Thomas Aquinas Study Circle

Q66: The order of creation towards distinction

2008-06-01T21:14:00.000-07:00

Q65 A4: Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels?

2007-01-01T17:07:00.000-08:00

No. Corporeal forms are not from the angels but from God because all contrary opinions seem to have a common error (they all, in fact, seek for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought into being) whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26,27,28), proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the "composite."

Thus material forms come, not by emanation, but by motion.

We must not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent.

But since the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be referred to God as the first cause.

But in the first production of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately from God, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause.

According to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a single separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all horses, whilst above this is separate life, or "per se" life, as they term it, which is the cause of all life, and that above this again is that which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being.

Avicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist "per se" in matter, but in the intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures (called "intelligences" by them, but "angels" by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times, who say that God indeed created all things, but that the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it into species.

Q65 A3: Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels?

2007-01-01T17:05:00.000-08:00

No. Corporeal creatures were produced immediately by God because in the act of coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and it is impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone.

No secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that nothing can create except God alone, Who is the first cause.

Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by God, Moses said: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."

Q65 A2: Whether corporeal things were made on account of God's goodness?

2007-01-01T17:02:00.000-08:00

Yes. The Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things because the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God.

Reasonable creatures, however, have in some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him.

Origen laid down [Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God, and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given an higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the degree of their turning away.

But this position is erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after narrating the production of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins, "God saw that it was good" (Genesis 1), as if to say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But according to Origen's opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not because it was good that it should be, but that the evil in another might be punished.

Q65 A1: Whether corporeal creatures are from God?

2007-01-01T17:00:00.000-08:00

Yes. There must be one principle of being from which all things in whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual, or visible and corporeal because being is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different.

Q65: The work of creation of corporeal creatures

2007-01-01T16:59:00.000-08:00

Q64 A4: Whether our atmosphere is the demons' place of punishment?

2006-12-31T16:49:00.000-08:00

Yes. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that "the darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment day" because a twofold place of punishment is due to the demons: one, by reason of their sin, and this is hell; and another, in order that they may tempt men, and thus the darksome atmosphere is their due place of punishment.

Now the procuring of men's salvation is prolonged even to the judgment day: consequently, the ministry of the angels and wrestling with demons endure until then. Hence until then the good angels are sent to us here; and the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial: although some of them are even now in hell, to torment those whom they have led astray; just as some of the good angels are with the holy souls in heaven. But after the judgment day all the wicked, both men and angels, will be in hell, and the good in heaven.

Q64 A3: Whether there is sorrow in the demons?

2006-12-31T16:47:00.000-08:00

Yes. Sorrow must be said to exist in them because it is of the very notion of punishment for it to be repugnant to the will.

Moreover, they are deprived of happiness, which they desire naturally; and their wicked will is curbed in many respects.

Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far as they are passions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus they are proper to the sensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ. According, however, as they denote simple acts of the will, they can be in the demons.

Q64 A2: Whether the will of the demons is obstinate in evil?

2006-12-31T16:45:00.000-08:00

Yes. The demons remain ever obstinate in their malice because the angel's apprehension differs from man's in this respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we apprehend immovably first principles which are the object of the habit of "intelligence"; whereas man by his reason apprehends movably, passing from one consideration to another; and having the way open by which he may proceed to either of two opposites.

Consequently man's will adheres to a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it and of clinging to the opposite; whereas the angel's will adheres fixedly and immovably. Therefore, if his will be considered before its adhesion, it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite (namely, in such things as he does not will naturally); but after he has once adhered, he clings immovably.

So it is customary to say that man's free-will is flexible to the opposite both before and after choice; but the angel's free-will is flexible either opposite before the choice, but not after.

Q64 A1: Whether the demons' intellect is darkened by privation of the knowledge of all truth?

2006-12-31T16:42:00.000-08:00

No. Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that, "certain gifts were bestowed upon the demons which, we say, have not been changed at all, but remain entire and most brilliant" because the knowledge of truth stands among those natural gifts.

The knowledge of truth is twofold: one which comes of nature, and one which comes of grace. The knowledge which comes of grace is likewise twofold: the first is purely speculative, as when Divine secrets are imparted to an individual; the other is effective, and produces love for God; which knowledge properly belongs to the gift of wisdom.

Q64: The punishment of the demons

2006-12-31T16:41:00.000-08:00

Q63 A9: Whether those who sinned were as many as those who remained firm?

2006-12-27T10:58:00.000-08:00

No. More angels stood firm than sinned because sin is contrary to the natural inclination, while that which is against the natural order happens with less frequency; for nature procures its effects either always, or more often than not.

Q63 A8: Whether the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning?

2006-12-27T10:56:00.000-08:00

Yes. The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning because it did not compel them but rather induced them by a kind of exhortation.

Although the demons all sinned in the one instant, yet the sin of one could be the cause of the rest sinning. For the angel needs no delay of time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as man, who requires deliberation in order to choose and consent, and vocal speech in order to exhort; both of which are the work of time.

Q63 A7: Whether the highest angel among those who sinned was the highest of all?

2006-12-27T10:52:00.000-08:00

Yes. He who sinned was probably the very highest of all because the motive of pride is excellence, which was greater in the higher spirits.

This seems to be the more probable view: because the angels' sin did not come of any proneness, but of free choice alone. Consequently that argument seems to have the more weight which is drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet this must not be prejudicial to the other view, because there might be some motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower angels.

On this account Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set over the terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the view of the Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ. Dei vii, 6,7; x, 9,10,11). For they said that all the gods were good; whereas some of the demons were good, and some bad; naming as 'gods' the intellectual substances which are above the lunar sphere, and calling by the name of "demons" the intellectual substances which are beneath it, yet higher than men in the order of nature.

Nor is this opinion to be rejected as contrary to faith; because the whole corporeal creation is governed by God through the angels, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5). Consequently there is nothing to prevent us from saying that the lower angels were divinely set aside for presiding over the lower bodies, the higher over the higher bodies; and the highest to stand before God. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that they who fell were of the lower grade of angels; yet in that order some of them remained good.

Q63 A6: Whether there was any interval between the creation and the fall of the angel?

2006-12-27T10:49:00.000-08:00

No. The devil proabably sinned at once after the first instant of his creation because this must be maintained if it be held that he elicited an act of free-will in the first instant of his creation, and that he was created in grace (Q62, A3).

For since the angels attain beatitude by one meritorious act (Q62, A5), if the devil, created in grace, merited in the first instant, he would at once have received beatitude after that first instant, if he had not placed an impediment by sinning.

Q63 A5: Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation?

2006-12-27T10:47:00.000-08:00

No. It was impossible for the angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate act of free-will because the agent which brought the angels into existence, namely, God, cannot be the cause of sin.

Q63 A4: Whether any demons are naturally wicked?

2006-12-27T10:45:00.000-08:00

No. The demons are not naturally wicked because everything which exists, so far as it exists and has a particular nature, tends naturally towards some good, since it comes from a good principle.

Now it is manifest that every intellectual nature is inclined towards good in general, which it can apprehend and which is the object of the will.

Hence, since the demons are intellectual substances, they can in no wise have a natural inclination towards any evil whatsoever; consequently they cannot be naturally evil.

Q63 A3: Whether the devil desired to be as God?

2006-12-27T10:42:00.000-08:00

Yes. Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as God according to likeness because he desired resemblance with God in this respect -- by desiring, as his last end of beatitude, something which he could attain by the virtue of his own nature, turning his appetite away from supernatural beatitude, which is attained by God's grace.

Q63 A2: Whether only the sin of pride and envy can exist in an angel?

2006-12-27T10:41:00.000-08:00

Yes. After the sin of pride, there followed the evil of envy in the sinning angel, whereby he grieved over man's good, and also over the Divine excellence, according as against the devil's will God makes use of man for the Divine glory because as to affection only those sins can be in the demons which can belong to a spiritual nature.

Q63 A1: Whether the evil of fault can be in the angels?

2006-12-27T10:36:00.000-08:00

Yes. An angel or any other rational creature considered in his own nature can sin because only in the Divine will can there be no sin, whereas there can be sin in the will of every creature, considering the condition of its nature.

Q63: The malice of the angels with regard to sin

2006-12-27T10:35:00.000-08:00

Q62 A9: Whether the beatified angels advance in beatitude?

2006-12-12T22:35:00.000-08:00

No. The beatified angels can neither merit nor advance in beatitude because every rational creature is so led by God to the end of its beatitude, that from God's predestination it is brought even to a determinate degree of beatitude; consequently, when that degree is once secured, it cannot pass to a higher degree.

Merit and progress belong to this present condition of life. But angels are not wayfarers travelling towards beatitude, they are already in possession of beatitude.

Q62 A8: Whether a beatified angel can sin?

2006-12-12T22:32:00.000-08:00

No. The beatified angels cannot sin because the beatified angel can neither will nor act, except as aiming towards God since beatitude consists in seeing God through His essence (and God's essence is the very essence of goodness).

Consequently the angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the same way as anyone else not seeing God is to the common form of goodness.

Now it is impossible for any man either to will or to do anything except aiming at what is good; or for him to wish to turn away from good precisely as such.

Therefore the beatified angel can neither will nor act, except as aiming towards God.

Q62 A7: Whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels?

2006-12-12T22:31:00.000-08:00

Yes. Natural knowledge and love remain in the angels because so long as a nature endures, its operation remains; but beatitude does not destroy nature, since it is its perfection.

Q62 A6: Whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts?

2006-12-12T22:28:00.000-08:00

Yes. It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the degree of their natural gifts because it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of grace and fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature, and because the angel is not a compound of different natures, so that the inclination of the one thwarts or retards the tendency of the other; as happens in man, in whom the movement of his intellective part is either retarded or thwarted by the inclination of his sensitive part.