicit proponents of this thesis.

The contexts of the two remarks are therefore such that we should expect there to be a degree of intertextual significance to Aristotle’s choice of simile. The metaphysical classification of pleasures expounded by the kompsoi and elucidated by this analogy is precisely what Aristotle is arguing against in the passage in which he turns to a simile from a context of male-male sexual relationships. In order to consider in more detail what that significance is we should first try to make sense of what the precise import is of this analogy in the Philebus. Once that is done, it should be easier to see in what ways Aristotle’s counter-analogy is supposed to work in response. That’s my next job.

Plutarch and psychology - again

2008-07-24T12:00:00.002+01:00

I have found some more interesting evidence which suggests that it is right to think that at Non posse 1092D Plutarch is ascribing two distinct kinds of activity to the rational soul: one theoretical and concerned with necessary eternal truths and one practical and concerned with particulars. The suggestion would be, therefore, that he thinks that there are ‘rational pleasures’ associated with each kind of activity and that therefore we can take rational pleasure in acquiring knowledge about the contingent and particular facts of history, for example, as well as in acquiring knowledge of Forms and metaphysical principles. The first passages is in De an. proc. which describes reason (λόγος) in terms which suggest that it is a single faculty able to operate on both intelligible or universal and perceptible and particular objects (see 1024E–1025A and 1025D–E). Consider in particular 1025E:

καὶ μὴν θεωρητικῆς γε τῆς ψυχῆς οὔσης ἅμα καὶ πρακτικῆς, καὶ θεωρούσης μὲν τὰ καθόλου πραττούσης δὲ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα, καὶ νοεῖν μὲν ἐκεῖνα ταῦτα δ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι δοκούσης, ὁ κοινὸς λόγος ἀεὶ περί τε ταὐτὸν ἐντυγχάνων τῷ θατέρῳ καὶ ταὐτῷ περὶ θάτερον ἐπιχειρεῖ μὲν ὅροις καὶ διαιρέσεσι χωρίζειν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀμερὲς καὶ τὸ μεριστόν, οὐ δύναται δὲ καθαρῶς ἐν οὐδετέρῳ γενέσθαι διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐναλλὰξ ἐμπεπλέχθαι καὶ καταμεμῖχθαι δι’ ἀλλήλων.

Now, as the soul is at once contemplative and practical and contemplates the universals but acts upon the particulars and apparently cognizes the former but perceives the latter, the reason common to both (ὁ κοινὸς λόγος) as it is continually coming upon difference in sameness and upon sameness in difference, tries with definitions and divisions to separate the one and the many, that is the indivisible and the divisible, but cannot arrive at either exclusively, because the very principles have been alternately intertwined and thoroughly intermixed with each other.

(trans. H. Cherniss)

This is clearly a Platonist attempt to make sense of the inter-relation between theoretical understanding and practical reasoning based upon a metaphysical account of the relationship between universals and particulars. (There are also evident Aristotelian influences on this view. Compare, for example: NE 1139a5–15.) What is important for present purposes is that these are most emphatically two related uses of reason.

The second passage is at Virt. mor. 443E, a work with very strong Peripatetic influences, which offers a similar division further identifies the virtue of the theoretical use of reason as wisdom, σοφία, and of the practical use of reason as prudence, φρόνησις.)

ἔστι τοίνυν τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἔχοντα τὰ δὲ πῶς ἔχοντα πρὸς ἡμᾶς• ἁπλῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντα γῆ οὐρανὸς ἄστρα θάλασσα, πῶς δ’ ἔχοντα πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀγαθὸν κακόν, αἱρετὸν φευκτόν, ἡδὺ ἀλγεινόν. ἀμφοῖν δὲ τοῦ λόγου θεωρητικοῦ ὄντος τὸ μὲν περὶ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἔχοντα μόνον ἐπιστημονικὸν καὶ θεωρητικόν ἐστι, τὸ δ’ ἐν τοῖς πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἡμᾶς βουλευτικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν• ἀρετὴ δὲ τούτου μὲν ἡ φρόνησις ἐκείνου δ’ ἡ σοφία.

Now in the world things are of two sorts, some of them existing absolutely, others in some relation to us. Things that exist absolutely are earth, heavens, stars, sea; things that exist in relation to us are good and evil, things desirable and avoided, things pleasant and painful. Now reason contemplates both of these but when it is concerned merely with things which exist absolutely, it is called scientific and contemplative; and when it is engaged with those things that exit in relation to us it is called deliberative and practical. The virtue of the latter activity is call prudence and of the former wisdom.

(trans. W. C. Hembold)

This passage is, admittedly, a little odd since it would appear to make a grasp of truths concerning the sea, for example, part of theoretical wisdom whereas thoughts about what is good will belong to practical wisdom only. This is perhaps a sign of a very strong Peripatetic influence here. Nevertheless, the general point is clear that Plutarch is not averse to offering reason differing spheres of activity and tends to discriminate these by different kinds of object.

It would be reasonable to think, given this view, that there could be rational pleasures associated with both the cognition of universals and the learning or perception of particulars and that appears to be the view offered in Non posse.

Psychology in the Non posse II

2008-07-21T12:05:00.002+01:00

I suggested in the last post that Plutarch may have thought that the rational soul was tasked with both theoretical understanding of things that are necessary and eternal and also various things that could be otherwise, and that therefore the pleasure we take in learning historical facts and the like might still in his eyes be 'rational' pleasures. This was part of an attempt to understand Non posse 1092E.

The case is unfortunately not so clear-cut. On the other hand, Plutarch is evidently also concerned in this work to show that Epicureanism fails properly to acknowledge the natural sense in which humans take pleasure in fame and a good reputation. Much of the discussion from 1098E to 1100D, for example, is designed to show not only that there are examples of men who have taken proper pleasure in their noble achievements but also that there is a general desire for and enjoyment of such pleasures among humans. Indeed, Epicurus himself is criticised as inconsistent on this score: his own concern for a particular reputation is what drove him to disown and then slander his teachers and enjoyed the reverence paid to him by his followers (1100A–C). In the terms of Plato’s Republic, these would appear to be the pleasures of the spirited part of the soul, the thumoeides: see, for example, 581a9–b5. Furthermore, when Plutarch concludes this work he offers a summary of the various pleasures and goods which the Epicureans omit from a human life, he tells us that Epicurus blinds ‘the love of learning of the theoretical part of us and the love of honour of the action-guiding part of us’ (τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τὸ φιλομαθὲς καὶ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ τὸ φιλότιμον) to their due pleasures (1107C). Here, it seems more likely that the ‘action-guiding’ part, the praktikon, is to be thought of as rather similar to Plato’s thumoeides and not another aspect of the rational part of the soul. Is that what's meant also at 1092E?

Psychology in the Non posse

2008-07-18T14:02:00.002+01:00

I’ve been thinking, prompted by the paper I gave at the Oxford Plutarch conference, about Plutarch Non posse 1092Dff. (chapter 9). Plutarch says that the Epicureans fail to include in their account of the good life a whole range of things which are pleasant, and properly pleasant to humans. For the most part, it seems to me that much of Plutarch’s case so far has drawn for its inspiration from Plato’s account of pleasure in Republic 9. But when Plutarch comes to offer his preferred characterisation of the pleasures appropriate to a rational human soul, he seems prepared to soften the restrictive account found in Republic 9. There, it is quite clear that Socrates wants true and pure pleasures, strictly understood, to be focussed only on objects which always are and are always unchanging. Most obviously, this is a reference to the Forms – the objects of knowledge of the true philosopher ruler – but perhaps a case might also be made for pure pleasures of this kind being generated by contemplation of mathematical objects of some sort. Plutarch, however, describes a significantly more expansive notion, including among his list of appropriate sources of pleasure not only mathematics (1093Dff.) but also the study of literature, history and the like. For Plutarch, we take pleasure in learning the truth even if these are truths related to contingent facts, in other words: what might be otherwise (1093A–C). All these, we are asked to agree, are rejected by the Epicureans as part of a blanket rejection of cultural and intellectual pursuits in favour of a concentration on the most basic physical needs.

This brings me to what is troubling me right now. Does Plutarch include here pleasures not belonging to the rational soul, strictly speaking, or is the expansion in the scope of pleasures assigned to the rational soul is licensed by Plutarch’s acceptance of a dual nature of that aspect of human psychology? In other words, does Plutarch have a dual account of the rational soul? At the moment, I think he does. In Non posse, he gives a reasonably clear indication that he sees the working of the rational soul being turned to two separate but related functions. At 1092E he describes the types of pleasure which a human ought properly to pursue, neither of which is grasped by the appetitive and bestial soul emphasised by the Epicureans. Rather the pleasures which we ought to pursue come...

ἐκ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ καὶ φιλομαθοῦς ἢ πρακτικοῦ καὶ φιλοκάλου τῆς διανοίας...

from the theoretical or learning-loving part or else the action-guiding and beauty-loving part of the mind... [1]

Do the alternatives mentioned correspond to two aspects of the rational part of the soul – one theoretical and the other practical – or do they correspond to the rational and ‘spirited’ parts of the soul more or less on the model of the tripartite soul of Plato’s Republic? In favour of the former option is Plutarch’s preceding comment that the good he is discussing is the good appropriate to the soul, what is truly ‘psychic’, has no mixture of pain and the like – all of which suggests that there are somehow still meant to capture the essence of the pure pleasures which Socrates discusses in the Republic. The former alternative would also appear to give a more satisfying overall coherence to his view, since the pleasures he goes on to list are hard to assign to the thumoeides but are instead, broadly speaking, aesthetic and cultural, concerned with particular stories, works, or occasions. They are therefore just the class of items which it would be hard to assign to the theoretical aspect of reason, if that is concerned with necessary and eternal abstract objects and truths. But they are on the other hand certainly related in some sense to a rational appreciation, a general love of acquiring beliefs and information about particular or contingent facts.

[1] The full context reads: ἃς δ’ ἄξιον καὶ δίκαιον εὐφροσύνας καὶ χαρὰς νομίζεσθαι, καθαραὶ μέν εἰσι τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ σφυγμὸν οὐδένα κεκραμένον οὐδὲ δηγμὸν οὐδὲ μετάνοιαν ἔχουσιν, οἰκεῖον δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ψυχικὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ γνήσιον καὶ οὐκ ἐπείσακτον αὐτῶν τἀγαθόν ἐστιν οὐδ’ ἄλογον, ἀλλ’ εὐλογώτατον ἐκ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ καὶ φιλομαθοῦς ἢ πρακτικοῦ καὶ φιλοκάλου τῆς διανοίας φυόμενον. Plutarch’s use of the term διάνοια elsewhere is not easy to pin down. It may be used perhaps as simply a synonym for ψυχή, but on other occasions has an apparently more restricted reference to the rational or ‘hegemonic’ part of the soul (Virt. mor. 441C, cf. 451B; De fato 571D; De soll. anim. 960A, 960C, 963D, 969C; Quaest. Plat. 1001D, 1002A).

Troop transport

2008-07-16T15:12:00.002+01:00

On the way to Oxford, I shared a carriage on the Cambridge-London train with five students, most - I think - from Anglia Ruskin University, who were on their way to some kind of Army training session. There were probably members of the Officer Training Corps, but in any case they were clearly militarised in some sense: they all had huge camouflaged packs and were speaking the lingo, peppering their chat with acronyms like RSM and swapping stories of 'knocks' taken in previous training sessions. On the other hand, they were clearly not yet fully enlisted. They were all still too relaxed and had the unmistakable air of students with at least a year of a course to go, just at the beginning of a long summer vacation.

In some ways, they were a very modern bunch. All were checking the phones regularly, texting friends, chatting about Facebook-planned events; one even had brought a laptop along with him. But this was also a very old-fashioned scene. They had all received their papers -- via email, I think -- telling them where to muster, which train to catch, what kit to bring, and the like. And when the excitement of meeting up again had worn off, even though they were not - I assume - really off to any genuine conflict zone, an odd quiet came over them all. Nerves, perhaps, as well as an kind of exhaustion.

These men were at most two years away from doing this journey 'for real', should they sign up properly for the army. And in that case they really would have been off to some genuine danger. It's after all not very likely that in the next two years the British Army will not be committed to action in various places across the world. I wonder if they were thinking about that. I wonder what would make someone, right now, join the army. Adventure? Excitement? National pride? Duty? I can appreciate some of these motives, but I certainly felt no envy at all for what they were off to do.

Plutarch

2008-07-11T09:17:00.002+01:00

I'm off on Sunday to a short conference in Oxford on Plutarch and philosophy. I've listed the papers below in case you're interested. I'm a bit of an amateur in this company so I shall probably learn quite a lot.

Professor Fran Titchener (Utah State University), ‘Plutarch’s attitude towards history in the Moralia’

Professor Aurelio Perez Jimenez (University of Malaga), ‘Fatalism, providence and liberty in Plutarch’s Lives’

Professor Luc van der Stockt (University of Leuven), ‘Emulation and rivalry: a ‘popular philosophical’ theme in Plutarch’

Professor Frederick Brenk (Pontifical Biblical Institute of Rome), ‘Plutarch the theologian and the philosophy of his time’

Professor Judith Mossman (University of Nottingham), ‘Philosophy of language in Plutarch’

Dr Eleni Kechagia (University of Oxford),’ Plutarch on ancient atomism’

Professor Donald Russell, ‘Plutarch and Quintilian- a dialogue’

Professor John Dillon (Trinity College Dublin), ‘Plutarch as an interpreter of Plato’

Professor Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp (University of Bonn), ‘Plutarch’s Aristotelian mood’

Professor Jan Opsomer (University of Cologne), ‘Explanatory principles in Plutarch’s philosophy of nature’

Professor Keimpe Algra (University of Utrecht ), ‘Plutarch on Stoic Theology and Demonology’

Dr James Warren (University of Cambridge), ‘Plutarch and Epicurean pleasure in the Non posse’

Dr Mauro Bonazzi (University of Milan), ‘Plutarch on the difference between the Academics and Pyrrhonists’

England 2 Columbia 0

2008-07-08T18:28:00.001+01:00

Kirsty MacColl's 'best of', Galore, is on rotation in the car at the moment. You should buy it if you don't have it already. This isn't on it, but it's also terrific. Super chorus.

Why no 'soul' in Plato's Crito?

2008-07-07T14:48:00.003+01:00

I'm giving some lectures on Plato's Crito next year so I thought I'd better re-read the thing carefully. I don't think I'd been through it properly since I read it as part of my first-year undergraduate Intensive Greek classes. I like it; certainly I like it more than the Ion, which it will replace in the first-year syllabus.

Anyway, I'm intrigued by Crito 47d3-6 and 47e7-48a1. There, famously, Socrates appears to be referring to a relatively familiar -- albeit paradoxical -- idea of his, namely that what matters most to one's welfare is the welfare of one's soul and that the welfare of one's soul is determined by whether one commits just acts -- which benefit the soul -- or unjust acts -- which harm it. However, Socrates does not once refer to the soul in this dialogue and he appears to go out of his way not to do so. Here are the passages:

ᾧ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο.

If we do not follow this, we will destroy and harm that which becomes better by what is just and is destroyed by what is unjust. (47d3-6)

Ἀλλὰ μετ’ ἐκείνου ἄρ’ ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν; ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἥ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν;

But should we live with that thing destroyed which the unjust harms and the just benefits? Or should we think this less important than the body whatever part of us this is which injustice and justice concern? (47e7-48a1)

It would be odd, to say the least, if what Socrates is referring to here were not 'the soul'. So why doesn't he come out and say it? True, what matters in this argument is that there is something or other which justice -- specifically the agent's commission of just acts -- benefits and which the agent's own commission of injustice will harm. What this is, precisely, is not so crucial right now. On the other hand, Socrates is not squeamish elsewhere about talking of souls. Why not here too?

I don't think the answer is just that Crito is 'unphilosophical' and would not get it [1]. Crito is an old hand at Socratic conversations, so we learn in the dialogue, and it would be odd if he hadn't picked up something along the line. It would be odd indeed, if he were so 'unphilosophical' that Socrates felt he had to resort to a somewhat obscure circumlocution to get his point across rather than just come out with a psychological thesis.

But there must be some reason. I'm still pondering, but I suspect the answer has to do with two further points [2].

1. The other important part of the dialogue must be Socrates' dream (at 44b) which certainly implies that Socrates is happy with the idea of some kind of survival after death, particularly if what matters here is the idea of a return home 'on the third day', that is: when he dies. Crito doesn't see what Socrates is getting at here either, of course (44b4) but that still doesn't make him 'unphilosophical'...

2. Crito himself is certainly not quite getting the point of Socrates' views in the dialogue, but it seems to me that this is a sign of something rather important that the Crito as a whole is trying to stress. What's wrong with Crito is not (just) that he is invoking the wrong sort of values (the welfare of philoi, family, reputation, money and the like) in putting the case for escape. These are perhaps, in a sense, 'unphilosophical', but that's not really the problem. The real problem is that Crito has followed and agreed to various Socratic arguments in the past, the conclusions of which Socrates still holds true and which are dictating Socrates' decision to remain in prison. Crito, however, seems to be able to follow these arguments only when they are not immediately relevant and applicable to a loved-one. Socrates is willing to reconsider the case, of course, but Crito will need to give the right kind of arguments to make him change his mind. So Crito is not 'unphilosophical' most generally; he is just not philosophical enough in this sense: he finds it hard to remain consistent with his argued principles when placed under the most testing personal circumstances. (It is revealing, then, that Crito cannot respond to Socrates' questions any further when he is explicitly asked to apply a general principle to the current situation: 49e9-50a3, the switch to the first person is marked, I'd say.)

How do these points help with the opening question? Perhaps, and this is perhaps a weak suggestion, Socrates is trying to persuade Crito as gently as he can that he really should just stick to the conclusions they had reached time and time before. Introducing any very strong psychological theses such as the idea of post mortem survival would potentially muddy the waters here when what matters is just the re-affirmation of the ban on wrong-doing and injustice, even in retaliation. Similarly, asserting that doing injustice harms the soul would potentially lead the conversation into unnecessary worries that would not help Socrates' case, nor help Crito deal with his particular and pressing crisis of philosophical faith.

[1] See e.g. R. Weiss, Socrates dissatisfied (Oxford, 1998, 43 and n.12).

[2] I'm particularly benefiting from re-reading V. Harte's 'Conflicting values in Plato's Crito' AGP 81, 117-47, reprinted in this handy collection.

More taxonomy

2008-07-04T18:32:00.002+01:00

Another blow for the VAT man: Pringles are officially not potato crisps (for one thing, they are less than 50% potato). They should be less expensive from now on. On the downside, they are clearly made of something very odd indeed: watch this demonstration of how flammable they are. Puts you off.

Probably good news for Pringles, overall, despite making public the precise components of the things and they only just won a court case proving that they are not satanic. Watching them burn makes you wonder, though...

Talent spotting

2008-07-01T09:38:00.002+01:00

At an event for teachers in college yesterday I was asked what qualities a teacher might look for in a student as a sign that the student might be suited to a philosophy degree. I don't think I gave a very good answer at the time -- it's not an easy question -- but I've thought a bit more since, so here goes.

Let's first be clear that what is being asked concerns whether a student will be suited to and enjoy a philosophy degree. I'm not interested in wondering how to spot 'philosophical' people more generally, if there are such people, and I'm not going to say anything about what makes someone 'a philosopher', whatever that is. Rather, I'm simply thinking about the course I know best and what the characteristics would be of a student who would enjoy and do well at it.

I suppose first we have to say that they need to be clever and hard-working. Just one of these on its own won't be enough because the material is challenging and there is a lot of it to cover. One thing we try to assess at an interview is whether the applicant will be able to get down to work, sometimes long hours on not-so-exciting things. Just as a football manager needs, proverbially, to know a player will 'give it 110% on a wet February night in Middlesbrough', so too we need students who will do their best for a supervision on a wet Wednesday in Lent on a topic that is not -- at least, on the surface -- the sort to get pulses racing. Swanning around clutching a novel by Sartre won't be enough.

They need also to be able to read well, that is: carefully, thoroughly and sensitively. They will meet a range of writers, some from different cultures and periods, and different kinds of writing. All of it will be challenging and pretty dense. They need to read critically, looking to the overall argument and structure of the piece in question. And they need to be able both to extract what it being said and why but also articulate well-aimed responses to it. They need to be able to express themselves clearly in writing and orally.

So far, lots of this is pretty generic. And that's not a surprise. I imagine lots of people who do well at philosophy could also do well in other similar disciplines should their interest have taken them in that direction, and vice versa. So now the question is: how can you tell if someone might be interested enough in philosophy?

This is less easy. Being someone who 'loves thinking', as many of the UCAS personal statements I read tend to say, isn't enough. Being someone who has read and enjoyed or perhaps read and been annoyed by some recent philosophical writing is a better start (but they need to be able to say why they enjoyed it or found it annoying. Not thinking to ask that question of oneself is a bad sign...) Wanting to appear 'deep' and trying to work out the ultimate nature of reality/the universe/the meaning of life is not good at all.

I reckon a good sign would be if a student is never content with a proposed explanation (in chemistry, or history, or maths, or whatever) until they've circled round it themselves, prodded it, thought about its repercussions, grounds, and further import. It's also a good sign if a student is argumentative -- not, of course, just in the sense of being stubborn -- but in the sense of being able and interested in a give-and-take of argumentative, dialectical discussion. It's important that the student is willing and determined to fight for their view, but within limits. It's not good if what matters is simply winning an argument or discussion, just forcing someone to give in. Being able to recognise when a line of thought won't work, or is flawed, or is no more plausible than an alternative, is extremely important. A kind of intellectual honesty, open-ness, and generosity is a good thing to have.

So that's my second attempt to answer the question. I'll ponder some more.

Reissues

2008-06-25T14:16:00.004+01:00

I've just picked up a copy of the Bompiani re-issue of Ettore Bignone's L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro. I read it last when writing my PhD but reckon it's now worth revisiting, particularly in the light of some recent work on, for example, Aristotle's Protrepticus. You never know, it might even spark some more useful thought on something that has been bothering me for a while: the brief quotation from Epicurus' On choices at DL 10.136 (= Us. 2) ...

“ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί• ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.”

(The text itself is disputable, but this is a reasonable stab at what it might have been. It's what Marcovich has, though that might not be thought evidence either way. You might read ἐνεργείαι instead of ἐνεργείᾳ, if you like.)

Anyway, I think it would be a bit odd if this had nothing to do with Aristotle. The other thing buzzing round my head at the moment is Burnyeat's proposal (in the latest OSAPh) about the role of the kinēsis / energeia distinction in Aristotle's works and, in particular, its place in NE 10. It must be right that part of what NE 10 wants to do is respond to a Platonic presumption that pleasure is a kind of incomplete process. And that is, obviously, something which Epicurus would be interested in too. I'm not sure yet whether these various bits and pieces will eventually fit together, but we'll see.

And good on Bompiani again for reissuing Bignone. They're doing some useful things. How about a reiusse of Giannantoni's I Cirenaici?

Pleasures and pains of philosophy

2008-06-20T14:13:00.002+01:00

There's a recognised difficulty concerning Socrates' account of the pleasures of the philosophical life in Republic IX. The argument around 585 seems most plausible if its aim is to show that the process of satisfying an intellectual need by adding to the immortal soul knowledge of eternal, true, and unchanging Forms, is exquisitely pleasant. It is less plausible as an argument that the possession of philosophical truths is a consistently and long-lasting pleasant state.

If so, however, Socrates may have shown that becoming a philosopher ruler involves these supreme pleasures. He does not show that living as a philosophical ruler also does. Indeed, since this knowledge is not of a sort that would need ever to be re-learned, as it were, these pleasures, however good they are, appear to be a once-in-a-lifetime offer. [1]

Is this a problem? I'm not sure. Perhaps a life which as a whole contains such pleasures at some point in its duration, whatever the later hedonic state of the person, will always as a whole be preferable on hedonic grounds, to a life without such pleasure. Still, we can wonder what the affective life of a philosopher ruler would be like. We are told that in his harmonious soul even the pleasures of the appetite and spirit will be the best they can be (586e4ff.) but what about intellectual pleasures?

I'm not at all sure. I suppose even a philosopher ruler might have new things to learn if his hobbies should turn to a bit of mathematics just to fill in the off-duty hours. And perhaps the active recall and deployment of knowledge has its own pleasures. I can't see that the Republic says very much about this. Socrates is more forthcoming, however, about the discomfort that intellectual achievement involves and it seems to me that there is a very interesting story to be told about Plato's account of the affective aspect of philosophical learning. Certainly, it is disconcerting, even painful, to be made to re-evaluate previously-held opinions and perhaps even to discard wholesale one's general grasp of the world. And it is fairly clear that whatever the other details, a philosopher ruler will only achieve this exalted state after a lengthy and gruelling educational process which involves a dizzying re-consideration of the nature of reality, values, wisdom, expertise, authority, and all manner of other topics the grasp of which informs our everyday business. That is surely part of the message of the Cave analogy which, among other things, emphasises the pain of the ascent.

Socrates repeatedly notes the pain and discomfort felt by the man on his way up out of the cave as the new bright light and the journey take their toll (ἀλγοῖ 518c8; ἀλγεῖν 515e1; ὀδυνᾶσθαι 515e7). (Note also the reference to the philosopher’s ‘birth pangs’ as he struggles to grasp each thing’s nature (490a–b). Once he has achieved the goal of his intellectual desire he then would understand and truly live and be nourished and, in this way, be relieved of his pain’ (γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῴη καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὠδῖνος 490b6–7).

Is this consistent with saying that even the process of learning philosophical truths is exquisitely pleasant? Perhaps. Socrates might wish to distinguish between two processes: one painful and the other pleasant. The pain is caused by the sudden realisation of prior ignorance or misapprehension, the sudden recognition of a previously unnoticed lack (much as in many of the ‘early’ dialogues Socrates’ interlocutors voice annoyance and anger at being reduced to aporia). Certainly, there is evidence from other dialogues that the conscious feeling of pain might be linked by Plato not merely to a lack, but to a perceived lack. Not everyone who does not understand higher geometry is concerned by this absence; someone who recognised the lack and, more important, saw that the possession of what is missing would be beneficial, certainly might be so pained. A philosopher, after all, is someone who loves wisdom, desires it and so on. Becoming a philosopher involves recognising what one lacks, valuing it, and striving to possess it.

[1] See e.g. Gosling and Taylor, The Greeks on pleasure, 1982, 122–3.

Suicide Sunday

2008-06-15T08:00:00.002+01:00

That's the charming name of today in Cambridge: the Sunday immediately prior to May Week (in June, yes...) I suppose the title has something to do with the fact that the examination results will begin to be published in earnest next week. It also might have something to do with the fact that many of our fine students will probably feel like death before the end of the day.

That is because Suicide Sunday is a day packed full of garden parties (mostly involving drinking), punting parties (with drinking), breakfast parties (drinking) and the like. Many of the college 'sporting' (i.e. drinking) societies [1] will be holding garden parties today and a lot of students will more or less be doing a tour of these fine events, beginning around 10am and seeing how far through the day they can last. Addenbroke's Accident and Emergency department must love it.

The best advice is, unfortunately, to avoid central Cambridge from midday at the very latest. It is fortunately easy, however, to spot any potential revellers. The uniform, in force for at least the last 15 years is, for men, the following:

Blazer (perhaps a little soiled), shirt (at least one button undone), 'society' tie, shorts (kakhi and knee length), deck shoes or flip-flops, bottle of vodka, sunglasses.

The uniform for women is less strict, but is usually a dress which would not allow the lady concerned into the Royal Enclosure at Ascot.

In part, much of this is youthful exuberance and, for the most part, the students have been working long and hard for their recent exams. But I have in the past ventured out on this day and not enjoyed having to avoid large groups of wobbling students attempting to fill up at Sainsbury's. And there was a very unfortunate occasion when my parents came up to take me out to lunch and take home some of my stuff when we were treated, sitting at the Anchor, to an impromptu display of naked bridge jumping into the Cam... The chaps were terribly polite as they got out, but it was certainly enough to put you off your Ploughman's...

[1] The Facebook page for the relevant group from my own college is here. Just for information...

God and pain - again

2008-06-09T11:37:00.003+01:00

I've gone back to thinking about a passage in Sextus Empiricus M 9.162ff. in which Sextus asserts that if god is wise (has phronesis) then he is virtuous; and if he is virtuous he must know what sort of things goods, bads, and indifferents are (it's an anti-Stoic argument in origin) and therefore he must know what pain is like by nature. But he cannot know this without experiencing pain (no one who has not suffered gout can know what it is like to suffer gout; gout sufferers offer very different explanations of what it is like etc.) and therefore if god is wise he is corruptible. (Some of my earlier thought on this are here and here. I've probably changed my mind a bit now.)

I'm still wondering what the argument can tell us about Sextus' conception of the privacy of pain (not much, I think, but it does suggest that he would not reach for the sort of explanations of the privacy of pain which occur very readily to modern philosophers of mind and that itself might be interesting). But I'm also wondering about the legacy of this argument in later theology. It's clear that there are arguments over the possible compatibility of omniscience and other sorts of perfection. For example, we might compare this thought with a concern raised by Richard Francks, which he relates to a demand to ascribe to god omniscience ‘in a strong sense’:

‘My knee hurts, and I am aware of the fact. If a perfect physiologist examined my knee he would know it too. But there is a difference between my awareness and his. What kind of difference? I do not know anything which he does not know. On the contrary, he knows much more about my pain than I do-'I only know it hurts'. I do not even want to say that I know it better than he does. And, provided he is giving me his full attention, I do not want to say either that I am better aware of my pain than he is. ut there is still a difference between me and him: we know what we know in completely different ways. We might say: we know the same thing from different points of view. The question then is: is it enough for God to be the perfect physiologist, or must he somehow 'feel my pain'? I think he must, because if not, then there is something which I know and he does not, viz. not my pain, but my view of my pain. Of course, God 'knows just how I feel', but that phrase is no more comfort here than elsewhere: his knowledge remains theoretical, derived, whereas mine is perceptual, immediate. Mine is not therefore better, but it is different. If God's knowledge of my pain is only that of the perfect physiologist, then I have an awareness, a perspective, which God lacks. And that contradicts the spirit of the first requirement.’ [1]

Franck’s reaction to the argument, as far as I understand it, is that god’s omniscience can be preserved by god’s immanent omnipresence: god does have my perspective on my pain because he is ‘in me’ and therefore can know it as I can, ‘from the inside’ as it were. (I wonder what a Stoic would make of that.) I have also found some other discussions of problems raised by the tension between divine omniscience and experiential knowledge, particularly of pain, in Sarot 1992, 70–77. [2]

My question, though, is whether the Carneadean (probably) argument in Sextus is behind more recent discussions. I haven't seen it referred to anywhere. It might, perhaps, have come through the Latin tradition but the closest we get to this particular argument in Cicero Nat. deorum is, I think, (i) the argument from Carneades at 3.32ff. in which he argues that every living thing which perceives must also perceive pleasure and pain and therefore be liable to perishing and (ii) the argument at 3.38 which tries to show that god has no need of the virtue of prudence (prudentia, which must correspond to phronesis in Sextus' version) since he can experience nothing evil. (ii) is, clearly, the analogue of Sextus' argument but in Cicero it is extremely compressed and is different insofar as it turns on god's having no need of practical wisdom rather than on god's being incapable of having practical wisdom.

[1] Francks, R. 1979. ‘Omniscience, omnipotence, and pantheism’. Philosophy 54: 395–9, at 396.

[2] Sarot, M. 1992. God, passibility and corporeality. Leuven

Two things

2008-06-03T18:41:00.005+01:00

First, Jelly off of StoryMakers and SpringWatch has a blog. It's good.

And second, here's Bonnie Tyler. All together now.. '(Turn around!) Every now and then...'

Pleasure again

2008-06-03T11:39:00.001+01:00

Over at Smooth Motions, I've been joining in their interesting discussion of the Epicurean analysis of pleasure. There are also some interesting questions about the relative strengths of translations of Epicurean texts.

(Gasp...)

2008-06-02T10:18:00.002+01:00

Sorry for the thin posting recently. Today is a brief bit of breathing space in-between last week's May Week seminar on Aristotle De anima 1 (on which below) and the serious business of marking end of year exams. We do the latter in quite a rush so that all the results can be out and agreed by the beginning of July. And since in Classics we still manage double blind-marking it makes the whole process rather intense. Still, I'd rather be marking them than taking them. But all the same, spare me a thought this weekend as I collapse under a pile of scripts...

Last week's seminar was really good. I don't think I'd sat and read DA 1 carefully through as a unit before and it is surprising what it looks like if you do. By the end of the week, I think it's fair to say that there were lots of unanswered questions. For example, isn't it a bit odd for a work On the soul which says it deals with the various views of Aristotle's predecessors not once to mention the Phaedo? We wondered whether that dialogue might be at the back of A.'s mind here and there (and must surely be part of the background of the refutations of the harmonia-theory) but it gets no direct and clear treatment on its own. Did Aristotle think it was not a work of natural philosophy of the soul in the right manner?

Besides generating perplexity, the week was as usual an excellent chance for us on the home team to benefit from having a number of visitors come along and share their thoughts. They are usually much better prepared and informed about the text than we are but I hope they get something out of it as well.

And I've found something that should help out with the post-marking evenings. I've given up trying to compete with my family's scores at Wii bowling (for which my three year-old appears to have some uncanny talent) and have instead discovered this. (Note that the video contains 'Cartoon violence' and 'Comic mischief'. This is not a joke... The website explains: 'Cartoon Violence - Violent actions involving cartoon-like situations and characters. May include violence where a character is unharmed after the action has been inflicted; Comic Mischief - Depictions or dialogue involving slapstick or suggestive humor' . Good grief.)

Seeing yellow III

2008-05-28T14:29:00.001+01:00

Thanks to Kelli, I can now point myself to two abstracts of medical papers dealing with cases of xanthopsia: here and here.

Seeing yellow II

2008-05-24T18:14:00.004+01:00

Thank you all. Some very helpful info:

Gábor writes:

Hi, I was reading your blog on seeing yellow. Here is what Sherlock and Dooley write in their Diseases of the Liver and Biliary System: 'In deep jaundice, the ocular fluids are yellow, and this is considered to explain the extremely rare symptom of xanthopsia (seeing yellow)' (10th ed., Blackwell, 1997, p. 207). 'Extremely rare' I think is telling; I wonder if it is not a way of saying that we are not quite sure whether this symptom really exists, but there is this whole tradition.... I also vaguely remember the Geoffrey Lloyd wrote something about it in 'Observational error in later Gr. science.'

...and then...

'I checked and there is a long footnote on this issue in 'Observational error...' (fn. 2 on pp. 303f in the reprint in Methods and Problems...). By a survey of some authoritative medical books (he does not mention the one I was quoting) Lloyd shows that whenever there is a change in the wording of the successive editions, authors become more and more tentative about the existence of the symptom, but on the other hand, many books keep referring to it. Lloyd concludes: 'The repetition of this idea is remarkable testimony to the tenacity and conservativeness not just of popular belief but of medical opinion. Mr W.N. Mann, who confirms that he has not encountered a case of xanthopsia in jaundice, has remarked to me (personal communication) that it is striking that the matter has not been tested by a post mortem examination of jaundiced subjects to establish whether the media of the eye (aqueous, vitreous) and/or the lens is discoloured.'

I wonder whether such an examination has been carried out since 1982.'

So, there you have it. There is a weight of antiquity and, perhaps, simple prima facie plausibility behind this thought sufficient for it to be repeated as true and therefore not tested. Of course, for the Cyrenaics' point (which is why I originally wondered about the phenomenon) it only needs to stand as one example of a set intended to make the general point that it is reasonable to think that the way things appear to one is sometimes mistaken. You'd think that nevertheless they would be best served by examples which are familiar from general experience...

Seeing yellow

2008-05-22T13:43:00.003+01:00

I'm thinking about the Cyrenaics. I've thought a bit about their hedonism before, but it's high time I got properly to grips with their general epistemology. So I've been spending the last couple of days thinking about Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos (M) 7.190-200, at least the beginning of which (191-3) looks to me like it might contain the kernel of the original Cyrenaic argument for their slightly unusual epistemological view.

Lots of people before have been interested in these guys and in this text in particular, most recently because they might have been an example of a 'subjectivist' position and might even be the best example of a case of ancient 'external world scepticism'. I'm not sure about that. I think the latter is unlikely to be true and I need to get a proper handle first about exactly what 'subjectivism' is. (Like lots of isms, I suspect that it is regularly used to refer to slightly but crucially different views so comparing accounts becomes tricky.)

Here's the relevant bit of Sextus:

[191] (A) φασὶν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀδιάψευστα τυγχάνειν, τῶν δὲ πεποιηκότων τὰ πάθη μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν μηδὲ ἀδιάψευστον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκαινόμεθα, φασί, καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατὸν λέγειν ἀδιαψεύστως καὶ ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως <καὶ> ἀνεξελέγκτως• ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐμποιητικὸν τοῦ πάθους [192] λευκόν ἐστιν ἢ γλυκύ ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷόν τ’ ἀποφαίνεσθαι. εἰκὸς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ λευκοῦ τινα λευκαντικῶς διατεθῆναι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ γλυκέος γλυκανθῆναι. καθὰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοτωθεὶς καὶ ἰκτεριῶν ὠχραντικῶς ὑπὸ πάντων κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ ὀφθαλμιῶν ἐρυθαίνεται, ὁ δὲ παραπιέσας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ὡς ὑπὸ δυεῖν κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ μεμηνὼς δισσὰς ὁρᾷ τὰς Θήβας καὶ δισσὸν φαντάζεται τὸν ἥλιον, [193] ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ὅτι τόδε τι πάσχουσιν, οἷον ὠχραίνονται ἢ ἐρυθαίνονται ἢ δυάζονται, ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὠχρόν ἐστι τὸ κινοῦν αὐτοὺς ἢ ἐνερευθὲς ἢ διπλοῦν ψεῦδος εἶναι νενόμισται, οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς εὐλογώτατόν ἐστι πλέον τῶν οἰκείων παθῶν μηδὲν λαμβάνειν δύνασθαι.

My translation is as follows:

[191] The Cyrenaics, then, say that the pathē are the criteria of truth and that only these are apprehended and met with without deceit, while none of the things which have caused the pathē is apprehended or without deceit. For, they say, it is possible to say that we are ‘whitened’ and ‘sweetened’ without deceit and truthfully and reliably and irrefutably. But that what is the cause of the pathos is [192] white or sweet is impossible to declare. For it is reasonable that someone is disposed ‘whitely’ by something not white and ‘sweetened’ by something not sweet. For in so far as a dizzy person and someone with jaundice are affected by everything in a yellow fashion, someone suffering from ophthalmia is ‘reddened’, someone who presses on his eye is affected by doubling, and someone in a mania sees two Thebes and imagines that the sun is double [193] so in all these cases the fact that they all undergo some pathos – e.g. they are being ‘yellowed’ or ‘reddened’ or ‘doubled’ – is true, but that what is affecting them is yellow or red or double is considered false, so it is also overwhelmingly reasonable that we are able to grasp nothing more that our own pathē.

I'll have to come back to this text and I might have more to say about it soon.

Anyway, for starters I thought it was about time I sorted out something you find regularly in ancient epistemology, and which features in the bit I've quoted, namely the claim that people with jaundice see everything as yellow. It seems that people with jaundice do get yellow eyes (see exhibit a above, taken from here). But I can't really see any modern confirmation of the confident ancient claim that a person with such a condition sees everything somehow tinged yellow. You'd think they'd ask someone if they could. Perhaps it's just one of those old chestnuts that becomes accepted truth. It's clear the sort of point the example is supposed to make, whether or not this particular example is strictly speaking true. This paper sounds promising, but my science isn't up to making much sense of the abstract.

Readers of this blog have been v. kind in the past in sharing their expertise on a variety of topics, including specs-buying and choosing ties. So I reckon I've a fair chance of sorting this out if I just send the question out into the interweb: Do people with jaundice see things as yellow?

Testing times

2008-05-18T19:46:00.003+01:00

Children in English schools are tested a lot, perhaps to destruction. They are tested very regularly and the results spewed out in variously misleading league tables. Later on in the school system the modularised AS and A2 levels means that students are tested extremely regularly in the 16-18 age range. They get very good at taking these tests, at least the ones I see at Cambridge admissions interviews do. But it is not always the case that the strategy the smart ones adopt to get the highest AS and A2 scores is the best strategy to adopt when it comes to less defined university courses. A student who has worked out that they should find out what they need to know and what the examiners will gives ticks for is not always well suited to the more exploratory undergraduate courses.

That's later on in school careers. But younger children are tested a lot too. We are only now beginning to see the effects this has first- (well, second-) hand: our older daughter is 6 and now is having regular spelling tests (and perhaps other tests too; it's not always easy to work out precisely what she did at school because her reports are a bit variable...) She is finding it very stressful; not because she can't do it, but because she can. In fact, I am increasingly concerned that it is actively working against her enjoying learning to read. She gets very anxious about whether she has prepared well enough or long enough for the test. And she also gets upset if she feels the tests are boring and too easy. She's even upset for her friends if they don't get it all right: she worries about them and they are clearly upset if they are evidently not getting things all right.

And she is 6, for Pete's sake! S and I may be slightly pushy parents but we don't bang on about the need to get full marks in crappy spelling tests all the time, for sure. Right now, in fact, we spend much more time trying to say that the tests aren't important and she is doing fine, enjoying reading and learning to read more. I can't remember being 6 very well at all, but I'm pretty sure that there wasn't such an emphasis in the school on these kinds of quantifiable 'learning outcomes'. It's not the teachers' fault (her teacher is excellent and is very perceptive); it's not the school's fault (we're very happy with it). But something has gone wrong in the way we have chosen to assess schools. The method of evaluation has determined an unfortunately teleological method and it seems to be having negative psychological (and, I suspect, educational) effects.