Musings On Iraq

Terrorists Strike Baghdad With Massive Bombings For Third Time

2009-12-08T21:59:00.000-08:00

Terrorists again struck downtown Baghdad on December 8, 2009. This time several targets were attacked including the Karkh federal appeals court in Mansour west Baghdad, a police patrol in front of a technical college in Dora south Baghdad, the headquarters of the state-run Rafidain Bank in downtown where many Finance Ministry workers had relocated after their building was destroyed in an August 2009 bombing, and Iraq’s Judicial Institute in northeast Baghdad. The courthouse was totally destroyed, and overall at least 127 people were killed and 500 wounded.

These bombings follow the August attacks on the Foreign and Finance Ministries, and the October bombings of the Justice Ministry and Baghdad provincial council building. The bombings could have been predicted. Since the beginning of 2009 casualties have gone up and down. November saw the fewest monthly deaths since the U.S. invasion in March 2003. December therefore is going to be a bloody time in comparison even though fatalities are at their lowest level since the beginning of the war. The bombings have followed the same pattern of occurring every other month.

The attacks are meant to undermine the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who has built a large part of his popularity upon bringing relative calm to Iraq. It also allows militants to gain media attention, raise money, and appear much stronger than they actually are. Finally, it effects the operation of the government, which already works at a snails pace. Many basic services were no longer available immediately after the bombings in August and October because the various ministries and bureaucracies were disrupted.

Iraq’s insurgents, who were behind the bombings, have lost most of their standing with the Iraqi public. They can’t even launch these massive attacks every month like they use to. Unfortunately, the country’s society and politics remain so divided that there is still plenty of space for militants to operate and kill hundreds of people each month.

SOURCES

Arraf, Jane, “Baghdad bombings: Iraqis demand security,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/8/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Today’s blasts leave federal appeal court 100% devastated,” 12/8/09

Londono, Ernesto, “At least 127 dead in string of Baghdad bomb attacks,” Washington Post, 12/8/09

Myers, Steven Lee and Santora, Marc, “Election Date Set in Iraq as Bombs Kill Scores,” New York Times, 12/8/09

Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “At least 127 killed as explosions rock Baghdad,” Los Angeles Times, 12/8/09

Roggio, Bill, “Suicide attacks killed more than 120 Iraqis in Baghdad,” 12/8/09

Strobel, Warren and al Dulaimy, Mohammed, “String of bombings in Baghdad kills 127 people,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/8/09

Iraqi Parliament Passes Election Law – Again

2009-12-07T18:51:00.000-08:00

Just before midnight on December 6, 2009 Iraq’s parliament passed a second draft of the election law. The new legislation mixes versions of the original law and the amended version, and seems to be headed for confirmation by the Presidential Council.

The first version was passed on November 8, and used statistics from 2009 provided by the Ministry of Trade to determine how many seats were up for grabs in each province. Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi vetoed the bill saying that more seats should be made available to Iraq’s two million refugees, many of whom are Sunnis, which is Hashemi’s constituency. The Kurdish Alliance took advantage of the veto to amend the law so that it used 2005 numbers instead, which increased the number of seats available to the three Kurdish provinces, while reducing seats in eight other governorates. That was heading for another veto by Hashemi until the recent compromise came about.

The new election bill uses parts of both the original and amended election laws. First the Kurds will get three extra seats, second refugees will be counted as part of their home provinces, and third every governorate will get an increase in seats.

The Kurds were still holding out for more, but calls from President Barak Obama and Vice President Joe Biden convinced them to vote for the legislation. In turn, the U.S. promised that there would be a national census in 2010, and that the status of the disputed territories would be resolved. The former has already started, and needs no American help. However little has happened with the disputed areas since the U.S. invasion in 2003. A referendum was supposed to be held at the end of 2007 to determine their future, but that was delayed and then abandoned. The United Nations also offered reports on each disputed territory, but that led nowhere. The issue remains another intractable one in Iraqi politics.

For now, Iraqis can rejoice that elections are finally moving forward. They are still going to happen past the January 31, 2010 deadline set by the constitution. February or March are being mentioned as new dates. The problem is the current government’s term expires in March, and it’s predicted that it will take the major parties several months to put together a new one. That means some kind of caretaker regime will have to be created in the meantime, which will open up a whole other can of constitutional worms showing that when one issue is resolved in Iraq, there is always another one in the wings.

Seat Distribution 2005 Election Law vs. 2010 Election Law
Anbar 9 vs 14
Babil 11 vs 16
Baghdad 59 vs 68
Basra: 18 vs 24
Dhi Qar: 12 vs 18
Diyala 10 vs 13
Dohuk 7 vs 10
Irbil 13 vs 14
Karbala 6 vs 10
Maysan: 7 vs 10
Muthanna 5 vs 7
Najaf 8 vs 12
Ninewa 19 vs 31
Qadisiyah 7 vs 11
Salahaddin 8 vs 12
Sulaymaniya 15 vs 17
Tamim 9 vs 12
Wasit 8 vs 11
Compensatory Seats 45 vs 15
TOTAL: 275 vs 325

SOURCES

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “Iraq lawmakers approve election law,” Los Angeles Times, 12/7/09

Visser, Reidar, “No Second Veto: The Election Law is Approved by Tariq al-Hashemi and the Iraqi Presidency,” Historiae.org, 12/6/09

Security Situation In Mosul, November 2009

2009-12-06T11:36:00.000-08:00

The security situation in Iraq was a little different in November 2009. Unlike previous months, Baghdad province was not the deadliest place in the country. Rather Ninewa, largely driven by events in the provincial capital Mosul, had the most deaths for the month. Last month Ninewa had 61 attacks resulting in 41 dead and 80 wounded, compared to 59 attacks in Baghdad, 38 deaths, and 165 wounded. Around 90% of the violence in Ninewa occurred in Mosul. There were 55 attacks there in November, resulting in 37 deaths, and 71 wounded. That averaged out to 1.83 attacks per day, 1.23 deaths, and 2.36 wounded. That was the lowest number of attacks since January 2009 when there were 52, and an average of 1.67. 37 was also the lowest number of deaths since at least 2006, if not before.

Mosul is the second most violent city in Iraq after Baghdad. That’s because it is the largest urban stronghold of the insurgency. There are daily reports of assassinations, bombings, and attacks on local officials and security forces. That has begun to change however. Starting in November 2008 attacks and casualties began to see a steady decline. That coincided with the run-up to the January 2009 provincial elections, and the formation of the al-Hadbaa List. The coalition was a collection of Mosul business elites, tribal leaders, and Kurds opposed to the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. (3) Al-Hadbaa was eventually able to work out a cease-fire with local insurgents, and got the backing of local Baathists and their fighters, who by 2008 had been able to assume command of the fighting there from Al Qaeda in Iraq. Al-Hadbaa ended up winning the election, which marked a return of Sunni Arabs to politics in Ninewa after they had boycotted the 2005 vote. The greater participation is directly responsible for the reduction of attacks in Mosul. The divide of the city between Arabs and Kurds however, still gives some reason to turn to violence, and the continued security incidents there.

Attack and Casualty Statistics for Mosul – January to November 2009

January 52 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 1.67/day
56 Deaths, Avg. 1.80/day
56 Wounded, Avg. 1.80/day

February 81 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.89/day
58 Deaths, Avg. 2.00/day
111 Wounded, Avg. 3.96/day

March 86 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.77/day
69 Deaths, Avg. 2.22/day
169 Wounded, Avg. 5.45/day

April 79 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.63/day
53 Deaths, Avg. 1.76/day
191 Wounded, Avg. 6.36/day

May 83 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 3.06/day
64 Deaths, Avg. 2.06/day
164 Wounded, Avg. 4.70/day

June 73 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.43/day
58 Deaths, Avg. 1.93/day
123 Wounded, Avg. 4.10/day

July 73 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.35/day
79 Deaths, Avg. 2.54/day
169 Wounded, Avg. 5.45/day

August 77 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.48/day
102 Deaths, Avg. 3.29/day
171 Wounded, Avg. 5.51/day

September 72 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.40/day
65 Deaths, Avg. 2.16/day
60 Wounded, Avg. 2.00/day

October 66 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 2.12/ day
60 Deaths, Avg. 1.93/ day
82 Wounded, Avg. 2.64/ day

November 55 Attacks/Incidents, Avg. 1.83/ day
37 Deaths, Avg. 1.23/ day
71 Wounded, Avg. 2.36/ day

Averages:

4th Quarter 2007: 38.66 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 1.26/day
77.33 deaths/month, Avg. 2.52/day
114.66 wounded/month, Avg. 3.73/day

1st Half 2008: 57.5 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 1.89/day
88.00 deaths/month, Avg. 2.90/day
210.00 wounded/month, Avg. 6.92/day

2nd Half 2008: 75.33 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 2.45/day
80.83 deaths/month, Avg. 2.63/day
168.33 wounded/month, Avg. 5.48/day

1st Half 2009: 75.66 Attacks/Incidents/month, Avg. 2.50/day
59.66 deaths/month, Avg. 1.97/day
135.66 wounded/month, Avg. 4.49/day

For a history of the violence in post-invasion Mosul see:

The Changing Face of Violence In Mosul

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 charred bodies found inside car bomb,” 11/1/09
- “2 civilians killed in Mosul,” 11/19/09
- “2 civilians wounded in cab bomb blast in Mosul,” 11/1/09
- “2 gunmen killed in IED blast they planted,” 11/8/09
- “2 policemen wounded in hand-grenade blast in Mosul,” 11/12/09
- “3 children wounded in Ninewa blast,” 11/15/09
- “3 mortar shells hit central Mosul,” 11/9/09
- “3 soldiers wounded in Mosul blast,” 11/15/09
- “13-year-old Christian boy shot down in Mosul,” 11/13/09
- “Army officer killed in Mosul blast,” 11/23/09
- “Asiacell employee gunned down in Mosul,” 11/2/09
- “Body found, civilian killed, another wounded separately in Mosul,” 11/12/09
- “Bomb kills child, wounds 5 civilians in Mosul,” 11/15/09
- “Car bomb causes slight damage in Mosul,” 11/25/09
- “Child wounded in Mosul blast,” 11/11/09
- “Civilian killed in eastern Mosul,” 11/9/09
- “Civilian killed, son wounded in western Mosul,” 11/16/09
- “Civilian wounded as police detonates IED,” 11/22/09
- “Civilian wounded by Iraqi fire in Mosul,” 11/10/09
- “Cop wounded in Mosul blast,” 11/11/09
- “Employee shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 11/1/09
- “Gunmen kill employee in Mosul,” 11/22/09
- “Gunmen wound lawman in Mosul,” 11/3/09
- “Gunmen wound policeman in Mosul,” 11/8/09
- “Hand grenade wounds woman in Mosul,” 11/28/09
- “IED injures 2 cops in Mosul,” 11/20/09
- “IED wounds 2 civilians in Mosul,” 11/16/09
- “IED wounds 5 in western Mosul,” 11/6/09
- “Iraqi soldier shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 11/26/09
- “Judge survives assassination attempt,” 11/17/09
- “Lawyer shot dead by gunmen in Mosul,” 11/1/09
- “Mortar attack on Sunni endowment leaves 3 wounded,” 11/3/09
- “Officer killed, 2 cops wounded by roadside bomb in Mosul,” 11/5/09
- “Policeman killed by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 11/7/09
- “Security element killed in Mosul,” 11/30/09
- “Soldiers wounded in clashes with gunmen,” 11/21/09
- “Teacher gunned down in Mosul,” 11/21/09
- “Thermal bomb kills, injures 2 cops in Mosul,” 11/30/09
- “Thermal bomb leaves child killed, 4 wounded in Mosul,” 11/22/09
- “Thermal bomb wounds civilian in Mosul,” 11/16/09
- “Turkmen politician assassinated in Mosul,” 11/22/09
- “Unidentified body of young man found in Mosul,” 11/13/09
- “Unknown bodies found in Mosul,” 11/4/09

DPA, “Bomb kills three in northern Iraq,” 11/17/09

Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 3 November 2009,” 11/3/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 10 November 2009,” 11/10/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle Over Ninewa,” 9/28/09

Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 6 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/6/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 8 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/8/09

Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov. 9,” 11/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 26,” 11/26/09

Foreign Investment Increasing In Iraq, Led By UAE

2009-12-04T19:33:00.000-08:00

A recent report by the Dunia Frontier Consultants company found that foreign investment in Iraq is increasing over the last year, led by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The report said that direct foreign investment had more than doubled in the first nine-months of 2009 compared to all of 2008. Total investment is now estimated at $156 billion, a 241% increase from 2008. There are now 53 companies operating in Iraq from 24 countries. The UAE has placed $37 billion in Iraq, 25% of all investment. Their most recent deal was just announced on November 29, when a UAE company signed a contract to build a five-story, 5-star hotel in Karbala for 3,000 guests that is to be completed in the next four years. Karbala is a major destination for Shiite religious tourists. UAE businesses are also involved in a $20 billion real-estate deal in Baghdad and an $8 billion energy deal in Kurdistan.

Other countries putting money into Iraq are South Korea with $24.7 billion, the United States at $22 billion, England at $10.5 billion, Lebanon at $10.1 billion, and Kuwait with $6.8 billion. Overall, according to the Brookings Institution Iraq Index, foreign investment has increased from an average of $10 million a month from 2004-2007, to now $100 million a month in 2008 and 2009. The vast majority of these funds are going into Iraq’s energy sector, which is slowly opening up to foreign companies.

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction however points out that foreign companies are still severely limited in Iraq. The World Bank’s “Doing Business 2010: Reforming Through Difficult Times” ranked Iraq 153 out of 183 countries for promoting private enterprise and investment. That placed it at the bottom of the region. The major reasons are Iraq’s legislation and bureaucracy. The most cited example is that Iraqi law restricts foreign ownership of land, and requires companies to pay for the cost of services wherever they do business. The Iraqi parliament has tired to fix this by passing a new law recently that allows 100% foreign ownership of property except for places with oil, gas or minerals. The Kurdistan Regional Government already has such a law, and is seen as being much more successful in attracting foreign companies because of its better security situation, and more inviting laws. An August 2009 survey of 120 Iraqi businessmen pointed out other problems that make Iraq a difficult place for investors. Those include the lack of an effective legal system and regulations, poor protection of property rights, corruption that adds 20-30% to costs, excessive red tape, and difficulty in getting licenses and credit.

World Bank Ranking “Doing Business 2010”
Saudi Arabia #13
Kuwait #61
Turkey #73
Jordan #100
Syria #143
Iraq #153

The improved security situation and the recent efforts of the Iraqi Oil Ministry are largely responsible for the increase in foreign investment in Iraq. Outside of Kurdistan however, almost all of this money is going into natural resources because Iraqi laws are still seen as creating a negative environment for companies. Baghdad has only just recently begun to promote itself as a destination for foreign companies to do business, and still retains a top heavy, state-run economy. The government needs to find a balance between its national interests and those of foreigners, and adjust its laws appropriately because the country needs as much money as it can get right now to develop as U.S. and foreign aid is declining, and oil is not bringing in enough to cover its budget.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Contract with UAE firm to build highest hotel in Karbala,” 11/29/09

Ibrahim, Waleed and Benham, Jason, “Iraq passes key investment law,” Reuters, 11/23/09

MENAFN, “UAE firm to build tourist hotel in Karbala,” 11/30/09

O’Hanlon, Michael Livingston, Ian, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 11/20/09

Sambidge, Andy, “UAE tops list of foreign investors in Iraq in 2009,” Arabia Business, 11/24/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09

More On Wasted Reconstruction Projects In Iraq

2009-12-03T18:25:00.000-08:00

It’s been reported here many times before that one of the greatest signs of failure of the United States’ effort to rebuild Iraq was the number of large reconstruction projects that the Iraqis have not been able to maintain after they were handed over to them. The November 21, 2009 New York Times provided a few more examples:

• $270 million water treatment plant in Nasiriya, Dhi Qar. Works only at limited capacity because the equipment is too sophisticated for its Iraqi workers.

• $4 million maternity hospital Hilla, Babil. Doesn’t have staff or enough supplies. Iraqis were never trained on equipment that U.S. installed.

• $98 million wastewater treatment plant Fallujah, Anbar. Serves only 1/3 of homes it’s supposed to because government doesn’t deliver enough fuel for it to operate at full capacity.

• Ibn Sina Hospita, Baghdad. Was the largest American military medical facility in Iraq with $7.9 billion worth of equipment. Iraqi Ministry of Health didn’t have staff or supplies to maintain it so it was shut down.

• $165 million Basra Children’s Hospital. Has been under going construction for last four years and is $115 million over budget. Iraq hopes it will open sometime in mid-2010, but doesn’t have enough staff for it.

Based upon reports by the Congressional Research Service, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, and Government Accountability Office the major cause of these problems were that the Americans never asked the Iraqis what they wanted or could handle, didn’t provide enough training, the poor management skills of the Iraqis, a lack of funds from Baghdad, middle class flight due to the sectarian war that robbed the country of many of its professionals, and poor maintenance standards after years of wars and sanctions.

SOURCES

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Williams, Timothy, “U.S. Fears Iraqis Will Not Keep Up Rebuilt Projects,” New York Times, 11/21/09

League Of Righteous Breaks Off Talks With Baghdad

2009-12-03T18:16:00.000-08:00

On December 1, 2009 it was announced that the Iranian-backed, breakaway Sadrist group, the League of the Righteous, had ended its talks with Baghdad and would not run in the upcoming parliamentary elections. The cited reason was that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki refused to release the League’s leader Qais Khazali who is being held by the Americans at Camp Cropper outside of Baghdad. At the beginning of August 2009 Maliki met with members of the League and said that they had renounced violence, and that they wanted to run in the 2010 balloting. The two sides also agreed to release League members held by the U.S. as long as they hadn’t killed Iraqis. By the end of September over 100 had been set free.

Around the same time, the League’s spokesman, former Transport Minister Salam al-Maliki, unveiled the group’s list, the Covenant, which would run in the 2010 elections. This seemed to worry Moqtada al-Sadr, who was afraid that the new party would cut into his supporters, some of which were upset that he had decided to turn away from the Iraqi street and militancy to try to participate in the government again. It probably worried him even more when rumors spread that Maliki was thinking of having the Covenant join his State of Law list, and Sadr’s overtures to the League to get them to rejoin his movement were rejected. Those all seems over now that they are withdrawing from the voting.

The talks between the government and the League began months earlier when Baghdad was acting as a mediator between the British government that wanted the release of five of their nationals that were kidnapped by the League back in May 2007 during a raid on the Finance Ministry. In March 2009 the group said that it would exchange the British hostages in return for ten of their leaders being freed by the Americans. On June 20, the bodies of two of the Britons were released, Jason Swindlehurst and Jason Creswell who were security guards. On September 4, a third guard, Alec MacLachlan, was turned over, but he too was dead. Another guard is also believed to be deceased, but Peter Moore, an internet technician is thought to still be alive. His fate is now up in the air as the talks between the League and Baghdad have fallen apart.

Qais Khazali, a former leader in the Sadrist movement when it was led by Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, Moqtada’s father, formed the League of the Righteous in 2006. Khazali was chosen by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force to lure members of the Mahdi Army away from Sadr, and bring them closer under Tehran’s wing. The League quickly made a name for itself when it attacked the Karbala Joint Coordination Center in January 2007, killing five U.S. soldiers. That led to the March arrest of Qais, and his brother Laith, as well as a Lebanese Hezbollah commander Ali Musa Daqduq that was coordinating Iran’s financing and training of the League and other Special Groups. The group retaliated with its raid on the Finance Ministry in Baghdad in May 2007, which resulted in the five Britons being kidnapped. Some think they were pawns to be traded for the release of the Khazali brothers. That took far longer than they thought, as Laith was only just released in June 2009 as part of the deal worked out with the Prime Minister, two years and one month after the Baghdad attack. Qais is still in custody, which is why the talks with the government broke down. This leaves the group in limbo, as it does not have its leader, has renounced both violence and participation in the upcoming elections, and is probably not receiving much attention from Iran either as it is more focused upon the major Shiite parties that it wants to win the vote. It’s not even clear what constituency the League has, so this could be a sign of its demise.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “2nd UPDATE: Iraqi PM Met Group Behind Kidnap Of Britons,” 8/3/09
- “Iraqi kidnappers abandon govt talks,” 12/1/09
- “Over 100 from Iraqi group who killed Britons freed,” 9/27/09

August, Oliver, “End the torment, says Brown as death of British hostage is confirmed,” Times of London, 9/4/09

Awan Daily, “Maliki announced next week, the electoral coalition,” 9/25/09

Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/09

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Mohammed, Abeer, “Maliki’s Chess Game,” Institute of War & Peace Reporting, 9/10/09

Roads To Iraq, “Iraqi pre-election political map – The Shiites scene,” 9/21/09

Rubin, Alissa, and Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Frees Suspect in Killing of 5 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 6/9/09

Nov. 09 Sees Lowest Death Count Since U.S. Invasion

2009-12-01T20:22:00.001-08:00

Casualties in Iraq continue to fluctuate up and down with each month in 2009. October had a high number of deaths compared to September, so it was predictable that November would see lower figures. It also had the fewest deaths since the U.S. invasion in March 2003. As usual, Iraq Body Count recorded the highest number of deaths at 212 last month. The Iraqi Ministries reported 122 deaths, icasualties had 105, the Associated Press only counted 90 and English language press reported 190. In comparison, in October the Associated Press found 364 deaths, mostly due to the bombings in Baghdad in the middle of the month. The roller coaster pattern began in December 2008. January 2009 had fewer deaths, than the numbers went up for two months, before going into an up and down pattern for each month since April to the present.

November was also marked by very few mass casualty bombings (ten or more dead and/or wounded). There were only ten such attacks last month, resulting in 43 deaths and 136 wounded. That too was the lowest number of casualties this year from these types of actions, and the fewest bombings since early 2004.

November still saw wide scale violence however as there were attacks in fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. In October, as in most months, Baghdad was the most violent area of the country. Last month, while that province still had the most casualties overall, 203, Ninewa actually had the most deaths, 41 versus 38 in Baghdad. Those two were followed by Anbar with 31 deaths, Tamim with 25, Diyala with 21, and Salahaddin with 13. In southern Iraq there were some large bombings that resulted in 163 wounded overall, while Babil remains the most unstable province in the region as it is on the fault line between Sunnis and Shiites. Iranian backed Special Groups are also the likely culprits behind five attacks on American forces in southern Iraq, including a sniper attack that killed an American solider in Wasit. November also saw two rare attacks in the Kurdish region that resulted in two deaths. Kurdistan has been the most stable part of the country for years now.

2009 continues to see the fewest overall casualties since the 2003 invasion. This was largely due to the decision by Sunni parties, civilians, and insurgents, to participate in the January 2009 provincial elections after they boycotted the 2005 ones. The up and down pattern in deaths also defies many reports and predictions that violence would increase after winners and losers were pronounced in the 2009 vote, and that attacks would go up before the 2010 parliamentary balloting, that were originally planned for January. Iraq still remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world, but it is nowhere near what it was during the sectarian war of 2006-2007 when the country was at the precipice of total collapse.
Iraqi Deaths

	Brookings Institution	Iraq Body Count	icasualties	Iraqi Ministries	Associated Press
2008
July	500	584	419	465	510
Aug.	450	592	311	431	475
Sep.	400	535	366	440	503
Oct.	350	528	288	318	446
Nov.	270	473	317	340	360
Dec.	350	522	320	316	393
2009
Jan.	270	276	187	191	242
Feb.	230	343	202	258	288
March	260	416	278	252	335
April	340	484	347	355	371
May	240	332	188	165	225
June	320	488	367	438	447
July	220	395	240	275	309
Aug.	300	593	439	456	425
Sep.	200	299	158	203	238
Oct.	240	408	320	410	364
Nov.	N/A	212	105	122	90
Averages
3^rd Qtr. 2008	450.0	570.3	365.3	446.3	496.0
4^th Qtr. 2008	323.3	507.6	308.3	324.6	379.6
1^st Qtr. 2009	253.3	345.0	222.3	233.6	288.3
2^nd Qtr. 2009	300.0	434.6	300.6	319.3	347.6
3^rd Qtr. 2009	240.0	428.0	279.0	311.3	324.0
Last 6 months of 2008	386.6	539.0	336.8	385.0	447.8
First 6 months of 2009	276.6	389.8	261.0	276.5	317.5

Number of Mass Casualty Bombings and Statistics – January to November 2009

January 2009
Bombings: 10
Deaths: 104
Wounded: 185

February 2009
Bombings: 8
Deaths: 52
Wounded: 143

March 2009
Bombings: 15
Deaths: 155
Wounded: 297

April 2009
Bombings: 21
Deaths: 198 + 32 Iranians
Wounded: 497 + 105 Iranians + 10 Americans

May 2009
Bombings: 9
Deaths: 111
Wounded: 262

June 2009
Bombings: 14
Deaths: 174
Wounded: 517

July 2009
Bombings: 35
Deaths: 180
Wounded: 655

August 2009
Bombings: 44
Deaths: 359
Wounded: 2,252

September 2009
Bombings: 13
Deaths: 70
Wounded: 263

October 2009
Bombings: 22
Deaths: 241
Wounded: 887

November 2009
Bombings: 10
Deaths: 43
Wounded: 136

Attacks and Casualties By Province November 2008

Ninewa: Attacks: 61
Dead: 41
Wounded: 80

Baghdad: Attacks: 59
Dead: 38
Wounded: 165

Anbar: Attacks: 25
Dead: 31
Wounded: 59

Tamim: Attacks: 32
Dead: 25
Wounded: 39

Diyala: Attacks: 35
Dead: 21
Wounded: 82

Salahaddin: Attacks: 13
Dead: 13
Wounded: 7

Southern Iraq: Attacks: 24
Babil: 9
Wasit: 4
Basra: 3
Karbala: 3
Dhi Qar: 2
Maysan: 2
Qadisiyah: 1
Dead: 19 + 1 American
Wounded: 163

Likely Special Groups Attacks In Southern Iraq
U.S. patrol hit by IED in Basra 11/19/09
Sniper kills U.S. soldier in Wasit 11/22/09
IED attack on U.S. patrol in Dhi Qar 11/23/09
Katyusha Rocket hits U.S. base in Qadisiyah 11/27/09
Mortar attack on U.S consulate in Babil, 11/28/09

Kurdistan: Attacks: 2
Dead: 2
Wounded: 0

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Baghdad Cop Kidnaps then Kills Boy: Police,” Asharq Alawsat, 11/17/09
- “Four students killed in Iraqi violence ahead of polls,” 1/21/09

Associated Press, “Iraq: 4 killed, 32 injured in separate bombings,” 11/26/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “1 civilian killed, another wounded in Saadiya,” 11/24/09
- “2 bombs wound 4 in Baghdad,” 11/23/09
- “2 charred bodies found inside car bomb,” 11/1/09
- “2 civilians injured by bomb explosion in Baghdad,” 11/25/09
- “2 civilians killed in Mosul,” 11/19/09
- “2 civilians killed, injured in Jalawlaa,” 11/18/09
- “2 civilians wounded, 11 arrested separately in Diala,” 11/6/09
- “2 civilians wounded in Baghdad blast,” 11/21/09
- “2 civilians wounded in cab bomb blast in Mosul,” 11/1/09
- “2 civilians wounded in Falluja blast,” 11/9/09
- “2 gunmen killed in IED blast they planted,” 11/8/09
- “2 policemen wounded in hand-grenade blast in Mosul,” 11/12/09
- “2 rockets, mortar shell hit 2 U.S. bases in Salah el-Din,” 11/18/09
- “2 soldiers wounded in Diala blast,” 11/28/09
- “2 sticky bombs injure 5 in Baghdad,” 11/24/09
- “2nd explosion in Falluja injures 3,” 11/17/09
- “2nd sticky bomb in Baghdad wounds 5 people,” 11/4/09
- “3 children wounded in Ninewa blast,” 11/15/09
- “3 civilians injured in bomb explosion in Diala,” 11/13/09
- “3 family members killed, wounded in Diala,” 11/3/09
- “3 killed, 6 injured in blast in Baghdad,” 11/16/09
- “3 members of displaced family wounded in attack in Diala,” 11/29/09
- “3 mortar shells hit central Mosul,” 11/9/09
- “3 soldiers wounded in Mosul blast,” 11/15/09
- “4 bodies found in Baghdad,” 11/16/09
- “4 cops killed, wounded in armed attack,” 11/10/09
- “4 crime victims from one Yazeedi family in Mosul,” 11/30/09
- “4 wounded in 3rd explosion in Baghdad,” 11/4/09
- “4 wounded in bike bomb blast in Baaquba,” 11/13/09
- “5 civilians injured in Baghdad,” 11/12/09
- “6 civilians wounded in Baghdad blast,” 11/21/09
- “8 servicemen killed, wounded in Baghdad blast,” 11/16/09
- “11 people wounded by 2 thermal bomb attacks in Kirkuk,” 11/30/09
- “12 killed, injured in Mosul attack,” 2/2/09
- “13-year-old Christian boy shot down in Mosul,” 11/13/09
- “Abu-Ghraib hospital receives 13 executed bodies,” 11/16/09
- “Al-Qaeda kills Sahwa official in Diala,” 11/18/09
- “Al-Qaeda leader killed, 8 others arrested near Samarra,” 11/10/09
- “Anti-corruption committee chairman survives attempt in Thi-Qar,” 11/22/09
- “Army officer killed in Mosul blast,” 11/23/09
- “Asiacell employee gunned down in Mosul,” 11/2/09
- “Babel police foil attempt to bomb souk with shoe bomb,” 11/13/09
- “Baghdad blast wounds 4,” 11/25/09
- “Baghdad blast wounds 4 civilians,” 11/17/09
- “Barber killed in eastern Diala,” 11/6/09
- “Bicycle bomb kills 5, injures 24 in Khalis,” 3/2/09
- “Bike bomb kills, wounds 42 near Hilla,” 11/1/09
- “Blast hits policeman’s house in Kirkuk,” 11/5/09
- “Body found, civilian killed, another wounded separately in Mosul,” 11/12/09
- “Bomb hits army convoy in Amara,” 11/22/09
- “Bomb kills child, wounds 5 civilians in Mosul,” 11/15/09
- “Bomb kills Falluja mosque imam,” 11/24/09
- “Bomb wounds 2 brothers near Khanaqin,” 11/15/09
- “Bomb wounds 4 civilians in Baghdad,” 11/4/09
- “Bomb wounds 6 in Baghdad,” 11/22/09
- “Bomb wounds civilian, 6 nabbed in Diala,” 11/14/09
- “Booby-trapped bicycle wounds 3 civilians in Baghdad,” 11/7/09
- “Car bomb causes slight damage in Mosul,” 11/25/09
- “Car bomb leaves 13 casualties in Mosul,” 3/11/09
- “Checkpoint blast leaves woman dead,” 11/1/09
- “Child wounded in Mosul blast,” 11/11/09
- “Christian kidnapped in Kirkuk,” 11/23/09
- “Civilian body found, 6 suspects nabbed in Jalawlaa,” 11/1/09
- “Civilian body found in Salah al-Din,” 11/17/09
- “Civilian killed, 2 wounded in Ramadi blasts,” 11/5/09
- “Civilian killed, 3 wounded in Baghdad blast,” 11/26/09
- “Civilian killed in eastern Mosul,” 11/9/09
- “Civilian killed in tribal feud,” 11/14/09
- “Civilian killed, son wounded in western Mosul,” 11/16/09
- “Civilian wounded, 4 suspects arrested in Diala,” 11/29/09
- “Civilian wounded as police detonates IED,” 11/22/09
- “Civilian wounded by Iraqi fire in Mosul,” 11/10/09
- “Civilian wounded in 3rd blast in Baghdad,” 11/26/09
- “Civilian wounded in IED blast, 7 arrested separately in Diala,” 11/8/09
- “Civilian wounded in Kirkuk blast,” 11/2/09
- “Cop wounded by sticky bomb in Kirkuk,” 11/24/09
- “Cop wounded in Mosul blast,” 11/11/09
- “Criminal investigations chief escapes attempt on his life,” 11/23/09
- “Decayed body found near Kirkuk,” 11/17/09
- “Employee shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 11/1/09
- “Explosives found in train station in north of Basra,” 11/13/09
- “Falluja blast wounds 4,” 11/22/09
- “Female body found in Makhmour,” 11/13/09
- “Female student kidnapped in Kirkuk,” 11/1/09
- “Final toll from Karbala blast reaches 46,” 11/25/09
- “Gas station owner kidnapped near Baaquba,” 11/16/09
- “Girl found dead in Kut,” 11/7/09
- “Girl found half buried near Kut,” 11/9/09
- “Grenades in Kirkuk,” 11/10/09
- “Gunman shoots dead civilian in Kirkuk,” 11/14/09
- “Gunmen blow up house in Abu Ghraib,” 11/4/09
- “Gunmen injure former premier’s bodyguards in Baghdad,” 11/23/09
- “Gunmen kidnap civilian, army finds body in Diala,” 11/17/09
- “Gunmen kill army officer in Kirkuk,” 11/30/09
- “Gunmen kill civilian near Kut,” 11/22/09
- “Gunmen kill employee in Mosul,” 11/22/09
- “Gunmen kill Sahwa element southwest of Kirkuk,” 11/6/09
- “Gunmen kill taxi driver, steal vehicle in Baghdad,” 11/29/09
- “Gunmen wound lawman in Mosul,” 11/3/09
- “Gunmen wound policeman in Mosul,” 11/8/09
- “Gunmen wounded while planting bomb in Diala,” 11/21/09
- “Gunmen wounded while planting IED in Diala,” 11/1/09
- “Hand grenade wounds woman in Mosul,” 11/28/09
- “High school headmistress shot down in Baghdad,” 11/12/09
- “Hilla blast wounded up to 16,” 11/5/09
- “IED blast near Falluja, no casualties reported,” 11/27/09
- “IED blast rocks Ramadi but leaves no casualties,” 11/20/09
- “IED hits U.S. patrol in Basra,” 11/19/09
- “IED injures 2 cops in Mosul,” 11/20/09
- “IED injures 2 people in Kirkuk,” 11/17/09
- “IED kills 2 civilians, wounds 24 north of Hilla,” 11/26/09
- “IED kills civilian, injure 3 north of Talafar,” 11/3/09
- “IED targets U.S. forces, wounds 4 cops in Thi-Qar,” 11/23/09
- “IED wounds 2 civilians in Mosul,” 11/16/09
- “IED wounds 5 in western Mosul,” 11/6/09
- “Iraqi soldier shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 11/26/09
- “Judge survives assassination attempt,” 11/17/09
- “Katyusha rocket lands in U.S. camp in Diwaniya,” 11/27/09
- “Kidnapper killed, 3 nabbed in Kirkuk,” 11/5/09
- “Kirkuk explosion casualties rise to 14,” 11/16/09
- “Kirkuk governor chief guard survives attempt with explosive belt,” 11/20/09
- “Kurdish security officer killed in central Arbil,” 11/9/09
- “Kuwaiti killed in Anbar – Defense Ministry,” 11/23/09
- “Lawyer shot dead by gunmen in Mosul,” 11/1/09
- “Man gunned down, killer arrested in Kirkuk,” 11/14/09
- “Man, son killed in Diala,” 11/2/09
- “Media man seriously injured in assassination attempt,” 11/23/09
- “Mortar attack on Sunni endowment leaves 3 wounded,” 11/3/09
- “Mortar attacks on U.S. consulate in Babel leave 8 wounded,” 11/28/09
- “Mortars hit U.S. base in Salah al-Din,” 11/19/09
- “Mosque imam killed in Baghdad,” 11/24/09
- “Municipal council member gunned down in Baghdad,” 11/29/09
- “North Oil Company employee wounded by gunmen,” 11/8/09
- “North Oil Company’s worker kidnapped in Kirkuk,” 11/23/09
- “Officer killed, 2 cops wounded by roadside bomb in Mosul,” 11/5/09
- “Police chief says only 7 injured in Karbala blast,” 11/25/09
- “Police chief survives attempt on life,” 11/22/09
- “Police officer escapes assassination attempt in Baghdad,” 11/25/09
- “Police officer escapes assassination attempt in Kirkuk,” 11/5/09
- “Policeman killed by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 11/7/09
- “Prison-break in Basra results in 3 terror detainees escape,” 11/11/09
- “PUK official assassinated in Diala,” 11/26/09
- “Roadside bomb devastates U.S. vehicle in Samara,” 11/9/09
- “Roadside bomb wounds 2 civilians in Diala,” 11/3/09
- “Rocket fired from southwestern Kirkuk,” 11/11/09
- “Sadrist leader assassinated in Kirkuk,” 11/9/09
- “Sahwa fighter gunned down in Diala,” 11/17/09
- “Sahwa leader escapes attempt on life,” 11/9/09
- “Sahwa leader survives 2nd assassination attempt,” 11/18/09
- “Security element killed in Mosul,” 11/30/09
- “Soldiers wounded in clashes with gunmen,” 11/21/09
- “Sound bomb explodes near Tikrit Uni.,” 11/22/09
- “Sticky bomb injures 2 civilians in Baghdad,” 11/23/09
- “Sticky bomb injures 2 civilians in western Kirkuk” 11/10/09
- “Sticky bomb injures 7 people in western Baghdad,” 11/4/09
- “Sticky bomb wounds 4 in Baghdad,” 11/21/09
- “Suicide bomber killed by police in Anbar,” 11/22/09
- “Talafar residents arrest bomber, hand him over to army,” 11/20/09
- “Teacher gunned down in Mosul,” 11/21/09
- “Thermal bomb kills, injures 2 cops in Mosul,” 11/30/09
- “Thermal bomb leaves child killed, 4 wounded in Mosul,” 11/22/09
- “Thermal bomb wounds civilian in Mosul,” 11/16/09
- “Tikrit bomb wounds civilian,” 11/2/09
- “Turkmen politician assassinated in Mosul,” 11/22/09
- “U.S. force kills civilian, arrests son, 2 brothers in Ninewa,” 11/4/09
- “U.S. soldier shot down by sniper fire in Wassit,” 11/22/09
- “Unidentified body of young man found in Mosul,” 11/13/09
- “Unknown bodies found in Mosul,” 11/4/09
- “Unknown corpse found near Kirkuk market,” 11/17/09
- “URGENT/3 bombings in Falluja hit 12 civilians,” 11/16/09
- “URGENT/Car bomb explodes in Baghdad,” 11/24/09

BBC, “Fallujah car bomb blast ‘kills 13,’” 1/24/09
- “Suicide bomb kills many in Iraq,” 1/2/09

DPA, “Bomb kills three in northern Iraq,” 11/17/09
- “Female suicide bomber kills 40 pilgrims in Baghdad,” 1/4/09
- “Mortar attack targets US base in Ramadi – no casualties,” 11/1/09

Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday November 18, 2009,” 11/18/09

Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 26 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/26/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 3 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/3/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 10 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/10/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday, Feb. 11, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/11/09

Hussein, Jenan, - “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 22 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/22/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 4 November, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/4/09

Icasualties.org

Iraq Body Count

Iraq Today, February 2009
- January 2009
- March 2009

Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 6 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/6/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 13 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/13/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 9 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/9/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 16 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/16/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 8 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/8/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 5 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/5/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 12 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/12/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 10 March 2009,” 3/10/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 24 November 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/24/09

KUNA, “Suicide bomber in Ramadi kills three Iraqis, wounds five,” 11/1/09

Murphy, Brian, “Iraq reports drop in civilian deaths in November,” Associated Press, 11/30/09

O’Hanlon, Michael Livingston, Ian, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 11/20/09

Press TV, “Iraqi colonel killed in Baghdad blast,” 11/4/09

Reporters Without Borders, “Star TV host badly wounded in Baghdad shooting attack,” 11/24/09

Reuters, “Bomb attack sabotaged Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline,” 11/24/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 17,” 2/17/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 26,” 1/26/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 7,” 11/7/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 8,” 11/8/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 9,” 11/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 12,” 11/12/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 14,” 11/14/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 18,” 11/18/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 20,” 11/20/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 26,” 11/26/09
- “Iraq bomb kills two Shi’ite pilgrims – police,” 2/8/09
- “Iraq suicide bomber kills 18 at tribal lunch,” 1/2/09
- “Iraq’s Maliki beats religious parties,” 2/5/09

Sarhan, Saad and Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Attack on Crowded Livestock Market South of Baghdad Kills 12,” Washington Post, 3/5/09

Xinhua, “3 people killed in gunfire, bomb attacks in Iraq,” 11/10/09
- “3 workers killed, 15 injured in Iraq bombing,” 3/30/09
- “11 Iraqis wounded in Baghdad bomb attacks,” 11/23/09
- “At least 12 killed in bomb explosion in Karbala,” 2/12/09
- “Attacks kill 2 paramilitary members in Iraq,” 11/12/09
- “Civilian killed, 6 injured in Iraq’s Diyala violence,” 11/15/09
- “Death toll rises to 9 killed in west Baghdad explosion,” 3/23/09
- “Death toll rises to 16 in Baghdad car bombing,” 2/11/09
- “Gunmen slaughter 6 in north of Baghdad,” 11/25/09
- “Policeman Killed in Bomb Attacks in Diyala,” 3/3/09
- “Suicide car bomb kills three policemen in W Iraq,” 11/22/09
- “Suicide car bomber wounds 10 in northern Iraq,” 1/6/09
- “Two policemen killed in booby-trapped house explosion in Diyala,” 3/22/09
- “Two people killed, 22 injured in Baghdad bomb attacks,” 1/5/09
- “Two people killed in Iraq’s Diyala violence,” 11/29/09

Iraq’s Oil Exports Drop For Third Straight Month

2009-12-01T18:43:00.000-08:00

October 2009 saw the third straight month that Iraq’s oil exports dropped. Last month Iraq produced 2.50 million barrels of oil a day, and exported 1.87 million. That was down from September when the same amount was produced, but 1.95 million barrels a day were exported. An Iraqi official said the cause for the reduced numbers were two terrorist attacks upon the northern pipeline that goes to Turkey, which was just struck again this month.

Overall, Iraq’s petroleum industry has seen two divergent trends in 2009. Production has consistently gone up since January where it started at 2.15 million barrels a day, and then peaked at 2.50 million barrels by September, the benchmark set by the Oil Ministry for 2009. At the same time, exports have followed a rollercoaster pattern, starting high in January at 1.91 million, then dropping in February to 1.77, then climbing back up to 2.08 million barrels a day in July, a post-invasion high, before falling to 1.87 million last month. An average of 2.00 million barrels a day in exports was the mark called for in the 2009 budget, which has not been achieved.

Iraq’s highest oil production since 2003 was in 2008 when it produced 2.50-2.60 million barrels a day from May to August. By the end of that year Iraq averaged 2.41 million barrels. So far, from January to October 2009, it has averaged 2.16 million barrels. This year has seen the most exports at a yearly average of 1.91 million barrels. The previous high was in 2008 at 1.84 million. Those numbers are still below pre-war levels when Iraq was producing around 2.8 million barrels a day. Before the 1991 Gulf War and international sanctions, it was able to average 3.5 million barrels a day in overall output.

Due to the on-going global recession, Iraq’s revenue from petroleum is also down from previous years even though the price of a barrel of Iraqi crude has increased during the year. At the beginning of 2009 Iraqi oil was selling for $36 a barrel. That has since increased to $71.94 in October. That has brought in $29.1 billion so far. That compares to $61.9 billion in 2008, and $41.0 billion in 2007. The overwhelming majority of Iraq’s funds come from oil. The economy is still largely state-run as well, so the government is the major source of investment and jobs.

As reported before, Baghdad has had to scale back its budget two years straight because of the combination of low prices and uneven exports, and is going to run a deficit for the second straight year, which had not happened since the 2003 invasion. Iraq’s petroleum industry suffers from old and aging infrastructure, too much government bureaucracy, inadequate planning, and deep political divisions within parliament, and between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government over who has control of contracts and future development of oil fields, all of which have held up development of the industry.

Monthly Averages of Iraqi Oil Production/Exports in Millions of Barrels Per Day

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Jan.		2.44/1.53	2.10/1.36	1.73/1.05	1.66/1.30	2.24/1.93	2.15/1.91
Feb.		2.27/1.38	2.10/1.43	1.83/1.47	2.08/1.50	2.39/1.93	2.32/1.77
March		2.43/1.82	2.09/1.39	2.10/1.32	2.08/1.58	2.38/1.93	2.37/1.81
April		2.38/1.80	2.14/1.39	2.14/1.60	2.14/1.50	2.40/1.88	2.37/1.83
May	0.3/0.0	1.88/1.38	2.10/1.30	2.13/1.51	2.03/1.64	2.60/1.96	2.41/1.90
June	0.675/0.2	2.29/1.14	2.17/1.37	2.30/1.67	2.00/1.47	2.52/1.96	2.43/1.96
July	0.925/0.322	2.20/1.40	2.17/1.55	2.22/1.68	2.07/1.71	2.54/1.85	2.48/2.08
Aug.	1.44/0.646	2.12/1.11	2.16/1.50	2.24/1.68	1.91/1.69	2.50/1.70	2.48/2.00
Sep.	1.72/0.983	2.51/1.70	2.11/1.60	2.23/1.65	2.3/1.90	2.37/1.65	2.50/1.95
Oct.	2.05/1.14	2.45/1.54	1.91/1.23	2.26/1.55	2.34/1.91	2.37/1.69	2.50/1.89
Nov.	2.10/1.52	1.95/1.32	1.98/1.16	2.10/1.44	2.38/1.88	2.40/1.88
Dec.	2.30/1.54	2.16/1.52	1.92/1.07	2.15/1.45	2.42/1.93	2.35/1.73
Yr. Avg.	1.44/0.795	2.25/1.47	2.07/1.36	2.11/1.50	2.11/1.66	2.42/1.84	2.16/1.91

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraq’s Oct. oil exports drop due to attacks,” 11/22/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq’s oil exports in Oct. reach 58.2m barrels,” 11/22/09

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Iraq Status Report,” U.S. Department of State, 11/18/09

Elliott, Michael, “So, What Went Wrong?” Time, 10/6/03

Reuters, “Bomb Attacks Halts Iraq-Turkey Oil Pipeline,” 11/24/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United Sates Congress,” 10/30/09

Iraq Bans Chinese Oil Major

2009-12-01T18:35:00.000-08:00

As reported before, the Iraqi Oil Ministry warned China’s Sinopec oil giant in August and October 2009, that it would be banned from future oil deals if it continued to work in Kurdistan. In the middle of this year Sinopec purchased the Swiss-Canadian Addax Petroleum that is a co-operator of the Taq Taq oil field in Irbil, Kurdistan, one of two that produces petroleum in the region. Sinopec was allowed to participate in the first international bidding round for Iraq’s oil fields in June 2009, but was later told that it would be shut out of the second round unless it ceased its business dealings with the Kurds. That threat has now come to fruition as Sinopec was refused when it tried to pay participation fees in mid-November for the December 2009 bidding. Sinopec’s banning is due to the dispute between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government over who has the power to sign contracts and develop Iraq’s future oil reserves. Currently the Oil Ministry calls all of the deals the Kurds have signed illegal, and blacklisted the companies. Sinopec is the newest added to that list. This argument has delayed the technical issue of increasing Iraq’s oil exports, which are the major source of income for the country, as the country’s politicians are caught up in a never ending argument.

SOURCES

Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Sinopec bid to take part in Iraq oil deals rebuffed,” 11/22/09

Iraq Still Doesn’t Have Meters On Oil Industry

2009-12-01T18:32:00.000-08:00

As reported before, Iraq’s oil production and exports have fluctuated up and down since the U.S. invasion in 2003. In 2009 Iraq has averaged 2.28 million barrels a day in overall production, and 1.83 million barrels in exports. Those are only estimates however by the Oil Ministry because hardly any of the industry has meters to get accurate numbers. In July 2009 the Board of Supreme Audit, one of three anti-corruption agencies in Iraq, reported the following about recording the Ministry’s production:

• Only 2 of the 34 meters installed at 21 sites run by the North Oil Company were functioning correctly

• North Oil Company said that by end of 2009 it would have meters installed on all of its facilities

• Maysan Oil Company has no meters

• South Refinery Company has no meters

• Dhi Qar refinery uses a depth bar rather than meters

• 59 meters are required for the southern Iraqi facilities, but there are only 4 orders currently in progress, and no credit to purchase the rest

The lack of meters not only means the Oil Ministry has no real numbers on its production, but also allows large smuggling to occur. A 2008 audit of the Ministry for example, found 698,000 barrels of crude missing that were believed to have been stolen, and the Ministry recorded 6 million barrels less than the South Oil Company claimed it produced.

SOURCES

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09

Human Rights Watch: Ninewa’s Minorities Under Pressure From Both Sunni Insurgents and Kurds

2009-11-30T20:31:00.000-08:00

In November 2009 Human Rights Watch released a new report detailing the plight of minorities in Ninewa province entitled “On Vulnerable Ground.” The report covers the history of successive governments in Baghdad to Arabize Ninewa by pushing out minorities and Kurds and replacing them with Arabs, and then the ascendancy of Kurds there after the U.S. invasion. They turned around and tried to Kurdicize those same regions to advance their plans to annex the disputed territories there. At the same time, the Sunni Arab insurgency has targeted minorities for being non-believers or cooperators with the Americans. Minorities such as Christians, Shabaks, and Yazidis are therefore in a precarious situation being pressured from all sides to either leave or comply with stronger forces.

Map of Mosul Province

“On Vulnerable Ground” starts with some historical background to Ninewa. Beginning in the 1930s the Iraqi central government started a program to Arabize Ninewa, which has historically been one of the most diverse areas in the country. It is the home to Arabs, Kurds, Christians, Shabaks, and Yazidis, especially in an area known as the Ninewa plains, which are the districts immediately to the east of Mosul. In the 1970s Baghdad stepped up its efforts to move Arabs into Ninewa and push Kurds and minorities out that only got worse under Saddam Hussein. After the Gulf War in 1991 Baghdad tried to pressure Kurds and minorities to register as Arabs, and would not give birth certificates to babies with non-Arab names for instance. They also pressured minorities to join militias and perform other tasks to prove their loyalty or face expulsion. Many Kurds and minorities moved to Kurdistan, which had gotten its autonomy in 1991.

Map of the Ninewa Plain

After the U.S. invasion, the Kurdish peshmerga swept south into Ninewa with U.S. forces. Many Arabs who had moved there under the government’s programs fled before the advance. In the days after the fall of Mosul, the capital of Ninewa, the peshmerga also began kicking out Arab families from towns in the surrounding areas. These factors together increased the ethnic tensions in the province. In all the areas where the Kurds occupied they eventually established their influence through the presence of their peshmerga forces and control of the administration. The divide between Arabs and Kurds intensified after the 2005 provincial elections, when the Sunni Arabs decided to boycott. This allowed the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan, which was made up of the two major Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, to win 31 of the 41 council seats in Ninewa.

The ascendancy of the Kurds, and the displacement and loss of power of the Sunni Arabs directly led to the growth of the insurgency in Ninewa. As reported before, Mosul remains the last urban stronghold of the Sunni militants. They in turn, have carried out some of the largest attacks in the Iraq war against Ninewa’s minorities. Christians, Yazidis, and Shabaks have all been singled out for mass casualty bombings, and targeted killings, taking thousands of lives, and forcing many minorities to flee the region. In one spate in October 2008 for example, the Christians of Mosul faced an organized campaign of murder and intimidation to drive them out of the city. 40 were killed, and 12,000 fled Mosul. Arabs and Kurds exchanged blame for the attacks, but Human Rights Watch’s interviews led them to believe that it was definitely the work of Arab insurgents. Some of the largest bombings in Ninewa this year have also been against Yazidis and Shabaks. Sunni militants consider all three groups, Christians, Yazidis, and Shabaks, to be non-believers or collaborators with the Americans.

From 2005 to the present the Kurds also carried out a systematic campaign to co-opt, cajole, threaten, and intimidate Ninewa’s minorities to support the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) plans to annex the disputed areas in the province. This has followed a two-pronged carrot and stick approach. First, the KRG has spent millions of dollars on minorities to win over their loyalty and create patronage systems. For example, the KRG’s Finance Minister Sarkis Aghajan, a Christian, was ordered by the KRG Prime Minister Nerchivan Barzani to build churches, fund Christian community organizations, and create Christian militia groups. They also used these means to undermine those who opposed the KRG’s plans. Second, the Kurds have used pressure and intimidation. Christians told Human Rights Watch that they were encouraged to sign forms calling for the annexation of Ninewa’s disputed areas by Kurdistan. The KRG also considers Yazidis and Shabaks to be Kurds, and have pressured them to register themselves as such to gain aid. Minority leaders and activists have also been targeted with the Kurds implicated in the attacks. Two Yazidi activists opposed to Kurdish aims were arrested and tortured for six months in 2007. The leader of the Shabak Democratic Gathering was killed by gunmen in July 2008 a few meters from a peshmerga checkpoint who did nothing before, during, or after the attack. Another Shabak politician claimed he was attacked by men wearing Kurdish uniforms before the 2009 provincial elections. Other minorities said they were stopped from attending political rallies by anti-Kurdish groups before the 2009 elections, and were warned that if they didn’t vote for the Kurdish Fraternal List they would lose their homes and jobs. Many of these tactics reminded Human Rights Watch of Saddam’s and earlier Arab government policies. Both the Kurds and minorities were victimized and expelled from Ninewa under the Arabization program. Now the Kurds are repeating many of these same policies to annex the northern regions of Ninewa to Kurdistan.

The 2009 elections turned out to be a major setback for the Kurds’ plans. They lost to the Arab led al-Hadbaa party who took all of the provincial offices, shutting the Kurds out of power, and calling for the withdrawal of the peshmerga. In response, the Kurdish Fraternal list is boycotting the provincial council, have refused to allow Arab officials to carry out their duties in Kurdish controlled areas, and have threatened to break away 16 towns and districts from Ninewa and create their own administration in protest. In June 2009 the KRG made the situation worse when it passed a draft constitution that claimed all of the disputed areas in Ninewa as part of Kurdistan, and said that the peshmerga had the right to operate in Ninewa.

In the end, Human Rights Watch is very worried about the future of minorities in Ninewa province. They are concerned as well, as a Christian leader recently said he is worried about increased attacks on his community in Mosul as Christmas approaches. They are facing the violence of Sunni insurgents, and the forced assimilation and co-option by the Kurds. They are also caught in the middle between the dispute between the central government, the al-Hadbaa provincial government, and the KRG for control of the disputed territories in Ninewa. Human Rights Watch’s findings are also not new. In December 2008 two similar reports were released, one by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom on Iraqi minorities throughout the country, and another by the Brookings Institution and the University of Bern on minorities and displacement. They both noted the relentless attacks minorities have faced at the hands of insurgents, and the tactics the Kurds have employed against them. Due to these circumstances, Iraq’s minorities have been left with only two real options. First, many have fled becoming displaced or refugees. 20% of Iraq’s refugees for example are believed to be Christians. Second, those that have stayed in Ninewa have tried to align with one of the more powerful actors, whether it be the Kurds, or now the central government and the al-Hadbaa provincial council. None of these provide the protection and rights Ninewa’s minorities deserve, and as long as the divide exists between the KRG and Baghdad their situation is unlikely to get any better.

SOURCES

AK News, “Christians fear escalation of attacks with approach of Christmas,” 11/28/09

Badkhen, Anna, “Kurds evicting Arabs in north Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/19/03

Ferris, Elizabeth and Stoltz, Kimberly, “Minorities, Displacement and Iraq’s Future,” Brookings Institution-University of Bern, December 2008

Human Rights Watch, “On Vulnerable Ground,” 11/10/09

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, "Iraq Report - 2008," December 2008

Kurdish Lawmaker Sums Up Problems With Iraqi Politics

2009-11-29T09:59:00.000-08:00

Parliamentarian Mahmoud Othman, a leader in the Kurdish Alliance, was quoted in the November 28, 2009 New York Times summing up the problems with Iraqi politics. When asked about the possibility that the country would hold elections past the January 31, 2009 deadline set in the constitution he replied, “So what? Nothing in Iraq is very legitimate.” Every major piece of legislation and decision in Iraq is endlessly delayed because of power politics and a zero-sum attitude by law makers. Iraq held its last parliamentary elections on December 15, 2005, but it took four months for Nouri al-Maliki to be named prime minister, and a month after that for him to name his cabinet. The last national elections the country held were for provincial councils. They were originally planned for October 2008, but got delayed until January 2009. The new election law was supposed to be passed by October 15, 2009. There’s talk that it may be confirmed in the beginning of December, but there’s also a possibility that Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi will veto it a second time because the amended version reduces seats for Sunni provinces. Elections are now planned for February or March 2010, one to two months passed the constitutional deadline. Otherman is right than, Iraqi politics does lack legitimacy with its public who see the government as dysfunctional because its unable to provide basic services or make big decisions.

SOURCES

AK News, “Hashemi to take final decision on elections law after Eid,” 11/28/09

Chon, Gina, “Iraqis Miss Target Date on Election,” Wall Street Journal, 10/16/09

Myers, Steven Lee, “Benchmarks in Wartime: As Reliable as Promises,” New York Times, 11/28/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09

Economist Not So Sure About U.S.-Qods Force Meeting Now

2009-11-29T09:58:00.000-08:00

In the November 19, 2009 print edition of The Economist there ran a story “Iraq and its neighbours, A regional cockpit,” which was reported here on November 25. The piece claimed that U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill and commander of American forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno met with the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force General Qassem Suleimani to discuss the U.S. withdrawal in the offices of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani in September 2009. As soon as the story was put up on the magazine’s website it was pulled however. On November 26 they gave an explanation saying that the story was told to them by an Iraqi politician close to Tehran, and confirmed by a senior American official. Just before The Economist printed it however, Gen. Odierno and Ambassador Hill denied the meeting ever happened. The magazine mentioned these, but since then General Odierno and General David Petraeus gave such a strong objection that The Economist reconsidered and withdrew the story from its website. It now says it takes the American officers at their word.

SOURCES

Economist, “Iraq and its neighbours, A regional cockpit,” 11/19/09
- “Were we wrong?” 11/26/09

Former U.S. Economic Adviser Warns Of Impending Jobs Crisis In Iraq

2009-11-29T09:54:00.000-08:00

In the November 16, 2009 New York Times, Frank Gunter, the former senior civilian economic advisor to the U.S. military in Iraq warned of an imminent job crisis unless Baghdad liberalized its economy. He wrote that Iraq is facing the dual challenge of a lack of jobs and increasing numbers of people entering the labor market. The July 2009 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s report put unemployment at 17.3% and underemployment at 29.4%, for a combined figure of 46.7%. A January 2009 United Nations study found that young people were hit the hardest with men between 15-29 years of age facing 28% unemployment. They were 57% of the unemployed overall in the country. The cause is that the government is the largest employer in the country, constituting 43% of all jobs and 60% of full time work, and it prefers older workers. This was a major concern for Gunter because 250,000 young people enter the labor market each year, and are discriminated against by the largest employer. Not only that, but the drop in oil prices led to a hiring freeze in 2009.

The other part of the problem is the small size and limitations on the private sector. Outside of farming, there are few jobs available from businesses. It is hard to start an enterprise, get the licenses from the government because of complicated laws, slow bureaucracy, and costs, get credit, and trade internationally. That’s the reason why the World Bank has ranked Iraq 153 out of 183 countries for ease of doing business, placing it at the bottom of the region. This forces many businesses to pay bribes to government officials or participate in the underground economy. Either way, the private sector is not big enough to address the employment demands of the nation.

Faced with these two problems, Gunter warns that by next year Iraq’s unemployment rate will begin climbing rapidly, and this might lead to social unrest. He warns that militants have always taken advantage of poor men offering them cash to carry out attacks. Criminal gangs are also very active in Iraq, and young unemployment people might be easy recruits for them as well. The lack of opportunities will also add to the already high levels of discontent towards the government. Gunter recommends simplifying Iraq’s commercial code so that it is easier to establish businesses. There have been few moves in this direction, other than attempts to attract foreign investment with limited success. Instead Iraq maintains a state-run economy with a slow, inept, and corrupt bureaucracy that is largely unable to meet the needs of its people.

SOURCES

Gunter, Frank, “Liberate Iraq’s Economy,” New York Times, 11/16/09

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09

Parliamentary Seat Allocations At Heart Of Iraqi Election Law Dispute

2009-11-27T18:42:00.000-08:00

After Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi vetoed the parliamentary election law on November 18, 2009, the major Shiite and Sunni parties amended it to the detriment of Hashemi and Sunni provinces. The bill says there should be one seat in parliament per 100,000 people in each province. The legislation originally used 2009 numbers based upon the Ministry of Trade’s food ration system. That was going to increase the number of seats in Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa, and Salahaddin, which have the largest amounts of Sunnis in the country, by 24 seats. When the law was amended it switched to using 2005 numbers with a 2.8% increase for population growth. The result was that the Sunni provinces lost a total of 6 seats, while Sulaymaniya in the Kurdistan Regional Government got 3 new seats when before it was going to get none. The change was due to the fact that the Kurdish Alliance in parliament had threatened a boycott of the 2010 elections unless they got more seats. At first, they were only going to get three extra seats between the three provinces of the region. The major Shiite coalitions, the Iraqi National Alliance made up of the Sadrists, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, and smaller parties, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law, also wanted a law passed sooner rather than later, had no interest in increasing seats Sunnis may get, and wanted to punish Hashemi for vetoing the bill.

After the amendment was passed it was expected that Vice President Hashemi would veto the law again. Now there is news of a possible breakthrough, but nothing has been confirmed and parliament is on break until December 8 because of a religious holiday. No matter what, the elections will not happen by January 31, 2010 as the constitution stipulates. A member of the Iraqi Election Commission said they might not occur until February or March 2010. Either way a caretaker government will have to be installed until the election results are finalized, and the major blocs work out a new ruling coalition

Differences In Parliamentary Seat Allocations In Selected Provinces

Provinces	2005 Election Law	Original 2010 Bill	Amended 2010 Bill
Anbar	9	14	13
Diyala	10	13	12
Ninewa	19	31	28
Salahaddin	8	12	11
Sulaymaniya	15	15	18

SOURCES

Bakri, Nada, “Iraq’s parliament passes another election law,” Washington Post, 11/23/09

Ibrahim, Waleed, “Iraqi parliament fails to reach election deal,” Reuters, 11/22/09

Nordland, Rod, “Veto of Iraq’s Election Law Could Force Delay in Vote,” New York Times, 11/19/09

Ramzi, Kholoud, “election faces inevitable postponement,” Niqash, 11/27/09

Visser, Reidar, “Constitutional Disintegration,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 11/19/09
- “The IHEC Publishes the Distribution of Governorate and Compensatory Seats,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 11/11/09

Former British Diplomat Confirms That U.N. Inspectors Were Means To War With Iraq

2009-11-27T18:38:00.000-08:00

On November 24, 2009 England began its third inquiry into the Iraq War, this time headed by John Chilcot. On November 26 Britain’s former ambassador to the United States Christopher Meyer testified. He confirmed what has been reported here before, that the Bush White House had decided upon war before the United Nations weapons inspectors returned to Iraq in November 2002. He told the inquiry, “The U.S. military timetable was already in place before weapons inspectors went in.” Meyer said the original invasion date had been set for January 2003, but was pushed back to March. He believed that the inspectors had no time to complete their work by that date, and instead the U.S. and England turned the process into a means to find evidence of Iraq’s WMD to provide a “smoking gun” to justify the war. Meyer told the inquiry, “It was another way of saying, ‘It’s not that Saddam Hussein has to prove he’s innocent, we’ve now got to bloody well prove he’s guilty.’ And we – Americans and British – have never really recovered from that because of course there was no smoking gun.” England’s former ambassador to the United Nations Sir Jeremy Greenstock agreed that the inspectors never had the time to do their job because the drive for an invasion was so strong in Washington.

Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair had been the original impetus to go to the United Nations and have weapons inspectors return to build support for an invasion. On March 12 and 13, 2002 Blair’s political adviser David Manning met with National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice in Washington where he suggested that inspectors be sent back into Iraq to build a legal base for war, and convince the international community of the U.S. and British’s case against Saddam because it was expected that he would refuse to give them unlimited access to his country. Later, on March 17, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had lunch with Ambassador Meyer, where he suggested that inspections would be a way to trip up Saddam over WMD, and help justify regime change. In April President Bush met with Blair in Texas, where the Prime Minister again emphasized the need to go the U.N. route if the U.S. wanted British support. Bush finally agreed after Secretary of State Colin Powell lobbied him on the same point during dinner on August 5, 2002.

U.N. Resolution 1441 was eventually passed on November 8, 2002 and weapons inspectors entered Iraq shortly afterward. The U.S. and England saw them as a means to provide a justification for overthrowing Saddam however, rather than a way to disarm Iraq. When the inspectors found breaches of 1441 but no “smoking gun” Bush went ahead with the war anyway as planned in March 2003.

For more on the U.N. inspections see:

The U.N. Inspectors Were Right: Iraq Was Not A Threat

Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections

How The Administration Reversed Itself On Finding Iraq’s WMD

Interview With VP Dick Cheney On Weapons Inspections March 2003

2002 CIA White Paper On Iraq Vs The 2002-2003 U.N. Inspectors

SOURCES

Brown, David, “Invasion lacked legitimacy, Sir Jeremy Greenstock tells Chilcot inquiry,” Times of London, 11/28/09

Manning, David, “SECRET – STRICTLY PERSONAL,” 3/14/02

Marsden, Sam and Cordon, Gavin, “Iraq invasion was of questionable legitimacy, says envoy,” The Independent, 11/27/09

Melkle, James and Sparrow, Andrew, “Iraq war build-up ‘left us scrabbling for smoking gun’ says ex-UK ambassador,” Guardian, 11/26/09

Meyer, Ambassador Christopher, “CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL,” British Embassy, Washington, 3/18/02

Burrough, Bryan, Peretz, Evgenia, Rose, David and Wise, David, “Path To War,” Vanity Fair, May 2004

RTT News, “British Investigation Into Iraq War Begins,” 11/24/09

Sparrow, Andrew, “Iraq inquiry – live,” Guardian, 11/27/09

Sparrow, Andrew and Melkle, James, “Iraq invasion legitimacy was in doubt, Chilcot inquiry told,” Guardian, 11/27/09

Stobart, Janet, “Blair words on Iraq changed after 2002 visit with Bush, Briton testifies,” Los Angeles Times, 11/27/09

Possible Breakthrough On Election Law Deadlock

2009-11-26T19:10:00.000-08:00

The Washington Post reported that there might be a tentative agreement on the Iraqi election law. The Post said that the number of seats up for grabs in Ninewa would be increased to satisfy Sunnis. A spokesman for Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, who vetoed the election bill, said that he had tentatively agreed to this compromise. After Hashemi rejected the legislation, the major Shiite parties and the Kurdish Alliance amended the law that would give most of the seat increases due to population growth to the Kurds. They had threatened a boycott if that didn’t happen. Those came at the expense of Sunni provinces like Ninewa however, which led the Vice President to threaten a second veto. Hashemi’s okay is the only thing holding up the legislation going into affect as the other members of the Presidential Council, President Jalal Talabani and Vice President Adul Adel Mahdi have already signed off on the amended version. Iraq is in the middle of an Islamic holiday, Id al-Adha, however, so Hashemi may not sign off on it until the celebrations are over.

SOURCES

AK News, “A spokesman for Vice President Hashimi is expected to send written assurances in writing to the ratification of the election law,” 11/26/09

Alsumaria, “Iraq election law amendment in spotlight,” 11/26/09
- “Iraq leaders seek compromise on election law,” 11/26/09
- “Talabani, Adul Mehdi sign amended poll law,” 11/26/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Provinces’ seats red line – al Hashemi,” 11/26/09
- “Talabani, Shiite VP sign amended election law,” 11/25/09

Al Forat TV, “We have reached a settlement with Hashemite about not canceling of election law again,” 11/26/09

Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Lawmakers Hunt for Election Compromise,” New York Times, 11/26/09

Shadid, Anthony and Bakri, Nada, “Iraqis reach tentative agreement on elections law,” Washington Post, 11/26/09

Wasat, “Hashemi will not invalidate the law of the last elections,” 11/26/09

Maliki Returns To Sectarian Politics

2009-11-26T15:01:00.000-08:00

On October 1, 2009 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki officially announced his State of Law list that would compete in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Almost every Western report on his coalition mentioned how broad it was, that it was non-sectarian, and how the Prime Minister was running a nationalist campaign. Recently however, Maliki has been emphasizing sectarian politics by warning of the return of Baathists.

On November 12, 2009 for example, Maliki went to a meeting of tribal leaders in Sadr City, Baghdad and said that Iraq’s enemies were trying to undermine the political process during the elections. Three days later he was more specific when he said that Baathists were trying to use the 2010 vote to get back into power, and that he would never let that happen. Then on November 16 at a press conference Maliki said that Baathists would not be allowed to participate in the upcoming elections in any form, and that all talks with them by the government were banned. Maliki has been emphasizing the Baathist threat to Iraq since the August 2009 Baghdad bombings, which he blamed on former regime elements in Syria. In fact, the government aired a new set of video taped confessions on November 22 of three men who claimed they were Baath party members who carried out the October 25, 2009 attacks on Iraq’s Ministry of Justice and Baghdad provincial council offices. In Iraqi politics, whenever Shiite politicians mention Baathists they are talking about the threat of Sunnis returning to power, just as talk about Iranian influence by Sunnis is about Shiite rule.

Maliki’s rhetoric has angered one of his State of Law coalition partners, Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman. He is the head of the Al-Anbar Tribal Council and the Flags of Iraq Party, and was one of the leaders of the Awakening movement there. The sheikh said that those who keep talking about Baathists sound like a broken record, and that Baathists should be able to participate in elections as long as they don’t have any charges against them. He finished by saying that if Baathists were to be truly banned from Iraqi politics, than half of the Sunnis in Anbar would not be able to participate. This is significant because Sheikh Sulaiman was the only notable Sunni politician Maliki was able to draw into his list. He is a minor player however as his party wasn’t able to win a single seat in Anbar in the 2009 elections, and Maliki’s Dawa Party is firmly in the lead of the coalition.

Of more interest is the fact that Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and member of the Iraqi National Alliance issued a statement saying that Baathists should be able to take part in Iraqi politics as long as they didn’t have blood on their hands. The Supreme Council has always been one of the most ardent proponents of using the Baathist card against any moves towards reconciliation with Sunnis, and only recently called for the banning of Baathists from the 2010 vote as well. His release was almost certainly a response to Maliki’s comments as the National Alliance is the State of Law’s main challenger.

At the other end of the spectrum, the Sadrists, the other major players in the National Alliance, both attacked Maliki and supported him at the same time. First, a Sadrist parliamentarian said that the authorities faked the November 22 confessions of the alleged bombers. At the same time, Moqtada al-Sadr, echoing the Prime Minister, said that there could never be reconciliation with the Baathists. This shows both that Maliki’s attempt to play sectarian politics with the Baghdad attacks is widely questioned within Iraq, while talking about Baathists still resonates in Shiite politics.

The Prime Minister’s emphasis upon the Baathist threat could be a sign of his foreboding about the coming election. While Maliki is still the most popular politician in Iraq, the August and October 2009 ministry bombings in Baghdad have hurt his claim that he has brought security and stability to the country, so bringing up Baathists is a way for him to defer blame. He also has not been able to bring in any new significant partners into his coalition. Some believe that that his announcements are aimed at his potential rivals, specifically the Iraqi National Movement of former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi, parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq of the National Dialogue Council, and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. Finally, a return to sectarian politics may be a way for him to firm up his base with Shiites, and distract them from more pressing issues like the continued lack of services and corruption in the government.

SOURCES

Ali, Ahmed, “Iraq’s Elections Challenge: A Shifting Political Landscape,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 11/20/09

Alsumaria, “Maliki warns of enemies ahead of elections,” 11/12/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “PM warns of Baathists’ infiltration through election,” 11/15/09

Chon, Gina, “Maliki Coalition Tries to Bridge Iraq’s Deep Sectarian Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, 10/2/09

Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Maliki unveils new national, nonsectarian Iraqi party,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/1/09

Al-Hayat, Elaph, “In Surprise Statement, Al-Hakim Calls for Involving Ba-athists in Iraqi Political Process,” MEMRI Blog, 11/20/09

Karadshesh, Jomana, “Alleged Baath members confess in videos to Iraq attacks,” CNN, 11/23/09

Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Leader Creates Broad Coalition,” New York Times, 10/1/09

Roads To Iraq, “Ba’ath Party and the election – intro,” 11/24/09
- “Ba’ath Party and the election 1,” 11/24/09
- “Disagreement among the “State of Law” and The political-football crisis,” 11/17/09

Al Sabah, “PMi: No talk with Ba’athists,” 11/17/09

Shadid, Anthony, “Maliki Creates Coalition To Compete in Iraqi Vote,” Washington Post, 10/2/09

Iraqi Government Sets Up Its Own Youtube Station

2009-11-25T18:20:00.000-08:00

The Iraqi government recently launched their own station on Youtube, which can be viewed here: youtube.com/iraqigov

Here's Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announcing its start:

Top U.S. Officials Met With Iranian Revolutionary Guards Commander In Sep. 09

2009-11-25T18:10:00.000-08:00

In an article entitled “Iraq and its neighbours: A regional cockpit,” the latest issue of The Economist reports that U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill and commander of Americans forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno met with the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force General Qassem Suleimani in September 2009. Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani facilitated the meeting, which occurred in his offices in Baghdad. Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan has not only been one of the staunchest supporters of the U.S. since the 1991 Gulf War, but also has long standing ties with Tehran as it fought on the Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, and received support from them afterward.

According to The Economist Hill and Odierno wanted to get assurances from Suleimani that Iranian backed groups would not attack U.S. forces as they withdrew in 2010, and to warn him that Tehran should not interfere in Iraqi affairs after U.S. combat forces were out of the country. The first request should be easy to accomplish if the Qods Force commander wishes since Iranian-backed Special Groups are hardly active in Iraq anymore. In October 2009 for example, there were only six attacks on U.S. forces in southern Iraq, which were likely the work of Shiite militants. Iranian agents are occasionally caught trying to cross into Iraq, and Iranian made weapons are still being found as well. The second part, however, is not going to happen. Iraq is one of Iran’s major foreign policy concerns. As reported before, Tehran wants to make sure that Iraq never becomes a rival again, and that a friendly Shiite government remains in power in Baghdad. In fact, Iran’s military policy is subservient to these larger goals, which is probably why there are so few Special Groups operating right now as Iran has scaled back its support for them whenever important political evens occur in Iraq. Right now that’s the 2010 parliamentary elections. Tehran is very involved in trying to keep the Shiites together for this vote so that they can come out victorious. For example, the speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani visited Iraq for four days in early-November 2009 where he tried to convince Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to join the main Shiite coalition the Iraqi National Alliance. What wasn’t mentioned in The Economist article is what prid pro quo the U.S. officials might have offered General Suleimani to call off his activities in Iraq. Without incentives from the United States there is no reason for Iran to listen as it feels that it has the upper hand with the Americans withdrawing.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards has been the main way Tehran has tried to influence events in Iraq. In the 1990s the Qods Force was created to carry out the Guards’ foreign policy. In 1998 General Suleimani took command of the Force. It not only funds Shiite parties and militiamen, but is also in charge of trade and smuggling within Iraq.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Bombs and missiles seized on Iraqi borders,” 11/16/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Police arrests 2 Iranians in Khanaqin,” 11/18/09

Badkhen, Anna, “The Iranian factor in Iraq insurgency,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8/21/05

Economist, “A regional cockpit,” 11/19/09

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Majid, Kamal, “An Assessment of the conditions in the Kurdish part of Iraq,” Brussels Tribunal.org, 7/23/08

Phillips, James, “Iran’s Hostile Policies in Iraq,” Heritage Foundation, 4/30/07

Roug, Louise and Daragahi, Borzou, “Iraq Edges Closer to Iran, With or Without the US,” Los Angeles Times, 1/16/07

Fadhil Sons of Iraq Leader Sentenced To Death

2009-11-24T18:04:00.000-08:00

On November 20, 2009 the head of the Sons of Iraq (SOI) in Baghdad’s Fadhil district, Adil al-Mashhadani, was sentenced to death by an Iraqi court. He was charged with the murder of a girl whose mother complained to him about the violence in the neighborhood during the sectarian war. Mashhadani was originally arrested in late March 2009, which set off a day of fighting between Iraqi and U.S. forces, and Mashhadani’s SOI. The SOI leader shows both who the U.S. was willing to work with during the Surge as well as Baghdad’s ambivalent attitude towards the Sons of Iraq program.

In the summer of 2007 General David Petraeus and his top advisers met to discuss a new Sunni policy. It was decided that the U.S. would try to replicate the Anbar Awakening in Baghdad, and other Sunnis areas in central and northern Iraq. In 2005 the Sunni tribes of Anbar had begun to turn on Al Qaeda in Iraq because they no longer perceived them to be allies, but as a threat since the Islamists were attempting to take over the insurgency and impinge on many of the tribes’ businesses. This inspired the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program where American forces began creating ties with insurgents and tribal groups that were willing to fight Al Qaeda.

Fadhil is a small neighborhood in eastern Baghdad near the Tigris River. The area was known for having a very active insurgency in 2006-2007 that was battling Shiite militiamen from Sadr City, which was just to the northeast, and carrying out attacks on the Americans. Adil Mashhadani was a cell leader there. He was a former member of the Republican Guard, and originally joined the fight against the Americans in Fallujah in 2004. In April 2007 Mashhadani’s forces were devastated in a fight with the U.S., followed by Al Qaeda attempting to replace him. Faced with the triple pressure from the Islamists, the Shiites, and the Americans, he decided to switch sides and work with the last. By May the U.S. battalion in Fadhil had organized Mashhadani's men into a SOI unit, and had also been able to work out a deal with the Shiites in the surrounding areas. By June Mashhadani was in firm control, creating his own little fief supported by U.S. troops and reconstruction money. In October Al Qaeda tried to strike back at him with a failed suicide attack. That led to a month’s long battle that expelled the Islamists from the rest of the area. By December 2009 the U.S. got him to reluctantly work with the Iraqi Army and government. This earned Mashhadani the respect of the first two U.S. officers to work with him, who protected him from officials in Baghdad that wanted him arrested for murder.

At the very end of December 2008 things started to change. A new U.S. unit began receiving information about Mashhadani’s men taking part in extortion, rape, and insurgent activity, while it was transferring Fadhil to Iraqi control. This caused tensions with Mashhadani who didn’t want to give up his power. He also complained that hardly any of his men were getting jobs or being paid by the government as promised. That all ended at the end of March when he was arrested by Iraqi Special Forces. His SOI unit, which only numbered about 150 men, was disbanded afterward.

Mashhadani’s detention and the subsequent fighting set off alarm bells in the U.S., but got a much more mixed reaction within Iraq. Many American commentators feared that his arrest would set off a wave of fighting between the government and the SOI since the Prime Minister had never approved of the program since its inception. Sunnis expressed both fear and approval. An SOI commander in Dora, Baghdad for example, was afraid that Iraqi forces would arrest him, while another in Adhamiya said that Mashhadani had been killing people and extorting money and therefore deserved what he got. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha of the Anbar Awakening chimed in that Mashhadani had been breaking the law, and called for an end to speculation that his arrest would undermine security in the country. His subsequent death sentence has created the same sort of mixed feelings amongst the SOI.

Adil Mashhadani was the type of man that the U.S. was willing to work with to bring an end to the sectarian war. The question has only been raised by a few like Nibras Kazimi of the Hudson Institute and Talisman Gate blog, but could the U.S. have avoided this whole ordeal if it had decided to crush the entire insurgency rather than attempting to divide and conquer it? After the Samarra bombing in February 2006, which set off the civil war, the Sunnis quickly realized that they were going to lose, as they were outnumbered 3 to 1 by the Shiites. At the same time Al Qaeda was focusing their violence on fellow insurgents who would not follow their lead. The Americans took advantage of this situation to cut a short-term deal with Sunnis like Mashhadani who were willing to turn on the Islamists to save their own skins, which created a long-term problem with the Iraqi government who never approved of the U.S. policy. Instead they could’ve let Mashhadani and Al Qaeda battle it out, and then swept up the remains. The problem for General Petraeus was that would’ve taken longer and led to more fighting at a time when he was under intense domestic pressure in the U.S. to show results as quickly as possible. The Sons of Iraq program appeared to be a way to do that, and the U.S. and Iraq are still facing the consequences as the Americans are trying to ensure the SOI get as many jobs as possible from a government that lacks both the will and capacity to do so.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Awakening council ex-leader sentenced to death,” 11/20/09
- “Awakening forces clash with Iraq police,” 3/30/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Sahwa leader captured in central Baghdad on “terror” charges – spokesman,” 3/28/09

Burns, John and Rubin, Alissa, “U.S. Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old Qaeda Allies,” New York Times, 6/11/07

Dagher, Sam, “Market bombings: Baghdad locals want security, not Iraqi police,” Christian Science Monitor, 2/4/08

Kazimi, Nibras, “How To Do A “Surge,”” Hudson Institute, 4/2/09

Leland, John, “Iraq Sentences Sunni Leader to Death,” New York Times, 11/20/09

Nordland, Rod, “Rebellious Sunni Council Disarmed After Clashes, Officials in Baghdad Say,” New York Times, 3/31/09

Nordland, Rod and Rubin, Alissa, “Sunni Fighters Say Iraq Didn’t Keep Job Promises,” New York Times, 3/24/09

Parker, Ned and Ahmed, Caesar, “Sons of Iraq movement suffers another blow,” Los Angeles Times, 3/30/09

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Baghdad Arrest Sets Off Clashes,” Washington Post, 3/29/09

Reuters, “Iraqi forces arrest more U.S.-allied Sunni guards,” 4/4/09

Rosen, Nir, “The big sleep,” The National, 4/24/09

Rubin, Alissa and Cave, Damien, “In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict,” New York Times, 12/23/07

Rubin, Alissa and Farrell, Stephen, “Awakening Councils by Region,” New York Times, 12/22/07

Rubin, Alissa and Nordland, Rod, “Troops Arrest an Awakening Council Leader in Iraq, Setting Off Fighting,” New York Times, 3/29/09

Ziezulewicz, Geoff, “Empowered by the U.S., imprisoned by Iraqis,” Stars and Stripes, 9/24/09
- “U.S., Iraqi forces progress cautiously after ‘Sons of Iraq’ arrest,” Stars and Stripes, 4/15/09
- “U.S. troops, Iraqi army work to secure Baghdad district after militia leader’s arrest,” Stars and Stripes, 4/5/09

VP Hashemi Shoots Himself In The Foot With Veto Of Iraqi Election Law

2009-11-23T19:59:00.000-08:00

On November 8, 2009 Iraq’s parliament finally passed an election bill after weeks of delay. Ten days later Vice President Tarqi al-Hashemi vetoed it. Hashemi objected to the fact that Iraq’s refugees, the majority of which are Sunnis, would have their votes go towards only eight compensatory seats that would also be shared with smaller parties that didn’t get enough votes at the provincial level, but did well nationally. The Iraqi Election Commission says that there should be one seat in parliament for every 100,000 people, and it’s generally believed that there are at least 2 million Iraqi refugees. The problem was that the Vice President tried to portray his act as a line-item veto, demanding a change in the number of seats set aside for refugees, while claiming that the rest of the bill should not be touched. This is not allowed under Iraqi law however. What his veto did in effect, was open the election bill to the demands of other parties that undermined his own goals.

As reported before, the Kurdish Alliance in parliament objected to the proposed increase in the parliamentary seats from 275 to 323 because the three Kurdish provinces got few to no new seats. Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani even went as far as to threaten a Kurdish boycott unless the arrangements were changed. By vetoing the election bill, Hashemi empowered the Kurds to negotiate this very issue.

They aligned with the two major Shiite blocks, the Prime Minister’s State of Law and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, to pass an amendment on November 23 to the election bill. It skips Hashemi’s request for an increase in seats for refugees, by counting their votes as part of the provinces they were originally from, and rearranges the parliamentary seat allocations by province by using older 2005 statistics with a 2.8% increase for recent population growth, rather than 2009 numbers. Using the 2009 figures, Sunni provinces such as Ninewa were due for large increases in seats, but those will now go the Kurds instead. This suits the Shiite parties as well that were not enthusiastic about any extra seats in Sunni provinces.

Vice President Hashemi’s veto has thus backfired. He not only didn’t get the increases he requested for refugees, but the amendment reduces Sunni chances to get a larger say in parliament. When the changes were voted on members of the Iraqi Accordance Front, former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List, and some Sadrists walked out. This will likely lead to another veto by Hashemi. The head of the Iraqi Election Commission said on November 19 that elections would be delayed because they can’t happen at the end of January 2010 as planned because that would coincide with Shiite religious ceremonies, while the constitution says that voting must be held no later than January 31. What is probably going to happen is that parliament will attempt to overturn Hashemi’s second expected veto, they need a three-fifths vote and the bill will become law, balloting will be held in February, and a caretaker government will have to be announced in the meantime. This all shows that Iraq is barely a country of laws as its politicians rarely if ever meet any deadlines, whether they’re self-imposed or in the constitution.

SOURCES

Arraf, Jane, “Iraq election official: Even if Kurdish boycott averted, January deadline impossible,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/20/09

Bakri, Nada, “Iraq’s parliament approves amended election law,” Washinogton Post, 11/23/09

Ibrahim, Waleed, “Iraqi parliament fails to reach election deal,” Reuters, 11/22/09

Londono, Ernesto, and Mizher, Qais, “Iraqi parliament passes election law after reaching deal on Kirkuk,” Washington Post, 11/9/09

Nordland, Rod, “Veto of Iraq’s Election Law Could Force Delay in Vote,” New York Times, 11/19/09

Roads To Iraq, “What happened today?” 11/23/09

Visser, Reidar, “Constitutional Disintegration,” Iraq And Gulf Analysis, 11/19/09
- “The Hashemi Veto Backfires, Parliament Ups the Ante,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 11/23/09

Iraq’s Displaced Forgotten In Debate Over Election Law

2009-11-22T10:41:00.000-08:00

Iraq’s parliament has spent months debating and negotiating over the 2010 election law. While it has discussed several issues such as the status of Kirkuk and voting for overseas Iraqis, nothing has really been said about Iraq’s internally displaced. The result is that many will likely be disenfranchised as happened in the 2009 balloting.

Recently, hundreds of displaced families protested in Diyala against the planned parliamentary vote. They said they would not participate because the voting rules were rigged against them. In the current election bill, Article IV says that displaced families can vote, but only in their original home district they were forced out of, and are ineligible if they transferred their food ration cards to another district. The Iraqi Election Commission has said that around 1 million displaced can vote under these regulations. The latest United Nations figures record around 1.6 million displaced, which means 600,000 people may be disenfranchised.

Another problem is that even those that can vote still have to register, and few have done so. In October 2009 the Iraqi Election Commission reported that only 20,000 displaced voters had signed up by then. The Commission said that it was setting up special teams to try to get more to participate. The same thing occurred in the 2009 provincial elections when the displaced were confused about the voter rules, and few registered. The result was that tens of thousands didn’t get to vote. That led to several protests.

Since there has been no real debate by Iraq’s politicians to correct these problems the same scenario is likely to play out in 2010. Iraq’s displaced are already facing a plethora of problems from findings jobs, housing, to getting services, now a sizeable number are probably going to be shut out of voting for their representatives for a second time.

SOURCES

Fadel, Leila, “Low turnout in Iraq’s election reflects a disillusioned nation,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/1/09

Naji, Zaineb, “Voter Apathy Among Iraq Displaced,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 9/24/08

Niqash, “election law text,” 11/9/09

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Election Commission Urges Vote Law’s Approval,” 10/7/09

Al Sabah, “Many displaced families in Diyala boycott elections,” 11/17/09

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Return Update Iraq September 2009,” November 2009

Iraq Moves Down List Of Most Corrupt In The World

2009-11-20T19:05:00.000-08:00

Transparency International is a German based organization that tracks corruption across the world. They recently released their 2009 Corruption Index that ranked and compared 180 countries. Since the U.S. invasion in 2003 Iraq has consistently been in the bottom 25 most corrupt nations. In fact, by 2006 it had dropped to the second or third most corrupt in Transparency International’s list. In the latest Index Iraq actually moved down the list for the second year in a row to be tied for the fourth most corrupt country, along with Sudan. Iraq received a score of 1.5 out of 10. Somalia, 1.1, Afghanistan, 1.3, and Myanmar, 1.4, were at the very bottom.

Iraq’s Ranking In Corruption Index 2003-2009
2003 #20
2004 #17
2005 #22
2006 #3
2007 #2
2008 #3
2009 #4

Iraq’s score placed it at the very bottom of nineteen other countries in the Middle East. Qatar, 7.0, the United Arab Emirates, 6.5, and Israel 6.1, had the best scores. Iraq, 1.5, Iran 1.8, and Yemen 2.1, were at the other end of the spectrum.

Transparency International said that nations like Iraq faced severe challenges to establish solid institutions, transparency, and accountability because of instability. That’s apparent each month as there are constant reports about corruption. In November 2009, for example, the Integrity Committee, one of Iraq’s three main anti-corruption agencies, said that it was planning on going after 455 senior officials, including ministers and governors. In October, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s brother was arrested at the Dubai International Airport trying to smuggle Iraqi antiquities out of the country. In September, the Integrity Committee released a poll from June 2009 of 3,500 Iraqis that found 79% had to pay bribes at government departments, and 20% offered money to officials. Finally, in August, terrorists allegedly paid up to $10,000 to members of the Iraqi security forces to get two truck bombs through checkpoints to attack government ministries in Baghdad.

As Transparency International’s Indexes have shown over the years, corruption remains a pressing problem for Iraq. It eats away at the public’s confidence in the government, costs hundreds of millions of dollars for a country desperate for cash for rebuilding and development, and effects security and services. Baghdad and Washington often talk about addressing this issue, but according to Transparency International there has been little progress.

SOURCES

AK News, “Integrity Committee to sue 455 senior Officials,” 11/9/09

Benraad, Myriam, “Iraq’s Enduring al-Qaeda Challenge,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 11/18/09

Inside Iraq, “Officials take bribes, the Government Makes Reports,” McClatchy Newspapers, 9/30/09

Larsa News, “Maliki’s brother arrested in Dubai Airport while trying to smuggle Iraqi Antiquities,” 10/26/09

O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 11/4/09

Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2009,” 11/17/09

Columbia University Charts Sectarian Cleansing of Baghdad

2009-11-19T17:09:00.000-08:00

Dr. Michael Izady of Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs recently gave an interview to the Swiss-based International Relations and Security Network. He presented a series of maps that he put together on Baghdad during Iraq’s civil war. They show the effects of the fighting as the capital went from a mixed Sunni-Shiite city, into a segregated one.

Izady’s first map is from 2003 when the U.S. invasion began. There were majority Sunni and Shiite areas peppered throughout Baghdad. Sadr City in northeast Baghdad was the largest and most well known Shiite area, but there were others such as Amiriya in the west by Baghdad Airport, Ghazaliya in the northwest by Abu Ghraib, and Shula and Kadhimiya in the north. Majority Sunni areas were Hurriya in the north, Washash, Mansur, and Karkh in the central region, Sadiya in the south, and Adhamiya on the eastern bank of the Tigris River. The majority of the capital however was mixed Sunni-Shiite, especially in the central, southern, and northeastern regions.

Baghdad 2003

Green – Shiite majority
Red – Sunni majority
Blue – Christian majority
Yellow – Mixed Sunni-Shiite

The next map skips ahead to 2006. The February bombing of the Shiite shrine at Samarra in Salahaddin province north of Baghdad in that year is credited as beginning of the sectarian war, and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army is largely blamed for carrying out most of the ethnic cleansing. In actuality, in 2005 the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Badr Brigade militia took over the Interior Ministry under the government of Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and began setting up death squads and carrying attacks on Sunnis. The Supreme Council also began pushing out Sunnis from the security forces, and replacing them with its followers. The activities of the Badr Brigade were exposed in late 2005 when U.S. forces came across a secret detention facility in the capital holding 169 abused prisoners, some of which were tortured. The Interior Minister Bayan Jabr, a Badr Brigade leader, tried to deny the seriousness of the find.

The 2006 map shows the first changes in the sectarian make-up of the city. These can be seen in the outskirts of the city. Sadiya in the south for example, and Hurriya and Washash on the west bank of the Tigris went from Sunni to Shiite majority. The three neighborhoods directly northwest of Sadr City, Hayy Aden, Sahab, and Hayy Sumer went from being mixed to Shiite. In turn, Amiriya in the west went from Shiite to Sunni, along with Ghazaliya above it, and Jihad went from mixed to Sunni to the south. Karkh in central Baghdad, which surrounds the Green Zone, also went from Sunni to mixed.

Baghdad 2006

Green – Shiite majority
Red – Sunni majority
Blue – Christian majority
Yellow – Mixed Sunni-Shiite

The third map covers early 2007. At that time the sectarian war was still going full throttle. For example, the Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index recorded 3,462 killed in November 2006, 2,914 in December, 3,500 in January 2009, 2,700 in February, and 2,400 in March. By that time the segregation of Baghdad was pretty much complete. Adhamiya was the last large Sunni majority neighborhood left in the western half of the capital. Most Sunnis were now concentrated in a strip of western neighborhoods including Kindi, Mansur, Yarmuk, Khadra, Amiriya, and Ghazaliya, along with a few southern district like Dora and Muradiya. Only central Baghdad around the Tigris River had large numbers of mixed areas left with the northwest, northeast, southwest, and southeast all Shiite majority now.

Baghdad Early 2007

Green – Shiite majority
Red – Sunni majority
Blue – Christian majority
Yellow – Mixed Sunni-Shiite

The fourth map is from late 2007. The only real change was along the west bank of the Tigris. There, the southern section of Adhamiya became Shiite, while Resaca and Gaitanis became Sunni majority. During that period, the sectarian fighting was petering out. The Iraq Index counted 1,100 deaths in September 2007; the last time it would record over one thousand deaths in a single month. After that there were 950 killed in October, and 750 in November and December each. The Surge had also led to blast walls being erected around many of the Sunni neighborhoods and the creation of the Sons of Iraq program where the majority of the Sunni insurgency gave up and switched sides to align with the Americans rather than face annihilation at the hands of the Shiite militias, Al Qaeda in Iraq, or the United States. Both of those policies solidified the segregation of Baghdad.

Baghdad Late 2007

Green – Shiite majority
Red – Sunni majority
Blue – Christian majority
Yellow – Mixed Sunni-Shiite

The last map is from mid-2008. There were very few changes by that time. The only noticeable ones were around the Riyad area that went from mixed to Shiite on the western bank of the Tigris across from the Green Zone. By 2008 the sectarian war was over, the insurgency was reduced to largely carrying out terrorist bombings and hit and run attacks, and deaths were dropping.

Baghdad Mid 2008

Green – Shiite majority
Red – Sunni majority
Blue – Christian majority
Yellow – Mixed Sunni-Shiite

Izady believes that the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad by the Shiite militias and the Sons of Iraq movement were the major reasons why the civil war ended. The Badr Brigade and Mahdi Army effectively removed most of the Sunnis to a western strip of the capital, while the Sons of Iraq signaled the collapse of the insurgency. The Surge didn’t fully get underway until mid-2007, and facilitated the reduction of violence and segregation that was already underway. Izady thinks much of the same for Sadr’s August 2007 cease-fire. Again, the fighting was already winding down by then, and Sadr never told his followers to disarm, and many factions had broken away or become Special Groups that were no longer following Sadr’s direction, so there were plenty of militiamen still active. There were just fewer Sunnis to target, and many militia cells turned to exploiting their own Shiite communities instead.

The BBC did a similar set of maps comparing pre-2006 Baghdad to 2007 based upon information from the International Medical Corps. It found a very similar pattern of Shiite expansion in the east and northwest, the vast reduction of mixed neighborhoods, and the concentration of Sunnis in the west. Many other students of the Surge attribute these same factors for the end of the civil war, but just put different emphasis on each point.

The one disputable point that Izady made in his interview with the International Relations and Security Network was when he said he believed that Sunnis were reduced to 12% of Iraq’s population because of the fighting. He said many became refugees in Syria and Jordan. While the exact percentage Sunnis made up of Iraq and Baghdad are disputed, a general number used in sources such as the CIA Factbook is around 30%. How much they made up of Baghdad before the U.S. invasion is an even harder figure to calculate. In the December 2005 national elections however, the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front and Iraqi National Dialogue Front pulled 22.9% of the vote in the capital, while the Iraqi National List, even though led by a Shiite, former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi, also draws strongly from Sunnis, got 13.4%. That’s roughly 30% of Baghdad as well. If Izady is to be believed than just over half of the Sunnis fled the country. In 2003 Iraq had a population of around 26 million, if 30% were Sunnis that would be roughly 7.8 million, half of which would be 3.9 million people. The United Nations estimates that there are only 2.5 million refugees however, not all of which are Sunnis. There are other sources that think that Sunnis were only 15-20% of all Iraqis, which would be approximately 3.9million-5.2 million. That would match the refugee numbers much more closely.

Izady’s maps are a valuable resource in charting the changes that Baghdad witnessed after the U.S. invasion. It was and remains the center of power and conflict in the country to this day. The Shiite militias undertook a concerted effort to push Sunnis out of parts of the city beginning in 2005, and largely succeeded as Izady’s graphics show. When the insurgency largely gave up and joined the Sons of Iraq, and the U.S. put up blast walls around many communities, those marked the effective end of the sectarian war. The result is a segregated and Shiite dominated capital, that in a way is symbolic of post-Saddam Iraq as there was displacement across the country, and the Shiite parties are now in firm control of the government, with no real threat from other sects.

SOURCES

BBC, “Baghdad: Mapping the violence,” 2007

CIA, Factbook

Guler, Claudio, “Baghdad Divided,” International Relations and Security Network, 11/9/09

Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, “Legislation Election of 15 December 2005,” 2006

International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07

Matthews, Dylan and Klein, Ezra, “How Important Was the Surge?” American Prospects, 7/28/08

Murphy, Dan, “New Iraqi leader seeks unity,” Christian Science Monitor, 4/24/06

O’Hanlon, Michael Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 8/20/09

Otterman, Sharon, “IRAQ: The Sunnis,” Council on Foreign Relations, 12/12/03

Wong, Edward, “U.S. Splits With Iraqi Official Over Prisoner Abuse,” New York Times, 11/17/05