International Intelligencer

Issue 3 and the Evolution of International Intelligencer

2007-10-31T21:30:00.000-07:00

The third issue of International Intelligencer has been posted and I am proud to say, it is the best to date. In other exciting news, the project has come under new direction with two Oberlin College students, Sam Cassanos and Claudio Guler, who are working hard to get the new issue out. The name of the journal has also been changed to International Dialogue and will be undergoing cosmetic changes as well. The new blog can be viewed at www.intdial.blogspot.com and will be updated regularly with commentary, links, video clips, etc.

Interview with Professor John Mueller by Brian Pugh

2007-10-31T20:45:00.000-07:00

John Mueller is the Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center of Ohio State University. His latest book, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them, was deemed “accurate, timely and necessary,” by the New York Times Sunday Book Review. The following interview was conducted by Brian Pugh and the views presented do not necessarily reflect those of anyone involved with the International Intelligencer.

Q: Some people argue that one of the reasons we have not had a terrorist attack in the US in more than five years is that American Muslims are well integrated and therefore are less likely to sympathize with radicals. There is considerable bitterness among Muslims in Europe, symbolized by the 2005 riots in France. Would you say that in the long run Europe is in greater danger of al-Qaeda terrorism?

A: The 9/11 hijackers stayed away from the Muslim community because that is the lamppost under which the FBI is looking for its lost keys.

If you were doing something big-planning for the next big attack, you would stay away from the Muslim community. The situation in France is not the same. They rioted because they were discriminated against. They wanted to join society. The French case is evidence that terrorism is not prevalent. If terrorism is so easy to do and there are all these discontented Muslims, why isn't there terrorism in France?

Q: Would you agree with the argument that CIA veteran Michael Scheuer made in the book, Imperial Hubris, that al-Qeada's main grievance is with Western involvement in the Muslim world and the belief that there is a systematic effort to oppress Muslims?

A: Yes. The main thing is they don't like American foreign policy in the Middle East. It is what we do, not who we are. The reporter Jim Fallows for the Atlantic Monthly said that there may be security specialists who do not think this, but he hasn't met one yet. However, I would disagree with Schuerer on some things.

Q: Like his call for the "Shermanesque" total war?

A: And that the bodies would be stacked like cord wood. His argument that our survival is at stake-I disagree strongly with that.

Q: Last year John Mearsheimer, from the University of Chicago, and the Academic Dean of the Kennedy School of Government, Stephen Walt, wrote a working paper on the Israel lobby's influence on American foreign policy that was very controversial. Would you count the "Israel lobby" as part of what you call the "terrorism industry" which exploits national security fears in the US?

A: One thing they say fairly strongly is that the Iraq War would not have taken place without the Israel lobby. That doesn't seem clear to me at all. It seems that the Iraq War could have happened without it, though the lobby contributed. I think the environment after 9/11 played a much bigger role. If you were in favor of the Iraq war, you would use 9/11 as a pretext. In as much as the Israel Lobby was for the war, they used it. With anything like 9/11, people who have agendas will use it. They would be crazy not too.

Q: When it comes to domestic policy, there are rival interest groups, like labor unions and business, that counteract each other. Is there anything like that in terms of foreign policy? Are they are any natural allies against the terrorism industry?

A: There may be. I'm trying to find them. I'm going to talk to a group associated with FEMA. I thought I would be walking into the lion's den, but someone told me that the FEMA people are outraged by what they think of as the wasting money on terrorism instead of disaster preparation. At least in theory, the Democrats, because the terrorism issue is bad for them. The greater the public anxiety about terrorism, the worse their electoral prospects are. I've also found a lot of people agree with me and say "I'm glad you said this," especially people that fly a lot, and economists, but I'm not sure if that's a natural constituency or not.

In 2004, Kerry and Bush both accidentally said something right about terrorism before backing away from their statements. Kerry said he wanted to get it back to where it was before 9/11, where terrorists are not the focus of our lives. Bush said something similar and the campaigns jumped all over each other for these statements. Zbigniew Brezinski is the most influential person to speak out on this. Some people in the press have done some things. After the FBI arrested alleged al-Qaeda terrorists in Miami, Richard Cohen in the Washington Post said, "come on, these guys are a bunch of lunies." They said they were going to launch a ground offensive against the US. They might have been dangerous, but to take them seriously as a threat to the US is ridiculous.

Q: If terrorism has been overblown, what is the greatest threat facing the United States? Nuclear proliferation? Global Warming?

A: Nothing right now is much of a threat. There are problems, but no threats. Probably the biggest is China trying to get Taiwan back. Certainly, keeping control over the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a good idea. I don't see anything I would call a threat, there are problems and potential problems. Global warming is something I would see as worth spending time on and trying to get a policy handle on. It's really tricky. 60 Minutes said that to do it seriously, you have to think about nuclear power. If you do everything possible in the US and it's whiped out by new cars in India, then you are just spinning your wheels. Before spending a lot of money and effort, those things should be nailed down as much as possible. Gregg Easterbook has written about this: with human ingenuity, technology has a way of compensating. If the incentives are right, people will adapt.

Q: Changing gears a little, why isn't there more international conflict? Samuel Huntington predicted a "Clash of Civilizations," John Mearsheimer wrote an essay, "Back to the Future", where Europe would suffer instability after the Cold War and that France and Germany would once again become geopolitical rivals, and Noam Chomsky predicted that America and other industrial countries would become locked in great power-style competition. Why haven't these theories been realized?

A: They're wrong. The whole idea that Germany or Japan would naturally want to become nuclear powers never struck me as convincing. What they want is to be rich and fat and wouldn't get nuclear weapons unless they were threatened. There aren't that many international wars. There have been civil wars, but those have mostly come to an end without new ones popping back up. Depending on definitions, the only war going on in the world right now is in Iraq. That isn't to say a lot bad things aren't going on like in the Sudan. Ethnic cleansing is not war, though it may be worse than it. Because one bad thing goes away they all don't go away. As my editor put it, "John, you maybe right, but I still have faith in my fellow man."

Compensatory Injustice: A Critique of Affirmative Action in India by Angad Singh

2007-10-31T20:41:00.000-07:00

Caste politics is an extremely divisive issue in India, and with good reason. Historically, untouchable castes were forbidden from entering the temples in which the general populous worshiped, were prohibited from obtaining water from the community well, and if even their shadow came across that of a Brahmin, the latter would have to purify himself. Many of these untouchables, or dalits as they are more commonly known, were largely forbidden entrance into schools and jobs and forced into menial labor thereby perpetuating a cycle of poverty.

In recent times, however, it is not entirely clear to me how entrenched caste is. It is my impression, which is by no means fact, that caste discrimination is largely absent in more cosmopolitan areas, such as large cities. However, I do not doubt that it is prevalent in many rural areas. One of the most important programs the Indian government has put in place to redress caste injustice is affirmative action, or the reservation system.

Affirmative action in India has a long history, dating back to British rule. Since the British Raj, a total of 22.5% of all seats in government service (the Indian Civil Service) and government run education, are reserved for untouchable castes and tribes. This quota has been codified in India’s Constitution and is required by law. In 1990, prime minister VP Singh broadened these quotas, recommended by the Mandal Commission, to include what are known as other backward classes (OBCs), and demanded that 27% of government seats be allotted to them, on top of the 22.5% allotted to dalits and scheduled tribes, thereby mandating that 49.5% of all government seats in the civil service and state education be reserved for certain types of historically discriminated castes. Since that time, the extended quotas have been hotly debated and many demonstrations have broken out both for and against reservations. The issue has been so emotional that several students in the past have resorted to self-immolation in protest of the reservation system.

While there needs to be a redress of caste discrimination, these government mandated quotas go to far and are a ham-handed approach to a nuanced problem. Firstly, isn’t it bizarre that in order to redress the problems of societal caste discrimination, the government would institutionalize such discrimination? It seems unfair to hold the caste of a member of a “forward” caste against him or her. This seems contradictory and this institutionalization of caste only makes caste a more salient factor in societal relations and enflames passions as is obvious by pro and anti reservation demonstrations.

Also, there is evidence to suggest that in many cases, people of lower caste who are ranked lower in the academic ladder than a higher caste get preference for admittance into higher-level government funded education. Arun Shourie, an Indian politician and journalist, has claimed that in many instances, lower caste candidates get accepted with much lower academic standing and entrance exam scores than more meritorious candidates of “forward” castes. Such a policy will no doubt tend to dilute the academic quality of India’s institutes of higher learning.

However, the government is intent on extending these reservations. In fact, the central government amended the Constitution in 2005 to pave the way for government legislation mandating state schools to adopt the extra 27% quota for OBCs and the amendment explicitly says the government can force private schools to obey this quota as well.

The claim that reservations dilute intellectual standards in schools is something even the government agrees with. Witness the Central Educational Institutions (Reservations in Admission) Act of 2006 that was enabled by the 93^rd amendment to the Constitution as discussed above. The Reservations in Admissions Act demands that higher education state funded schools enact the 27% quota for OBCs yet explicitly exempts certain “institutions of excellence, research institutions, institutions of national and strategic importance” such as the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology, the National Brain Research Centre, and others. While the law explicitly does not state why these institutions are exempt from the OBC quota, the fact that these institutions are deemed of national and strategic importance imply that personnel in these places ought to be India’s best and brightest. By excluding certain institutions, the government implicitly acknowledges that the quota system leads to greater intellectual mediocrity yet are still adamant in expanding the system into premier IT and medical universities.

This is not to say that all members of backwards castes do not perform as well as those from forward classes, however, it seems in general that due to the lack of candidates from backward castes, government bureaucrats are forced to accept lower ranking members of “backward” castes and that often means “backward” caste candidates of lower academic rank. On the other side, reservations means that “forward” caste candidates have to compete more rigorously as there are fewer available seats.

The problem ought to be redressed at the primary school level. Insofar as education is essential toward social mobility, the Indian government ought to reform primary school education. To my knowledge, the higher-level state universities in India are quite good while primary school is in terrible shape, an unfortunate circumstance. That is why reform at this level is needed. Perhaps this can be done through government, yet if not, a more market-oriented approach is needed where government subsidizes educational entrepreneurs in starting a private school. Once competition in this sector grows, tuition fees will likely decrease and for those who still cannot afford it, government ought to give vouchers that will promote school choice for poverty stricken families so they can choose to send their children to either agricultural or vocational schools to immediately improve economic conditions, or if possible, send them to a school where English, economics, and IT are emphasized, admittance being dependant on merit, of course.

By abandoning the inefficient reservations system and focusing on basic education and perhaps anti-poverty programs, the government can help redress not only the problem of poverty due to caste discrimination, but poverty in general insofar as this pernicious inequality cuts across caste lines.

One and the Same: Functional Chaos in Rome and Beyond by Claudio Guler

2007-10-31T20:39:00.000-07:00

Over spring break, I had the opportunity to visit my sister in Rome. The call for new articles for our next issue had come in shortly before break and I thought it would be interesting to write on something I observed while there. But what, if anything, does life in Rome have to do with international politics?

For the EU, Rome has many associations. It was there that over half a century ago the treaty that gave birth to the concept of a united Europe was signed. This connection is unambiguous. But in the spirit of Italian uncertainty, I wanted to find something more abstract. How else could Rome relate? Could I discover a more distant connection? It turns out the writing was on the wall.

Life in Rome – and for that matter in much of Italy – is chaotic and often exercised in an ad hoc fashion. Anarchy is too harsh a word to describe the situation, but allusions to its presence can be observed. As both a student of international relations and a citizen of Italy, Rome’s modus operandi is too difficult for me to rationally comprehend in some standard model of organization. There are simply too many unstructured and unexpected events occurring simultaneously. The only manner in which I can explain its continuing existence and fortitude is as functional chaos – a system lacking in ordained rationale.

That which can be accomplished in most of the western world in a few simple steps almost always requires a few supplemental ones in Rome. Where in most developed societies, interactions among individuals are well defined and regulated by the law, in Rome almost everything is negotiable. There, like on the international stage, the law is often more nominal than practical. I have observed this most noticeably in two realms: domestic politics and traffic relations.

Rome, the home of Italian politics is an epicenter of political confusion. Political scientists have diagnosed Italy with polarized pluralism. Under such a system, there exist too many splinter parties along a political spectrum. In order to retain power, each party plays to its own constituency and refuses compromise. The result is political gridlock. Laws are negotiated and passed, however, their binding quality – not to mention their enforcement – is almost always in question. Therefore, if none of your neighbors are adhering to them, why should you encumber yourself? This is exemplified by what in Italy is called l’evasione fiscale or fiscal tax evasion. Although no one knows precisely, it is estimated that more than 50% of anticipated taxes are not collected.

Similarly, traffic relations in Rome work much in the same manner. For example, certain red lights must be observed, while others can be considered optional. This appears extremely dangerous, but where order doesn’t prevail, situational awareness does.

On my last day in Rome, unannounced protests shut down a large portion of the city’s transportation network. Since buses were no longer a good option, I opted for a taxi. I found a police officer and asked him where I could find one. His colloquial response was as follows: “Look…there is one now unloading some passengers. He isn’t supposed to pick you up on the side of the street like this, but if you can get him to do it, hop in.” Unfortunately by the time I had gotten to the taxi he had already driven off. But never mind the taxi, wasn’t that a police officer that just recommended me to break the law?!

Examples of functional chaos can be witnessed on a daily basis in the international arena. Each time a state acts in defiance of international law it is by definition functioning outside a system of ordained rationale. This happens to come about quite often. There is no supranational governing authority and as a result, functional chaos has stepped in to fill the void.

Therefore, Rome, much like the international arena, is fundamentally governed by functional chaos. It appears to be reasonably self-regulating. In both spheres there exist laws and customs – both written, as well as unwritten – yet in the end, the individual’s or the state’s will reigns supreme. That which restricts each entity and forces it to conform is the existence of the other and its own will.

This must all seem horribly pessimistic. But, there is after all something rather reassuring about this condition. Although it takes some time to get used to functional chaos (I often need to assimilate when returning to Italy), it is in the end – well, functional. With a little patience and some nonchalance, it can be endured and out of it grows an exciting and spontaneous society unmatched in utilitarian novelty.

Thus, if we hold true that both Rome and the international arena are fundamentally governed by functional chaos, and, we consider Rome to be a successful example of permanence, then the prospects for the future of international society appear encouraging. Hopefully we will continue to codify our interactions and adhere to our agreements, but until then, Rome may provide a relevant working model.

Chessmaster Turns to Politics by Andrew Brooks

2007-10-31T20:31:00.000-07:00

Throughout his brilliant professional chess career, Russian Garry Kasparov has involved himself in Soviet and Russian politics. Since his retirement in 2005 from the World Chess Federation, the former World Champion has stepped into the international spotlight. While his celebrity has come from his abilities in the game of chess and not from his political message, he stands to become an influential figure in Russia’s future. His arrest in April of this year has created controversy, bringing Russian human rights and free speech abuses to the fore of international news.

His accomplishments in chess are vast. After becoming a Grand Master at the age of only 17, he catapulted into highest circles of world chess, winning the title of World Champion five years later at the age of 22. The youngest World Champion in history, he also increased his rating to become the highest rated player in the world at the age of 23. He is the only player to have earned a rating higher than that of Bobby Fischer, chess champion in exile and American Cold War chess hero. This development came in 1990, and, though Kasparov left the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) later that year, was a point of Soviet pride in the final years before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kasparov is also well-known for his victory in 1996 over Deep Blue, IBM’s super-computer chess machine, and subsequent loss to the smarter Deeper Blue in 1997. He lost the title of World Champion to fellow Russian Vladmir Kramnik in 2000, but kept his position as highest rated in the world until his retirement in 2005. He cited an inclination towards writing and Russian politics, which he saw as “misguided.”

Kasparov began his political participation in 1984, when he joined the CPSU. By 1987, he was elected to the Central Committee of the Komsomol, or “Communist Union of Youth.” Throughout the 1990s, Kasparov involved himself in the Russian democracy movement. After leaving the CPSU in 1990, he helped create the Democratic Party of Russia. Three years later, he helped create a coalition of parties advocating democracy, called the “Choice of Russia” bloc. In 1996, Kasparov campaigned for Boris Yeltsin, former Russian president.

While part of his record is pro-democratic, his more recent political involvement and overall political participation is mixed. His involvement with the “The Other Russia” coalition has drawn criticism from those who accuse the coalition of including parties like the National Bolshevik Party and the Workers’ Party, who oppose the democratically elected government. Other accusations assert that the coalition contains fascist, nationalist, and far-left elements. He has faced personal criticism and occasional violence for his political leanings, including eggs thrown by Putin supporters, and a blow to the head with a chessboard by a Russian who disagreed with him.

In Russian political circles, Kasparov has gained the title of gadfly during Russia’s post-Soviet period, and particularly during the years after his retirement from chess in 2005. Often followed by the Federal Security Service (FSB), Kasparov has noted that he is under suspicion of “extremist activity.” He once complained, “I don't even understand what the G8 means because the G7 stood for seven great democracies, which Russia is not.” In late 2006 and in March of 2007, he helped organize a string of demonstrations opposing President Putin and St. Petersburg Governor Valentina Matviyenko’s policies. In mid-April he was arrested on his way to a rally in Moscow, briefly held by police, and fined the equivalent of approximately 40 US dollars. “Today, the mask came off the Putin police state,” he said. “They are violating the Constitution. It's obvious the regime is nervous and unstable if this is how they react to a nonviolent march.”

While Kasparov himself was not injured in the event, many others, some elderly, were beaten, arrested, and interrogated, drawing attention from all major international media. The event allowed Kasparov to use his celebrity to bring criticism of Putin’s policies affecting free speech and to win international legitimacy for Russia’s anti-Putin democracy movement. Kasparov has said that there is a national debate on democracy and free society and that he and those Russians who advocate democracy are winning. While Russian officials would like to keep Kasparov and his political allies muzzled, and have taken steps to do so, Kasparov has vowed to continue raising eyebrows.

The Mecca Agreement in a Regional Context by Sam Cassanos

2007-10-31T20:19:00.000-07:00

Over a year has passed since the watershed Palestinian Authority (PA) parliamentary elections that brought Hamas to power. The sources of Hamas’ success, often wrongly explained in America as an expression of the Palestinian people’s opposition to the two-state solution, was actually attributable to the group’s pragmatic evolution. Hamas was able to exploit Fateh’s disunity, reputation for corruption, and inability to negotiate independence in a victory that has possibly weakened commitments within Hamas to its founding ideology.

However, after forming a government, Hamas fell victim to the same international forces that have drained Fateh of its credibility. The United States and the European Union requested that the government officially adopt the PLO’s platform (unilateral recognition of Israel, obey past PLO-Israel agreements, and adhere non-violence) before it could receive aid or partake in diplomatic relations.

After a year of deprivation and violence, between both Hamas and Fateh and with Israel, a unity government finally formed this past February with the help of Saudi Arabia’s mediation. This so-called Mecca Agreement grants Hamas nine ministers, to Fateh’s six, in a new cabinet that will staff the coveted interior, finance, and foreign ministerial portfolios with independents. The agreement also obliges Hamas to respect past PLO-Israel accords. These conditions are favorable to Hamas, and now thanks to a nonpartisan Saudi aid and renewed US and EU donations to Fateh ministries, Hamas will be the majority party in an operational new government. On top of that, it resisted international pressures and ultimately only had to publicly acknowledge what it had already done: decided to work within the institutions of the Palestinian Authority.

The Mecca Agreement is a good place to start in order to examine the regional implications of Hamas’ victory. While the most popular lens used to explain current Middle Eastern politics focuses on an allegedly expanding transnational Iranian influence, or a developing “Shia crescent,” the future of American imperialism in the region is probably just as much if not more threatened by the example of Hamas, a party with its origins in the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) that was able to unseat a US-Israeli ally, Fateh, in a democratic election. A similar situation exists across the border in Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood holds 88 out of 454 seats in the parliament. The MB bloc, while too small to pass legislation, has according to an article in Middle East Report made a habit of “proactive study of political issues and use of parliamentary procedure to hold the government’s feet to the fire” thus transforming the group into “the nation’s only real political party.” This is occurring at time when the National Democratic Party (NDP), and the government it dominates, have become profoundly alienated from the Egyptian people. In one dramatic example, the government could only safely distribute frozen chickens to the homeless victims of a fire by dispatching them over a ten-foot gate.

The NDP’s internal problems should be coupled in an analysis with their foreign policy. When these elements are looked at together, they expose the precariousness of the NDP and American power in the Middle East. Cairo makes itself useful to the US by serving as an interlocutor for it and Arab governments. Both the US and Egypt believe that as the first Arab state to make peace with Israel and as a state that saw its lifeline extended by seeking rapprochement with Jerusalem and Washington, Egypt can guide and encourage other nations to follow its example. Furthermore, as a negotiator in intra-Arab disputes, Egypt can promote US interests. However, over the past year Egyptian mediation has failed to put an end to internal Palestinian violence, produce a PA government acceptable to the US and Israel, or free the Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, who was captured by Palestinian militants last June. The NDP has persistently warned the US that it must do more to acknowledge Palestinian rights and assuage their grievances or face an intensifying regional instability. But this is not the role that the US wants its client to play. In short the emergence of Hamas and the Egyptian MB as viable parliamentary candidates is actively devaluing the NDP as an American ally.

Last year’s PA elections set off a chain of events that diminished Egyptian and Jordanian efficacy as mediators but enhanced Saudi Arabia’s international influence. The political impasse between Hamas and Fateh following the elections and the inflated fears of Iranian expansion into the Levant-Middle East drew Saudi Arabia further into Palestinian politics. Riyadh proved capable of using its wealth and influence to create a PA government that did not meet the expectations of the US, EU, or Israel but which the former two are forced to tolerate and work with albeit in a qualified way. Thus a declining American hegemony, marked by the degeneration of Fateh and the NDP, has allowed the Saudi’s increased leverage in the Levant.

This new influence extends not just over other Arabs but to the United States as well. As the only intermediary able to unify Fateh and Hamas, Saudi Arabia’s political goals in Palestine cannot be easily dismissed or opposed by anyone. Furthermore, as concern grows over Iranian influence projected through Hezbollah, the Iraqi Shia, and Hamas, Saudi Arabia’s image in Israel has been revised. For the reasons the kingdom was feared, its oil wealth, substantial military spending, Islamist identity, and close relationship with America, Saudi Arabia now appears as a useful ally against Iranian power.

In the wake of Hamas’ victory, when Iranian donations to the controversial new government received widespread media attention, conventional thinking incorporated these events into a pre-existing narrative of Iran’s regional ascendancy. But as with much of the commentary on the “Iranian threat” the fear of a Hamas-Iran alliance was overblown and the election and the events that followed weakened America’s hegemony in the region for reasons that have little to do with Iran. As of right now, the Palestinian-Saudi relationship dwarfs in monetary value and political import any relationship between Hamas and Tehran. What has happened in Palestine mirrors developments in Egypt.

America’s allies have spoiled their reputations and Islamist parties, by moving towards the center and by practicing honest government, are able to capitalize on these circumstances. At the risk of instability and state breakdown, these forces will have to be accommodated. That Hamas and the MB in Egypt have entered democratic process is of inestimable value to the Palestinians, Egyptians, and even to the United States. Their experiences as parliamentarians will prepare them with necessary skills in governance, promote political moderation, deepen their relationships with civil society, and introduce them to the contours of international politics. If the US insists that its allies remain in power and the Islamists be marginalized, the consequence is an erosion of the current officialdom and the institutions that can prepare the region and the world for a democratic co-existence of secular and religious parties.

The Modern Kurdistan by Ali Kurdistani

2007-10-31T18:20:00.000-07:00

For some of you, the title of this article may seem strange as it is not clear what “the modern Kurdistan” means exactly. Kurdistan may not seem modern because of two reasons: first, the Kurds do not have an independent state yet, Second, should a completely independent Kurdish state include parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran or only include Iraqi Kurdistan, the region that Iraqi Kurds currently control and are therefore more independent than other Kurds in the Middle East?

The history of the Kurdish people is complex. The big powers of the early 20th century divided the Kurds and their land among four Middle Eastern states, Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. The lives of those Kurds were shaped under the rules of those states and even their thought and culture was influenced by Persian, Turkish, and Arabic influences in those countries in which they are still living in today.

Because of dividing the Kurdish people among those states, the Kurds living under foreign governments with hostile policies against the Kurds, could not unite and work together to get their own rights as the people of other Middle Eastern nations did.
In my view, the modern Kurdistan means the current Iraqi Kurdistan and this region, in my view, will determine the future of the Kurds in the Middle East.
Since the Iraq War, Iraqi Kurdistan has made progress in different aspects and those political and economic changes that have happened and are happening in Iraqi Kurdistan are also influencing other Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Syria.

Since Saddam's regime has been removed from power, the Kurdish issue has become an important national and international political issue as more and more people around the world are focusing on what is going on in Iraqi Kurdistan.
The Kurdistan regional government (KRG) within Iraq is the only Kurdish government in the Middle East and in the world as it represents the Kurdish voice and Kurdish interests. The KRG does not only represent the Kurds within Iraq, but it also represents Kurds worldwide although it cannot and has no right to interfere in regional states that contain a Kurdish population.

Sometimes, those regional states of Turkey, Syria, and Iran allege that Kurds are interfering in their internal affairs and making problems for them but this is untrue, because these governments have always made and continue to make problems for the Kurds within their countries and for the Kurds in Iraq as well.

It is known around the world that the Kurds do not have their own independent state yet but they do have the Kurdish independent government within Iraq. It's true that this government is not one-hundred percent independent, but it’s a Kurdish government representing Kurdish rights and interests, and therefore it's natural if the KRG and the Kurds within Iraq help the Kurdish people worldwide, as all states and governments around the world help their own people everywhere.

The Kurdish situation is really different than any other issue in the region because the Kurds do not have an independent state yet, and therefore Kurds need to help each other. The Kurdish situation is like the Jewish situation in the early 20th century. Just as Jews around the world united and helped each other to establish their own independent state, Kurds ought to do the same.

The Kurdish people and government of Iraqi Kurdistan are helping the Kurds in the region directly and indirectly, since in the last few years, many Kurdish individuals and families from Iran, Syria, and Turkey have moved to Iraqi Kurdistan and are continuing to do so, especially after Saddam’s removal. Those Kurds are living, working, and studying in Kurdish homes, Kurdish jobs, and Kurdish schools under native Kurdish rule.

This migration is happening after Saddam's removal because during his rule, the Kurds within Iraq and the Middle East could not help each other and collaborate because of the hostile rogue state policies against the Kurds. Due to these policies, the Kurdish people within Iraq and other regional states could not understand each other’s problems. For example, Kurds within Iraq had little relations with the Kurds in Turkey except for a few individuals, they were not knowledgeable and familiar about the Kurdish question within Turkey and vice versa.
I have met some Kurds from Turkey who have no knowledge of what Saddam did against the Kurdish people in the town of Halabja in 1988 (Saddam attacked Halabja with chemical weapons killing many people). This lack of understanding was also true of Kurds in Iran and Syria.

Another major obstacle for Kurds to understand their mutual problems in the Middle East is the presence of different Kurdish written and oral dialects. For example, the Kurds of Turkey and Syria write with a Latin alphabet and speak in what is called the Kurmanji dialect, but the Kurds in Iraq and Iran write with the Arabic alphabet and speak in the Sorani dialect, therefore it is really difficult for Kurds to understand each other if they live in different countries.
But I as I mentioned before, many Kurds from Iran, Syria, and Turkey have moved into Iraqi Kurdistan after the beginning of the Iraq War and as a result of employment at governmental and non-governmental institutions, Kurds are now learning each other’s dialects and are developing a mutual understanding and social cohesion.

Iraqi Kurdistan has become the headquarters of Kurdish national and political movements and Kurdish opposition parties from Iran, Syria, and Turkey have offices in Iraqi Kurdistan. These parties are getting support from Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Most of the Kurdish people within Iran, Syria, and Turkey are sympathetic to the Kurdistan regional government and its leaders despite the presence of their own political parties and leaders. But now that Iraqi Kurdistan is becoming the general Kurdish headquarters and its leaders are becoming the leaders of the Kurds in the Middle East in general, the modern Kurdistan is unifying Kurdish political, security, and economic projects in the Middle East.
In my view, without the support of the West, and especially the American people and government, a modern Kurdistan will not be a success in terms of economic, security, cultural and educational factors.

The modern Kurdistan still needs a lot of changes and more modernization and this will not happen without the knowledge of experience. The Kurds need a lot of guidance which they have to take from modernized Western countries to further modernize the Kurdish political, economic, educational and legal institutions.

One has to realize an important point: a modern Kurdistan will be the most pro-American country in the Middle East, and the Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan will be the best friends of the American and European people.

As a Kurd from Iraqi Kurdistan, I would recommend that Kurdish young free thinkers should work with American free thinkers to promote modernization and global values in the modern Kurdistan. And in other ways the modern Kurdistan needs more internationalization in all aspects especially in terms of education to educate the new Kurdish generation on international laws, international relations, and international ideas.

A True Test for Democracy: Turks Fear of a Fifth Military Coup by Nigar Hacizade

2007-10-31T18:08:00.000-07:00

Turkey is a secular country, states the Turkish Constitution, which is one of the only two in the world to mention secularism as a principle. Indeed, the notion of separating the affairs of the state and religion has been of primary concern to the ruling elite of Turkey since the Republic’s foundation in 1923. Trying to isolate the new country from the old Ottoman mentality, which proved itself to be anti-modern, Turkish politicians executed a series of reforms, ranging from giving suffrage to women to changing the dress code, abandoning the Islamic calendar and the Arabic alphabet, the abolishment of the Caliphate and so on. It is highly debatable whether these reforms were understood, welcomed or internalized by the majority of the people. In any case, they were top-down and quite harsh in their implementation, evidenced in the hanging of dozens of people for wearing the traditional fez or turban instead of the Western hat.

Founded by Kemal Ataturk, himself a revolutionary soldier, Turkey switched to a multi-party system in 1945 (again, in a top-down decision), but the army could not tolerate the Democratic Party which was elected for a second round, and intervened with a coup d’Etat in 1960. The Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Finance were executed.

47 years have passed since then. In the meantime, Turkey witnessed three more military interventions; in 1971, 1980 and 1997. While only the year 1980 witnessed thousands of deaths and more asylum seekers, arrests, torture and bans on freedom of speech than the other times, the “post-modern coup” in 1997, in which the army forced the Islamic-inclined Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign and shut his party down through the constitutional court, was quite unexpected. In any case, the following decade saw enough optimism that people became confident they would not have to face another coup. After all, Turkey had a promising future as one of the fastest growing economies in the world, passing its European Union accession laws one by one. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP in its Turkish acronym), itself ruled by a former ally of Erbakan, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, naturally had its controversies, but in certain aspects –including the process of EU candidacy- Turkey was doing better than ever. The EU was even pushing for diminishing the role of the army in Turkish politics for a more democratic setting. Well, it turned out the army had no such intentions.

Around midnight On Friday April 27^th 2007, the day the Parliament held presidential elections, the General Staff issued a statement on its official website. Voicing their concerns about where the country is headed, the authorities warned the government about insisting on its controversial presidential candidate as well as for its “reactionary activities”, firmly stating that as the permanent guardian of the Republican values, the army would not allow for the secular structure of the Turkish Republic to ever be altered. "The Turkish armed forces are against those debates... and will display their position and attitudes when it becomes necessary. No-one should doubt that," the statement said. The next day, the government’s representative appeared on TV. In his statement, he criticized an intervention and stated that such a move can do nothing but damage democracy and manipulate the constitutional court. The court needed to make a decision in the following days on whether the presidential elections were valid or not. On Sunday April 29^th 2007, around 1 million people were on the streets of Istanbul in a follow-up demonstration to the one in Ankara held the week before. The demonstrators wanted to voice their support for the secular values of the Republic against the ruling AKP and Erdogan, which they believe, are still invested in Islamic values and have not genuinely reformed, as they claim.

The tension between “the secularists” and “the Islamists” has been turned into a crisis by the army. According to some, the General Staff timed its statement in a way that would make the protesters look like they are in support of a military intervention. While the demonstrators were quite diverse in age, gender and background, middle-class, “modern,” “white” Turks constituted a vast majority. On the one hand, some carried banners that read “Neither sharia nor a coup; we want democracy in Turkey.” On the other hand, the speakers refrained from condemning an intervention, like the government did, implying a coup would not have consequences as vital as if the country is to be ruled by pro-Sharia Islamists.

Is the secular structure of the country really in danger? The answer to this question has been dividing the country, creating a degree of polarization unseen since 1980. Objectively speaking, one thing is certain: the ruling party has not done anything illegitimate so far. They have come to power, took the majority of the seats in Parliament, and proposed their presidential candidate legitimately. In fact, even if it is claimed that the Constitution, the make-up of the Parliament or the methods for presidential elections are flawed, these are hardly the fault of the AKP. If anything, it should be remembered that Turkey is still using the constitution imposed by the military regime after the last coup in 1980. The current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who is a staunch defender of Kemalism and secularism, has been elected under the same law. The question arises: why did the Republican People’s Party (the leading opposition party; CHP in its Turkish acronym) refuse to be present at the parliament during the elections, and later sued AKP for holding the elections despite their absence?

For one thing, the candidate’s –Abdullah Gul, current Foreign Minister- wife wears a headscarf. The presidency is a highly ceremonial position in the Turkish system, but being a post Ataturk once held, it is also highly symbolic. For many, a first lady with a headscarf is unthinkable. It is viewed as a symbol of political Islam. This would be against every ideal the Republic stands for, and should be avoided, even if a military coup is the only way to do so. For a country that is 99% Muslim, that is almost weird, but Turkey is a weird country.

The other, less superficial reason is that Republicanism is more than an ideology in Turkey; it is a way of living. For the elite class in Turkey which for decades has been trying to align itself with Europe and “Europeanness”, while looking down upon Turkey’s Middle-Eastern and post-Soviet neighbors, this lifestyle is in danger. For years the country has been ruled either by or under the shadow of the army, the strongest defender of this way of life. From the day AKP won the majority of the votes in 2003 becoming the single ruling party after a decade of unsuccessful coalition governments, this ruling elite has been alerted. Appealing to the “less European” and claiming to blend a degree of nationalism, conservatism but also democratic ideals, AKP was going to be only the second government in the history of the Republic to ever finish its term as scheduled, without early elections or intervention, had this crisis not happened. What consequences this would have had; we will never know.

On Wednesday, May 2^nd, the constitutional court ruled against the presidential vote. It is obvious that the decision was under the influence of the army and that it was a political and not a legal one. What divides people is that while the secularists claim this is “for the best, even if influenced”, the government and its supporters have called the decision “a blow on democracy.”

Now the country is getting ready to vote in the early elections in July, which the Prime Minister Erdogan announced even before the court’s decision. Everyone, including members of AKP, Gul himself, the opposition, bureaucrats and journalists, came to a consensus that bowing to the “people’s will” was the only solution to get the country out of this crisis. A number of constitutional changes are also in order, including having the President elected by the people and changing the make-up of the Parliament to allow for more opposition parties to be represented.

While so many secularists voice their discontent with the opposition and mainly CHP, whose only card to play is the secularism one, they see no other option but to vote for one of them; anything to get rid of AKP and the possibility of a first lady wearing a head scarf. They are afraid that the Islamist-rooted party might try and intervene in what they wear, what they drink, or how they live. Others see this fear as ungrounded, and explain how a more conservative Turkey and a coup will both damage the country. The Turkish economy is growing at an almost unstoppable rate, and pays its foreign debt thanks to the foreign investment which annually brings $30 billion to the country. Either of the options will halt this progression and take the country back in time. AKP is confident it will come out of the elections as strong as before, while two of the three main opposition parties that are in the center-right are preparing to merge before the elections to ensure more votes.

It should be obvious to anyone that there is absolutely no way Turkey could benefit from another military coup. It never has. Especially those who have experienced the destructiveness of the former interventions should urge the supporters of such an intervention to come to their senses. Some foreign commentators have stated that Turkish democracy might even come out of this test stronger than before. One question remains though: what will the Army do if AKP comes through in the July elections or if Gul is elected president by the people? Will it risk everything it has achieved in the last 20 years to protect its hegemony, or will it finally accept that democracy means accepting those who think differently? The latter is what Turkey needs more than anything right now.

A New Dynamic: Women Leaders Around the World by Sophia Yan

2007-10-31T17:53:00.000-07:00

Although traditional gender roles have been whittled down over the years, the political arena is often still considered a boy’s game, a male’s playing field. Female political leaders continue to face issues of inequality and sexism, facing not only expected opposition in office, but also having to field gender issues. Despite this, there is a growing number of strong women in high-profile leadership roles, as evidenced by the Council of Women World Leaders and its members’ successful offices.

While America’s 2008 presidential election has been called the most expensive election in history by both politicians and the media, estimated at $1 billion, things have not been all too different overseas. Socialist presidential candidate Marie-Ségolène Royal for France’s 2007 election argued with one of her top advisors, the party’s chief economic expert, Eric Besson, about the estimated campaign costs of €35 billion. Besson resigned, a move interpreted by both the press and the public as a refusal to recognize just how much Royal’s race would cost French taxpayers. Last month, Besson published a book, entitled Qui connaît Madame Royal? (Who knows Mrs. Royal?), publicly expressing his lack of support for Royal, condemning her and her campaign for already negatively affecting the very people she claims to support and represent.

Although an article published in the popular weekly magazine Paris Match hinted at Royal’s possible candidacy, her rise was still viewed with surprise by the public eye. However, her intentions only became clear after publishing the opening chapters of her political manifesto, which coincided with the launch of a heavily Internet-based electoral campaign in which she allowed her supporters to contribute by helping her finish the book.

According to Royal, she restrained from rallying her candidacy because of the sexist opposition she knew would arise; the situation would have been different had she been male. Reading between the lines, Royal was saying: It is possible that Besson would have not objected to a campaign of €35 billion, and it is possible that the French media, rather than noting Royal’s vamped-up wardrobe as of late and newly minted teeth from a few trips to the orthodontist, would be more focused on her ideas for reform.

“French women politicians perceive male domination as a fact of life. Real power is where the men are,” wrote Niilo Kauppi from the University of Helsinki in the European Journal of Women’s Studies. France’s International Women’s Day attracts female activists with slogans like “There isn’t a gene for housework,” also a popular motto on International Labor Day. These cries have not struck enough of a chord with the existing government; most support centers for women, victims of domestic abuse, and sexual violence are independent clinics rather than state-owned. Unlike her opponent, the French conservative party’s (UMP) candidate Nicolas Sarkozy, Royal has drawn a delicate balance between her strong-willed, hard-headed national and foreign policies, as well as supporting social issues that involve women and the family.

Royal’s political career thus far proves that she is an excellent candidate. During her tenure in 1992 as Minister for the Environment, she stood behind recycling, preservation of the countryside and control of noise pollution. Education is also a priority for Royal, stressing the importance of fostering healthy environments in public schools. She has taken bold strides against child prostitution and pornography and is further committed to sexuality issues, promising to legalize same-sex marriages. And it is no surprise that Royal seems to be a creative feminist, abetting further sexual equality in France, a country where a woman’s salary is reportedly 80% of a male’s salary.

Since December of last year, Royal has been traveling abroad extensively to further international recognition and rapport. She has called on the UN to impose sanctions on groups like the Taliban, an example of modern oppression. Royal is also against any nuclear program in Iran and has cited inspiration from the Chinese legal system. Why, then, should a strong politician, covering all her bases, be concerned with sexism? However, Royal certainly has good reason to proceed with caution.

In 1999 at the Paris Agricultural Show, French Minister of the Environment Dominique Voynet was assaulted with sexist insults. While this prompted an increase in dialogue concerning women’s issues in France, the new ideas thrown around did not last long. Perhaps the problem is not isolated in France.

Last July during the G8 Summit, President George W. Bush placed his hands on German Chancellor Angela Merkel shoulders, a gesture more personal and intimate than she had expected, who flailed her arms in response. A video circulated on the popular internet hub, YouTube, and prompted Jon Stewart of The Daily Show to joke about the incident as a “move she learned in date rape prevention class.” Rather than talk heading in the direction of harassment and inappropriate professional behavior, satirist Stewart took it the other way, targeting Merkel rather than Bush. Sexism still has its hold, even on a popular American television show.

Merkel assumed office in November 2005, announcing ideas to improve the state’s economy and reforms to lower unemployment in her first government address at the end of the month. After having held office for about 100 days, Merkel’s approval rating was the highest for any German Chancellor since 1949. Merkel’s nickname, “The Iron Frau,” is an allusion to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who was know as “The Iron Lady.” This nickname served her well earlier this month when she visited the Middle East, offering Europe’s help as a part of a larger global effort, prompting Israelis and Palestinians to return to the negotiating table for peace talks.

Such activities help to support the mission of the Council of Women World Leaders and its Ministerial Initiative. Created at a 1996 summit of 11 of the world’s leaders, the Council and its Ministerial Initiative’s mission is “to promote good governance and enhance the experience of democracy globally by increasing the number, effectiveness, and visibility of women who lead at the highest levels in their countries,” with high-profile female members from around the globe. One of its members, President of Chile Michelle Bachelet of the Socialist Party took the traditionally macho country by storm during her campaign, promising reforms that would give women a more audible voice.

However, Bachelet’s term has been a little rockier than Merkel’s. In her first 100 days, Bachelet worked on a number of issues ranging in complexity, from providing the elderly with free health care to suggesting reforms for the social security and the electoral systems. Last April, a large student movement demanding better quality of public education led to a sharp decrease in Bachelet’s approval ratings, prompting her to reorganize her cabinet. Bachelet has also initiated an anti-corruption plan in response to alleged misuse of public funds in past administrations. Furthermore, Bachelet faced a huge controversy of whether of not the morning-after pill could be distributed without parental consent. This, coupled with talk of a new public transportation system in Santiago and a nine-month stagnancy in renaming a new Comptroller General, led to critical media coverage prompting Bachelet to reshuffle her cabinet a second time, not even a month into her second year.

Whereas Merkel has enjoyed positive media attention, the Chilean press has extensively criticized Bachelet’s work. Although Merkel ran into one major problem — accused of plagiarizing part of a speech from President Ronald Reagan in a 1980 presidential debate — she was able to spring back quickly and effectively, a flexibility she has exercised more efficiently than Bachelet.

However, the conditions in which Bachelet had been in prior to assuming office have also shaped some widely shared sentiments against her. In her early 20s, while still in medical school at the University of Chile, Bachelet’s father, Air Force Brigadier General Alberto Bachelet Martinez was taken into custody by General Augusto Pinochet’s secret police, where he died from torture. Bachelet and her archeologist mother, Ángela Jeria Gómez, were also captured, detained at the Villa Grimaldi and were tortured for 21 days.

Bachelet had bravely taken office in 2002, becoming South America’s first female defense minister in 2002, assuming power over some of the men who may have been involved with the death of her father and her own terrible experience. In a rare situation, the tables were turned. One of the reforms that Bachelet promised in her campaign before the 2006 election was to split her cabinet evenly between males and females, a hugely liberal idea for Chile where sexual harassment in the workplace was made illegal in 2005. Senator of New York, Hillary Rodham Clinton, has also announced similar plans “to enlist thousands of women to play roles in her presidential campaign, hoping to build on the enthusiasm her candidacy has stirred among female voters at early campaign events,” according to The New York Times.

Gender inequality and sexism between male and female political leaders needs to be pushed off the table, especially with the increasing number of strong female figures successfully stepping into office.

Issue Three and the Evolution of the International Intelligencer

2007-10-03T19:21:00.001-07:00

The third issue of International Intelligencer has been posted in its entirety and I am proud to say it is the best one yet. In other news, the whole project is evolving. Oberlin students Sam Cassanos and Claudio Guler are now the editors and the name has been changed to International Dialogue. In addition, all new blog posts will occur at www.intdial.blogspot.com and will be updated regularly.

Welcome to the second issue of International Intelligencer!

2007-03-18T20:39:00.000-07:00

The second issue has just been printed and we are excited to hear your responses. This issue features articles on Russian foreign policy, Libya's HIV scandal, Venezuela-US relations, the recent Chinese anti-satellite missile test, the troop surge in Iraq, and an interview with Charles C. Sipos, co-counsel for Salim Ahmed Hamdan of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006).

The Heat War: Russian Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalization by Daniel Koehler

2007-03-18T20:34:00.000-07:00

As the saying would have it, you can’t teach an old dog new tricks. Vladimir Putin would beg to differ. The former KGB spy and current Russian president seems to maintain a residual Cold War mentality while using original and creative approaches to adapt to a world of economic interdependence and high energy costs. In January 2006, the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom, known for its close ties to the Kremlin, cut off gas supplies to Ukraine after the latter refused to accept a dramatic rise in prices to global market levels. Later that same year, pipelines supplying gas to Georgia were mysteriously blown up with no evidence of terrorist involvement. Coincidentally, both countries had recently replaced Soviet-era apparatchiks with more Western-oriented politicians. Under Putin’s stewardship, Moscow has also gone on to forge closer ties with several regimes in the Middle East and Latin America. In short, Putin’s objective seems to be control over his “near abroad,” or former Soviet republics, while expanding Russia’s sphere of influence elsewhere. His tool is these countries’ dependency on Russia’s economic or political patronage.

While the objectives of Russian foreign policy are likely to remain unchanged at least until Putin presumably steps down in 2008, the tools that are used cannot. The threat of raising the price of gas to Ukraine to market levels bore weight only because these market levels are currently so high. Natural gas cannot feasibly be transported in large quantities except through pre-existing pipelines, and Russia does have the advantage of an extensive network. But as new pipelines are built, Russia’s position stands to be compromised. Hence, we see Moscow taking steps to increase the dependency of former Soviet republics on Russian gas. Gazprom recently offered Armenia discount prices for Russian gas in exchange for control over part of its pipeline network, including those pipelines that bring in gas from Iran. Now that Gazprom has control over gas coming into Armenia from Iran as well as Russia, and given recent events in Georgia and the Ukraine, Yerevan may think twice before contravening Moscow’s wishes.

Some, however, have pointed to the recent dispute between Russia and Belarus as evidence that Gazprom’s actions are not driven by political considerations. Belarus’ president, Alyaksandar Lukashenka, has traditionally maintained close ties with Moscow, and negotiations had been in progress to establish a consolidation of the two nations into a single state. As these observers note, this did not prevent Gazprom from raising the price demanded for gas sold to Belarus in January of this year. But this logic is questionable, to say the least. If Gazprom’s actions really were based purely on economic motives, then why did we not see a simultaneous price hike for all the Soviet successor states paying below-market rates, as opposed to the consecutive and separate raises we have actually seen? Why, for that matter, were some of these countries offered below-market rates in the first place? It seems far more likely that Gazprom’s threats to Belarus were an attempt to mask the political motivations of its earlier energy policy, especially in light of the criticism leveled by several Western governments following the Ukraine affair.

Well disguised it may be, but this tactic of “energy diplomacy” is not a foolproof strategy. Turkey has a far-reaching network of gas pipelines, and could potentially be the missing link between gas-abundant Iran and gas-hungry Eastern Europe. This would spell trouble for Russia as it seeks to flex its geopolitical muscles, and so we have recently seen attempts at alternative measures. In flagrant disregard of EU and US policy, Putin invited several Hamas leaders to Moscow for discussions soon after the group was voted in. Moscow has also been heavily involved in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, at one point offering a deal to enrich uranium on Russian soil for transport back to Iran. In July, Moscow renewed a contract with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in which it agreed to continue selling the South American nation fighter jets, helicopters and assault rifles. Interestingly, all of these governments are known for their vehemently anti-American positions.

This could be interpreted as a move away from the Russian use of energy resources as a foreign policy tactic, or even as a training ground for Putin to try out a new political approach in the international arena. But it is more likely evidence of the true nature of his general style of foreign policy. Moscow’s attitude to Western governments is indifferent at best, as demonstrated by its willingness to deny Germany and Poland oil without prior consultation in the wake of the dispute with Belarus, and Putin is an opportunist. His goal of creating a Russian sphere of influence is facilitated by the perseverance of anti-Western regimes that are lacking in economic and political resources.

Since Hamas took power, the Palestinian Authority has been deprived of aid from the European Union and United States, one of its major sources of funding. Iran has been penalized by the UN Security Council with economic sanctions for its uranium enrichment program, and Venezuela has been largely isolated by the United States, the regional hegemon. By offering assistance, Putin is reasserting Russia’s presence on the international stage by making these countries dependent on Russian assistance, in the same way as Ukraine, Georgia and indeed Belarus are dependent on Russian gas. Naturally, the potential to deny Ukrainians and Georgians gas supplies in the freezing winter has a more immediate and more tangible effect than offering a helping hand to alienated rentier states, and the ability to use it with neighboring countries is, from Putin’s point of view, an opportunity too good to miss. But should the opportunity to use this political lever fail Vladimir Putin, we may rest assured that he will find alternative means to establish his international authority.

Trading Lives for Money: Libya's HIV Scandal by Vasil Zlatev

2007-03-18T20:31:00.000-07:00

How much does a human life cost? Most would say it is invaluable. However, that is not Muammar Gaddafi’s answer to this question. He would say that a human life costs a certain amount of money. Consider the following story.

On February 9, 1999 five Bulgarian nurses, a Bulgarian doctor, and a Palestinian doctor were accused of infecting 393 Libyan children with HIV. This accusation is rather dubious because the evidence presented by the Libyan prosecutors is contradictory. That is why the European Union, USA, and organizations such as Amnesty International have all condemned the trial and demanded the liberation of the accused medical workers. Now, eight years later, the five nurses and the Palestinian doctor are still in custody and have been sentenced to death.

It all began in October 1998, when two children who were treated at the Al Fatih Children’s Hospital in Benghazi, Libya were diagnosed with AIDS. The families of the infected children were eager to find the culprits who caused that tragedy and subsequently made an appeal to Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. Consequently, a hunt for the culprits was initiated. The Palestinian doctor Dr Ashraf al-Hadjudj and the six Bulgarians, from the 23 who were arrested at first, Nassya Nenova, Valya Cherveniashka, Valentina Siropulo, Snejana Dimitrova, Christiana Vulcheva and her husband Dr Zdravko Georgiev were kept in prison. Moreover, Libya interpreted the infections as a plot against Libya initiated by the CIA and Mossad with the six Bulgarians and the Palestinian doctor as secret agents of the two agencies.

The nurses and the two doctors were forced to confess that they have deliberately infected 393 children with HIV, under the duress of torture. The tortures were so intense that one of the nurses, Nassya Nenova, attempted a suicide.

One Bulgarian, Smilian Tachev—who was jailed for 174 days on unrelated charges—was a witness of the tortures. He recalls: “The nurses were beaten with many-stranded wire, for a long time and painfully. Then they were made to run, crawl, stand on one leg with their hands stretched up. When they collapsed totally, they were dragged somewhere and brought back in a helpless state.” Tachev adds that he witnessed the use of probes to force unidentified objects down the women’s throats, electricity applied on their bodies, and dogs set loose upon the screaming victims.

All these actions are prohibited by the Libyan law. The Libyan law safeguards respect for the rights of detainees upon detention and testimony, and if these rights are violated, the charges may be nullified. Libya has also signed the UN Convention against Torture which not only prohibits torture, but also “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”

The evidence on which the argument of the prosecution rests is the claim that blood banks with HIV-infected blood in them were found in the apartment of Christiana Vulcheva, the alleged organizer of the infection. The evidence that the prosecution presents, however, is so dubious and untrustworthy that it cannot be taken for granted. First, the confessions of the accused were made as a result of 90-days of torture. The Benghazi Criminal Court, however, refused to acknowledge that the accused were tortured despite the fact that the Libyan People’s Court has accepted that the medical workers were tormented and that there was not enough evidence to prove that they have infected the children, which automatically nullifies the confessions of the six. On the other hand, the Benghazi Criminal Court sentenced the five Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor to death on the basis of one and the same evidence. In that way, the rulings of the two institutions totally contradict with each other, which is another reason to question the validity of the Benghazi Criminal Court’s verdict.

The defense of the medical workers rejected all claims of the prosecution. As far as the blood banks are concerned, they were found in Christiana Vulcheva’s apartment after a perquisition on which she was not present, which is illegal according to Libyan laws. That means that the blood banks might have been deliberately placed in the apartment of Christiana Vulcheva. In addition, the prosecution never presented the blood banks with infected blood to the court despite the fact that the defense requested them. Isn’t it strange the main evidence in a trial was never presented to the court? Another strange fact is that the date of the perquisition in Christiana Vulcheva’s apartment is in April 1999, while according to the official documents, the examinations of the blood banks found in her apartment were conducted on February 2 and February 15, 1999. How can someone examine something that has not been found yet? So, if the Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor are innocent, how did the infection occur? Let’s see what some of the most famous AIDS specialists say on the topic.

Prof Luc Perrin, in whose hospital in Switzerland some of the infected children have been treated, has examined 185 of them and concludes that in many the infection is actually older than a year. Prof Perrin comments: “I can tell for sure that the HIV infection occurred before September, 1997.” Nassya Nenova, Valentina Siropulu and Valya Cherveniashka started working in the Al Fatih Children’s Hospital on February 17, 1998, and the Palestinian doctor Dr Ashraf al-Hadjudj—on August 1, 1998. The “organizer” of the group Christiana Vulcheva has never worked in Al Fatih Children’s Hospital.

According to Prof Perrin the AIDS outbreak occurred because of poor hygiene in the hospital. Prof Perrin explains: “If a single source of contaminated blood had caused the HIV outbreak, all the children would be infected by the same hepatitis C subtype. What we observed can instead be explained by the reuse of syringes or poor sterilization procedures.”

The opinions of Prof Luc Montagnier, the co-discoverer of AIDS, and of Professor Vittorio Colizzi, in whose hospital some of the children were treated, coincided with that of Professor Perrin. Prof Montagnier and Prof Colizzi examined separately the HIV outbreak in Al Fatih Children’s Hospital, but they reached to one and the same conclusion. The Libyan court refused to acknowledge the reports of the three professors and even added their names in the list of alleged criminals.

The logical question follows: “Why did Libya sentence six medical workers, who are apparently innocent, to death?” There are a couple of possible explanations. Sadly, they are all connected with either money or political power.

Libya had suffered for years from the embargo imposed on it after the Lockerbie incident in which a Libyan intelligence officer was convicted of aiding a terrorist plot that resulted in the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. The incident led to international isolation and economic problems for Libya. It is likely that insufficient funds for healthcare caused the reuse of syringes in Libyan hospitals and the Libyan state needs funding in order to better the condition of healthcare.

Here is where the “money reason” comes. The parents’ organization of the infected children demands that Bulgaria pay 10 million Euros to the families of each infected child. If Bulgaria does that, the Bulgarian nurses will be liberated. The sum 10 million Euros is not picked by chance. It is connected with the sum that Libya paid as reparations after the Lockerbie case; that is clearly an attempt from the Libyan side to regain this money.

But why were citizens of Bulgaria and Palestine accused specifically? The first reason is again connected with money. Libya has to pay a debt of $290 million to Bulgaria. Libya proposed liberating the Bulgarian nurses in exchange of not paying its debt to Bulgaria. Moreover, in 1998 Bulgaria was not member of NATO nor the European Union, so it didn’t have much political influence. As for the Palestinian doctor, he might have been picked for several reasons. First, he is a Muslim, which rejects the possibility of a religious conflict in the trial. Second, by selecting a Palestinian, Libya maybe trying to prove that its claims are not a matter of money or power, but justice insofar as Libya has had close relationships with some Palestinian groups. And finally, the international relations’ system is based on state-state interactions, and since Palestine is not an official state, it cannot count on broad international support.

Last, but not least is Muammar Gaddafi’s desire not to degrade his image of a leader. If he confesses that the HIV outbreak was caused because of poor hygiene, he undermines his own authority. Furthermore, Benghazi, where Al Fatih Children’s Hospital is located, has long been a place with relative independence and strong tribal chiefs, who are not that submissive to Gaddafi. In fact, some of these chiefs tried to initiate a coup d’etat against him in the past.

To sum up, with the trial against the Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor, Libya is trying to fix the state’s economic deficit and to regain its role on the international scene after the embargo imposed on the country. Libya hopes to receive some money and after releasing the six accused medical workers (because I doubt that Libya will actually kill them), it will “prove” to the world that Libya is a fair and just country. But should that be achieved after ruining the lives of innocents? Should that be achieved after ugly bargaining for money in exchange for human lives? Should people be tortured and treated like animals? Muammar Gaddafi seems to have no qualms about these transgressions. Meanwhile, the innocent medical workers are wondering everyday whether they will see their countries and relatives again and even whether they will see the sun at the next day.

Chavez Finds Some Breathing Room by Andrew Brooks

2007-03-18T20:29:00.000-07:00

In recent months, Hugo Chavez has made sweeping reforms to the Venezuelan political system. Chavez supporters have become empowered by his new socialist reforms, while detractors have seen the reforms as a logical step in Chavez’s authoritarian populization of Venezuelan politics. Changes in Venezuelan domestic policy and communications, and in American foreign policy have given Chavez the political space to become aggressive in policy-making. The timing and scope of Chavez’s reforms is strategic, relying in part on changes in US party politics.

A populist, Chavez derives power mainly through aggressive partisan policy, media influence, and by cultivating an image of protector, defender, and revolutionary. His administration floods newspaper and television media with his political message as well as harsh rhetoric against the opposition. He also engages in more subtle forms of media control through a network of loyal supporters placed in high corporate media positions to influence content and, allegedly, to intimidate journalists. While some point to opposition television stations such as Globovision as examples of free press, Chavez refused to renew the operating license for RCTV, Venezuela’s second largest station, and supporter of the 2002 coup attempt. Furthermore, Chavez hosts a live talk show, Alo Presidente, in which he addresses political and social issues. This show was broadcast weekly until January, when Chavez announced that it would become daily.

Chavez’s “Bolivarian Missions” ostensibly constitute a strive towards democratic socialism, emphasizing poverty reduction, free health care, free education, worker-managed governance, and nationalization of communications, industry, and natural resources. In January, Chavez began a fresh six-year term and passed a new enabling act, expanding his powers for the next 18 months to rule by decree. Critics call it a blitz towards authoritarianism, while Chavez and his administration look forward to a new era of “maximum revolution.”

Chavez’s foreign policy has relied on an adversarial position towards the United States. He has drawn legitimacy for a trade agreement and coalition of Latin American leaders Evo Morales and Fidel Castro and for another coalition with Iran and Russia. Branding Bush an imperialist, “el Diablo,” and “pendejo,” Chavez’s image of strength and independence from the world’s greatest power allows him to push harder on anti-market reforms. The two leaders have had harsh rhetorical squabbles that may be coming to an end.

The United States has experienced an enormous shift in its foreign policy discourse. Only months after the 2006 US midterm elections that saw Democrats win control of both the House and Senate, the American foreign policy discourse has shifted. Whether due to failures in Iraq and a worsening situation in Afghanistan, or to a shift in party control of both legislative houses, isolationist and anti-interventionist rhetoric has made a revival. In February, the House voted to reprimand the president for his Iraq policy. Further Iraq involvement, for better or worse, will be hampered by disagreements between President Bush and Democrats and skeptical Republicans in the House and Senate. Furthermore, with discussion of interventions in Iran and North Korea on the rise, the United States is in a difficult position, highly skeptical of any type of escalation in new geopolitical regions.

Chavez now has more space to develop his image as protector of the Venezuelan people. In early March, 2007, he held a protest against President Bush’s Latin American trade talks, setting up rallies virtually next door. The lack of response from Bush or other US policy-makers, whose hands are tied by the new isolationist sentiment, will be seen by many Venezuelans as a sign of defeat or weakness. Rule by decree and increasing media control allow Chavez to broadcast his message of revolution without the delegitimization of international reprimand. Due to the circumstances, we can expect to see Chavez grow even bolder in his rhetoric, policy, and cooperation with states unfriendly to the United States.

The Baby Gorilla: China's Military Ambitions by Claudio Guler

2007-03-18T20:27:00.000-07:00

Today, all eyes in the international arena are focused on the events unfolding in Iraq, and with good reason. But for a brief moment on January 11th, 2007, China offered its own glimpse into the future of the international order.

Carried out unilaterally and in complete secrecy, the Chinese tested an anti-satellite intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM). The target was one of its own aging weather satellites orbiting 537 miles above the surface of the earth. The IRBM successfully hit its target and managed to destroy it through simple collision. Traveling at 4.34 miles per second, the IRBM crumbled the weather satellite and in the process sent harmful space debris spewing into near Earth orbits.

With this test, China has become only the third country in the world, following the US and the former USSR, to develop and test the technology necessary to physically terminate a satellite. This can be considered quite an engineering accomplishment achieved by the Chinese and one that may signify serious consequences for US military power. However, it was the manner in which the test was carried out that raised eyebrows across the international community.
The unilateral and clandestine nature of the test has raised questions about its rationale. In response, the US, Japan, Australia, and South Korea all immediately filed complaints with Beijing, stating they have no intentions of commencing an arms race in space. Although this was a standardized diplomatic reaction, these countries – especially the US – may be overlooking the bold print message the Chinese wanted to send.

Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the bipolar system came the never before seen tranquility of the 1990’s and a world overwhelmingly governed by US hegemony. With the election of George W. Bush in 2000, the US’ superpower status remained, but the tranquility of the 90’s quickly faded. Now, China’s test of an anti-satellite weapon may be implicitly challenging US hegemony with confidence.

The US has recently acted with a great deal of bravado around the world, and this may be an early sign of others’ displeasure. A curiously relevant example of such US bravado has come from President Bush’s review of the US National Space Policy (NSP) in 2006. The opening remarks that state the guiding principles of the unclassified segment of the US NSP are written in a rather one-sided tone. The most controversial of which states: “The United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.”

The Bush administration also recently withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. This treaty was designed to reduce tensions in conjunction with nuclear weapons development. By limiting nations’ legal abilities to construct national safety nets against incoming nuclear weapons, this treaty was an intricate pillar in the international organization and the laws of space. The combination of such actions have made other nations uneasy about the US’ intentions to maintain the non-militarized order of space.

When questioned about the Chinese launch of an anti-satellite IRBM, the White House press secretary responded: “…we do want a civil space cooperation with the Chinese and others.” Cooperation? If cooperation was the policy of the current US administration, why did they in a 2005 UN Security Council vote to call for negotiations on a space treaty to limit the militarization of space, cast their vote as the only ‘no’ against 160 ‘yes?’

Is it possible that this test was meant to send a message to the US to tone down its strutting and to return to the negotiating table? If Bush refuses to see this, China has clearly expressed its right and ability to make future war fighting difficult for the United States. This matter is particularly pertinent when combined with China’s massive military buildup over the past ten years and its express desire to have Taiwan under the Mainland China communist rule. In the past, the US has vowed to defend Taiwanese sovereignty, which has been an underlying tension in international security.

A recent article in the Washington Times by Bill Gertz, entitled “Chinese Dragon Awakes,” outlines the scale of China’s military buildup. Copious amounts of funding from China’s rapidly developing economy have afforded China the opportunity to modernize their armed forces. Although still far behind the US military’s capabilities, Gertz says, “China is building its military forces faster that US intelligence and military analysts expected.” With a revitalized high-tech military that can disrupt US communications, tracking, and guidance systems in times of war, such capabilities would make defending Taiwan and the homeland significantly more difficult.

The prescription is for a change of course. The US should reverse its quasi-imperialistic behavior and not only speak of cooperation, but also pursue it. The Chinese IRBM launch is a rather minor issue that tells a much larger story. By returning to the negotiating table on this issue, the US can begin the process of giving others less reason for concern. At the least, negotiating is better than ignoring. Choosing to ignore will prove deconstructive and, in the long run, damaging.

In conclusion, it should come as no surprise that the Chinese were the ones to audaciously challenge US hegemony. For millennia, the Chinese have been a unified civilization and one that intends to rise again. Right now, the US is the 800-pound gorilla sitting in the room. However, a baby gorilla sits not far away, and it is difficult to imagine this baby gorilla not growing up. When this day comes, do you want to be the one sitting next to the uncomfortable 800-pound gorilla?

Iraq: It's Not Over 'til it's Over by Adam Khatib

2007-03-18T20:20:00.000-07:00

American intervention in Iraq has failed to establish a stable, democratic Iraq. This statement cannot be denied. However the notion, proposed by members of the Democratic Congress including current presidential frontrunners Hilary Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama, that removing American forces from the situation will come to improve the situation for Iraqis is an inherent absurdity. Scheduled withdrawal dates and caps on troop levels spell disaster for the future of Iraq.

The plan presented by President Bush calls for increased troop involvement in the mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad in which Sunni and Shia temperaments have turned towards abhorrent levels of violence. In order to stem the bloodshed, the plan calls for an American troop increase of approximately 22,000 soldiers and Marines. These added forces will help to halt levels of violence thereby improving the ability of Iraqi politicians to carry out the bargaining processes needed to settle current sectarian differences. Crucial to solving these disagreements is the creation of a constitutional agreement regarding the sharing of funds from oil revenue between the Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish populations.

There is no guarantee that this plan will succeed. Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq would likely be better served by a number closer to 30,000 additional soldiers in order to improve security for the Iraqi people, raising the number of troops currently in Iraq to approximately 170,000. This number, combined with Iraqi and private security forces, will bring the ratio of soldiers per Iraqi civilians close to numbers necessary to effectively battle insurgent forces. In addition, the current increase must be properly managed and sustained for a long enough period as to allow security to take hold, likely a period of 12-18 months. This will certainly have a greater chance of success than leaving inadequate troop levels as they are.

According to the updated counterinsurgency manual, coauthored by newly appointed Multinational Force Iraq commander General Patraeus, minimal troop numbers for security and trust-building operations should be set at 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants. Such was the case in 2005 in the northern Iraqi city of Tal Afar in which American forces under the Col H.R. McMaster were able to institute a “clear, hold, and build” strategy. After clearing the city of insurgent forces, American forces stayed and maintained a daily security presence on the streets while at the same time working to rebuild damaged infrastructure. Such measures focus on stability and gaining the trust of residents. Such measures can only be successful if adequate levels of troops are available to apply them.

Deep-seeded sectarian rifts have undeniably widened in recent months bringing increasing levels of violence. What is certain however is that a withdrawal of American forces in the current lack of instability will fail to bring law, order and democracy to Iraq. What withdrawal will do is increase the rate of a descending spiral into death and destruction. The oft-cited Baker Hamilton report, though calling for a phased withdrawal of American forces, itself notes this grim fact.

In order to have any chance of success, American commanders must be able to evaluate and control the levels of troops needed on a mission specific basis. Setting a troop-level cap would tie the hand of General Petraeus and leave current forces stretched far to thin to accomplish security tasks. Setting troop withdrawal schedules serves only to eliminate any American encouragement for compromise between the Shia, Kurds, and Sunnis.

Abandoning Iraq would likely lead to one of a series of disturbing outcomes. One is a failed Iraqi state, subject to the vying whims of its neighbor nation states. Such an Iraq would be a continually devastated nation in which sectarian violence and terrorism are the perpetual and inevitable way of life. Another outcome is a partitioned Iraq in which the creation of vying Sunni, Shia and Kurdish states is marred by violence over oil resources. Yet another possibility is an Iraq in which the majority Shia government, perhaps under the influence of Iran, fully endorses the wholesale slaughter of the Sunni minority. None of these options are acceptable outcomes for the US or Iraqi interests on the whole. Of course these outcomes are not the only possible ones, however what is impossible is a magical transition towards a viable political arrangement if America leaves Iraq in its current situation.

The idea that removal of US troops will force Malaki into compromise is counter-intuitive at best. Pulling out American troops, as advocated under the guise of “redeployment” or “phased withdrawal” by Senate Democrats such as Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama, would not have the desired effect. It would leave the legitimate Iraqi government and people mercy to the throes of a full-fledged civil war. Skyrocketing levels of violence far greater than any amounts that have been previously experienced are the likely outcome.

It is not too late for the situation in Iraq to improve. The fatalistic notion that Iraq is a lost cause and that there is no solution for the Iraqi government and people is tantamount only to casting the Iraqis into doom. It is absolutely necessary that Iraqis create compromise and change for themselves. America cannot accomplish these tasks. What America can do is set the stage for the necessary political process to take place. If security levels are increased and the Iraqis still fail to agree to compromise, continuation of civil war will be inevitable and it will be time for American forces to leave. At this point there is still an opportunity for compromise, and as long as there is a possibility, American forces still have a role to play.

Interview with Charles C. Sipos (co-counsel for Salim Ahmed Hamdan in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) by Angad Singh

2007-03-18T20:13:00.000-07:00

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the executive branch of the US government established special military tribunals to try alleged enemy combatants held in Guantanamo Bay. On June 29th, 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) that the military tribunals violated both domestic and international law. I had the honor to interview the co-counsel for Salim Ahmed Hamdan regarding the Supreme Court ruling and the Military Commissions Act (MCA) that was passed by Congress as a consequence of the Court’s ruling. Any views presented in the interview do not necessarily reflect those of anyone involved with the International Intelligencer.

Q: On the behalf of the International Intelligencer, I thank you for your participation in this interview. Firstly, could you please tell me your occupation, about your involvement with Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and what theorists or theories have most influenced your political thinking?

A: I first became involved in the Hamdan case when the law firm where I’m an associate, Perkins Coie in Seattle, was asked to act as co-counsel with Professor Neal Katyal and Lt. Commander Charlie Swift. We helped Prof. Katyal and Commander Swift prepare the initial habeas petition, and ultimately stayed on board throughout the course of the case. We continue on with them as co-counsel to this day. My primary area of responsibility focused on the extent to which the Executive’s system of military commissions complied with the procedures set forth in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”). The UCMJ sets forth the primary and essential trial procedures for use in courts-martial. The Executive’s commissions were inconsistent with the UCMJ in a number of ways, although perhaps most notably, by allowing the trial to be conducted without the accused present. My own political views didn’t come into play for the representation of Hamdan. The Executive commission process that the Supreme Court ultimately struck down offended domestic and international law, and that conclusion wasn’t dependent on political views. So, I didn’t think about it that much.

Q: The majority opinion, as written by Justice Stevens, states that the military commissions created to try alleged unlawful combatants, such as Hamdan, are unconstitutional as they not only violate the domestic military law as enshrined in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), but also violate international laws of war, specifically, the Geneva Conventions. The main complaint, in terms of domestic law, was that the commissions violated the clause of the UCMJ that states courts-martial and military commissions must be “uniform insofar as practicable.” The Court argues that they were not uniform because of the ability to exclude the accused from being present at one’s own trial and that the accused may not view all the evidence used against one due to national security reasons. Is any aspect of national security at risk if the accused is presented with the evidence against the accused? Does the administration have any evidence of this claim? Is there any historic precedent for withholding evidence from the accused under domestic military law?

A: Although it is certainly possible that evidence presented in commission cases might pose security concerns, courts (including our Federal Courts) are well-equipped to deal with this kind of sensitive material. Numerous procedures already exist – the filing of documents or evidence under seal, presentation to judges in camera, closing the court room for certain portions of the proceeding – that allow courts to effectively address security concerns. We didn’t receive or review any specific evidence in Hamdan’s case (and of course, if we had, we couldn’t discuss it), but we did take the position that our existing Federal Courts and courts-martial could handle trials that implicated security concerns. In preparing Hamdan’s case, we did not uncover any cases where the prosecution was allowed to convict an accused on the basis of evidence that the accused never saw, and the Government did not put in any authority that supported such an argument. As the District Court judge in Hamdan commented, the Government is always free to elect not to put in particular evidence if it feels it is too sensitive. But they can’t have it both ways by withholding that evidence from the accused and then asking the court to nonetheless convict him on the basis of it.

Q: One argument used by the executive to dismiss alien enemy combatants’ claims to protections under the Geneva Conventions is that al-Qaeda is not a signatory to the convention. In terms of international law, the Court opinion, as authored by Justice Stevens, argued that it is irrelevant that al-Qaeda is not a signatory to the Geneva Conventions because Common Article 3 of those conventions still applies to them. However, the DC Federal Court of Appeals ruled that Geneva does not apply. Is it not a requirement that combatants must a) wear a standard uniform or visible emblem b) carry arms openly c) be a part of a chain of command and in general follow the laws of war to be protected under the Geneva Conventions? In light of al-Qaeda’s tactics of attacking civilians and violating the aforementioned requirements, are members of al-Qaeda protected under the Geneva Conventions? Since Geneva requires a competent tribunal to assess whether the combatants are lawful or not, do the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) constitute a competent tribunal to asses al-Qaeda and or the Taliban’s combatant status under domestic and or international law?

A: This area gets a bit complicated, but the short answer is that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (called “Common Article” because it appears in each of the four Geneva Conventions) protects persons who are not uniformed members of military forces. Hamdan denies he was a member of al-Qaeda, and there was never any hearing that complied with the requirements of the Geneva Convention – called an Article 5 hearing – determining his status to be anything other than a prisoner of war. Our position has been that the CSRT did not meet the requirements of Article 5 and was not a “competent tribunal” for purposes of making this determination. Moreover, it is undisputed that the Government consistently maintained that it need not comply with the Geneva Convention’s Article 5 status hearing requirements.

Q: Justice Stevens has argued that Common Article 3 does afford protections to persons such as Hamdan because he was caught in the territory of a Geneva signatory, Afghanistan, in a conflict not of an “international character.” But, is not the current War on Terrorism global in nature? Should the phrase, “armed conflict not of an international character” be read broadly to include the current War on Terrorism due to the omission of a previous draft of Common Article 3 that clarified the phrase by claiming, “especially in cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion,” as Justice Stevens has argued?

A: I believe Justice Stevens’ analysis was correct in determining that the Geneva Conventions extend to Hamdan and the circumstances of his capture. Whether the Geneva Conventions would apply to every person the Government claims has been captured as part of the “War on Terror” is an open question, but I think the Court in Hamdan was correct to reject the Executive’s argument that its actions in that “War” are somehow universally exempt from the dictates of international law and the Geneva Conventions.

Q: Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) a week after the 9/11 attacks which authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force” to combat nations, organizations, or persons that were involved or aided the 9/11 attacks in order to prevent such acts from occurring on US soil again. The executive has used the AUMF to argue that Congress had given it powers to establish the tribunals in question in the Hamdan case. How far does the AUMF let the executive conduct the War on Terrorism? Does the AUMF bolster the administration’s argument about the necessity of a unitary executive in a time of war? How much purchase does unitary executive theory have in Court? How can the Court reconcile the demands of war with the demands of domestic and international law? Are there legal gaps that do not address pertinent issues in the War on Terrorism? Should domestic and or international law be updated to take into account the various issues the courts have encountered in the War on Terrorism?

A: As the Court in Hamdan observed, the AUMF did not speak in any way to the President’s authority to conduct trials or to mete out punishment. It simply mobilized military forces, but did not otherwise amplify the Executive’s constitutional powers or authorize unilateral Executive action in spheres of authority committed to the Judiciary or Congress. Again, it is certainly possible to argue that domestic or international law should be modified in order to address threats posed by international terrorism, but one of the key insights of the Hamdan decision is that it is not for the President alone to do so.

Q: The DC Federal Court of Appeals ruled that the Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable. Are there any precedents that weaken or strengthen this argument? As precedent is concerned, how much can the courts rely on Ex Parte Quirin (1942), a Supreme Court case that upheld President Roosevelt’s convening of a military tribunal to try captured German spies?

A: The Hamdan Court effectively rejected this reading, by holding that Hamdan had enforceable rights under the Geneva Conventions. Since at least the Head Money Cases, decided in 1884, it has been the law that where treaties provide for private or individual rights (and the Geneva Convention is such a treaty), then those rights are judicially enforceable by courts.

Q: The administration has tried to circumvent terrorism cases from judicial review through clauses in the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) and the Military Commissions Act (MCA). How have these clauses prevented, or not, court review of writs of habeas corpus, detainee treatment, and other issues? Is Justice Scalia’s argument in Hamdan correct, that the court does not have jurisdiction due to the language of the DTA?

A: The Court in Hamdan rejected the Government’s argument that the DTA stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear pending cases filed by detainees challenging their detention or trial before military commissions. Whether or not the MCA accomplishes what the DTA did not, is likely an issue that the Supreme Court will have an opportunity to decide in the coming months.

Q: In light of the massage of the MCA, what course of action has Hamdan taken, or is taking?

A: Hamdan’s case was remanded to the District Court (the trial court level in our Federal Courts). The Judge there ruled that he no longer had jurisdiction over Hamdan’s case, because the MCA had effectively withdrawn that jurisdiction. Hamdan is currently appealing that decision.

Q: Do certain provisions of the MCA violate the ruling of the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld? Particularly the admission of hearsay evidence and the continued ability of the military judge to exclude the accused from the trial if classified information “could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable damage to the national security.” Do these clauses violate the UCMJ uniformity requirement as the Court has ruled? Do these clauses violate Common Article 3 in its requirement to try the accused in a “regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”?

A: Angad – sorry, but answering this question in full requires discussion of ongoing legal work we’re doing on Hamdan’s case. The rules on attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product make it tough for me to discuss thoroughly.

Q: The MCA states that conspiracy is a triable offense in the new military tribunals. Does this violate the Court’s ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld? Furthermore, does the MCA foreclose the possibility of court review of writs of habeas corpus for unlawful enemy combatants? Does it also foreclose judicial review of such an alien’s condition of detention as pertaining to coercive interrogation/torture domestic or abroad through extraordinary renditions?

A: The MCA attempts to do these things, and whether or not the law is constitutional is something that the Supreme Court will ultimately be asked to decide. My answer to the questions below are pretty much the same, and again because of privilege concerns, am not in a position to provide too much more detail than that. I can tell you that certain aspects of the MCA are being challenged by Hamdan in his appeal, by a group of other Guantanamo detainees whose cases are in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and by a case in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals involving a resident alien whom the government contends is an enemy combatant and is currently held in prison within the United States. At this point, these challenges primarily concern the question of whether or not federal courts still have habeas corpus jurisdiction over detainee cases.

Q: Does the MCA legalize extraordinary rendition in its language that states a convicted alien enemy combatant may be confined in a prison of one of the US’ allies?

No answer.

Q: Does the MCA exclude the US from section 1(d) of Common Article 3 that prohibits “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of execution without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees, which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”? Can the MCA legally exempt the US from this clause? If so, are there not drastic ramifications for international law in general? Does this exemption, if it is an exemption, violate the Supreme Court’s ruling that the military commissions must comply with Common Article 3?

No answer.

Q: Is the MCA constitutional because the most important laws governing these issues are domestic ones, as Justice Kennedy implied in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld? What are, and are not, grounds for determining the MCA as unconstitutional? Is the MCA being challenged through the courts? What is the likelihood of certain aspects of the MCA being deemed unconstitutional?

No answer.

Q: Do you have any closing comments? I thank you very much for your participation in the interview.

A: I appreciate you contacting me, and am glad to hear that students at the collegiate level are taking an interest in the Hamdan case and the important issues that it presents. Good luck with the journal and feel free to contact me if you have any follow-up. Thanks again.

Afghanistan: State-Building Under the Influence by Angad Singh

2006-12-05T20:44:00.000-08:00

As the world’s attention focuses on Iraq, it is easy to forget about Afghanistan. As a struggling state whose nation building efforts are mired in a myriad of problems, some thought Afghanistan was a done deal after the fall of the Taliban. After all, the US “doesn’t do” state-building, according to George W. Bush before the Afghanistan invasion.

But that is exactly what the US, NATO and the Afghani government are trying to do, with limited results. Afghanistan has made remarkable headway in developing democratic institutions since the fall of the Taliban, yet many significant obstacles persist in its development. The most significant problem is a resurgent Taliban that has increased attacks on US-NATO forces in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan. The porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border not only led to the escape of Osama bin Laden and his cohorts, but continues to allow the Taliban to crossover into friendly areas of Pakistan to use as a haven.

Hamid Karzai, the president of Afghanistan, is frustrated with President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan for signing a deal with tribal/Taliban leaders of North Wazirisitan, an area of Pakistan that shares a border with Afghanistan. The deal states that Pakistani security will ease border checkpoints, release some militants, and generally observe a cease-fire. In return, the Taliban would stop cross border attacks into Afghanistan.

Since the fall of the Taliban government, the US has put pressure on Pakistan to fight these rebels yet Pakistani security forces have been unsuccessful due to the tenacity of the Taliban and their ability to find sanctuary in the mountainous border region. Furthermore, there seems to be a general reluctance amongst Pakistan security forces to fight the Taliban and their supporters as the ISI, Pakistan’s infamous intelligence agency, had backed the Taliban regime when it was in power. A recently publicized paper written by an officer of Britain’s Defence Academy condemns the ISI for continuing support of the militant group. The new North Waziristan deal will lead to what Karzai fears most: a region where the Taliban can build up forces for cross border attacks along an even more fluid border through which not only militants can pass, but also the illegal drugs that finance them. In sum, the deal evidences the failure to win militarily against a guerilla group using the means of conventional warfare, a reality the US is realizing in Iraq. Consequently, new and creative means must be implemented to disrupt the Taliban’s activities and provide incentives to dissuade people from aiding the militant group. Part of the solution may lie in co-opting the Taliban’s main source of funding: opium.

Afghanistan produces 92% of the world’s opium, which continues to fund the Taliban. Insofar as the Taliban and armed drug lords benefit most from the illicit narcotic trade, opium production and poppy cultivation become intimately tied to the problem of insurgency and crime. The US is still using the blunt instrument of crop eradication to fight drug production; such tactics have failed and continue to fail, most noticeably in Latin America. The US has contracted DynCorp International, also reportedly involved in the drug war in Latin America and in training the Iraqi and Afghani security forces, to eradicate poppy fields in Afghanistan. However eradication programs hit the poor and not the criminal gangs and the Taliban who profit most from the drug trade. In fact, such programs may perpetuate the very evils the US government wishes to eliminate.

According to the Senlis Council, a Brussels-based think tank, Afghanis are increasingly joining or indirectly aiding the Taliban due to US-led poppy eradication efforts. The US needs to abandon this ham handed approach. Johann Hari, a columnist for The Independent, advocates the termination of eradication programs and in their place set up a system in which western governments purchase Afghani poppy seeds and sell them to pharmaceutical companies to make legal opiate based painkillers. Hari cites the success of a historical precedent in which Turkey effectively became a supplier for legal opiate-based medicines in the 1970s. Such a solution may be plausible but would also have to be accompanied by fostering job growth for the numerous other people involved in the drug trade. If the poppy purchase plan were to be implemented, the various conduits in the drug trafficking chain would be left jobless, angry, and armed. Without further employment opportunities, the government would risk a stronger coalition of drug gangs and a Taliban prepared to topple the Afghani government to regain their previous power.

Job growth would not only ameliorate the conditions that militants capitalize on for recruitment, but is essential for a stable society. Some progress has been made on the economic front. For instance, Coca Cola has opened a bottling plant in Kabul that provides 350 jobs, the largest telecommunications company in Afghanistan, Roshan, partly owned by the American firm MCT, is making profits. Future prospects include the 3M Corporation contracting distributors in Afghanistan and the dairy company, Land O’Lakes, was commissioned by USAID to revitalize Afghanistan’s dairy industry. While signs of progress exist, they are more of an exception than the rule.

Economic progress cannot be made until the government administers essential services such as electricity, efficient irrigation systems, and the general infrastructure that provides the base for economic improvement. Currently, the government can only provide a paltry 6% of its populous with electricity. International donors have given billions of dollars worth of aid money, and perhaps more is needed, but the main obstacle to development seems not to be lack of aid, but lack of honest government. Corrupt regional leaders who have been co-opted into the federal government need to be replaced with those who have an interest in Afghanistan as a whole and not merely their own self interest, a far cry from the entrenched tribalism of the nation, making house cleaning an extremely difficult task.

Some say security is a prerequisite for economic growth, but if creative solutions aren’t implemented for both security and economic problems, expect to see Afghanistan slip back into the internecine conflict that has plagued it for much of its history.

Interview with Ali Kurdistani (A Kurdish Journalist) by Angad Singh

2006-12-05T20:31:00.000-08:00

I met Ali Kurdistani in Nicosia, Cyprus in the summer of 2006 while attending a symposium on Middle East conflicts. I approached Mr. Kurdistani for this interview because the Kurdish perspective has been largely overlooked in the common discourse about Iraq. However, Mr. Kurdistani’s views are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of International Intelligencer.
-Angad Singh

Q: Hello and thank you for participating in the interview. Can you give me your name, job, and what publications you have written for?

A: First of all, I want to thank International Intelligencer for giving me this opportunity to extend my view to the American people. My name is Ali Kurdistani, and I am a political writer and journalist in Iraqi Kurdistan. Since 2001 I have been writing articles and stories for many local Kurdish newspapers like Kurdistani Nwe, Aso, Hawal, Hawlati, and most recently, Soma Digest. Most of these are political newspapers, some belong to Kurdish political parties, and others are independent. Most of my articles are about political affairs especially political Islam, US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq, Kurdish–American relations, and Israeli foreign policy.

Q: Many people are unaware of what makes the Kurdish people unique. Can you describe how the Kurds are different from Arabs?

A: The Kurds are politically and culturally much closer to the West than Arabs. We are pro-Westerners but the Arabs are anti–Westerners. This is generally true because there are some open-minded Arabs, but very a few in Iraq. There is currently no violence against Americans and other foreigners in Kurdistan; no American soldier has been killed by the Kurds or in Kurdistan. Meanwhile in Arab areas of Iraq, there is daily terror against Americans and all Westerners. The Kurds are looking for a secular state in Iraq like the American and European secular and democratic models. Even though we are Muslims, there are few Islamists in Kurdistan. We are frankly rejecting the establishment of an Islamic government in Iraq and Kurdistan. We promote the Kurdish secular view to solve Iraqi problems while Arab Islamists promote a religious view. This is one of the main differences between the Kurds and Arabs in the current Iraq.

Q: Can you explain how Kurdistan operates within the greater Iraq? How Independent is it from the rest of the country? Is there a struggle to disarm the peshmerga, the Kurdish militia?

A: Kurdistan is like another country in Iraq right now. There is a different economic, political, and security situation in Kurdistan than other parts of Iraq. Kurdistan is not separated officially from Iraq yet, even though we have our own government, parliament, and Kurdistan President, Masoud Barzani. Kurdistan is well guarded by the Kurdish Army, the peshmarga, and Kurdish security guards. Economically, we are still getting money from the Iraqi government, which is our own share of Iraqi oil money that is divided among the Iraqi governates. Kurdistan is mostly independent politically, even in our relations with the US, EU, and other regional neighbors. Economically, we are going to have our own oilfields in Kurdistan. About the peshmarga, there is no struggle to disarm the peshmarga by the Iraqi government and America, because the peshmarga is not a militia group like others in Iraq. The peshmarga is now an official Kurdish Army to protect Kurdistan.

Q: What is the situation in Kirkuk? Is it rightfully Kurdish or are there some legitimate Arab claims to it? Why is it so important?

A: The situation in Kirkuk is not normalized yet. Kirkuk was originally a Kurdish city with Arab, Turkmen and Christian minorities. This city during Saddam’s regime became Arabized by forcing Kurdish families to leave their native home and replacing them by Arab families from the Middle and South of Iraq. This process happened especially in Kirkuk and Khanaqin. Later, those Kurdish families became refugees in other cities of Iraqi Kurdistan and stayed there, especially in Sulaimania, Erbil, and Dhok. After the liberation of Iraq, those families tried to get back home but they could not. There was even an article in the Iraqi transitional constitution in 2003, article 58, that tried to normalize the Kirkuk situation but the Iraqi government and coalition forces did not implement it. The Kirkuk situation is still not better especially because there is a security problem and therefore the Kurds are not satisfied with what’s going on in Kirkuk. Whether the Kurds will be able to return home depends on article 140 in the new Iraqi constitution. There should be a referendum in 2007 to determine whether Kirkuk will be part of Iraq or Kurdistan. In the Kurdish view, Kirkuk is so important not just because of oil, but also because it’s part of our country, Kurdistan.

Q: Describe the affects the US invasion of Iraq has had on the Kurdish people and Kurdistan. What is the general feeling of the Kurdish people towards this 2nd Gulf War?

A: The US invasion made a very good impression on the Kurdish people because the US overthrew our main enemy in Iraq, Saddam Hussein. His regime oppressed us for 35 years. The Kurdish people were very happy with the war; we felt that the US came to punish our enemy and liberate us. It was the first time in our life that the warplanes over Kurdistan’s sky fought against our enemy. We supported the invasion because it was against the most dictatorial regime in the world. We raised an American flag beside the Kurdish flag and put the American president’s photo beside Kurdish leaders’ photos and we celebrated for days with one of the biggest parties in our history.

Q: How did Saddam Hussein treat the Kurdish people? Can you describe the Anfal campaign, Arabization, and some other ways Hussein oppressed the Kurds?

A: Saddam’s regime treated the Kurdish people very badly. Saddam did not just oppress Kurdish fighters, but oppressed all the Kurdish people, all children and old people as well. The Anfal campaign is the biggest crime Saddam did against the Kurdish people. Anfal is a long story; I cannot describe it in just a few sentences. In general, Anfal was a process where the Iraqi Army attacked Kurdish villages and towns in Kurdistan, even with chemical weapons. They destroyed many villages and killed many people. Later, the Iraqi Army arrested those still alive and took them to the South of Iraq and separated parents from children. Later, after 3 to 5 months, they released the old people. The rest of the Kurdish families, about 182,000 people including women and children, were burned alive and thrown in a ditch. After the Iraq War, we found many mass-graves. Some of them were recognized as deaths from the Anfal campaign. Arabization was a long process by Saddam’s regime to destroy Kurdish identity and culture. Saddam tried to Arabize Kurdistan’s demographic by forcing Kurdish families to leave their homes and replacing them with Arab families, especially in Kirkuk, Khanaqin, and Mosul. Also, the education system was another part of Arabization by teaching Arabic culture, history, and geography of the Arab homeland to Kurdish students.

Q: What is the prospect for a proper Kurdish state? What role do Iran, Turkey, Syria and other countries play in the goal for a completely independent Kurdistan?

A: In Iraqi Kurdistan, all of the Kurds want to have their own Kurdish state, but there is a lack of international and regional support and many other obstacles blocking this main Kurdish dream. Our leaders usually say we will stay with the united Iraq despite our right to a Kurdish independent state. Regional powers always take the role of suppressing any Kurdish attempts to establish a Kurdish state in the Middle East. They are still scared about what's going on in Iraqi Kurdistan after Iraq war. After the US came to our region, those regional powers are much less powerful against the Kurds. Like before, America and Israel, and Western powers have a bigger role in Kurdistan and in the goal of a Kurdish independent state. Therefore the Kurds, with their support, will determine Kurdistan’s fate. Finally, the Kurdish state will be born in the near future.

Q: What is the main issue of friction between Kurdish groups such as the PUK, KDP, and PKK? Do you think the violence of the PKK in Turkey is helpful in changing attitudes about Kurdish rights? How are Kurds treated in Turkey?

A: The Kurdish political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan have their own structure. They were born in the specific political, social, and economic situation in Iraqi Kurdistan. There is no friction between the PUK and KDP. Both have political and national approaches for the same goals and there is no ideological friction between them. When they fought each other in 2004-2006 it was due to political and economic power because both declared that they were the Kurdish party fighting for Kurdish rights and interests in Iraq. The PKK was born in Turkey and therefore has a different view of Kurdish problems. They call for a greater Kurdistan. PUK and KDP never call for greater Kurdistan. The PKK’s use of violence in Turkey will not solve Kurdish problems. I do believe that the Kurdish problem will be solved peacefully in Turkey. The Kurds are treated badly in Turkey. They still do not have cultural and national rights there. The EU has warned Turkey many times about violating Kurdish rights. It is another obstacle to Turkey’s membership to the EU.

Q: How has Kurdistan progressed and grown, economically and politically, since the 2003 US invasion?

A: Since the US invasion, Kurdistan has been progressing in many main aspects, especially politically and economically. On the local level, we have achieved many important political gains for Kurds in Iraq. Internationally, the Kurdish case has advanced. We have become allies of the US and England, and we have established new relations with many Western countries. Since the invasion, many countries, especially America and Europe, have focused on Kurdistan. They want to build political, diplomatic and economic relations with Iraqi Kurdistan. They will even have a diplomatic mission in Kurdistan. Our foundations and organizations have become members of international organizations, and recently the Kurdistan regional government officially agreed to take part in UN conventions and meetings. Economically our budget increased and many Western and regional companies are coming to Kurdistan to invest. We have started digging oilfields in Kurdistan. Also since the invasion, we have built two international airports, which have had a major influence on the economic and political situations because of direct flights between Kurdistan, Europe, and Middle Eastern countries.

Q: Do you think Jalal Talabani, the president of Iraq, is doing a good job? What is the significance of having a Kurdish politician in the higher realms of the Iraqi government?

A: I do think Jalal Talabani is doing a good job in Baghdad. We still live within Iraq and should therefore be part of the Iraqi government. We need to be able to oppose those Arabs who will create problems for the Kurds and Kurdistan. For example, Talabani opposed Ibrahim Jafari, former Iraqi Prime Minister, when he made decisions unfavorable to Iraqi Kurds. We are not in Baghdad to serve the Arabs. We are there to support and achieve political and national rights for which we have fought over a large part of Iraq’s history. If there were no Kurdish politician in the higher levels of the Iraqi government, the Arabs would violate Kurdish rights and make more problems for the Kurds. Having Talabani, Kurdish ministers, and Kurdish members in the Iraqi parliament is important for Kurdistan. We are in Baghdad defending and protecting the achievements we have made in Iraqi Kurdistan and are participating in shaping and forming the new Iraqi government, which will never attack Kurdistan again.

Q: What are the future prospects of Iraq in general? How is the fighting in the center, Anbar province, and Baghdad to stop? Can Iraq unify or do separate countries need to be made along ethnic lines such as Kurdistan in the north, a Sunni country in the middle, and Shiites in the south?

A: I get information on the central and Southern Iraq via the media. Iraq is already separated into three provinces, but that is not recognized officially except for the Kurdistan region, which is recognized by Iraqi constitution as a federal region. There is the possibility of establishing a Kurdish state in the north of Iraq because we have the main elements of a state, like a good economic and security situation. And we have more than 15 years experience administrating Kurdistan. In the future, Iraq will separate into three states, but those states might be within a federal government in Baghdad.

Checks and Balances: Thai Style by Andrew Brooks

2006-12-05T20:28:00.000-08:00

Thaksin Shinawatra, Thailand’s democratically elected Prime Minister, has become an increasingly controversial figure in Thai politics since his ouster in a recent military coup-d’etat. Before September 19th, 2006, Thailand had enjoyed 15 years of relative political calm after the coup of 1991, whose conclusion replaced an unwelcome military dictatorship with a democratically elected civilian government. Thaksin became Prime Minister in February, 2001. Over the course of the next 5 years, alleged corruption in the central government, social division, and growing ethnic and religious tensions in the diverse Southern provinces have become known as the most immediate threats to Thai stability. In spite of his role in the recent military take-over, coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin has promised to repair the failures in government that Thaksin has come to symbolize.

The former Prime Minister’s five years in office draws regional partisanship. While those in major cities have branded him no more than a corrupt businessman, using his post to enrich himself, his family, and his business partners, rural workers regard their former leader as a moral man working tirelessly for the Thai people. However many saw Thaksin’s popularity and disdain for the monarchy as a violation of a long-standing political tradition. Responding to intelligence that Thaksin had planned his own military power grab in Bangkok the same day of the coup, reports indicate that King Bhumibol ordered a military solution from loyalist generals that became the September overthrow.

The former Prime Minister’s political record is as mixed as his reputation, but offers a web of paradoxes that stray from the partisanship and rhetoric in public debate. While many see Thaksin’s economic policy as simultaneously pro-Western and self-interested, his health and micro-finance reforms have buoyed small rural businesses and the national economy, and have allowed access to medical care and insurance to millions of Thais who were previously without them.

However, Thai news sources have revealed that Thaksin’s reforms may not have been as benevolent or representative of the people’s will as they seemed. While rural and poor Thais have been able to receive medical treatment or any operation for less than a single US dollar under Thaksin’s universal healthcare program, that policy has bankrupted the public hospital system, thereby driving wealthier Thais to expensive private hospitals, many of which are owned by family members of the former Prime Minister. Despite popular support for tax breaks and incentives and micro-finance opportunities central to his economic policy, Thaksin was able to use loopholes hidden in broad economic reform packages to sell his family’s $1.9 billion stake in a major telecommunications firm tax-free. Whether or not allegations of corruption are true, these social-welfare programs allowed him to justify a pattern of alleged predation that crippled his legitimacy as prime minister.

Thaksin’s domestic security policy has also come under fire in recent years. His aggressive use of only military means to suppress Islamic insurgency groups in the Southern provinces had not made any progress. On the contrary, it has radicalized their religious underpinnings. The Mujahadeen Islam Pattani and the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) are among militant Islamic groups fighting in a hundred-year-old struggle for separation from the Thai state. Weekly shootings, bombings, and kidnappings began to intensify in late 2003 and early 2004 and claimed the lives of over 1000 Southern Thais, to date, mostly Buddhists. Coupled with his anti-narcotics campaigns in Bangkok in 2003, in which the Thai military police shot and killed hundreds of innocent Thais, took bribes, and planted evidence, Thaksin’s hard-line “shoot first, ask questions later,” approach to security drew broad criticism, characterized as brutal and unconstructive.

While King Bhumibol has not been faced with such high-stakes policy decisions, he has built an enormous base of political support albeit outside the democratic system. Thailand’s ninth king in its current dynasty has cultivated an image comparable to that of a new Siddhartha; he is renowned for his benevolent influence on government and society. Though he has very little formal power and often speaks in proverbs, his words mobilize the populace like no politician can. The mere mention of traffic in Bangkok or passing question of a politician’s integrity will stir thousands within the government and public to action. He has used the royal purse, funded by donations from supporters, to embark on agricultural projects for poor peasants, social programs, and even flood-relief. Having eschewed formal politics, his enormous power has come almost entirely from his philanthropy.

In essence, the Thai military has removed one populist and replaced him with another. Due to the King’s military and popular support, the coup strongly favors the monarchy. It allows Bhumibol, who has close ties to coup leader General Sonthi and Acting Prime Minister Surayud Chulalont, to play a role in determining what form the new Thai democracy will take. Whether or not these three leaders are transparent in the process of addressing national concerns, rewriting the constitution, and rebuilding the government, will hold great bearing on the quality of democracy that results. Because he relies on a reputation of benevolence, Bhumibol has constrained himself and military leaders to achieving nothing less than success. They must restore a better, less corrupt, more representative, and more constructive democracy. If they do not, the power of the monarchy, the coup leaders, and the overall quality of democracy, will have taken a serious blow.

Live from West Point: A Paradigm Shift by Joshua Keating

2006-12-05T20:19:00.000-08:00

Last month, as I flew across the Eastern seaboard from the warm and crunchy confines of Oberlin to a strange new world of the Student Conference on U.S. Affairs at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the country’s political establishment was undergoing its own radical transition. As I was landing, I saw on the news that Donald Rumsfeld was stepping down as Secretary of Defense. Then the even bigger shock: Senator George Allen, after offending one macaca too many, was conceding to challenger Jim Webb, giving democrats control of the Senate. If ever there was a weekend to reexamine America’s global policy this was it.

With the appointment of Robert Gates to the Secretary of Defense post, James Baker and Henry Kissinger weighing in on the Iraq debacle, and increased calls to negotiate with Iran and Syria, it appears that realism is back in vogue in America’s foreign policy establishment. This was more than reflected in the conference.

SCUSA is an undergraduate foreign policy conference which has been held at West Point for the past 58 years. Hundreds of delegates from American colleges and military academies attend to discuss various aspects of US foreign policy. Oberlin sends one delegate every year thanks to generous funding by the Richard Hallock foundation.

At my table, which discussed US policy toward Russia and Central Asia (no Borat jokes please!) debate was lively and informed on topics ranging from nuclear non-proliferation to oil and gas reserves. But the mood became more despondent and confused when the topic of democracy building came up. One student delegate went so far as to say that democracy wasn’t even something we should be talking about.

The attitude was similar from the keynote speakers who addressed us. One professor said he believed that the Bush administration’s promotion of democracy in the Middle East had created a situation where we had no choice but to negotiate with regimes whose interests and beliefs are diametrically opposed to ours. A former prominent member of Bush’s foreign policy team admitted that since 9/11, America has a huge image problem and we should reorient our policies towards informing the world about all the great things we do rather than trying to impose our values. (I would name names but we were specifically told that the speeches were not for attribution and I never mess with a school were students are required to keep big-ass rifles in their dorm rooms).

Can it really be only 15 years since we were so sure that democracy and capitalism would triumph that some went so far as to proclaim “the end of history?” Ten years since Bill Clinton assured us that “commerce helps make the world safe for democracy?” One year since George W. Bush earned a round of applause from both sides of the aisle for proclaiming that “the advance of freedom will lead to peace,” and “We are witnessing landmark events in the history of liberty. And in the coming years, we will add to that story?”

Has the Bush team’s foreign policy, that deformed bastard child of Ronald Reagan and Leon Trotsky, made us so cynical about America’s role in the world that we’re going to give up on spreading democracy and human rights altogether, close off our borders to immigration and trade and focus solely on security?

The signs from the party now in control of congress are not promising. It was the Democrats, remember, who led the fight against the completely reasonable Dubai ports deal, a move widely viewed as racist and reactionary in the Muslim world. Democratic lawmakers have already signaled opposition to trade deals with Colombia, Peru and Haiti. And despite bipartisan support and favorable public opinion, the new Congress does not seem to have any plans in the works to do anything productive to make America’s immigration process more humane and sensible.

That voters have finally come around and recognized the true folly of Bush’s crusader foreign policy is a positive development. I was happy to see that both civilian and military delegates seemed to agree that military force was generally not the best way to accomplish the ideological objectives of U.S. foreign policy. Talking to our enemies and being humble in our goals would certainly be a welcome change, but I worry that disaffection with Bush’s Wilsonian idealism will lead to Jacksonian isolationism, to borrow Walter Russell Mead’s terms.
With the best of intentions, America’s foreign policy since 9/11 has created far more problems than it has solved. I hope that the new “realist” leadership in Washington, and the future leadership represented by students like those at SCUSA and at Oberlin, will recognize that in order to solve America’s problems, the nation must become more engaged in the world, not less.

Don't Mess With Russia by Kevin Brondum

2006-12-05T20:17:00.000-08:00

Russia and the United States are not friends. Events since the collapse of the USSR have disappointed the US’s initial euphoric hopes of easy cooperation with its former nuclear rival, and a bright, democratic future for the newly liberalized country. The end result of 74 years of Soviet communism and 15 years of post-Soviet liberal capitalism is a large country frustrated by the loss of its superpower status, struggling to maintain its traditional sphere of influence, disillusioned with its new capitalist democratic system, and engaged in an endless, exhausting effort to defeat the separatist movement in Chechnya.

It can only help so much to assign blame for Russia’s ongoing difficulties to liberal democracy. The West had no role in the escalation of the Chechen conflict, or President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to curtail and gradually undo democratic reforms, but its promotion of the “shock therapy” program, which sought to privatize Russia’s state-run economy as quickly as possible, was disastrous. It put property formerly held by the government up for grabs, and the ensuing economic free-for-all led to monstrously widespread mafia activity and helped boost a robber-baron oligarchy to power. Shock therapy brought about the collapse of the ruble in 1998, from which Russia has barely recovered.

Since then, the United States has managed to gall Russia in some other ways, not least by chipping away at Russia’s regional influence. Everyone following post-Soviet politics from the West has read or heard over-simplified, exultant reports of “color revolutions,” or “flower revolutions” in the media. The most recent examples are the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia (2003), the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine (2004), and the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan (2005). The typical account features a frustrated nation rising to demand that its corrupt, fraudulent, or dictatorial government be replaced with an accountable, honestly elected, democratic one.

The Western press is correct to characterize these movements as useful for the progress of Post-Soviet democracy, but deemphasizes the fact that these little “revolutions” would probably not have taken place without Western encouragement. American businessman and activist George Soros’s crucial financial and moral support for the Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution is well known and widely resented in Russia.

Former participants in the Rose Revolution later joined Westerners in supporting Ukraine’s Orange Revolution a year later in 2004, a popular protest against allegedly fraudulent results in the Ukrainian election. The initial results showed a narrow victory for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s favored candidate, Viktor Janukovich, which seemed to ensure Russia’s continued and unchallenged influence in Ukraine’s affairs. His opponent, Viktor Juschenko, had been the pro-Western candidate, and the favorite of Ukraine’s rising bourgeoisie. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which sent people to observe how the votes were tallied, reported fraud and voter intimidation intended to favor Janukovich, and Juschenko’s supporters took to the streets waving orange flags and wearing orange clothes to protest. The Orange Revolution, as it was called in the Western Press, successfully reversed the results of the election and granted the pro-Western Juschenko the presidential office.

Certainly, these color revolutions were a victory for democracy in principle. But Russians may be right to suspect ulterior motives in Western support for the “Rose” and “Orange Revolutions” — the politicians that came out the better for those events were, after all, pro-Western.

Whatever its motives, the frequency of Western interference in the affairs of post-Soviet states has won little good will toward our country from Russia. Russians’ feelings about the United States now approach paranoia. Aleksandr Prokhanov, a Russian writer, speculated quite ludicrously that the United States had incited France’s 2004 race riots to bully an ally that had opposed the Iraq invasion, and many Russians accepted the suggestion as entirely plausible. If Russians were capable of imagining that the United States engineered the Paris riots, they might easily imagine ulterior motives for American support of democratic movements in former Soviet Republics that have undermined Russia’s regional influence.

It should also come as no surprise, then, that Russia is beginning to assert itself in the geopolitical arena. At the G-8 summit, Russia refused to kowtow to the United States’ wishes in its policy toward Iran, a longstanding trade partner, and supported Iran’s claim to the right to enrich uranium in direct defiance of Washington’s wishes. Another illustrative example of Russia’s perceptible suspicion of the West was Air Force Commander Alexander Mikhailov’s open declaration in 2003 that Russia would shoot down any NATO spy plane caught flying even a kilometer inside Russian airspace.

The United States and its allies should feel fortunate that Russians’ popular distrust and resentment of the West has not escalated to outright hostility. We have to avoid antagonizing the only country whose nuclear arsenal matches the United States’ for sheer size. Of course the dynamics of deterrence virtually ensure that Russia would not stage a nuclear attack against us, but its stockpile gives it the muscle to assert itself. The Russian government has consistently shown its willingness to challenge perceived intrusions into its sphere of influence. In response to the success of the color revolutions, for instance, Putin accused Russian NGO’s of being “puppet” organizations, serving Western interests, and undermining Russian sovereignty. He signed a law permitting increased monitoring of their activities and funding, and gave the state the right to suspend any organization that got in the way of its governing effectively. The West’s unthinking intervention may, in fact, encourage the Russian state to tighten its control rather than progress toward a democratic ideal.

The Russian state guards its authority and power jealously from other contenders, such as big business, and still exercises much more power over the governed than has become traditional in the long-standing liberal democracies of the West. This is not the place to try identifying any deep cultural and historical causes for the ongoing difficulties of implementing democracy in Russia. I feel I can safely say, however, that democratization in Russia will be slow for a while to come. The West is not in a position to make Russia, nor any former Soviet Republic, democratic and free. After their defeat in the Cold War (and the West has treated it as a defeat), and the failure of “shock therapy”, why should the post-Soviet states continue to seek guidance from the West? Why shouldn’t they doubt Western competence, or the purity of Western intentions, in trying to “democratize” their state systems? If the former Soviet states are to democratize, they have to do it on their own.

Where Iraq Stands by Claudio Guler

2006-12-05T19:58:00.000-08:00

Unfortunately, a political stability spectrum figure that is included in the print version of the article failed to transfer into this blog. I trust the article to still be understandable.
-Angad Singh

It has become abundantly clear that US policy and objectives in Iraq following the military invasion in March of 2003 have failed. The aggregate result has been a shift to the left by Iraqi society along its political-stability spectrum (figure above). The American ideological dream of compelling Iraq to shift rightward now appears incompatible and has led to a virtual government on the right of the spectrum, when Iraqi society actually finds itself on the left. In response to such a lack of substantiated government, Iraqis are retreating to the security of their tribal networks. This transition has invigorated the sectarian violence formerly existent in both the religious and the tribal realms.

This article, the first of a two part series, aims at presenting a framework of the current Iraqi situation on a political-stability spectrum. Also, I will draw several conclusions for the prospects of a national Iraqi government controlling a unified Iraq. The second article will then use this framework and these conclusions to discuss possible approaches to shifting Iraqi society rightward on the political-stability spectrum to regain stability. The second article will also discuss the partitioning and federalization of Iraq as an alternative to the single state model.

A fundamental prerequisite for an effective democracy is that the parties involved must be willing to compromise and seek consensus. If, however, the parties cannot compromise, as can be observed in Iraq, the government becomes virtual and incapable of providing services to its citizenry. Upholding law and order being the most elementary of these. This is the current state of Iraqi politics. The strong sectarian resentments between the Sunnis and the Shiites are rooted in an approximately 1,350-year-old feud over the true disciple of the prophet Muhammad. In addition, there exists the tribal animosity between the Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds and their splinter sects. All this hostility now finds itself unchecked and manifests itself daily on the streets of Iraq. In the political arena, the system has become gridlocked. Such unwillingness to compromise due to embedded conflict has thrown Iraqi politics into a state of polarized pluralism. This political phenomenon can be described as a situation in which there are too many parties with opposing views striving to control the government. As a result, no party is willing to compromise because of the fear of losing power and influence. Each party plays to its own constituents and is consequently applauded for upholding extremist policies and refusing compromise. Such polarized pluralism is further exacerbated by the demographic makeup of Iraq.

The three major sects, the Sunnis (~30%), the Shiites (~60%) and the Kurds (~10%) are disproportionately represented in Iraq. Any hope of putting together a popular majority government is therefore dismal because the Shiites would automatically win a majority and gain control of Iraq. Undoubtedly, this would be unacceptable for Sunnis and Kurds. In summation, the sectarian feud and the tribal strife in Iraq as well as their uncompromising conditions have lead to polarized pluralism in the political system and violence in the streets. Iraq will not soon be able to successfully implement a democratic government.

Iraq’s modern history has no democratic heritage. Following WWI, the British gained control of the territory of Iraq from the Ottoman Turks and instated King Faisal as its occupational ruler. In 1932 Iraq gained its independence from the British and in the same year its leader, King Faisal died. His successor, King Ghazi ruled until 1939, but his rule was often troubled by attempted military coups. Next came the government of Rashid Ali, but that too lasted only until 1941 when the British once again invaded Iraq over issues of oil. Iraq was again granted its independence in 1947 with the British instating the Hashemite Monarchy. By 1958 the Hashemite Monarchy had come to its end and thereafter, several successive military coups led by the Iraqi Army resulted in a series of short-term dictatorial governments. Finally, in 1968 Saddam Hussein al-Majid al-Tikriti ascended to power. This too happened by way of a military coup. Historically speaking, democracy in Iraq has never blossomed, so for what reason should it prosper spontaneously in three short and conflicted years?

This brings me to a discussion of US policy in Iraq. The Bush Administration’s original plan was to instantaneously shift Iraq further rightward on the political-stability spectrum. While still maintaining stability, the Americans thought that they could compel Iraqis to compromise and create a functioning democratic state. However, this line of reasoning was naïve because of the foreseeable Iraqi reluctance to compromise. The problem was further aggravated by the US’s decision to oust all Baath party officials from the former Iraqi government and military under Saddam Hussein following the country’s occupation. As a result, Iraq found itself without any functioning government. But instead of patiently waiting for a new one to be erected, Iraqis retreated to the safety of their tribal networks and began functioning extra-governmentally. This has resulted in the abrupt slip of Iraqi society to the left on the political-stability spectrum. So if stability must be regained and the shift cannot be completed collectively and democratically, what options remain?

What must be avoided is a further slip to the left by Iraqi society on the political-stability spectrum. Currently, the only factor holding Iraqi society in a state of semi-civil war is the American military presence. If the US exits under the current conditions, Iraq will be left in a power vacuum. This would likely result in full-scale civil war and possible military interventions by neighboring counties such as Iran and Syria looking to influence the outcome of a post-war Iraq. Furthermore, large-scale refugee dispersions into neighboring countries would place these nations under immense stress and worsen the already catastrophic humanitarian crisis. International oil supplies would be further negatively affected, generating a possible international economic recession. In other words, this scenario is extremely frightening. If all else fails, the US military must contain the conflict within Iraq’s borders. Moreover, it is important to note here, that if Iraq were to implode into full-scale civil war, the discussion contained in this article will most probably be irrelevant due to the unpredictable outcomes of such a scenario.

So the option that remains is the regrettable reality of an autocratic government. So far, it has been the only form of government that has persevered throughout the course of Iraqi history. This is due to the fact that autocratic governments supplied with sufficient resources have been able to quell the sectarian divisions within the country through the use of violence. To maintain stability over a given territory, autocrats are presented with two options. The first is to make political concessions; the second is to apply terror. Given the dismal success rate of democratic Iraqi compromise, terror is historically the preferred means. That is why an autocratic government finds itself in the middle of Iraq’s political-stability spectrum. Although not approaching the moral desirability of the democratic right of the spectrum, the autocratic government has provided a relative degree of stability for Iraq in the modern age.

Such stability does however come at a significant humanitarian cost. Two examples that immediately come to mind are the 1982 Hama Massacre in Syria and Saddam Hussein’s chemical attack on the Kurdish city of Halabja in 1988. The Hama Massacre transpired as follows. A domestic uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood of Hama, Syria was not well received by President Assad. In response, he ordered that Hama be besieged, pummeled with artillery, and subsequently infiltrated. The death toll of the massacre was estimated at 20,000 persons. Surely not all were involved in the uprising. But who they were did not matter as much as the message the massacre sent to the remainder of Syrians. Similarly, Saddam Hussein’s chemical attack on the Kurds, which killed an estimated 10,000 persons, was an attempt to reestablish his political dominance by force. Much like in Syria, in Iraq stability and violence are not mutually exclusive.

In conclusion, the establishment of a functional state in Iraq will result in a positive shift to the right by Iraqi society on its political-stability spectrum. This is what must be accomplished to end the senseless bloodshed. Unfortunately, to achieve stability and maintain Iraq as a single entity, more atrocities are to be expected. An in depth discussion of the options available to achieve this rightward shift will be presented in the next article.

The final conclusions for the analysis of Iraq’s political-stability spectrum are the following. First, democracy in Iraq will not work for now due to polarized pluralism. Iraqi society’s inability to compromise has gridlocked the virtual, US imposed, “democratic” state and caused Iraqi society to slip into a state of instability and semi-civil war. Second, Iraqi society must not slide further leftward along its political-stability spectrum. The civil war must be contained within the borders of Iraq as much as possible. Third, an autocratic government is the only form of government that has been able to control Iraq and offer a relative degree of stability, albeit at the regrettable humanitarian cost of such a regime. This is the context within which a constructive rightward shift for Iraq will be discussed in the following article.

Welcome to International Intelligencer!

2006-12-05T16:22:00.000-08:00

Greetings! This blog is an analog to the print version of International Intellgiencer, a publication featuring opinion/analysis articles about current foreign affairs. Our first issue is out now on Oberlin College campus, so pick up a copy. All articles from the printed issues will also be posted in this blog along with other tidbits that are exclusive to the blog.

The first issue features articles from Oberlin Students, however, participation is not limited to just Oberlin Students. Please contact angad.singh@oberlin.edu and andrew.brooks@oberlin.edu if you wish to submit an article, a letter, or anything else.

We look forward to your comments!