The Torch

NATO/US "surge" in Afstan?

2009-11-21T19:48:00.003-05:00

After the Slovaks? I don't know but even if more non-US NATO troops are sent will their presence be, er, meaningful and effective (see the Dutch angle at the end of this post)?

U.S. Enlists Allies in New Surge
Americans Seek Up to 7,000 Extra NATO Troops for Ramp-Up in Afghanistan

The Obama administration is in advanced talks with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies for a coordinated rollout of a new Afghan war strategy, which U.S. officials hope will include a commitment by European allies to send several thousand additional troops.

U.S. and European estimates of the new troops they may get from NATO allies vary from 3,000 to 7,000. Those would complement the additional U.S. forces Mr. Obama is considering; those options range from 10,000 to 40,000, but U.S. officials have said a combination of combat troops and training forces totaling 35,000 has gained the most momentum [35,000 would be quite something, one can but hope]...

U.S. officials' estimates of foreign troop increases are mostly targets at this point, and include some that already have been publicly announced or signaled by governments.

According to people briefed on U.S. plans, the Obama administration is targeting six European allies to contribute battalion-sized units, generally about 500 to 1,000 troops. Officials say they are most hopeful they can get commitments from Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

Italy, which has 2,800 troops in Afghanistan, has signaled it would be willing to keep deployed the 400 added soldiers it sent as part of stepped-up security surrounding the August Afghan elections [see Update here]. An Italian official declined to comment. U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown likewise has signaled intention to send 500 more troops [when the UK is dithering about 500 troops things are indeed at a pretty pass] , and Turkey has recently announced it is doubling its current complement from 800 to 1,600 [that's because they're now in command of the ISAF Kabul region, more here and note the "non-combat"].

Both Germany[see Update and Upperdate here] and the United Kingdom could find it politically difficult to commit more troops -- at least in the coming weeks.

Streamlining CF training for Afstan--in California: Task Force 1-10 (TF 1-10)

2009-11-21T14:19:00.005-05:00

One focal point for field exercises rather than two:

Canadian soldiers to face 'California Taliban' before real thing

In the northeastern reaches of the Mojave Desert lie a series of small villages with exotic names such as Medina Wasl, Al Jaff and Wadi Al-Ra'id. They are places that cannot be found on most maps.

The villages, built to resemble those in Iraq and Afghanistan, are part of a vast U.S. Army training ground known as "The Box," where soldiers must constantly be on guard against mock guerrilla attacks.

Soldiers from CFB Petawawa near Ottawa will travel to the training post in early January to face the desert insurgency. The troops will spend seven weeks in the high desert as part of their intensive preparation for Afghanistan.

Petawawa's 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group will send about 1,900 soldiers to Kandahar in late April for a six-month tour-of-duty [more on the Task Force here].

First, though, they will be exposed to what officials at Fort Irwin's National Training Centre [sic] call the "Afghan scenario:" elaborate simulations of Taliban ambushes, roadside bombs, suicide car bomb blasts and riotous mobs.

Fort Irwin employs U.S. soldiers, local actors, Afghan-Americans and Hollywood special effects artists to create ultra-realistic training exercises in the California desert...

Before their last tour of duty in Afghanistan in 2007 [2008 actually], soldiers from CFB Petawawa trained at both Fort Bliss, Texas and at Alberta's CFB Wainwright [see this post]. That training schedule, however, meant soldiers were forced to leave their families twice in the months before their overseas deployment [see this post].

This time, officials from CFB Wainwright will travel to Fort Irwin to work with the war-bound Canadian soldiers in Southern California...
Soldiers from CFB Petawawa will live in the desert bases and conduct daily operations as if in Afghanistan. They'll face various kinds of insurgent attacks and other crises.
"When you leave the base and enter The Box, you enter the mindset that you are in a theatre of operations," said Lieut. Dennis Power, public affairs officer for the 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. "Everything you do in The Box, you do as if you're in a theatre of operations."
Video cameras are mounted throughout the villages, allowing military trainers to review the conduct and reaction of soldiers to various situations. They can then offer critiques to both individual soldiers and their officers...
In preparation for their move to Southern California, soldiers at CFB Petawawa this week began to load more than 700 military vehicles onto railcars for transport to Fort Irwin.
A total of 3,700 Canadian soldiers, support staff and trainers will eventually be in Fort Irwin, allowing the brigade to be completely self-sufficient while in the Mojave Desert.
Soldiers from CFB Petawawa have been in training since September for their deployment to Afghanistan.

Canadian reliance on US forces for protection of development (and other) efforts/Dutch update

2009-11-21T13:46:00.005-05:00

Now and in the future:

MacKay in talks with U.S. over 2011 troop pullout

HALIFAX - Canadian troops can return home in 2011 assured that U.S. forces will be able to handle security for Canada's continuing diplomatic and development mission in Kandahar, Defence Minister Peter MacKay said Friday.

Enlarge Photo

The Canadian Press

Defence Minister Peter MacKay, left, and U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates field questions after a meeting at the Halifax Citadel National Historic Site in Halifax on Friday.

MacKay said he's had talks on the matter with the Americans, but no firm conclusion has been reached...

"We have discussions with other countries, including the United States, around issues of force protection on certain projects," MacKay said.

The Canadian army is set to end combat operations in Kandahar in July 2011, but the development mission will continue. MacKay had not previously explained how that would be possible without Canadian troops.

MacKay said U.S. soldiers already patrol one of the country's biggest signature projects, the Dahla dam in northern Kandahar.

"It's an example of where there will be a transfer of the security responsibilities and yet the project will continue.

"There is a means to continue that without the Canadian military (being) present."

...Gates said picking up the Canadian burden "is very much sustainable" for the U.S.

"We know this is coming for the Dutch in 2010 [but see this: "Cabinet to decide Afghan mission by Christmas"] and for Canada in 2011 and (NATO commander) Gen. (Stanley) McChrystal is planning appropriately," he said...

Gates noted Canada has suffered proportionally more casualties than any other NATO nation in Afghanistan [except for the Danes] and there is great sympathy among the allies ...

Here's a post on the dam from May 2009, and an excerpt from a September post:

...
The Canadian government set as a benchmark the creation of 10,000 seasonal jobs in the reconstruction of the Dahla dam but, so far, only 199 Afghans are working one year after the project was announced...

And more on the Dutch:

Dutch Expect Mission in Afghanistan to Continue

(Angus Reid Global Monitor) - Most people in the Netherlands think their country’s soldiers will continue to serve for some time in the international force fighting in Afghanistan, according to a poll by Maurice de Hond. 27 per cent of respondents say the Dutch mission in Urguzan will be extended, whereas 31 per cent say the mission will continue, but with fewer soldiers.

A fifth of respondents think Dutch soldiers could be relocated to another area in Afghanistan, and 14 per cent say all Dutch soldiers will return home after 2010 [emphasis added]...

Late last month, the Second Chamber voted, after an intense debate, against renewing the country’s troop commitment in Urguzan. However, on Oct. 23, Dutch defence minister Eimert Van Middelkoop declared: "You have to make the distinction between Afghanistan and Uruzgan. The parliamentary debate was only about Uruzgan. The motion is a fact, now it is up to the cabinet to make the next move. It is still open [emphasis added]."..

Compare with our government's dancing. And note:

...The Commons' resolution says out of Kandahar. Period. But not Afstan...

Update thought: Whatever our proportionate fatalities in Afstan (very small on any absolute scale) if the Dutch contrive to continue mililitary operations of some not insignificant extent, even though formally non-combat, after 2010 and Canada does not after 2011--then a very large part of credit we have gained with allies from our efforts will be about as valuable as the rocks and sand in the southern Afghan deserts.

When the going gets tough, and one is not necessarily a really important player, and all that. Latest speculation about allies here.

More on the consequences of failing in Afstan

2009-11-21T13:15:00.003-05:00

Further to this post,

"What If We Fail in Afghanistan?"/Strong horse update

David Bercuson weighs in:

Don't head for the exit
The West should set an objective, not seek a way out, which would mean defeat
...
The people of NATO's member countries are surely more confused than ever about the mission and have lost sight of the West's vital interest: to show the Taliban and their Islamist allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan that they will not be allowed to threaten a wide swath of South Asia from their mountainous redoubt along the border between the two countries...

...When the peoples of the Western democracies began to realize that their safe, secure and prosperous world still had to pay a blood tithe for their safety and security, they began to demand “exit strategies”: virtual guarantees that every war would have a predictable, controlled ending. But that's not what happens in war...

Wars almost always end politically, or they simply peter out – no matter how long it takes – because the determination and the physical capability of one side are greater than those of the other. When the stronger side persists, an end of some kind follows.

The West has the physical resources to wear the Taliban down, but now seems to have lost the will to do so.

Canada, Britain and the United States have lost fewer soldiers killed in six years of conflict in Afghanistan than the Allies did in one morning on June 6, 1944...

Unless the NATO countries actually fighting the Taliban can agree on a single unified political objective (the rest of NATO is important only symbolically but not militarily), there is no foreseeable successful exit strategy, and the only realistic exit strategy on the table right now consists of evacuation and defeat, either sooner or later. No political solution is in the cards for Afghanistan, as long as the ideological and religious core of the Taliban keep faith with their holy mission. At this point they have no reason not to.

Defeat in Afghanistan would return the Taliban to power in at least part of the country, virtually ensuring a resurrection of the civil war that raged from 1989 (when the Soviets left) to 1996, when the Taliban prevailed. Defeat could also embolden the Taliban in Pakistan to the point where they might eventually dominate that country or turn it into an Islamist state.

How long would India tolerate an Islamist state on its northwestern frontier?..

When the talk of “exit strategies” is closely examined, the real choices emerge. And they are stark. Fight this war to a successful outcome – understanding that success does not mean victory, though it must mean stability and security for most of the people of Afghanistan – or choose the pace of defeat.

War is both terrible and complex but one age-old dictum still applies. If you are attacked and you are defeated, you will pay significant consequences. The West was attacked and cannot lose the war in Afghanistan with impunity. That is an exit strategy with a high degree of risk and even more punishment in the long run.

David Bercuson is Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary

On India, an excerpt from an earlier post of mine:

...
My quick thoughts on Indo/Pak. I think he's rather over-optimistic about Pakistan, the army after all being the only thing that holds it together--other than fear of India which Mr Coll seems just to wish away. And I believe from all I've learned about the subcontinent that Indians still want Pakistan to go away (most recently, how would you like a fractious, semi-Islamist state with nuclear weapons next door? makes the Cold War look like a piece of cake by comparison). A split up of Pakistan, de-nuked so oder so, into bits under an Indian "sphere of influence" being the ultimate Indian goal, remember Bangladesh.

The Indo/Pak enmity (at the level of Pakistani national consciousness, where that exists) is fundamental and simply not appreciated as such in the West...

For Valour

2009-11-20T15:49:00.002-05:00

No excuse: I should have posted this earlier...

Congratulations to all those recognized by the Governor General for either valour or meritorious service last week.

Here are the citations for valour:

Warrant Officer David George Shultz, S.M.V., C.D.
Edmonton and St. Albert, Alberta
Star of Military Valour

On May 6, 2008, a Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team patrol was ambushed in the Zhari district of Afghanistan. At the first sign of contact, Warrant Officer Shultz formulated and executed a flanking manoeuvre to neutralize the insurgent position. After securing the area and providing a situational report, the patrol was attacked again. Regardless of the risks, Warrant Officer Shultz plunged into intense enemy fire to assess the situation, direct his soldiers and engage the enemy. He repeatedly re-entered the danger zone to extract casualties and execute the patrol’s fighting withdrawal. His leadership and courage inspired his soldiers and prevented further casualties.

***

Master Corporal Michael C. J. Bursey, M.M.V.
Shilo and Brandon, Manitoba; Conception Bay South, Newfoundland and Labrador
Medal of Military Valour

On September 3, 2008, during an insurgent ambush in the Zharey district of Afghanistan, an anti-tank round destroyed a light armoured vehicle, resulting in numerous serious casualties. While exposed to sustained enemy fire, Master Corporal Bursey repeatedly returned to the vehicle, in which ammunition was exploding in the ongoing fire, to help extract and tend to the casualties. Master Corporal Bursey’s composure and decisive actions ensured critical care for the casualties until their evacuation.

***

Sergeant Martin Joseph Jean Côté, M.M.V., C.D.
Edmonton and Lancaster Park, Alberta; Québec, Quebec
Medal of Military Valour

On June 2, 2008, insurgents ambushed a joint Canadian-Afghan patrol in the Zhari district of Afghanistan. As the patrol moved to seek cover, they triggered an improvised explosive device that seriously injured four members. Shaking off the effects of a severe concussion and oblivious to the ongoing attack, Sergeant Côté triaged the casualties, passed vital information to headquarters and began life-saving treatment. With the patrol unable to effectively break contact, he continued to expose himself to intense enemy fire, to treat injuries and encourage wounded personnel during the prolonged fighting withdrawal.

***

Warrant Officer Robin John Crane, M.M.V., C.D.
Edmonton and Morinville, Alberta; Bay Bulls, Newfoundland and Labrador
Corporal Tyler Brian Myroniuk, M.M.V.
Edmonton, Alberta
Medals of Military Valour

On August 4, 2008, insurgent forces surrounded an Afghan National Army company in a complex ambush in the Panjwayi district of Afghanistan. Warrant Officer Crane and Corporal Myroniuk selflessly remained in the danger zone to extract an Afghan casualty and support another Canadian soldier who was caught in the open. Together, they stood against over 30 insurgents using small arms fire and, when their ammunition was depleted, resorted to hand grenades to hold off the enemy. The courage of Warrant Officer Crane and Corporal Myroniuk saved Canadian and Afghan lives and prevented the company from being outflanked.

***

Corporal Mark C. W. Ejdrygiewicz, M.M.V.
Shilo, Manitoba and Lethbridge, Alberta
Medal of Military Valour

On September 3, 2008, during an insurgent ambush in the Zharey district of Afghanistan, an anti-tank round destroyed a light armoured vehicle, resulting in numerous serious casualties. While under constant fire from the enemy, Corporal Ejdrygiewicz worked to extract the injured from the vehicle, in which ammunition began exploding, while alternately providing suppressive fire against the insurgents. Corporal Ejdrygiewicz’s selfless courage under fire was pivotal to the protection and treatment of casualties.

***

Master Corporal Brent W. L. Gallant, M.M.V.
Borden and Angus, Ontario; Lower Sackville, Nova Scotia
Medal of Military Valour

On June 2, 2008, a Canadian soldier was wounded during an insurgent ambush in the Zharey district of Afghanistan. Surrounded on three sides, Master Corporal Gallant made his way through heavy enemy machine-gun fire to the casualty’s location and began treatment while using his body to shield the soldier from ricochets. Master Corporal Gallant’s unwavering devotion, courage and decisive actions were critical in the treatment and evacuation of the casualty, and were an inspiration to fellow soldiers of his platoon.

***

Sergeant Russell J. R. Gregoire, M.M.V., C.D.
Shilo, Manitoba; Fort Frances and Timmins, Ontario
Medal of Military Valour

On June 14, 2008, Sergeant Gregoire’s section was ambushed in the Zhari district of Afghanistan. What was initially considered light contact quickly became a concentrated amount of small arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire, splitting the section in two. With the lead element taking a serious casualty and in danger of being overrun, Sergeant Gregoire formulated an extraction plan. Regardless of the risks, he led the remainder of the section into heavier fire to provide cover for the beleaguered soldiers’ evacuation. Sergeant Gregoire’s selfless devotion and courage inspired his platoon throughout the three-hour engagement.

***

Sergeant Jayson William Kapitaniuk, M.M.V.
Edmonton, Alberta
Medal of Military Valour

On June 14, 2008, during a major battle group operation in the Zharey district of Afghanistan, elements of C Company were ambushed by insurgent forces. In an attempt to support a platoon that was pinned down under heavy fire, Sergeant Kapitaniuk repeatedly exposed himself to intense enemy fire to regroup his own troops and to relay counter-attack directives. His leadership, determination, and courage were vital to the effectiveness of his unit throughout the engagement and fighting withdrawal.

***

Corporal Jordan E. Kochan, M.M.V.
Shilo, Manitoba and Cochrane, Alberta
Medal of Military Valour

On September 3, 2008, during an insurgent ambush in the Zharey district of Afghanistan, an anti-tank round destroyed a light armoured vehicle, creating a deadly mass-casualty situation. Exposed to sustained enemy fire and the exploding ammunition from the burning vehicle, Corporal Kochan, then private, assisted and treated one of the wounded soldiers who had been ejected from the vehicle by the blast. With insurgents targeting the casualty collection points, Corporal Kochan’s actions were vital to the treatment and evacuation of casualties.

***

Master Corporal Paul D. Rachynski, M.M.V.
Edmonton and Bonnyville, Alberta
Medal of Military Valour

On May 6, 2008, a Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team patrol was ambushed in the Zharey district of Afghanistan. After neutralizing the initial threat, Master Corporal Rachynski selflessly led both Canadian and Afghan soldiers through heavy insurgent fire to rejoin his besieged patrol. Master Corporal Rachynski’s determination and calm under fire allowed his patrol to evacuate the wounded and execute a fighting withdrawal with no further casualties.

***

Corporal Anthony J. R. Rotondi, M.M.V.
Edmonton, Alberta and Hamilton, Ontario
Medal of Military Valour

On May 6, 2008, a Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team patrol was ambushed in the Zharey district of Afghanistan. While exposed to intense enemy fire, Corporal Rotondi assisted two seriously injured fellow soldiers and relentlessly returned fire to allow first aid and casualty evacuation. Corporal Rotondi’s bravery and perseverance in the face of a determined enemy were inspirational to those around him and helped save the lives of fellow soldiers.

***

Warrant Officer Dale Milton Verge, M.M.V., C.D.
Stephenville and Beachside, Newfoundland and Labrador
Medal of Military Valour

On March 30, 2008, insurgents initiated a fierce and persistent attack on an Afghan police sub-station in Spin Pir, Afghanistan. Early in the action, Warrant Officer Verge sustained significant injuries. Oblivious to his wounds, he re-engaged with suppressive fire and directed effective point defence, neutralizing the enemy and repelling the attack. Warrant Officer Verge’s selfless courage, tactical acumen and leadership set an example of resolve and prevented the sub-station from being overrun.

What an exceptional group of people. Reading the citations and the level of danger these men exposed themselves to, I'm amazed none of them are being awarded these decorations posthumously. Indeed, I'm thankful they aren't.

Following are the recipients of the Meritorious Service decorations:

Master Warrant Officer Rodney Albert Dearing, M.S.C., C.D.
Commander Pierre Christophe Dickinson, M.S.C., C.D.
Lieutenant-General Joseph Guy Marc Lessard, C.M.M., M.S.C., C.D.
Warrant Officer John Robert McNabb, M.S.C., C.D.
Lieutenant-Colonel Darryl Albert Mills, M.S.C., C.D.
Chief Warrant Officer Giovanni Moretti, M.M.M., M.S.C., C.D.
Brigadier-General Denis William Thompson, O.M.M., M.S.C., C.D.
Major James Edward Allen, M.S.M., C.D.
Warrant Officer Todd Barry Buchanan, M.S.M., C.D.
Colonel Jamieson Cade, M.S.M., C.D.
Major Michael Roy Deutsch, M.S.M., C.D.
Warrant Officer Michael Patrick Forest, M.S.M., C.D.
Major Stacy Allan Grubb, M.S.M., C.D.
Major Joseph Antonio Marcel Louis Hamel, M.S.M., C.D.
Colonel Charles Mark Hazleton, O.M.M., M.S.M., C.D.
Colonel Yann John Hidiroglou, M.S.M., C.D. (Retired)
Warrant Officer Kevin Thomas Johnson, M.S.M., C.D.
Colonel Vihar Govind Joshi, M.S.M., C.D.
Commander Kelly Brian Larkin, M.S.M., C.D.
Master Corporal Tyler J. Latta, M.S.M.
Major John Robert Prudent Latulippe, M.S.M., C.D.
Corporal Marc L. S. Murray, M.S.M.
Commander Steven Paget, M.S.M., C.D.
Master Corporal Jacob N. Petten, M.S.M.
Warrant Officer Jason Guy Pickard, M.S.M., C.D.
Major Catherine Enid Potts, M.S.M., C.D.
Corporal John Clifton Wayne Prior, M.S.M.
Colonel Jean-François Riffou, M.S.M., C.D.
Major Robert Tennant Ritchie, M.S.M., C.D.
Captain (N) Brendan Ryan, M.S.M., C.D.
Corporal Cameron M. Smithers, M.S.M.
Lieutenant-Colonel Martha-Anne Paule Stouffer, M.S.M., C.D.
Corporal Rory E. Swanson, M.S.M.
Commander John Aubrey Williston, M.S.M., C.D.
Warrant Officer Terence Charles Wolaniuk, M.S.M., C.D.

Bravo Zulu!

Afstan: Shooting the messenger

2009-11-20T13:55:00.006-05:00

I think Damian deals well the difficult substantive issues that have been involved in dealing with Afghan detainees. I'm going to look at how the matter is now being dealt with in Canada. I find the government's approach reprehensible.

But first full audio of Richard Colvin's testimony Nov. 18 to the Commons' Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan (I could not find a video).

Then some headlines in chronological order, first two a month ago:

MacKay seeks answers on abuse report
Opposition charges 'wilful blindness,' as defence minister says report about torture concerns didn't get to his desk

THE DETAINEE FILES: Canada's top soldier wants to know fate of missing Afghan reports [with videos]

Afghan detainees surrendered by Canada were tortured: Envoy

Officials dismiss Afghan torture claims
Canada would never participate in a 'war crime,' retired general says

Rick Hillier denies receiving Afghan abuse alert

Critics want Afghan torture case inquiry
Ottawa paints whistleblower as Taliban dupe

Torture issue arose in 2006
Source: Canadian officials discussed suspected abuse

And something to clear up: Mr Colvin is not a "senior" or "top" diplomat as most of our media insist on describing him. He is mid-level, roughly Lieutenant-Colonel equivalent I would think. This story gets much of that right, but (the headline also is completely mis-leading as political types or ministers would have had no involvement in his assignments)...

Colvin groomed in hot-spots around the world by Liberals and Conservatives

The man who is now the target of so much Conservative scorn was thought suitably intrepid to be assigned by his government masters to some of the hottest counter-insurgencies over the past 15 years.

A spokesperson for the Foreign Affairs Department said Richard Colvin, who has unleashed a political tsunami on the government with his stunning testimony about torture in Afghanistan, doesn't rate an official biography because he is a relatively lower-level functionary.

And yet Colvin served out sensitive Foreign Affairs missions in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territory before he was posted to Afghanistan. He is among the rare diplomats who have served in both Moscow and Washington, where he is now a first secretary in the intelligence liaison office...

Oops! From the current version of the official publication:

Canadian Representatives Abroad

United States of America - Washington, D.C.

Mission
The Embassy of Canada to the United States of America, Washington
...
Counsellor [emphasis added] (Political) R. Colvin

Mission		The Embassy of Canada to the United States of America, Washington

There are 18 counsellors at the embassy. Counsellor rank is one above first secretary.

A key point to me is that senior bureaucrats and CF officers apparently took no action for a long time on Mr Colvin's reports of Afghan government abuse/torture of detainees turned over by the CF (such abuse is absolutely common in many parts of the world but that's another story). Then he says a very senior official indeed told him to stop putting things on paper.

A question: if his reporting, on a very serious matter that became a political hot potato in February 2007, was not taken seriously, or was considered seriously flawed, why was no effort apparently made by Foreign Affairs or the CF otherwise to determine what was happening to detainees? The person doing the job was told, in effect, to down tools.

The government is now doing its worst to discredit Mr Colvin. In the Commons' Question Period this morning the government lead, transport minister John Baird, repeatedly maintained Mr Colvin's testimony and reports were not credible. So, if he was not credible in 2006-7, I ask again why was no effort made seriously at that time to find out the real facts? Did people simply not want to know?

It is also passing strange that if Mr Colvin lacked credibility in the eyes of his superiors he nonethless was posted to the very sensitive job of intelligence liaison in Washington, D.C. It's hard trying to have it six ways to Sunday. And it's also pretty reprehensible that top bureaucrats and CF officers are acquiescing in the government's politics of personal destruction.

I have no belief that things would be dealt with much differently under a Liberal government, though perhaps there would be fewer efforts to shoot the messenger. What a sad state of affairs this country is in.

By the way, there was no "first-hand" evidence (what the government decries Mr Colvin for not providing) for the torture of Mahar Arar nor for that of Messrs Almalki, Nureddin and El Maati either. It's not very often that foreign security services torture right in front of Canadian officials or let those officials physically examine prisoners soon after any torture.

Disclosure: I was a foreign service officer with External Affairs from 1974 until 1988, ending up with, er, middle rank.

Update: A judicious, in the best sense, editorial in the Globe and Mail (the editorial board, oddly, seems rather less Globeite agenda-driven that reporters and editors):

The torture and the paper trail
A consistent pattern of looking the other way when informed about the abuse of Afghan detainees would say something disturbing about a whole group of Canadian institutions

Upperdate: Fuller profiles of Mr Colvin are here and here.

Impact of AFG Surge Will Depend on Where/How Surge Happens

2009-11-20T12:57:00.003-05:00

While we await the U.S.'s final decision and plan for future troop deployments to Afghaniatan, BruceR over at Flit raises a good point - where any surge goes makes a big difference:

Experience has proved the only way you keep the Afghan police alive and honest long enough for them to make a difference is by living with them 24/7, not by driving out on alternate mornings to see if they’re still breathing. Putting more soldiers into KAF, by contrast, will increase the lineups at the French bistro and the Burger King, but will do absolutely nothing to help Afghans.

Nothing improves if we pull back

2009-11-20T11:45:00.001-05:00

Richard Colvin's recent testimony before a parliamentary committee has caused quite the tempest:

All detainees transferred by Canadians to Afghan prisons were likely tortured by Afghan officials and many of the prisoners were innocent, says a former senior diplomat with Canada's mission in Afghanistan.

Appearing before a House of Commons committee Wednesday, Richard Colvin blasted the detainees policies of Canada and compared them with the policies of the British and the Netherlands.

...

He said unlike the British and Dutch, Canada did not monitor their conditions; took days, weeks or months to notify the Red Cross; kept poor records; and to prevent scrutiny, the Canadian Forces leadership concealed this behind "walls of secrecy."

"As I learned more about our detainee practices, I came to a conclusion they were contrary to Canada's values, contrary to Canada's interests, contrary to Canada's official policies and also contrary to international law. That is, they were un-Canadian, counterproductive and probably illegal.

I was asked to comment on the situation by the folks at CBC's Connect with Mark Kelley, and if you weren't...ahem...lucky enough to have it on at the time, you can catch the clip here. (My sister-in-law happened to see me on one of the TV's at the gym, but the sound was turned down. Fortunate for her: I'm told I make a much better impression when you can't hear me.)

I've already committed a lot of 1's and 0's to the topic of detainees here at The Torch. If you're not a regular reader, this post sums up most of my thoughts on the issue, and I think lays out the central problem in all of this a bit more clearly than I've seen it anywhere in the MSM. Follow the links there and you'll find other material that adds more context.

There are also a couple of points I didn't have a chance to make in the CBC video or here on the blog in specific reference to the detainee issue.

First, it's worth remembering that the underlying issue with treatment of detainees isn't our procedures, our tracking, or our paperwork. In fact, it's not our anything. It's the Afghan police, judiciary, and penal system.

And by the way, we're already working on improving that. For those who didn't read it at the time, you should meet Kevin Cluett, one of the many unheralded and tireless Canadians working to make Afghanistan a better place. When I was in Kandahar, he was one of only four Canadian corrections officers in all of Afghanistan: one worked with the national government in Kabul, one was a senior leadership mentor for the local prison warden and supervisor of the crew at the KPRT, and two were mentors and trainers to the guards at Sarposa prison. I don't know if this situation has changed, but that small cadre was putting in long and dangerous hours to fix the root of the problem: Afghan prisons. Nobody's talking about that, though - not sexy enough.

And would all those moaning and groaning about what a disgrace this is be willing to surge CSC officers into Kandahar to turbo-charge that valuable program? I doubt it. Even if all the outraged said "yes, we should send more good Canadians from Correctional Services Canada into harm's way," would they also be willing to bump up the number of force protection soldiers keeping them relatively safe, to take more casualties as more vehicles were running up and down the roads between our bases and camps and the Afghan prisons, and to keep the program going past 2011 so it had a realistic chance at effecting a long-term, sustainable cultural change within the Afghan system?

Hands up if you think that's a realistic scenario? Right then. As I've said previously:

It's a fantastic idea.

But here's the kicker: there are a million fantastic ideas to move Afghan society forward, and we simply can't do all of them.

Does it make more sense to spend money on rehabilitating irrigation canals for Afghan food crops so a village can feed itself, or to spend that money on a prison so that incarcerated Taliban fighters get three squares a day? Should we be more concerned with providing a Village Medical Outreach to a hamlet that hasn't seen a real doctor in a decade or more, or with providing basic electrical service to a town, or with stocking a hospital's maternity ward with supplies and equipment, or with training children how to avoid land-mines, or with teaching police how to conduct a decent checkpoint or investigation, or with digging a well and providing a clean water supply to a collection of families without one now, or with building a school where the future of Afghanistan learns to read and add, or with providing a secure pay system for essential workers like doctors and teachers to help curb graft and corruption, or should we really be most concerned with heating a jail in the winter?

That was a run-on sentence, because the list of projects we could undertake would make for a run-on mission if we let it.

At this point, we can't fix everything. We need to focus our efforts on a limited spread of achievable goals. Protecting detainees better than we do is certainly achievable if we want it to be - but what other goals will be sacrificed to make it so?

Right now, this mission is about choices for Canada. It's about the difficult process of triage for an entire nation. Civilized countries are meticulous about human rights, even those of detainees. Has Afghanistan progressed to the point where this is the highest priority?

The other point I wish I'd been able to make properly was actually best put by BruceR at Flit:

You think we had our own jails in Cyprus or Suez? Neve is really arguing that, contra Bono, the world does not, in fact, need more Canada, regardless of whatever future massive human rights violations might seem to warrant Canadian military intervention, because we can't trust the jails of any country that might benefit from that kind of presence.

I have no doubt the plight of detainees in Afghan jails could be improved. No doubt whatsoever.

I have yet to hear a compelling argument, however, that would justify diverting scarce money and attention into a realistic fix, let alone a commitment to putting forth the long-term resources that would be required for that solution.

To those who throw their hands up and say this is yet another reason we should get out altogether, I ask: where will those Afghan prisoners be if we stop trying to help the Afghans build their country's institutions? Better or worse off? Let your righteous indignation chew on that question for a moment.

I suspect that if you're honest with yourself, you'll come to the same unsatisfying conclusion I have: in Afghanistan, if we let the perfect be the enemy of the good, nothing will ever get better.

Update: As usual, BruceR at Flit has some valuable things to say about the Afghan detainee transfer brouhaha, including some personal anecdotes about avoiding the taking of detainees while he was over there mentoring the ANA. Too much paperwork, it seems...here's a snippet:

With detainees, we always seemed to be in one of those perfect catch-22s that typified the ISAF mission. Afghan law said all detainees had to be brought before a judge within 72 hours of capture. This was rigorously enforced. Unfortunately, that made it kind of difficult, given the IED situation and everything else, for mentors to establish any kind of evidentiary linkage with an IED attack or other insurgent activity that would justify their continued detention and deliver detainee and evidence by road to Kandahar in time (if it was ISAF-collected evidence, the declassification and translation processes each would have taken days if not weeks). So by Afghan law, nearly all detainees, both innocent and guilty as hell, should have been promptly released by the judge on sight, and certainly many were.

Perhaps Canadians, who've hadn't taken detainees in a counterinsurgency situation before this since, oh, about 1902, weren't the best people to be instructing the Afghans on how to do this right. And once again, really we were falling afoul of that early handover by the West of Afghan sovereignty, to the point where we really had no control over what normally would be essential processes in a counterinsurgency fight: the courts, the prison system, police questioning. And we tried not to notice how much that subverted our other efforts.

Need I say the whole thing is worth reading?

New Canadian commander at Kandahar/More US troops to be under his command?

2009-11-19T15:31:00.006-05:00

Interesting development, see speculation about the US unit at the end:

The incoming commander of Canadian Forces in Afghanistan is preparing to change the focus of counter-insurgency efforts as he deals with the possibility NATO will once again enlarge the area under Canadian control.

Brig.-Gen. Daniel Menard said Thursday he plans to increase troop levels in the province's dangerous capital, [emphasis added, more here] marking a shift from existing strategy concerned largely with rural areas southwest of the city.

"We will be putting a lot of emphasis on Kandahar city," Menard said. "Kandahar city, for me, remains centre of gravity. It is certainly key terrain and it needs to be taken care of."

Menard's efforts in Kandahar city are expected to be bolstered by further additions of U.S. troops, who are likely to fall under Canadian command.

The NATO general in charge of southern Afghanistan, Nick Carter, is slated to issue orders by Monday that could significantly change the territory and resources under Menard's control [British Major General Carter took command of ISAF RC South on Nov. 1 for a year; the next commander will certainly be American, and I would expect the US to keep the command].

According to Menard, up to four more U.S. units could come under Canadian command [emphasis added, see below, perhaps all part of the brigade combat team mentioned].

"This is critical for me in order to move forward," he said. "Number of troops does make a difference."

Menard took over Thursday as commander of Task Force Kandahar from Brig.-Gen. Jonathan Vance, whose so-called "model-village approach" had won praise from Canada's NATO allies.

Current Task Force Kandahar (TFK) Commander, Brigadier General Jonathan Vance, greets the incoming TFK Commander, Brigadier General Daniel Ménard, upon his arrival at the Kandahar Airfield, 15 November 2009. THE CANADIAN PRESS/Handout photo/ Master Corporal Angela Abbey, Canadian Forces Combat Camera

"There is much that others can learn from what the Canadian Task Force [composition here, already includes one US Army infantry battalion along with one Canadian--and a US Army MP battalion may also be under Canadian command] has achieved in the last nine months," Carter said at the transfer of command ceremony.

"Canada had provided a model of how modern counter-insurgency should be prosecuted."

Under Vance, Canada's area of responsibility shrunk by more than half last summer with a surge in U.S. troops [see this post].

He took the opportunity to concentrate Canadian efforts in a series of villages in Dand district [more here], which saw a drop in insurgent activity during his tenure.

But Menard acknowledged the possibility that ISAF headquarters could once again enlarge Canada's area of operation.

"I am expecting some orders over the next two days," he said.

As far as I know no "further additions of U.S. troops" are planned for Kandahar province in the near future; though President Obama may decide to send a fair number, it will be some time before they arrive. I could well be wrong, but it seems unlikely to me that the US Army's combat unit at the province, the 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, would be put under Brig.-General Ménard.

But maybe the training/mentoring 4th Brigade Combat Team of the 82nd Airborne , now in the province could be put under Canadian command ("Task Force Fury", more here, here, and here--the Illinois National Guard 33rd BCT mentioned at the first link has left Afstan and I have not discovered if it's been replaced, maybe by the MPs for Kandahar). Just speculating about the 4th BCT. But, seeing as the very mobile Stryker BCT is covering Kandahar City in a broad arc from from west to north to south/southeast outside the city, the 4th BCT would seem appropriate for the city itself and immediate environs.

Afstan: I guess it all depends on what the meaning of "leaving office" is (and, silly soothing phrase, "glide path")

2009-11-19T13:32:00.005-05:00

But at least "glide path" is bit better than "off ramps". The Afghan president at his second inauguration (the headline of the Times story is misleading):

President Hamid Karzai today signalled the beginning of the end of foreign military intervention in his country, when he pledged that Afghan security forces would take the lead in combating the Taleban over the next three to five years...

Mr Karzai said: “Within the next three years, Afghanistan, with continued international support and in line with the growth of its defence capacity, wants to lead and conduct military operations in the many insecure areas of the country.

“We are determined that by the next five years, the Afghan forces are capable of taking the lead in ensuring security and stability across the country,” he said...

In conjunction with his aim to build up the Afghan security forces, Mr Karzai also pledged to try and make peace with the Taleban, whose insurgency has spread steadily across the country over the past three years.

“We invite dissatisfied compatriots who are not directly linked to international terrorism to return to the their homeland,” he said with clear reference to Taleban figures mainly residing in neighbouring Pakistan. “We will call Afghanistan’s traditional loya jirga [grand assembly] and make every possible effort to ensure peace in our country.”..

That would mean a much reduced need for foreign combat troops by the start of 2015. Now, is President Obama going to aim at having US troops basically out by 2013 or 2017 (the years when a new US president would actually assume office)? I'd bet on the former, in which case he'll be a two years ahead of President Karzai's timeline, a bit of a sticky wicket:

Barack Obama to set out 'end game' for Afghanistan
President Barack Obama has declared for the first time that his review of policy in Afghanistan will contain an exit strategy designed to avoid a "multiyear occupation" [terrible word choice that, fodder for the anti-war zealots].
...
"I am confident that when I announce my decision the American people will have a lot of clarity about what we are doing, how we are going to succeed... and most importantly what's the endgame on this thing," he told CNN.

"Unless you impose that kind of discipline it could end up leading to a multiyear occupation that won't serve the interests of the United States."

He added that he was determined to bring the war to an end before leaving office, though he was not asked if he expected that to be after 2012 or 2016.

"My preference would be not to hand off anything to the next president. One of the things I'd like is the next president to be able to come in and say I've got a clean slate," he said.

His remarks immediately raised concerns among allies that setting a limit on American military involvement would encourage the Taliban to lie low until US troops had pulled out, rather than forcing them to reconcile with the Kabul leadership.

A Western diplomat told the Daily Telegraph: "Reconciliation [see first story] is more likely to happen if the Talibs realise that they cannot simply wait you out.

"A short term surge that makes you look weak once you draw down from it is potentially an incentive to a war of attrition."...

BruceR.'s Afghan essentials

2009-11-18T11:02:00.003-05:00

1) Today's essential Afghan PowerPoint:

From the CounterInsurgency Center blog, essential info for troops heading to Afghanistan...

2) Today's essential Afghan reading

Gilles Dorronsoro.

Dorronsoro and, singing in a slightly different register, David Kilcullen are shaping the new Conventional Wisdom on Afghanistan virtually as I write. What's out, in this new CW? PRTs, NATO-style OMLTs, and clear-hold-build, at least as a generally applicable model for Afghanistan...

Afstan: Globeites hard at their agenda

2009-11-18T10:42:00.002-05:00

From Norman's Spectator:

...
--What the Globe reported on Afstan yesterday

Brown aims for Afghan withdrawal

Britain and other NATO partners could join Canada in withdrawing from active combat in Afghanistan, shifting the war to the Afghans in a process that could begin by the end of next year, according to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

Mr. Brown announced in a speech Monday night that he hopes to hold an international conference in London in January to decide on a withdrawal timeline in which his country's 9,000 troops, along with the rest of the NATO force, would hand over power to the Afghan National Army.

--What a former Globester now with the NY Times is reporting today

Brown Vows to Continue War Effort in Afghanistan

As President Obama moves closer to a decision on the United States military’s request for more troops in Afghanistan, the British government has made an unflinching commitment to continue its role as the second largest troop provider in the 43-nation coalition fighting the war.

In the face of opinion polls suggesting that British public opinion has moved sharply against the war in the face of rising British casualties, Prime Minister Gordon Brown and David Miliband, the foreign secretary, used major speeches in the past two days to reaffirm Britain’s determination to fight on in Afghanistan alongside the United States...

Predate: More on Mr Brown here.

Afstan: Slovakia first in hoped-for NATO troop increase

2009-11-18T10:00:00.003-05:00

Further to 3) at this post a month ago, it's now official:

Slovakia to add 250 NATO troops to Afghan mission

Slovakia pledged about 250 extra soldiers Tuesday to the NATO-led force in Afghanistan, the first of what British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said would be a series of international reinforcements.

The central European country will double the size of its 246-strong contingent in Afghanistan, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico said in a joint statement with Brown following talks in the British capital.

Brown, who has said he is lobbying allies in Europe and elsewhere for as many as 5,000 extra soldiers [see 2) here], said more such announcements were on their way.

"We will be approaching other countries and I believe that, including Britain, maybe 10 countries will be prepared to give extra support in Afghanistan," he said.

NATO's Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in the Scottish city of Edinburgh on Tuesday for an address to the group's parliamentary assembly, has so far steered clear of saying how many extra reinforcements the trans-Atlantic alliance was willing to send to Afghanistan.

He told delegates Tuesday that NATO was leaning toward adopting a new counterinsurgency strategy that would include a substantial number of extra troops — but he did not elaborate...

...neither he nor the Slovak leader said when or where the Slovaks might be deployed. They currently serve in the Afghan province of Kandahar and in Uruzgan alongside Dutch soldiers [emphasis added], but the statement said they could be relocated to "other territorial parts of Afghanistan."..

I'll be very suprised if 5,000 troops are pledged, and will bet that most of those who are will not be for combat, maybe some for training but certainly not mentoring in the field. And I'm very doubtful the biggies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain) will contribute much more. As for the Germans:

Germany to extend Afghanistan mission another year

"Ice Pilots" on History Television tonight

2009-11-18T09:37:00.003-05:00

First, a post two years ago:

Aging birds in the north

Don't let anyone say Canada has no Commandos up there...

Now today (not exactly a military story, but some of the planes were, via Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs):

Ice Pilots NWT wildly exhilarating

Keep your nose down, never pull on it.

And, by the way, if you're thinking of planning your wedding destination, or you're thinking of flying off on a second honeymoon, have you ever considered the high Arctic?

Those are just some of the suggestions made in tonight's premiere of the wildly exhilarating new docu-reality series Ice Pilots NWT, about a crew of hardy, hard-ass pilots who fly 1940s-vintage DC-3s and DC-4s across 1.2 million square kilometres of frozen lakes and unforgiving tundra hugging the North Pole [they fly for Buffalo Airways].

These are manly men and manly women, and if there's one thing you don't want to hear -- if you're a rookie passenger huddled among crates of supplies being ferried to mining camps and small communities up north -- it's, "We are having engine issues."

Despite the peppy music and fast editing, Ice Pilots NWT isn't a contrived competition show, like Ice Road Truckers or Survivor: North Pole. It's more of a chronological look at a season of white-knuckle flying in some of the world's most challenging flying conditions, but without the dry, authoritative tone of most workplace documentaries.

As produced by Vancouver filmmaker David Gullason, Ice Pilots NWT has a lively snap and a brisk tone and feel to it. You don't have to be wedged into a tiny cockpit and feel the roar of the engines to appreciate the drama and adventure of Arctic flying.

Ice Pilots NWT truly is a show everyone in the family can watch and enjoy together. (10 p.m., History Television) [emphasis added, program webpage here]...

One video, lots more here:

The Afghan Mission Dance: What are we waiting for?

2009-11-18T07:01:00.003-05:00

CBC's James Cudmore had two minutes with Defence Minister Peter MacKay this week to explore the daylight between the CDS's orders to start packing to get out of Kandahar by the summer of 2011 and statements by the Defence Minister and other politicians about some sort of CF presence post-2011.

Here's what the Minister told CBC (2 minute video):

The military mission as enunciated in the parliamentary motion calls for an end to military operations, so that is clear.

I think I said many, many times we are living within the spirit of the parliamentary motion. We are respecting the democratic decision that was made by a majority of parliamentarians here.

I’m saying we’ll live within the spirit of the parliamentary motion.

Oh, now I get it - all we need to so is channel the SPIRIT of the motion.

The dance continues...

Meanwhile, Senator Colin Kenny suggests something else at work here:

Kenny acknowledged that Canada may be delaying any post-2011 pronouncement until after the American strategy becomes clearer.

U.S. President Barack Obama is expected to decide imminently whether to send a troop surge to Afghanistan.

The reality is, Canada has no natural allies in Congress and must always rely on the administration to be positively disposed to it.

Thus, any request for help in Afghanistan from the Obama team would have to be carefully considered.

“Canadians don’t like to hear that too often, but it’s a reality.”

A bit more on this here, as well as a bit of history:

Post-2011: MND MacKay still dancing the Afghan fling

CDS serves a hard Afghan ball to the government

Afstan: Planning to end (most of?) the CF's mission/Update: Dutch and Aussies

"What If We Fail in Afghanistan?"/Strong horse update

2009-11-17T09:44:00.004-05:00

Steve Coll of the New Yorker is right on the mark, in my view:

Last week, I found myself at yet another think tank-type meeting about Afghan policy choices. Toward the end, one of the participants, who had long experience in government, asked a deceptively simple question: What would happen if we failed?

First, the question requires a definition of failure. As I’ve argued, in my view, a purpose of American policy in Afghanistan ought to be to prevent a second coercive Taliban revolution in that country, not only because it would bring misery to Afghans (and, not incidentally, Afghan women) but because it would jeopardize American interests, such as our security against Al Qaeda’s ambitions and our (understandable) desire to see nuclear-armed Pakistan free itself from the threat of revolutionary Islamist insurgents. So, then, a definition of failure would be a redux of Taliban revolution in Afghanistan—a revolution that took control of traditional Taliban strongholds such as Kandahar and Khost, and that perhaps succeeded in Kabul as well. Such an outcome is conceivable if the Obama Administration does not discover the will and intelligence to craft a successful political-military strategy to prevent the Afghan Taliban from achieving its announced goals, which essentially involve the restoration of the Afghan state they presided over during the nineteen-nineties, which was formally known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

What would be the consequences of a second Islamic Emirate? My scenarios here are intended analytically, as a first-draft straw-man forecast:

The Nineties Afghan Civil War on Steroids...
Momentum for a Taliban Revolution in Pakistan...
Increased Islamist Violence Against India, Increasing the Likelihood of Indo-Pakistani War...
Increased Al Qaeda Ambitions Against Britain and the United States [not to mention Canada]...

A previous post on Mr Coll:

How to deal with Afstan, AfPak, Indo/Pak, and al Qaeda/Update on strong horses

Strong horse update (from NATO's Danish Secretary General):

Nato chief: quick exit from Afghanistan will unleash 'global jihad'
Withdrawing from Afghanistan too quickly would allow al-Qaeda to return and launch a “global jihad” against the West, the head of Nato has warned.

Big Canadian operation at Kandahar ignored/Other CF Afstan news/Globeite update: Blackwater

2009-11-17T09:11:00.004-05:00

So far only the Globe and Mail (good on them, but a rather, er, curt story) has seen fit to report this; most of our media only pretend to cover the CF at Kanadahar, and don't even use what is reported--see second story:

Canadian offensive sees little action [that's good, right?]
Operation Hydra launches with 1,000 Canadian troops [emphasis added, that's big, right?] and 200 Afghanistan National Army soldiers in push toward a known Taliban command post south of Kandahar

One of the biggest Canadian operations of the entire Afghanistan mission launched this week with barely a shot fired.

More than 1,000 Canadian troops and 200 Afghanistan National Army soldiers surged towards the village of Haji Baba, a known Taliban command post south of Kandahar, on Sunday, encountering a single belligerent insurgent along with a maze of improvised explosive devices.

The lack of resistance has become a Taliban calling-card in recent international operations, often followed by an extended period of heavy IED activity. Canadian Forces expects the Haji Baba mission, titled Operation Hydra, to be no different.

As tanks, armoured vehicles and foot soldiers moved gingerly towards the village, locals actually approached them to ask for a shura, a meeting or consulation in many Muslim countries. The advance halted momentarily for the shura. Afterwards, residents began pointing out IEDs to Canadian and Afghan Forces, according to Canadian Forces Captain Lena Angell.

“That is definitely an important sign for us, that villager are actually coming to our assistance,” she said.

Canadian Forces have surrounded the village for several weeks, intercepting insurgents fleeing the town ahead of operation. Other insurgents have likely doffed any Taliban symbols and are now posing as long-time community members. The Canadians will spend much of the coming weeks interviewing locals to weed out the Taliban interlopers, according the a Forces spokesman.

From there, they the plan to turn Haji Baba into another “model village”, similar to Deh-e-Bah, where continuous military patrols have combined with a deluge of development projects to convince most locals to trust westerners and the democratic government they support [more here].

A broader story from CP, picked up by almost none of our major media. Fie!

Sizing up new Canadian tactics against changing insurgency in Afghanistan

The Canadian military says its new methods are effectively weakening the insurgency in Afghanistan, but the Taliban's resilience is raising questions about the changing nature of the guerrilla war.

Hundreds of fighting-age Afghans have been offered wages to work on development projects, sparing them from having to earn a living by fighting for the Taliban.

It's one of the counter-insurgency moves used under Brig.-Gen. Jonathan Vance, who will complete his tour of duty as top commander of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan on Thursday.

Combined with increased Canadian presence in key villages in Dand district [see link at end of story above], senior military officials suggest the insurgency in the area is beginning to fragment.

"It's early days, but I would like to posit we're seeing a definite split with some of the initiatives we're taking," said Col. Mike Patrick, the outgoing chief of operations for Canada's Task Force Kandahar.

He's referring to the breaking away of Afghans "who would pick up arms and fight with the Taliban to gain money, (who) aren't necessarily ideologically motivated but are trying to seek a methodology for feeding their family."

Their departure means that "for the Taliban, the pool for recruiting people has virtually dried up," Patrick said.

The insurgency now appears to be headed by commanders based in Pakistan - known as the Quetta shura after the city where Taliban leader Mullah Omar is said to be hiding - leaving local, part-time Taliban fighters vulnerable to being influenced by the Canadians.

But even so, the Taliban threat is showing few signs of waning, especially in traditional strongholds.

While Canadians have secured large areas of Dand district, for example, Panjwaii district remains volatile and was the site of the deaths of two Canadian soldiers last month...

Then there's a worthwhile Canadian Forces' initiative:

Kandahar field officers given wide powers over military spending
Four senior officers have authority to approve expenditures up to $1-million on everything from armoured cars to phone cards

When Canadian military personnel in Afghanistan decided last February to rent an undisclosed number of armoured vehicles for travelling around Kabul, they did not need to beg money from bean counters in Canada.

And when deployed soldiers bought more than $800,000 worth of cards for cellular phones, they did not have to push paper through the bureaucratic channels of the Department of National Defence.

They simply turned to their own bosses in the field.

Four senior military officers in Afghanistan have been given the authority to approve purchases of up to $1-million that are “in direct support of operations.”

Since April, 2008, the officers have approved 59 contracts, each worth more than $500,000, according to documents released under federal Access to Information legislation.

Until that time, all major Canadian military purchases in Afghanistan had to be made through the Public Works Department or the procurement branch of DND...

Many of the larger amounts that the four senior officers approved were to pay private security firms to guard forward operating bases, checkpoints and other Canadian military installations [more here].

There were four contracts this year, each for about $900,000, to pay for road and culvert repair in different districts. The military is hiring local villagers to do this kind of work to sustain a new anti-insurgency strategy in the so-called model villages it is defending southwest of Kandahar [see stories above].

Globeite update: Ms Galloway forgot to play the obligatory Blackwater card in the story above so today out it comes:

...in Iraq in 2007, private security guards employed by the U.S. security firm Blackwater Worldwide shot and killed at least 14 civilians in a crowded Baghdad square.

The company, now called Xe, is operating in Afghanistan, but it is unknown if it is employed by the Canadian military. The Defence Department will not divulge the names of the firms under contract for reasons of operational security...

Fie and hurl.

This Little Piggy Helped the Wounded

2009-11-16T20:09:00.002-05:00

Spotted in MERX:

Defence Research and Development Canada – Suffield (DRDC S) has developed a fully instrumented anaesthetized swine model that they have used extensively in both research and training efforts. Initial efforts using this animal model focused exclusively on issues involving chemical warfare (CW) agents. However, due to recent and ongoing conflicts in the world, the focus in military medicine has shifted to non-traditional battlefield injuries, specifically, blast injuries such as haemorrhage, non-penetrating, shock and resuscitation and crush injuries. Plans are in place to install research into these conditions at Defence Research and Development Canada – Suffield (DRDC S), this will necessitate the expansion of the domestic swine model (DSM) out of the operating room suite and adjust it new and non-experienced field conditions. The objective of the requirement is for assistance with an anaesthesized swine model used for trauma research projects and training program. The period of contract is from date of award to October 31, 2012.

Translation: we've been doing research on the effects of bio-agents using anaesthetized pigs, and now we want to look for better ways to treat trauma using the same set-up.

I hope DND communicators are ready for the animal rights folks who will, without fail, squeal in horror (pun intended) about this valuable life-saving idea. A note to PETA: this stuff can lead to ways to save more civilian lives, too - think of that the next time a friend gets into a car accident.

Another argument to expect from PETA and their ilk: pigs aren't like people, so we could be putting folks at risk with the results of this research. Oh yeah? Then why do many people undergoing heart valve replacement surgery get, are you ready for this, valves from pigs' hearts?

A bit more here.

Juno Beach and Francis Godon

2009-11-16T19:54:00.004-05:00

Further to this post,

"The story of a Metis veteran: The Measure of a Metis Man"

more from his son at Dust my Broom; the man wears the uniform well:

I want to say that it was a great honor to be with my father on this journey back to Juno Beach. He has in the last 10 or so years been able to open up as to his experiences and trauma during the D-Day landing and the 11 months he was kept as a Prisoner of War. This trip helped to calm some of the demons that have haunted him through out the years...

To arms, citizens, when duty calls. Breaks me up.

Not 'the "bravest woman in Afghanistan"'

2009-11-16T16:06:00.007-05:00

That's Brian Platt's view, at The Canada-Afghanistan Blog, of Malalai Joya:

Brave Women

Malalai Joya is now touring the Vancouver area with her new book, "A Woman Among Warlords". (I'm not going to link to it.) In general, she receives fawning press coverage. You'll often see her quoted as the "bravest woman in Afghanistan", which is apparently what the BBC dubbed her.

I went to a presentation of hers on Friday afternoon [Nov. 13], and this is her message: Canadians troops need to leave now, the status of women is worse than ever, and the current government under Karzai is just as bad as the Taliban government was. There is no hope for the future until the United Nations and NATO leave Afghanistan alone. I'm not simplifying anything; that's all she says, over and over again.

So what is Joya's solution for Afghanistan after international soldiers leave? That's a good question!

In fact, at the presentation she was asked what would prevent the Taliban from taking over after a NATO/UN withdrawal. Instead of answering the question, she proceeded into a long speech about how terrible the situation is right now. So I put up my hand and demanded she answer the question. This led to a long, angry exchange between the two of us that lasted about 10 minutes, at which point I was told to shut up by the "antiwar" organizers of the event.

Considering that Malalai Joya, rabble.ca, stopwar.ca, and Simon & Schuster have a book to sell, we're going to be hearing a lot from the "bravest woman in Afghanistan" over the next little while...

Read on for the brave women. Plus more from Terry Glavin:

An Encounter With The Latest Poster Girl For Dizzy, Bourgeois Vanity.
...
It is only in "the west" that she serves any purpose. She can be summoned as a sort of celebrity spokesmodel for that caste of the west's rich liberals who have a weird need to believe the lie that there is something "feminist" or "progressive" in the narcissistic, reactionary isolationism they have adopted as the defining mark of their own political virtue. It's the reason why so much effort is expended in building up a cult of celebrity around Joya. That's all that's going on here. It has absolutely nothing to do with what Afghan women want or need...

"Afghanistan: General disarray"/"Afghanistan is at the crossroads while Canadians sleepwalk"/Update: A poem

2009-11-16T15:48:00.007-05:00

Conference of Defence Associations' media round-up; excerpt:

...
The CDA returns to its readers after a busy hiatus. The Executive Director Colonel (Ret’d) Alain Pellerin and a number of defence stakeholders visited Afghanistan in October. They visited Kabul and Kandahar. Articles by General (Ret’d) Paul Manson and Tom Caldwell after the visit are linked below.

General (Ret’d) Paul Manson writes on how while Afghanistan is approaching a crossroads, Canadians are sleepwalking towards failure and that it is time for Canadians and the government to “wake up to the reality of Afghanistan.”
http://cda-cdai.ca/cda/commentary/afghanistan/sleepwalk021109

Thomas Caldwell for the National Post writes on his impressions from his recent visit to Afghanistan.
http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2009/11/09/thoma...

And excerpts from Gen. Manson's article, sentiments we at The Torch have been expressing for some time:

...The media’s preoccupation with ramp ceremonies at the expense of analytical reporting of events in the field has distorted the picture, as has editorial pressure to focus on bad news while ignoring less newsworthy successes.

Canadians’ misunderstanding of the reality in Afghanistan can also be excused in that they have scarcely benefitted from a rational political debate about the situation. The silence from the Conservative Government on the issue has been no less than stunning, especially in regard to what will happen when the fast-approaching parliamentary deadline of July 2011 arrives. Strong convictions are held by many analysts (myself included) that the imposition in early 2008 of the 2011 deadline by Parliament was a serious mistake. For one thing it sent an unfortunate message, not just to our enemy, but to our 41 allies in the International Security Assistance Force, telling them that Canada is no longer interested in saving Afghanistan from a return to power by the Taliban. It is a dismaying message to the people of Afghanistan, who desperately want us to stay. It gives other nations whose own publics might be wavering an excuse for reducing or extracting their military forces, which inevitably imposes a heavy burden on the Americans, whose contribution already far exceeds that of its allies.

Moreover, following through with the mandate to withdraw our military contingent two years from now will largely wipe out the great credit that Canada and Canadians, civilian and military alike, have earned through our significant contribution to date. After years of being regarded as the bad boy of NATO, going back to 1968, Canada’s international stature has risen immensely because of our work in Afghanistan. It will be lost unless Canadians reverse the course.

But it is not simply a matter of reputation. Canadians must realize that our military presence in Afghanistan is not purely about aiding a nation that desperately needs our help, important as that may be. There is also a vital national interest at stake, about which most Canadians seem blissfully unaware...

...the federal government must reverse its misguided policy of silence on the question, at last showing real leadership instead of governing reactively in response to polls. Opposition parties must discard their crass partisanship in favour of the national interest, in such a way that Parliament can reverse the unfortunate 2011 deadline. The media must exercise their enormous influence to inform our citizens of the real issues, and Canadians themselves need to think beyond their own discomfort over casualties and the fond belief that this is someone else’s war.

It’s time for Canadians to wake up to the reality of Afghanistan.

General (Ret’d) Paul Manson is a former chief of defence staff (CDS) and past President of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. He just returned from a five-day familiarization trip to Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan.

Update: Please read Primus' comment:

"Homage to a Government"
--Philip Larkin, 1969...

Canada's War Poet Now Downrange

2009-11-16T11:22:00.002-05:00

Based on recent postings, it appears Suzanne Steele of warpoet.ca is in theatre - a couple of her most recent pieces from the sand box:

48 Hrs. Leave

you see him. in KAF.
on the boardwalk.
where they all go
to catch a waft of normal – a latte, a Tim’s,
a game of dust hockey
blue against white,
maybe buy something
sparkly, or a pashmina for a girlfriend,
a new baby, a wife,
lid a laptop open
remember he has
another life than this
of waiting and fight.

fresh from outside.
body. eyes.
none of him quite there.
only that washed-eye stare
like he’s dipped his head
in chlorine for too long
bleached himself of anything
that he once was
back home in Texas or B.C.
or York or Kandahar.
the war in his head
bigger than that
outside the wire
where he’s got to go
in just a few hours
back to desert and night
back to bayonet, NVGs
rifle, the business,
his other side.

and this short & sweet piece, "Soldier's Words From Outside The Wire":

the sand

the sand

the sand

God damn

Cnd. soldier/ Kandahar province/2009

Afstan: More on the French (including the Legion) at the Tagab Valley/Across the border

2009-11-16T09:11:00.006-05:00

Further to this post,

Afstan snippets: French fighting...

Simple and to the point

2009-11-15T12:51:00.003-05:00

Update: From the comments, I'm not sure if it was made clear enough in this post that this comes from an e-mail making the rounds right now, and was not intended to be taken at face value.

- Damian

***

I came across this post this morning and thought it worthwhile for all to read:

I was sent this and decided it needed to be posted

We will remember them.

In France , at a fairly large conference, Prime Minister Steven Harper was asked by a French cabinet minister if Canadian involvement in Afghanistan was just an example of "empire building". Mr Harper answered by saying,

'Over the years, Canada has sent many of its fine young men and women into great peril to fight for freedom beyond our borders. The only amount of land we have ever asked for in return is enough to bury those that did not return.'

You could have heard a pin drop.

Read more at the Essex County Wine Report

COIN, not, er, peacekeeping/Stupidly committing journalism

2009-11-14T19:24:00.010-05:00

From the Chief of the Land Staff in a CP story. Seems realistic to me. Why can we not now simply say "Chief of the Army Staff" and "Chief of the Naval Staff", we've already got a "Chief of the Air Staff" (via Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs)?

Future of the army lies in counter-insurgency: General

Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, chief of land staff, speaks with reporters in Kandahar City, on Wednesday, Nov. 12, 2008. (Bill Graveland / THE CANADIAN PRESS)

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — Counter-insurgency operations will eventually displace the army's traditional peacemaking capabilities [emphasis added, see below] as it prepares for life after the Afghan mission, says the general in charge of Canada's land forces.

Though the Canadian military is drawing up plans to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2011 [without clear direction from the government, for shame], the counter-insurgency lessons it has learned from the mission will occupy a central role in the spectrum of the military's capabilities, said Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, chief of land staff.

He believes the current geo-political situation, in which developed countries are concerned about the security threats presented by failed states, has made the long-time penchant for peacemaking irrelevant.

"Peacemaking still saw the diplomatic political powers interacting with protagonists who were willing to sit down at a conference table with essential force being almost a last resort," Leslie said in an interview with The Canadian Press during a recent trip to Afghanistan.

"It's not going to be peacemaking anymore, it's going to be counter-insurgency because the odds of us doing peacemaking between two functional states are probably pretty low, ergo COIN (counter-insurgency)."

"Counter-insurgency will not form the cornerstone of our operations, but it's right in the centre of our spectrum of capabilities we're going to train for."

But Leslie stressed that eschewing peacemaking capabilities for counter-insurgency does not mean the army will cease peacekeeping. He views counter-insurgency and peacekeeping existing on a spectrum that includes classic warfare at the extreme end.

Leslie's comments provide an indication about how the army is preparing to configure itself following the end of the Afghan mission...

...recruitment numbers are up, and Leslie says he now has more volunteers for overseas missions than there are spots available. However he has yet to be told what, if any, future missions they should prepare for [emphasis added, so much for the "Canada First Defence Strategy" that has no actual strategy].

In the meantime, he will focus on retooling the army ability to conduct counter-insurgency operations. While that means incorporating lessons learned from Afghanistan into future training, it also requires continuing the overhaul of the army's equipment.

"Our equipment of 15 years ago had a lot of armour on the fronts and tops because we were going to go toe-to-toe with the Russian bear," Leslie said.

"Almost of all vehicles now are going to have massive capability on the bottom and side."

The IEDs and landmines are not a threat limited to Afghanistan, but they will be the weapons of choice for insurgents in any theatre, he said.

"We're moving the centre-mass of vehicle lower, we're putting more on the bottoms and sides you can still use those in classic war fighting. But we don't were [sic, "doubt we're?] going to be doing a lot of classic war fighting [more on planned new vehicles here]."

Aaargh! This typical bit of Canadian journalistic nonsense: "Counter-insurgency operations will eventually displace the army's traditional peacemaking capabilities." Placed in the first paragraph to scare the pants off the gullible Canadian public. A truly stupid thing to write.

COIN operations, which would have to be ordered by the government of the day (want to bet for some long time to come?), have nothing/nothing to do with peacemaking (read "peacekeeping") capabilities. The Army that did peacekeeping from 1956 on was not trained primarily for that function. It was mainly trained most of the time to fight a major war against the Soviet Union ("we were going to go toe-to-toe with the Russian bear").

That did not hinder the Army's subsidiary peacekeeping operations (peacekeeping was never the government-assigned priority, see below); rather the inherent capabilities of a trained combat force enabled the Army also to perform as peackeepers. And I would argue that an army with extensive COIN training might be even better peacekeepers in the modern, non-state separating, context (should the government assign the mission) since that army will be much more attuned to knowing about and working with local populations.

These were the defence priorities in the Chrétien government's 1994 White Paper on Defence, the last such paper from a Canadian government, pity:

...
Chapter 3 - Combat-Capable Forces

21. At present, there is no immediate direct military threat to Canada, and today's conflicts are far from Canada's shores. However, Canada cannot dispense with the maritime, land and air combat capabilities of modern armed forces.

22. We must maintain a prudent level of military force to:
deal with challenges to our sovereignty in peacetime;
generate larger forces if needed; and
participate effectively in multilateral peace and stability operations and, if and when required, in the defence of North America and our allies in Europe, and in response to aggression elsewhere.
23. We must take account of the changing face of peacekeeping. The nature of these operations has changed considerably and now poses far more risks to our personnel [clearly a reference to the CF's participation in UNPROFOR ( think Medak Pocket), the UN's peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Croatia that ended up a horrible failure] .

Peacekeeping almost seems to have been an afterthought, as it were. Would it not be nice if those committing journalism actually knew rather more about the subjects they write about?

As for peacekeeping these days, see:

Peackeeping humbug

Why UN peacekeeping is no longer such a Good Thing



Current Task Force Kandahar (TFK) Commander, Brigadier General Jonathan Vance, greets the incoming TFK Commander, Brigadier General Daniel Ménard, upon his arrival at the Kandahar Airfield, 15 November 2009. THE CANADIAN PRESS/Handout photo/ Master Corporal Angela Abbey, Canadian Forces Combat Camera