Cascadia Wildlands

Alaska Risk Assessment derails

2009-05-11T06:58:00.000-07:00

Sarah Palin's "Alaska Risk Assessment," which once held promise of reforming oversight of Alaska's crumbling oilfield infrastructure, is in a death spiral. Watchdogs who've been following it are now calling on the State to hit the eject button.

This conclusion was reached reluctantly after several of us attended a day-long workshop, May 5 in Anchorage, held by project contractors Doyon/Emerald and ABS consulting. The workshop presented the draft methodology for conducting the risk assessment. The document is available for review, and public comments are being accepted through June 2.

What Palin announced way back in 2007 was a "comprehensive assessment of Alaska's Oil and Gas Infrastructure." Great! But like the Sarah we once knew and loved, the ARA has transformed into something very different.

First of all, the study is not even remotely comprehensive. With fancy logic puzzles they put on an elaborate set of blinders. Here is a partial list of the aspects of risk being totally excluded from the ARA:

Process Safety (e.g. corporate cost cutting, cheating, not following procedures)
Marine transportation
3rd party damage (terrorism, sabotage, maintenance damage)
Abandoned facilities
Facilities not yet in operation
Refineries
Gas distribution lines
Government oversight (or, lack thereof)
Maintenance
Management of Change

Having cut out MOST of the risks we face, they continue putting on blinders. Further screening criteria filter out "insignificant," or "acceptable," risks. Among the things they consider not worth their bother:

Any safety risk that would kill fewer than five workers in an explosion
Reliability of Cook Inlet infrastructure
"indirect" impacts of spills, such as to the fishing industry or subsistence
Health impacts (ie. from toxic exposure to the public)
Spills less than 10 bbl

Risks thus screened out will be assigned a "zero" ranking in the final risk profile. So, for example, if the ARA team discovers, even as a certainty, that some risk—a corroded pipeline, say— was likely to kill four oilfield workers and shut down Cook Inlet oil & gas production forever, that will be considered "insignificant" and given a "zero" risk ranking. Poof.

Not that they're likely to discover anything. The project was pitched as "an engineering analysis involving a thorough, independent appraisal of the condition of the state's oil and gas facilities." (Palin 2007 Press Release)

What has emerged is nothing of the sort. Take the claim of, "independent." The contract was awarded to Doyon/Emerald. Doyon has millions in oilfield contracts— about $25 million in annual contracts with Alyeska alone. (Source: ExxonMobil Pipeline Company 2007/Q4 FERC Form No.6/6-Q) Doyon also hopes to start controversial drilling in the Yukon flats. They are independent?

Alaska pioneer Walt Park, Governor Hammond's technical advisor during TAPS construction and Alaska's first Commissioner of Transportation, filed an official protest of Doyon's contract because of the conflict of interest. Parker's protest was dismissed by the State, but his point is being validated by what is happening.

The methodology involves no fieldwork, no inspections, no verification of any sort. They will ask the oil industry to share their own appraisals of their facilities, and report back whatever they're given as fact, without doing any validation. How can they discover problems if they don't look for them?

You'd think the chance to present their own side of the story as undisputed fact would be enough for the oil industry. You'd be wrong. Industry has provided essentially no information, and there's no sign they will. Industry provided no comments whatever on the methodology. They've shared nothing regarding their own risk management procedures. Assuming they have any. Industry cites bogus concerns about trade secrets and proprietary data, but it's clear they are sabotaging Palin's effort. Without an independent contractor to shake loose some real facts, the State's effort it sunk.

It gets worse. When it was announced, Palin's press release said the study would "identify facilities and systems that pose the greatest risk of failure, along with measures to reduce risk."

But Doyon/Emerald has backed off of making any recommendations. They are especially concerned not to recommend any increase in regulation or oversight. This is apparently based on industry pressure. (See followup comments of Richard Fineberg for documentation of this)

So, the ARA is not comprehensive, it is not an assessment, and it will not result in any recommendations for change. We're paying $5 million to get an incomplete photocopy of part of industry's own appraisal of itself and put it on a musty shelf.

The only part of the original mandate they seem to be fulfilling is to spend the alloted $5 million.

National Academy of Sciences is peer reviewing the methodology concurrent with the public review. Doing my best impression of The Eternal Optimist, I'm hopeful this group will put the hammer down. They're extremely smart people with lots of professional pride, and signs so far are of a rigorous process. But then, on the committee for NAS are Richard Rabinow, who made a 34-year career with Exxon and held a high-ranking corporate positions on TAPS in 1994-1995, and Shirish Patil, who does research for industry at University of Alaska, Fairbanks. Again, smart and professional. But how long do technocrats expect us regular idiots—who just live on the rivers, work in the oilfields, and clean up their spills— to ignore our own common sense and just trust them? Especially when all we see is paper flying, nothing changing, and oil spilling?

Given the methodology now proposed, the only possible purpose the ARA will serve is as a whitewash for industry and overseers to remain complacent with regard to oil spills. In this, ARA today is a complete transformation from its original, stated purpose.

The best way out now for the State is to cancel the contract with DoyonEmeral/ABS, invest the remaining funds in an oilfield ombudsman program, and support creation of a TAPS Citizens Advisory Council. There's a sign-on letter circulating that should draw broad support. Contact Betsy at Alaska Wilderness League (betsy@alaskawild.org), or me at Cascadia Wildlands Alaska Field Office, or if you or your group would like to sign on. Or, submit your own comments by June 2.

When it comes to preventing spills and accidents, we're all in this together, and complacency is our worst enemy.

—GWS

Cordova, AK

/Cascadia Wildlands ARA comments.pdf

Documents raise questions about TAPS corrosion

2009-04-01T12:12:00.000-07:00

When asked about corrosion on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS), the response from Alyeska and regulators is generally, "no problem." However, documents we just obtained through FOIA from the U.S. Office of Pipeline Safety raise key questions about corrosion on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.

1. Is Corrosion an Issue on the TAPS?

The nice thing about internal FOIA documents is they aren't polished for public consumption, and they say what they mean. One inspector writes, in a violation report filed for a June 18-21, 2007 inspection, "Alyeska does not have procedures to address internal corrosion. Alyeska asserts that the TAPS pipeline does not have internal corrosion. Pig records (2001, UT and MFL, 2004) indicate that there is internal corrosion on TAPS."

The full truth is complicated (industry seems to like things complicated). Alyeska answers this allegation directly, writing: "the rate of internal corrosion present in TAPS has been extremely low and non-injurious as shown by the minimal internal corrosion present in TAPS durign the first 31 years of operation. These low corrosion rates are the result of very low amounts of produced water (typicaly less than 0.45% BS&W) within the crude oil but more importantly, a very proactive cleaning pig program... ILI [smart pig] data supports the effectiveness of this program." Alyeska also indicates large jumps in the amount of corrosion chemical inhibitor injected, from 16,861 gallons in 2005, to 25,299 gallons in 2007. (Source: Alyeska's May 22, 2008 answer to NOPV CPF 5-2008-5008, finding 6 p.2)

So, corrosion is an issue on the TAPS, but Alyeska claims they are all over it. This raises a second question.

2. Is Alyeska's corrosion program on top of it?

Alyeska is generally regarded as setting the industry standard on corrosion control. But evidence to back that up is becoming thin. In 2008 alone, Alyeska was cited for 13 regulatory violations with regard to corrosion on TAPS. The pattern that emerges is of Alyeska systematically downplaying risks and cutting corners.

Some violations find the company legally guilty of "bad faith," for example in cutting back on monitoring for corrosion-related conditions at pipeline road crossings. (CPF# 5-2008-5008 violation report)

Also, "Alyeska does not monitor atmospheric corrosion on TAPS on a three year cycle. Alyeska asserts that the TAPS pipeline does not have atmospheric corrosion, because the above ground pipe is insulated." (CPF 5-2008-5008 violation report)

Others point to dangerous sections of line. There is trouble with the Greater Prudhoe Bay transit line, on the North Slope between BP's Skid 50 facility and Pump Station 1. This short pipeline is very similar to the feeder pipelines that spilled in March and August 2006 due to extensive corrosion. But while the feeder lines are being replaced, "the Affected Pipeline has never been cleaned or internally inspected since it was constructed roughly thirty yeas ago." (CPF 5-2008-5016H Notice of Proposed Corrective Action Order.)

Part of the trouble on the Slope seems to be inability of oil companies to work other. BP had initially planned to replace the GPB line, but suspended the operation "because it had not been able to obtain funding approval from all of the Owners." Alyeska's current plan is to perhaps replace the pipeline during summer, 2009.

Another dangerous area is Thompson Pass, where OPS critisizes Alyeska for slow response to pipeline damage from the October, 2006 flood. Of six locations Alyeska identified with possible flood-related damage, over a year later they had only investigated one.

And, at that one inspection, Alyeska actually had found damage to the mainline pipe. Pictures of milepost 761.7 show how the flood washed out the pipeline, tearing holes in the protective tape and washing sand and silt underneath. Alyeska's inspection report by their corrosion engineer indicates overburden was washed away from the pipe and replaced with 3-ft boulders. Despite finding this damage, Alyeska did not fix it. Alyeska was scheduled to investigate and repair the damaged locations in summer, 2008.

3. How close to the edge of failure does Alyeska operate?

It boils down to a risk assessment. What is the risk of a spill and how bad would it be, versus what would be the cost to prevent it? This risk assessment is exactly what the State should be doing with the ARA project, but aren't. Part of the barrier for the State team is that Alyeska isn't sharing their information with them, either.

One of the FOIA documents is Alyeska's Risk Assessment section of their Integrity Management Plan, dated November 27, 2007. It is just a summary, not the actual assessment, but it has some interesting numbers. It concludes that "overall risk of a leak exceeding 50 barrels on TAPS in the next 28 years is 0.26 per year, or once every 4 years." (p.5-29) They reference another (secret) report which "identifies pipeline segments determined to affect HCAs [High Consequence Areas on] (approximately 30% of TAPS)." (p.5-30)

It lists 135 "active corrosion site[s]" considered as risk inputs, (p.5-22) but doesn't explain how corrosion is calculated to increase risks. In the 2005 Risk Analysis (the DNV Study) their hired experts dramatically changed their judgement of the relative risk of corrosion, meaning they now take corrosion less seriously than they used to. (Source: DNV Screening Risk Assessment, May 6, 2005, pp.16-18)

The other part of risk assessment is how heavily you weigh the cost of a spill to one of these areas. Alyeska's record on this is abysmal. They only consider their own costs, taking free risks with downstream stakeholders. Their judgement of what is valuable is different from yours or mine. Copper River residents have been shocked to learn that our world-famous river is not considered an Environmentally Sensitive Area under regulation, for example.

The oil company cost to spill is not very high, so they feel free to take risks. It is often cheaper for them to let equipment fail than to maintain it. Cheaper for them.

In sum, this latest batch of documents shows a pattern of Alyeska downplaying risks of corrosion, which, despite glossy assurances, is a major issue on TAPS. Corrosion management is taking place behind closed doors, and stakeholders lack assurance that our interests are being protected.

Workshop on Citizen Oversight of Alaska Pipeline

2009-03-06T13:20:00.000-08:00

Downstream stakeholders are cordially invited to a Trans-Alaska Pipeline Citizen Oversight Workshop, March 10- 11, at the Valdez Civic Center.

Cascadia Wildlands Project’s Alaska field office, and Copper River Watershed Project, are hosting the consensus-building workshop that will involve subsistence, sport and commercial fishermen, conservationists, tribes, ANCSA Corporations, business-owners, and other downstream residents

Our mission as citizens, twenty years after the Exxon Valdez, is to work together on proactive measures to ensure that never again will such a disaster take place. While improvements have been made in Prince William Sound since the spill, the complacency in government and industry has again creeped in, especially on the TAPS.

As citizens, there are two key things we all have in common:

1. we want to keep the oil in the pipe;

2. we aren’t willing to just cross our fingers and hope.

The Goal of the Meeting is to reach consensus on priorities for improved safety of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, and initiate a plan of action to make that happen. Informal discussions among stakeholders have focused on a Citizen Oversight Council, similar to the one in Prince William Sound that was formed as a demonstration project after the Exxon Valdez. At that time, Congress found that similar Citizen Oversight Councils should be formed elsewhere as well. This promise has never been met.

If we are the change we've been waiting for, lets step up and make it happen. Hope to see you in Valdez!

Download Meeting Materials Here:

>Meeting Invite & Agenda

>Press Advisory

Background on Citizen Oversight:

> Fineberg Research (the most comprehensive, reliable source of information on the TAPS)

> Copper River Sensitive Area Map

>Copper River Watershed Project White Paper on Citizen Oversight

>Comparison Table on Citizen Oversight Models

>Predicted Impacts of a TAPS spill to Copper River

>PWS RCAC White Paper on Citizen Oversight

>Cordova District Fishermen United Resolution in support of TAPS RCAC

>Models of Public Oversight of Government & Industry, by Rick Steiner

>Citizen Challenge to TAPS Contingency Plan

Oil Industry Won't Play Along With Palin Risk Study

2009-02-24T14:56:00.000-08:00

The oil industry is refusing to cooperate with Palin’s Alaska Risk Assessment, according to project managers and documents. This is an arrogant and troubling stance that puts Alaska’s landmark risk study on the brink of failing before it even gets started.

A little background. The Alaska Risk Assessment is Sarah Palin’s answer to the rash of corrosion-caused oil spills and the 2006 Prudhoe Bay shutdown. Frank Murkowski had quickly put in place a new agency that would regulate the oilfield. Palin stepped back from the regulatory stance, and initiated a cooperative, scientific venture instead. It is premised on a comprehensive survey of oilfield infrastructure, gathering input of all stakeholders, analyzing that data objectively, then churning out hard numbers of risks to guide future decisions.

You might have thought industry would appreciate the favor of being freed from actual regulations. Having seen the slick oil company ads, you might have thought they’d be anxious to brag about their accomplishments, show everybody just how careful they really are.

You would be wrong. While other stakeholders stepped up to the plate and offered input, industry has refused to play along. The comment deadline came and went, with not a breath of industry feedback. Today they remain locked in argument over obscure points about “trade secrets” and “confidential” information. I suspect oil company lawyers are racking up the billable hours, but even giving them the benefit of the doubt, those legal concerns couldn’t possibly explain the lack of any input.

I see a couple possible explanations for this behavior.

First, maybe industry’s traditional secrecy takes over even when there is no rational reason. Habit trumps thinking. If Exxon asked BP what time it was, they’d have to first run the response through an army of lawyers. This stance does not serve industry’s interests, only their lawyers'.

A second, more sinister, explanation is that industry is deliberately sabotaging the Palin effort. Without industry cooperation, the risk study fails. The State would then be forced to either give up, or enact stricter laws and regulations requiring industry to share what they know. This kind of bullying has worked for them before.

Whatever the reason, the result is bad for all of us. Infrastructure continues to corrode, trust among stakeholders continues to erode, the State continues to waste money, and oil companies spend their efforts on lawyers, not engineers.

The lesson in all this, it seems to me, is that voluntary cooperation and self-regulation doesn’t work because the oil industry is not a good-faith partner. They just aren't good neighbors. They only do what they HAVE to, not a bit more. Effective management of Alaska's oil infrastructure, then, requires stringent regulation, with strong penalties for non-compliance.

No more Mr. Nice Guy.

Hawkins Island Subdivision Christmas Tale

2008-12-30T17:47:00.000-08:00

Proving that grassroots community activism really can make a difference, the Alaska DNR is tentatively calling off its planned 30-parcel subdivision in Shipyard Bay, on Hawkins Island in Prince William Sound.

It all started in late November, when the State put out a public notice on a preliminary decision to auction off some 300 acres in Shipyard and Deep Bays, just across the water from Cordova in one of the town's favorite deer hunting spots. Not just conservationists, but real-estate brokers and the village ANCSA corporation raised alarms. The state said the subdivision was necessary for "community expansion," but that just made no sense. What about all the empty subdivisions already right in town? Only three people live on Hawkins Island now, and they were all dead set against it. What was really going on here?

Hearing that town was united to opposition, Cascadia called a community meeting to strategize how to kill the proposal. Locals, hunters, landowners, real estate brokers, the local wildlife biologist, the mayor, media and others gathered in the Union Hall building on Main Street to put the pieces together and figure out what to do.

We got a pleasant surprise when the DNR official in charge, Jason Walsh, came down from Anchorage to attend our meeting. He opened with a background of where the project came from. The project is based on a "settlement" designation in the Prince William Sound Area Plan, a document written in 1988. Nobody in the community could remember where the idea had come from. Walsh said he had looked, but couldn't find anything about it in the project file.

So there's your conspiracy. Bureaucratic inertia.

Knowing that his proposal was based on an outdated plan, Walsh said he'd been carefully considering the wave of comments he was getting from locals. "You can sit at my computer and just watch the emails coming in," he said. Almost all urged him to drop the proposal. These weren't shallow comments either, he said. Most were based on long-term, intimate knowledge of the place. Deer hunting. Duck hunting. Clam digging. Mushroom gathering. Kayaking. Just exploring.

Then he dropped his bombshell. Walsh surprised almost everyone present when he then said that, based on these factors, so far he was leaning towards dropping the subdivision plan for Shipyard Bay. "A settlement designation is not appropriate for Shipyard Bay," he said, adding that "Public Recreation, and Habitat" would fit what he's heard so far. He urged people to tell him more about what the 3,000 acres of State land should be used for.

To resolve the issue the Prince William Sound Area Plan needs to be amended. It's long overdue anyway. There are supposed to be annual performance checks, and full reviews of the plan every five years, but none have been done since 1988 when the plan was signed.

Then came the catch. "I only can write decisions to sell land," he said. "I can't write decisions not to sell land." The planning people are in a different DNR division, it turns out, and they're beyond swamped. The State has five staff doing planning for the entire state, with massive issues in places like Mat-Su, Bristol Bay, and the Arctic. It will be at least five years before Prince William Sound gets any attention.

So, what can we do? The public comment period is open through February 2, 2009. Walsh urged everyone to use those comments to express what they want for the entire 3,000 acres of State land on Hawkins Island, especially Deep Bay, where he is still considering selling some lots. He can pass those comments on to the planning people.

I'll go a step further and urge folks to use their comments to urge the State to update the Prince William Sound Area Plan, as they're required to do. What made sense in the heyday flush of 1988 Prince William Sound, doesn't make sense after the realities of the Exxon Valdez, collapsed fisheries, advent of cruise ships, and opening the Whittier Tunnel.

Outdated Area Plans are a problem all over Alaska, so folks should also contact their elected representatives and tell them to stop starving the planning arm of DNR.

The Constitutional Natural Resources policy depends on balance. Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution sets state policy that resources must be made available for "maximum use consistent with the public interest." Section 2 then demands the legislature "shall provide for the utilization, development, and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the State, including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people."

State bureaucrats and politicians have been seeing only the "maximum use," part of that, not the equally important, "maximum benefit of the people."

Well, there is at least one DNR bureaucrat who was listening to the people. I heard several quip that Mr. Walsh's reversal on the subdivision was the first time they'd ever known of their comment to a government agency actually being listened to.

Now, Governor, Legislators, lets catch some Holiday magic and get these planning guys some support, eh?

Comment to: Jason Walsh, DNR/DMLW Land Sales Unit

Jason.Walsh@alaska.gov

For More Information: /Download%20Factsheet%20Here

Documents Show Corroding Alaska Pipeline

2008-11-21T16:47:00.000-08:00

Corrosion is eating away at approximately 319 significant pits in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, according to Alyeska pig run data obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The pig run data shows that corrosion is both severe, with as much as 47% wall thickness already gone in some locations, and widespread, being clustered in locations all up and down the line. [Ed Note, 3/29/09: recent, reliable third hand information is that Alyeska dug up this particular section this summer, and found the smart pig was inaccurate, and there was only 33% wall loss. I'm told their fix criteria is roundabouts 40% wall loss, so they plan to take action on it some time later.] Correspondence also released with the pig run results shows that, of the 319 rusting locations, Alyeska has scheduled only six for repair or special inspection on their three-year dig scope.

Corroded locations include:

29 pits in the Copper River Watershed, including one with 47% wall loss, along the Gulkana River;
16 pits along the Lowe River, including two in Keystone Canyon where maximum operating pressure exceeds the calculated "B31G" remaining strength;
19 pits along the Delta River;
7 pits within the town of Delta Junction;
7 pits in North Pole;
3 pits in Fairbanks;
4 pits in the Yukon River High Consequence Area;
18 pits where leaks would quickly drain to the Koyukuk River;
56 pits along the Sagavanirktok River, which threatens release into the Arctic Ocean.

This corrosion is a major danger to downstream stakeholders. A spill at one of these locations could spell disaster, particularly around stream crossings. Expect any corroded holes to leak for a long time before being detected, too. Alyeska estimates it would take them 3 months to detect a "small" leak in a buried pipeline section, such as those along the Gulkana, Sagavanirktok and Delta rivers.

The rusted TAPS is also a threat to consumers and the economy. The 2006 corrosion-caused shutdown sent shockwaves through markets and led to a gasoline price spike. An extended TAPS shutdown during winter could turn the pipeline into one long, crude-oil popsicle. Alyeska has no real cold restart procedure.

The list of "anomolies" are the long-awaited results of Alyeska's most recent "ILI-MFL" smart pig run. Generally run every three years, these smart pigs are the key method of checking TAPS for internal corrosion. The results show size and location of rusted spots and amount of wall loss. Calculations are then run that show the remaining "B31G" hoop strength, giving a conservative estimate of maximum operating pressure before the pipe would burst. The tool is not terribly precise, being specified to +/- 10%, 80% of the time.

These pig runs lately have been plagued with problems. The first attempt in 2006 failed on the southern part of the line, for undisclosed reasons. Around the same time, the huge metal O-ring in a cleaning pig was lost somewhere in the pipe. The smart pig was run again in 2007. The combined results are what is shown in the FOIA.

Additional correspondence released in this FOIA shows an inefficient bureaucracy and noncooperative industry. Alyeska repeatedly delays release of smart pig results, citing complications with subcontractors, BJ Process & Pipeline Service Company, and CC Technologies.

Federal regulators at Joint Pipeline Office show no evidence of being in control. Their directives are routinely ignored and violated by Alyeska, with no repercussions. There is only one lonesome inspection report in the file, and that is on a peripheral issue.

I want to say they are asleep at the wheel. But after reviewing the weak pipeline regulations in play, it may be a more apt metaphor to say they're stuck behind the wheel of one of those little clown cars, trying to influence the industry, who drives a Hummer.

There is more to come. These documents are only a first installment. Alyeska has filed a "reverse FOIA" seeking to block release of two related studies that should help explain the significance of the pig results. It looks like we may have to take them to court to see those.

Download the FOIA Here:

/Alyeska_pig_run_results.pdf

Whistleblower calls out Bush Justice Department for letting BP off easy

2008-11-11T14:58:00.000-08:00

EPA whistle-blower Scott West came forward yesterday charging that criminal prosecution of BP for the North Slope's largest-ever oil spill in 2006 was illegally blunted by Bush administration political appointees. The $20 million misdemeanor fine that was issued is far lower than the EPA's recommended fine of between $58 and $672 million. Also, investigation into felonies by BP executives was abruptly halted, before evidence had even been reviewed, and over objections of staff. (Download the /letter)

At root the case is about BP cutting corners by skimping on corrosion protection and control and leak detection systems. By cutting costs they increase profit. But, at the expense of more and bigger and worse spills and workplace injuries.

"The BP Alaska settlement is part of a pattern of "lowball" corporate public safety and pollution settlements engineered by the Bush Justice Department," West and Public Employees for Environmental Ethics said in a letter to the DOJ Inspector General asking for an investigation. "A $20 million fine is essentially a rounding error in terms of the money BP makes in Alaska. There is little deterrent value in this amount to encourage BP to change its ways..."

"The deterrence value of criminal fines is being systematically undermined by this DOJ," they write, pointing to"outrageous" low-ball settlements in the Olympic Pipeline explosion, Selandang Ayu sinking, and BP Texas City explosion.

West's allegations certainly fit into some familiar patterns. Justice Department being run by political hacks, big corporations getting slaps on the wrist for dangerous behavior, and evidence of wrongdoing being covered up. Corrosion continues to eat away the oilfield, and spills continue to happen. The only real surprise here is that this time, someone from the inside came forward and is making a fuss about it.

With the new administration we hope the Inspector General takes these allegations seriously. The whistle-blower writes that other senior managers can corroborate the allegations, "but they cannot openly talk at this time because their jobs would be in jeopardy." That in itself points to something wrong. Time to clean up your act, guys.

The bottom line in all this is that oil companies and regulators aren't doing their jobs. The results are evident in spill and explosions that continue to threaten Alaska's environment and workers, and the Nation's oil supply. Sweetheart deals are the almost inevitable result of doing things behind closed doors, and locking actual stakeholders out. Political appointees and corporate hacks are never going to do the right thing unless they are held accountable and their dealings are exposed to the light of day.

The ultimate solution then are Regional Citizen Advisory Councils that give stakeholders a seat at the table. That's what was done here in Prince William Sound after the Exxon Valdez, and it has done wonders. Contact your representative and tell them we need to do this, and join the CWP to help us make them.

Alaska Risk Assessment on the right track

2008-10-01T16:49:00.000-07:00

FAIRBANKS— Well they're sure taking their sweet time about it, but the State Risk Assessment of all our oil infrastructure seems to be moving in the right direction. If done right, the $4 million study will prove conclusively that Alaska's pipelines are in dire need of oversight, and show the benefits of a robust oversight and maintenance program.

The first public hearing on the project was last Thursday in Fairbanks. Industry and government people outnumbered the actual public three-to-one, but those who did show up brought an impressive breadth of knowledge. And among those whose job it was to attend were every member of the State Oversight Team, who are ultimately responsible for the recommendations at the end of the project, Senator Joe Thomas, Rep David Guttenberg, and Rep Scott Kawasaki. I've been to many public hearings and it is VERY rare for any actual decision-makers to be there listening. That they took the trouble here shows the State is taking public interest in the project seriously.

The best news to come out of Thursday's hearing was State project manager Ira Rosen's announcement that they are negotiating for a National Academy of Sciences peer review of the methodology. This is a great step that will help ensure the method and results are scientifically robust and objectively defensible. It is absolutely necessary too, because the project currently amounts to government and industry reviewing themselves alone. Both Doyon and the State live off of oil industry money. We're all Alaskans and I have growing faith they'll do a good job on this, but there is a clear conflict of interest. The NAS peer review will be the critical test.

To ensure at least some independent oversight of the actual implemenation phase of the project, they should fund and form a mini Citizen Advisory Council of Alaskan stakeholders for purposes of this study. The State could convene such a group to meet during project implementation and participate as a non-voting, advisory body during the critical decision phase. If impacted communities, industries like tourism and fishing, interests like subsistence, and Alaska Native tribes are not in the room when decisions are made, it will be very hard to hold the end product up as any kind of independent review.

And whoever thought to leave ADF&G off the State Oversight Team wasn't thinking clearly.

Also encouraging at the meeting was the strong role being played by the Department of Revenue. Deputy Commissioner Marsha Davis explained that Revenue was a "keenly interested agency," due to the threat to State revenues from accidents and spills. She also explained that the new ACES tax structure, being based on Net Profit, for the first time gives the state access to oil company figures for maintenance spending and unplanned disruptions due to accidents.

This is critical because the project relies on getting accurate information from oil companies, who are by habit not prone to share anything. Davis explained that if the industry tried to stonewall they'd "be their own worst enemy." The choice for industry really is whether to "do this the easy way, or the hard way." They can share the information voluntarily; or, force the State to enact further laws and regulations requiring it.

Probably the most intelligent comment of the evening came from Fairbanks citizen Ed Morgan, who gave everyone a quick lesson in "process safety." Recommended reading is the Baker report, which blamed process safety for BP's 2004 refinery explosion. Maintenance procedures don't mean anything if they're not actually done, for example. Human factors (like lack of training) can cause even physically perfect pipelines to fail. The key, he explained, is a work environment with good input feedback loops.

Pam Miller of the Northern Alaska Environmental Center pointed out that access to oilfield workers was critical, given historic company hostility to Whistleblowers. The project team said they'll take anonymous comments on the web. (Go HERE to comment). Several of us said that probably wasn't good enough, and offered suggestions for ways to reach workers on the patch. Anyone with information about risk factors on Alaska's oilfield would do all Alaskans a great public service by sharing their knowledge with this team. Use their comment form, and the State Project Contact is Ira Rosen: (907) 465-6219, ira.rosen@alaska.gov

Richard Fineberg, who has written extensively on these topics, noted agreement with every single public commenters. Dave Lacey noted that the reality of Global Warming need to be considered, including changing permafrost.

A Regional Citizens Advisory Council for the TAPS was brought up as a point of strong agreement, as a potential solution to many of the biggest risks. Morgan, who happened to have run Alyeksa/SERVS for some years, offered that in his experience, without any doubt, the Prince William Sound RCAC has made Alyeska's operations there better and safer. He said it was "well worth the money they spent on it."

I hope many of you will attend the meetings or comment on their online form.

For all the potential good of this project though, it sure is slow as molasses. They don't even plan to start actually DOING the study until after next summer. That is three years after the 2006 corrosion-caused spills and shutdown that showed something is broken that needs fixing. Meanwhile the Copper River sits exposed to the corroding pipeline, Big Oil is still cutting costs, and those of us downstream have no real voice in decisions. The ARA project is going in the right direction. I just hope they get where we're going before its too late.

Alaska Risk Assessment Off To Slow Start

2008-09-15T12:17:00.000-07:00

Alaska's oil pipelines and other infrastructure are falling apart at the seams, risking catastrophe for downstream village residents, wilderness areas and wild salmon runs.

So when Governor Sarah Palin announced the state would do a $4 million Risk Assessment evaluating Alaska's oil pipelines and infrastructure, we were among those who cheered the move. The fact-based study was Palin's response to the 2006 Prudhoe Bay corrosion-caused shutdowns. The above-board approach was a welcome relief to the Murkowski-era bureaucratic response to our badly managed, leak-prone and aging system of pipelines.

Over a year into the study though and progress is underwhelming. Bureaucracy is moving, money is being spent and people are doing things, but tangible results have been elusive. The study design ensures that important risks will be ignored. Public involvement seems more geared to winning consent of stakeholders than reforming pipeline oversight. Conflicts of interest of the company hired to do the study could also undercut credibility. Ideally public involvement and transparency can fix these problems, and project leaders assure us that this will be done. All in all though, rubber has not yet met the road.

The Risk Analysis, if done right, will be a comprehensive audit of oil infrastructure that identifies the highest-risk areas and recommends strong protective measures. This is a great opportunity for interests to be considered and weighed by objective standards, rather than just by oil company book-keepers and lawyers.

What is at stake? Consider that an oil spill from the TAPS could easily escape into one of our great rivers. I know that the Copper River is nakedly exposed for over 170 miles of pipeline. The Yukon is also exposed. Or consider the emerging disaster in NPR-A, where villagers in Nuiqsut are getting sick while gas flares run. With pipelines composed of leaky valves, rusted pipe, and cracked seals, rooted in unstable permafrost, all being run by glitch-prone computers programmed by cost-cutting oil companies, the risks need a hard look.

The primary accomplishment to date though is granting a $4 million contract to a private company to do the study. The selection of a Doyon subsidiary raises eyebrows because they are a major contractor on thevery pipelines and wells being evaluated. The conflict of interest is obvious. The state's press release touts the fact that Doyon is an Alaska company, showing shades of the cronyism and insider-dealing that has gotten previous administrations in trouble.

On the other hand, Doyon does have a professional, experienced staff, and certainly has the where-with-all and know-how to tackle the technically complex tasks. There are good, smart people on the job, and it would be wonderful to see them prove the critics wrong.

The biggest limitation of the study are the blinders put on by the State's criteria excluding risks of security/ terrorism, and marine transportation. Yet past risk anlyses have found that marine transportation is the most dangerous link in the oil transportation chain, and that terrorism/sabotage is one of the most risky aspects of pipelines. Coincidentally, Doyon also holds security contracts on pipelines.

The public meeting schedule has just been released, and I encourage everyone to get involved. Subsistence hunters and fishers, users, commercial fishermen, Bush Alaskans, oilfield workers and wilderness lovers all have a big stake in this. If you can't make a public hearing, comments can be submitted on the project website. Stakeholder involvement is the indispensable remedy to the complacence and conflicts of interest inherent in the bureaucracy and corporation-run study. If we all work together, we can get this done right. Hearing Dates are:

September 25—Fairbanks

October 1—Kenai

October 15—Anchorage

October 16—Valdez

October 22—Barrow

Hope to see you there!

Restoration Begins on Alaska's Lost Coast

2008-08-19T12:21:00.000-07:00

CAPE YAKATAGA, AK— Times are changing at Yakataga.

The road is closed, the saws are silenced, the loggers gone back Outside here on Alaska's wildest coast. The roar of log trucks, steady for the last thirty years working Alaska's biggest timber sale, is replaced with the roar of the surf. The economy of extract-and-export is being replaced with the restoration economy. Balance is being restored.

"Nobody's ever planted trees here before," remarks 27-year resident Lahoma Leishman, whose hot coffee and banana bread warm our small crew of volunteers after a morning of planting trees along streambanks. We are here for Cascadia's Lost Coast Restoration Project, a citizen monitoring and hands-on restoration effort initiated by Yakataga artist Jen-Ann Kirchmeier.

For nine days we've walked the closed-out roads, surveying streambanks, and planting in the highest priority ones, like Charley Creek, the Leishmans' source of water and a locally significant salmon stream. In total we planted 157 spruce and 147 willows on streambanks of all the salmon streams over the first two miles of road. This technique is designed to accelerate natural restoration of ecosystem function using simple hand methods—a sort of homeopathic approach to healing. We've now set up over 100 photo-point monitoring witness posts, for long-term monitoring.

Another top priority was to ground-truth the logging company road closeout. Basically, the 100 miles of old logging road are having all culverts and bridges removed. When done right, this is the single most important step forward to restoration of logged-over wildlands. When done carelessly however it can ruin streambanks and cause significant long-term harm.

We are happy to report that this work was done very well. This is no doubt caused by the extraordinary efforts the State of Alaska has taken to regularly inspect and issue permits for the work. Last year we noticed on the first sections that while work done when State inspectors were present looked wonderful, work done the day after they departed was rushed and was damaging salmon streams. State inspectors reacted quickly, and this year have ensured that every mile of closed road has been physically inspected.

The road from Icy Bay to the Yakataga is now irrevocably closed. Furthermore, Alaska Mental Health Trust has closed all access to their lands near Icy Bay to the public. Traditional Access to the vast public lands remains, but is made very difficult by the terrain. Just the way I like it.

With roads closed and logging jobs done, you might think the handful of hardcore Yakatagans would be despondent, but this is not the case. To the contrary, the export economy never gave these people much but hassle, and its departure has opened space to pursue alternatives. Talk at the Cape is of ecotourism, hunting and subsistence. There has been a virtual boom of toxic cleanup jobs of old military and mining junk too, which is good fast cash for residents.

The restoration economy is coming alive.

Special thanks to Marion Weber, Jen-Ann Kirchmeier, Harder Foundation, Titcomb Foundation, and the Eyak Preservation Council, without whose generous support this effort would not have been possible.

The work continues. For project documents and more information, check at www.lostcoastrestoration.org.

Cascadia Sues Tongass National Forest

2008-07-10T13:23:00.000-07:00

CORDOVA— Cascadia Wildlands Project joined with Greenpeace to file a lawsuit in District Court in Anchorage today, challenging 1,700 acres of old-growth logging in four timber sales on the Tongass National Forest, in Southeast Alaska.

At root this case is about maintaining abundant, huntable deer populations on the Tongass. Major restrictions on deer hunting are a certain result of ancient forest logging in this part of the world. That is because big trees provide food and shelter for deer during hard winters. Without these sheltering stands, deer are vulnerable to catastrophic populations collapses during deep snow winters. Climate Change further compounds the problem.

Deer are a critical subsistence food for residents, and the main prey of the rare Islands Wolf.

The Forest Service broke the law by fudging the science in its "Deer Model," to serve their political goal of getting the cut out. The two most glaring errors were using habitat quality data that it knew was not correlated to facts on the ground, and applying the wrong multiplier. The combined result was to underestimate logging impacts to deer habitat by as much as 120%. When confronted with the mistakes, rather than fix them the Forest Service concealed the information from the public.

Credit for the dogged pursuit of these errors goes to Larry Edwards, a former Alaska pulp mill worker-turned Greenpeace forest activist. For years and to anyone who would listen he patiently explained the errors, only to be stymied by the political arm of the Forest Service. Todays lawsuit was the last resort.

Nobody wins with this now-familiar pattern of twisting science to justify a political position. Mills won't get their wood, residents won't get their deer, wolves won't get their dinner, and environmentalists and Forest Service employees will spend their time in court, rather than out in the woods cooperating on restoration projects.

The boom days of old-growth logging are over, and no amount of scientific trickery or political bullying will bring them back. The sooner the Tongass catches up with their colleagues in the Pacific Northwest, who have made restoration forestry priority #1, the better off we'll be.

/Legal%20Complaint.pdf

Exxon Day in Cordova

2008-06-25T23:45:00.000-07:00

CORDOVA: The US Supreme Court has just sided with Exxon over the fishermen of Prince William Sound. Here in Cordova, there is defiant perseverance.

Town is quiet but spirits are aboil.

"To all of you who passed waiting for Justice... It is Done," says a sign put up at the fishermen's memorial. "I am sorry. I am so, so sorry... ... God help us... America the Beautiful??? Part of us is relieved that you are not here to witness this injustice against Prince William Sound and the People who love her. Rest Easy... We will continue to look out for those you left behind..."

Big signs plastered all along Main Street give voice to the collective sentiment. "Mom & Pop Lose: Corporations Win," "Innocent Until Proven Wealthy," and "Whose Nexxt?"

Exxon won this battle by playing dirty. They get to keep their damn money this time. But this quiet fishing town will persevere. As the sun sets on an empty harbor local kids play football in Main Street. The spirit here is unbroken.

No Comment

2008-06-16T17:10:00.000-07:00

For four days last week, in front of a State Administrative Law Judge, we tore down the facade and exposed Alyeska's dangerously inadequate oil spill prevention and response program on the Copper River. We were in Anchorage for the hard won Adjudication Hearing in Cascadia v. State Division of Spill Response.

Media coverage was excellent. See TV, Radio, and print stories here.

Fishermen, Alaska Natives, fisheries experts, and environmentalists laid out our case that:

1. the Copper River watershed is an "environmentally sensitive area," and;

2. Alyeska's contingency plans would allow spilled oil to escape into the river.

Inaccurate and incomplete maps, slow response times, obsolete equipment, personnel shortages, complacence, arrogance; you-name-it, a parade of witnesses showed Alyeska is guilty of it. So, what does Big Oil have to say for itself?

"No Comment."

For all four days their high-priced lawyers sat mute. They declined to offer any evidence, call any witnesses, make any opening or closing statement, or even to ask any questions of our witnesses. Assembled media were unable to get quotes. Big Oil's legal strategy is to pull the covers over their heads and try to go back to sleep.

Actually I'm exaggerating. They did open their mouths a couple times, to log procedural objections to our witnesses and evidence. It is as though Alyeska expects the system itself to shield them.

So, as an attempt at dialogue the hearing was a failure. The State and Alyeska don't want to hear, and they refuse to talk.

Legally and politically though the hearing was a smashing success. With oil companies playing dumb, the defense of the current, inadequate plan was mounted by DEC staffer Becky Spiegel. On cross-examination she was clearly evasive, and it became plain that legal standards were being grossly misapplied.

Media coverage and grassroots support of the case was excellent. Television, radio and print media gave the case prominent coverage. The feedback I'm getting is uniformly positive—everyone from Greenpeace to anonymous Alyeska employees.

The next steps are to file some more legal briefs. Commissioner Larry Hartig will make his decision some time in late summer or fall. Unless he is willing to pile on another travesty of justice for Alaska fishermen, Alyeska should expect a comeupance soon. They've been thumbing their nose at Justice too long.

Putting Big Oil on Trial

2008-06-02T12:44:00.000-07:00

COPPER RIVER— The State of Alaska and Alyeska Pipeline company will be on trial for failing to protect the Copper River from oil spills, June 9-12 in downtown Anchorage at 1016 W. 6th Ave., in the fourth floor hearing room.

The Trans-Alaska Pipeline threatens the Copper River for 180-miles as the pipeline snakes through the watershed, crossing many large tributaries. Given past experience and the aging, corroding pipeline, that spells a high risk that the next Exxon Valdez will be into our precious watershed.

Stakeholders from all walks of life have joined together to convince the state that Alyeska's oil spill contingency plan, which would allow oil to escape into the Copper River, would be an environmental and human catastrophe. At special risk are the famous Copper River salmon, and the world-renowned wetland at the Copper River Delta.

The state broke the law by approving Alyeska's oil spill prevention and contingency plan. That plan ignores the Copper River almost entirely, and is full of response gaps. Their basic error was in refusing to believe the Copper is a very important place.

Amazing but true: the State bureaucrats don't consider the Copper an "environmentally sensitive area." This allows them to plan to clean up an oil spill after the fact, rather than keeping enough equipment on hand to keep spilled oil from escaping into the river system.

Actually called an Adjudicatory Hearing, the case is Cascadia Wildlands Project v. Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. The decision will be made by the Palin administration's Commisioner of Environmental Conservation, Larry Hartig.

Requestor Cascadia Wildlands Project will present evidence, and call witnesses from the watershed, including Nick Jackson (Gulkana), John Craig (Kluti-kaah), Linda Tyone (Gakona), Karen Linell (Chistochina), Brenda Rebne (Ahtna), Dune Lankard (Eyak), Kristin Smith (Copper River Watershed Project), and James Brady, an expert in oil spill impacts to fisheries.

Interestingly, Alyeska's lead counsel in the case was also their lead counsel in the Exxon Valdez case. Apparently, their response is still to throw lawyers at their problems, rather than dealing with Alaskans straight. And they want us to trust these same owner companies to build our gasline? Enough is enough. Come clean, Alyeska, and join us. Lets work together to keep your oil in your pipe, and out of Alaska's rivers.

Check here for updates, or click below to download our legal brief.

/Opening_Brief.pdf

Tazlina River Pipeline Crossing a Risky Marvel

2008-05-20T15:57:00.000-07:00

The Trans-Alaska Pipeline hangs suspended across the Tazlina River, while swift, turbid water carries the breaking up ice pack downstream.

This is a dangerous and beautiful place. Its beauty is self-evident. The pure white noise of the river is all-encompassing. Steep, forested bluffs rise on all sides. Already, in early May, there are ducks playing on the river. Salmon will be here soon.

There is still river ice clinging to the banks. An ice bridge holds over the creek, where a sign indicates an oil spill containment site.

There is beauty in the design of the pipeline crossing, too. The suspension bridge is impressive. The zig-zag jumble of valves and pipe is dazzling. This skinny tube hanging over the river represents a fifth of our Nation's domestic oil supply. Wow.

The Tazlina TAPS crossing is a dangerous place because the pipeline is held up with wire over the river and a spill here would be a disaster. The Tazlina itself is a major salmon stream and the Copper River is only a few miles downstream. Subsistence fishwheels line the shores. Dipnetters are not far downstream. A Trajectory analysis done by Copper River Watershed Project and Ecotrust shows oil from here reaching the commercial fishery on the Copper River Flats in 39 hours. These ducks playing in the river here would be toast right away.

If a spill happened here, it would be uniquely difficult to clean up because things flow swiftly downhill and away. Once oil is in the river, there is no way the contingency plan to lay boom across the water would work. Boom works up to two knots, and the river must flow double that at least. Boom just doesn't work in swift, turbid waters, especially when they're choked with icebergs.

Response timing is another problem. The Contingency Plan is to respond to the (ineffective) containment sites in about six hours after detecting a spill. By that time, oil would already be well down the Copper, having just passed the beaches of Copper Center, sixteen miles downstream. We are challenging this containment gap in the Cascadia v. DEC adjudicatory hearing.

Even though both Pump Station 11 and the hub of activity that is Glennallen are right here at the Tazlina, there are a host of persistent maintenance problems that could cause a spill. In 2005 and 2006, erosion did damage to the Right-of-Way. There is also visible corrosion along many of the pipeline segments we saw here. On the very steep bluffs over the river, the pipeline looks like it is sliding out of its fittings. There was at least one dent that had punctured the side, exposing insulation underneath. Putty and wire patches covered some places.

What do the locals think of Alyeska spill response plan? "It won't happen," is the answer I got from one very well respected Ahtna leader, who lives near the confluence of the Tazlina and Copper. I had showed him Alyeska's proposed map for a spill containment site just outside his door. He patiently explained how the waters are too fast and silty for boom to work. Oil would bind with silt and turn into a semi-suspended mousse, impossible to effectively clean up. Besides, Alyeska doesn't have the dedicated responders and equipment needed to act quickly.

"I guarantee you," he said, pointing to Alyeska's diagram of boom and skimmers in the river, "they'll never do this."

We heard this message echoed over and over, including by Industry insiders. The company has been replacing workers with machines to the point now where there can be as little as a few people actually available on this stretch of pipeline at a given time. The people Alyeska lists as responders may be hunting and not available, or busy working on other essential tasks on some other part of the line.

The oil companies will say they need to shave costs, but give me a break. They are running this pipeline on pure profit and making a killing. It costs them only $120,000 to keep one full-time spill responder on staff for a year. At today's oil prices and pipeline throughput, that represents wellhead value of about one minute worth of the oil going through the line.

The bottom line for the Tazlina river crossing is not to ever let a spill escape into the river. After oil is in the water, it would be too late.

Copper River Threatened by Aging Pipeline

2008-05-13T13:41:00.000-07:00

CORDOVA—People who love Copper River Salmon take some notice: The Trans-Alaska Pipeline is visibly corroded through most of the upper Copper River watershed. The risk of a spill escaping into the river and ruining our prized salmon is increasing, even as the owner oil companies (BP, Exxon and Conoco) cut corners on maintenance and oil spill response.

Cascadia Wildlands Project recently spent a week touring the major river crossings of the TAPS in the Copper River watershed, and groundtruthing Alyeska's oil spill response plan. We have a court date coming up, and wanted to have the freshest information from the ground.

The pipeline runs through about 180 miles of the Copper River watershed, with major river crossings at the Gulkana, Tazlina, Klutina, Tonsina, Tazlina and Tsina Rivers.

What we found surprised me. There is visible rust along the underside of the pipeline through most segments that we saw. The corrosion is so bad it has eaten holes through the outer layer in many places. The pipe itself is hidden behind this outer layer and wrapped in insulation, so theoretically it could still be structurally sound. Whether the inside looks as bad as the outside is a question only Alyeska can answer, but it is clear from looking that maintenance is being deferred. What was once an 800-mile strip of gleaming metal is now dotted with patches, wire and putty. At joints between segments, the insulating stuffing has worked its way out, and flaps in the breeze.

And we were only checking the highest priority sections, around river crossings and the highway, almost right in town (by Alaskan standards). More remote, and buried sections, are probably even worse.

So the risk of spills escaping into the river system is increasing with time. This is expected. But at the same time the owner companies increase profits by cutting corners on maintenance and spill response. We talked to local leaders and residents, and they all told us the same thing: Alyeska is is not ready to respond to a spill, and government regulators don't seem to care.

"These guys couldn't pick up the oil off a mud puddle," was the opinion of one Alyeska employee we talked with. (He asked to remain anonymous. The company is well-known to fire employees who raise concerns.)

Lack of dedicated crews, lack of training, and lack of spill response equipment were common complaints.

In future posts we'll look at the line and spill response plans in more detail. But details aside, the most important truth from the ground is that the once shiny new pipeline today looks more like an old truck wearing down.

The oil company propaganda image of zero tolerance for corrosion isn't true. We brought cameras and a GPS for this groundtruth. Next time, maybe we should bring a role of duct tape, too.

-GWS

State, Alyeska deny accountability for spill response

2008-04-10T12:30:00.000-07:00

Oil company and state regulators' heads are firmly stuck in the sand about the risk of oil spills from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. This was evidenced in competing briefs just filed in our legal appeal of the oil spill contingency plan (or lack thereof) for the Copper River.

Our legal argument is that Alyeska's oil spill contingency plan must identify and protect environmentally sensitive areas. Politicians and PR people like to claim environmentally sensitive areas are protected. The laws say they are in as many words.

The oil companies don't want to and the state says they don't have to, but a growing chorus of Alaskans are demanding that they must include the Copper River area, home to a world-famous fishery, renowned wildlands, and livelihood for thousands of Alaskans. Even a small spill into the water could spell disaster. Fishermen, who lived through the Exxon Valdez in neighboring Prince William Sound, don't aim to let that happen.

Alyeska responds to this clear version of the law with the absolutely nuts claim that as long as they can come up with a single, successful, hypothetical spill scenario, then they've met the law and don't have to do anything else. Their preferred scenario happens to be in the interior forests above the Slana River, an entire mountain range away from the Copper River drainage.

Their argument is a last-ditch effort to avoid a fact-finding hearing into the gaping holes we've identified in spill prevention and response planning on the Copper River. Fishermen, Alaska Natives, Landowners, business owners, scientists are lined up to prove our case. We can prove that Alyeska's plan guarantees failure to respond to spills at the Klutina, Tazlina, or Gulkana River crossings.

This is not a remote concern. There is an oil spill somewhere on the pipeline every month, on average. Judging from the historic rate of spills, oil companies calculate what corresponds to a 19% chance of a major spill from the pipeline into the Copper River watershed.

It is absolutely crazy, but a one in five chance of destroying an international treasure and someone else's livelihood is cost-effective for oil companies.

It gets even crazier. At Alyeska the pressure from above is for relentless cost-cutting. So they've gone the extra mile and are skimping on spill prevention and response as well. Apparently the cost of letting spills happen and dealing with lawsuits, is cheaper than getting prepared to a standard that would contain spills before they escape downstream.

Given they are making billions of dollars in profit each year, it's not too much to as BP, Conoco and Exxon to do things right.

The oil company's lawyer laments that protecting the Copper River is an unreasonable burden, because, "the entire pipeline route is within one important watershed or another."

Hmm.

/Staff%20Legal%20Brief.pdf

/Cascadia%20legal%20brief.doc

/Alyeska%20legal%20brief.PDF

Meeting a goshawk at Scott Peak

2008-03-25T12:28:00.000-07:00

Dave saw it first, circling in from the southwest. The goshawk silently lit atop a big hemlock snag. It sat there, watching. Dave smiled, pointed up into the solid green tangle. "Here we go," he said. Needle in a haystack. The four of us stood on the snow, necks craned up to the forest canopy, captivated.

The Goshawk was bigger than I'd expected. With proud, strong chest he cocked his head just a little to watch. He stayed on the branch just long enough for me to snap a photo to prove he exists, then lit off back up the hill.

That goshawk encounter was the highlight of a recent groundtruth trip we took with fellow Alaskan conservationists Larry Edwards, Dave Beebe, and Don Hernandez, to the Scott Peak area of the Tongass National Forest north of Petersburg. The Forest Service is set on logging this place as part of its failing dinosaur of an old-growth logging program. They've decided to take the best buffers of old-growth that are left from a legacy of clearcutting in this valley. We were there to bear witness, learn from the land, and do what we could to help protect it.

What we found was that wildlife were using the remaining patches of old-growth more than you'd expect. Contrary to assurances, from those who should know better, that the place was ruined anyway, we found the place has a beating heart of wildness yet. There were deer tracks in proposed logging units on North-facing slopes at 800+ ft. There were tracks of a pack of wolves on a gorgeous salmon stream only 100 feet from more proposed clearcuts. Marten were around, too, and sign of marten traps along the road. We looked at stands of gnarled, old hemlocks, useless as lumber, and wondered how much money they'd lose cutting them down.

Because they are almost extinct, Queen Charlotte goshawks are one of the very few animals that are at all protected from logging by the Forest Service. There are so few goshawks left that the Forest Service protects them individually, by buffering their nests with "no-cut" zones. The nest for this particular goshawk had been buffered. But, that buffer had recently been erased and a larger one rejected because, according to the Forest Service, the nest was no longer occupied.

We were guided to this particular bird in this particular spot, to prove them wrong, by Larry. Larry's the Greenpeace forest campaigner out of Sitka and a relentless sleuth. He'd unearthed a map showing the nest location from the labyrinthine Forest Service files through the Freedom Of Information Act. The map was put there by the late Forest Service wildlife biologist Glen Ith, truly one of the heroes of conservation and scientific integrity in the Tongass. Glen himself had planned to be with us here, today, but he died a sudden death in his sleep only a couple weeks before. Life is precious.

It was Glen who had recommended the substantial "no-cut" buffer around this goshawk's nest. His superiors overturned his proposal because it interfered with proposed logging units. The Forest Service science machine thus turned its service from the forest to industry, took Glen off the job, removed his wildlife analysis from the project file, tried to fire him (over vaster and not unrelated issues), and started claiming that the goshawk nest was no longer occupied, making it clear for logging.

So the four of us fanned out, checking the branches of every tree for signs of the nest or the bird. It's a ridiculously difficult endeavor, but amazingly, magically, Larry spotted the nest, nestled beneath the low branches of an ancient hemlock tree.

Ferns hung from the big, old branches. But, no bird. No sign of the bird. This was still early in the season for them to be nesting. Goshawks tend to keep up several nests and rotate among them through various years. That is apparently what this pair has done. So, we'll have to return later in the season to find them in their nest.

Then the goshawk called. He was laughing, I imagine. From somewhere just up the hill. Near the little creek and a temple of cedar snags. Laughing at us from his new, hidden nest.

The Truth About the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill

2008-02-12T17:32:00.001-08:00

CORDOVA—With the Supreme Court set to hear climactic arguments February 27, injured Alaska fishermen have launched a campaign to get the truth out about Exxon's 1989 oil spill in Prince William Sound, from the tanker, Exxon Valdez.

The website, www.wholetruth.net, acts as a clearinghouse of information and contacts. Tying together law, science, economics, sociology, traditional knowledge and more, the website tells the real story of the spill, and of the ongoing litigation to hold Exxon responsible.

The grassroots, citizen effort is made necessary by a concerted effort by Exxon corporation to delay judgement, hide the truth, and confuse issues. After a lengthy trial, in 1993, Exxon was found guilty by a jury and ordered to pay a $5 billion punitive damages award. They've unleashed an army of lawyers to avoid paying it ever since.

Exxon argues arcane points of maritime law to claim the Captain alone is at fault, not the company. Captain Hazelwood, who seemed truly remorseful, quietly served out his community service in Valdez. Exxon corporation on the other hand has avoided paying a single penny of the punitive award, while raking in $40 profit last year. Exxon's handling of the case is a saga of strong-arm corporate legal tactics. Their legal team is a shameful triumph of cynicism.

It's been 19 years. Over 6,000 of the injured plaintiffs have died without seeing justice. Truly and literally, Exxon mocks the justice system.

At stake before the Supreme Court is not only the $5 billion punitive judgement, but also fundamental legal issues of corporate accountability, especially for water quality. Everyone who is interested in not having poisons dumped into their water has an interest in the outcome of this case.

So check out the site and spread the word.

Copper River oil spill contingency survey out for public comment

2008-02-06T15:56:00.000-08:00

CORDOVA— Alyeska's survey of the Copper River for oil spill contingency planning is out for public review and comment.

The report is a result of a Condition of Approval imposed by the state requiring a survey of the main stem of the Copper River. The Condition was imposed in response to public outcry from Copper River stakeholders, who noted the existing plans say nothing about the Copper. The fear is that a spill into the river would destroy the priceless Copper River salmon fisheries.

Alyeska's survey notes several "Areas of Opportunity," or containment sites, along the main stem of the Copper river. These are places where they think that spilled oil flowing downriver could theoretically be captured by boom and skimmer gear. The survey is an amendment to the larger contingency plan, and is subject to public review.

While certainly better than nothing, the proposed changes do more to highlight the insufficiency of existing plans than resolve concerns. The containment methods described in the survey would seem to have very limited ability to recover oil. An expert opinion recently commissioned by Cascadia, shows that these planned containment methods would recover only negligible oil. Even with a flawless execution, the swift river currents, quicksand, shifting gravel bars, and high silt loads would all make the response tragically ineffective.

Alyeska's response plan is way too slow. After oil has escaped into the river, it is already too late for effective spill response. The bottom line is: oil cannot be allowed to enter any river or stream in the Copper River Watershed. Period.

That is why we will continue pursuing legal action against the State regulators and Alyeska, until they have fully recognized and protected the Copper River.

To take action, download the pdf of the report below, and send comments by March 10 to:

Alaska Dep't of Environmental Conservation

ATTN: Rebecca Spiegel

411 W. 4th Ave.

Anchorage AK 99501

bspiegel@jpo.doi.gov

And send a copy to me, at gscott@cascwild.org.

/Copper%20River%20AOO%20Report.pdf

Chugach Forest plans big fee increases

2008-01-31T17:40:00.000-08:00

The five-year plan for recreation facilities on the Chugach National Forest shows they are tackling a budget deficit by increasing fees dramatically, and pursuing partnerships with citizens to help with maintenance. One cabin, at Pete Dahl Slough, on the Copper River Delta, is also scheduled for decommissioning.

The overall maintenance and operating costs for facilities on the whole forest is listed at $1,543,053. Yet, the appropriated funds available from Congress are only $918,284. So, bills have been piling up through the Bush administration. The plan, signed in 2006, shows a $1,418,090 maintenance backlog on the various cabins, campgrounds, trails, signs, and visitor centers on the forest.

According to the plan, the average fee at cabins is going up to $75 during peak season. That's a huge jump. It ventures into the realm of unaffordable for many families. Overall, the plan is to raise $635,759 from fees each year, more than triple the current total. Yikes.

This is a National Forest, not a private park. Right?

I honestly don't know what to think of the plan, beyond the obvious thought that these Republicans Stevens, Murkowski, Young, and Bush have really left us in a pickle. Example: while this was happening, Stevens spent $10 million to build the Whistle Stops project, which primary purpose was to be a photo-op for himself cutting a ribbon—ANY ribbon— on the forest's 100-year anniversary. Recreation on the Chugach costs peanuts compared to the jillions of dollars being squandered by the Feds on REALLY dumb things, like the war.

But on the other hand, there is real stewardship responsibility in citizens for our public lands. We don't have to let the cabins and outhouses fall apart, just because our president is an idiot.

So, read the plan. And let me know what you think!

Cascadia sues BIA for release of information

2008-01-29T16:37:00.000-08:00

Cascadia Wildlands Project filed a freedom of information act lawsuit against the Bureau of Indian Affairs today, in U.S. District Court in Eugene, Oregon. We are demanding that the BIA turn over all documents related to the proposed Shepard Point Road in Cordova, Alaska.

The BIA recently made a decision to construct the controversial road and port project (see our previous post). Unfortunately, they chose the most damaging, most expensive, and least effective alternative location for the facility—at the bottom of an avalanche chute, at a place called Shepard Point.

We suspect the recent decision was motivated more by political favor-trading, than by project criteria of what location would be best for oil spill response. The documents we requested are expected to reveal some of the back-room machinations behind this decision. Separate, previous FOIA requests have showed high-level involvement, including by former Governor Murkowski, Sen. Ted Stevens, and now-Federal Gasline Coordinator Drue Pearce.

Legally our case is open and shut. I expect a speedy resolution. The BIA has just flat ignored the law.

Today's FOIA lawsuit is the latest chapter in the project's divisive history. We hope it's one of the last. Re-directing this pork-barrel project to one of the alternative locations closer to town would better serve spill response, avoid environmental and safety problems, and cost only half as much as BIA's proposal.

BIA's project has big problems. Sooner or later, they'll have to stop hiding and face up to them.

Read the Complaint

/FOIA%20Complaint.pdf

Tongass National Forest opened to more logging

2008-01-25T15:40:00.000-08:00

CORDOVA—The new plan looks an awful lot like the old plan on the Tongass National Forest, in Southeast Alaska.

The Bush administration plan released today is designed to get the cut out, at the expense of residents, wildlife and conservation.

This can't be called a surprise. Over the last few months we've been dealing with a series of timber sale proposals of exceptional size and viciousness. Apparently, this is their long-term plan.

A glance at the new Forest Plan Record of Decision map shows they propose to log hundreds of thousands of acres. It's more of a logging plan, than a forest management plan. This is a last-ditch attempt to revitalize the failed old-growth logging industry in Southeast Alaska.

The truth is, the highest future value in Southeast Alaska is in fishing, tourism, subsistence, and quality of life. Logged-over public lands are a dime a dozen. People come from all over the world to see unspoiled forests teeming with deer, wolves and salmon.

There are useful things the forest service could be doing to help ensure this prosperous future. Restoration thinning for deer winter habitat, and thoughtful road restoration, are a better use of taxpayer money and Forest Service energy.

The new plan does nothing to address a pair of looming crises: lack of winter deer habitat, and a money pit on the highly-subsidized system of logging roads.

Deer Population on the Brink

Subsistence is the highest and best use of the wild, old-growth forests of the Tongass. Continued subsistence opportunities are threatened by a several generations of intensive logging, leaving very little winter habitat for deer.

Last winter saw major reductions in deer populations on the Tongass, leading to emergency closures of hunting. The major limiting factor for deer is the amount of winter habitat during severe winters—namely, low-elevation, especially south-facing, old-growth forests.

These big trees are exactly the same areas targeted in the plan for logging. Yet, the new plan, like the old one, contains no assurance of continued subsistence opportunities. The Forest Service is willing to promise timber volume for mills, but is not willing to promise deer for subsistence users.

The situation is made worse by Forest Service reliance of flawed computer models regarding protection for deer on individual timber sales. This head-in-the-sand approach leaves deer populations only two consecutive hard winters away from a catastrophic collapse.

Legacy of Road Maintenance

A major cost of the logging-centered approach are the tens of millions in federal subsidies needed to build and maintain the system of logging roads.

There are tens of millions of dollars of deferred maintenance on the road system. The new plan doesn't propose to do much of anything about it. Instead, it proposes to dig the hole even deeper by building more new roads.

These roads kill fish by blocking migration and through erosion. High road densities also basically ensure that wolves will be killed off.

Ironically, the Forest Service is so far behind on road maintenance already, that they have to close roads as soon as they build them for lack of maintenance ability. Taxpayer-funded roads are built and opened for logging trucks, then closed to use by locals.

So, expect the controversy over logging on the Tongass to continue. Cascadia will continue our work reviewing and challenging illegal timber sales, while pursuing and encouraging road restoration opportunties.

For More Information, get in touch:

gscott@cascwild.org (907) 424-3835

or for more detailed information on Tongass Forest issues, go to the excellent page of Sitka Conservation Society.

-GWS 1/25/07

Alaska Pipeline Threatens Downstream Residents

2008-01-16T13:24:00.000-08:00

A new expert analysis commissioned by the Cascadia Wildlands Project shows a chilling downstream exposure to oil spills from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline into the Copper River.

The jaw-dropping results of the analysis show, using the oil companies’ own response planning assumptions, that an spill into the Copper River watershed could reach as far as Cook Inlet and Kodiak.

Author James Brady, of North Cape Fisheries Consulting, was selected to do the analysis because of his first-hand experience. Brady was the state’s area fisheries manager before, during and after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. He writes that Aleyska’s planned response to a spill from the pipeline into the Gulkana, Tazlina or Klutina Rivers would:

Send a plume of oil smearing west along Alaska's coastline, as far as Cook Inlet;
quickly close the popular Copper River commercial, subsistence and sport fisheries;
send shock waves through markets;
have long-lasting impacts to subsistence users;
Even for a small spill, Brady writes, "subsistence fishers would see oil on the water and oil fouling their fish wheels or dip nets."
expose state agencies to massive costs trying to keep downstream fisheries open;

We had long known that the Copper River was exposed to a spill from the TAPS, but the fact that oil could travel as far as Kodiak, even the Alaska Peninsula, was a surprise. These are the exact areas still suffering from the Exxon Valdez spill. Another spill would be a devastating 1-2 punch for wildlife and residents. It is beyond ironic that the same company, Alyeska, who was in charge of first response in the 1989 incident as well, is again taking risks with Alaska.

The Brady Report also offers strong opinions about the high value of the Copper River fisheries, and need to protect them. The Copper is one of the world's greatest wild rivers. Whether with a dipnet, driftnet, fishwheel, or paycheck, tens of thousands of Alaskans depend directly on the Copper to put food on their tables. The lucrative commercial salmon fishery is world-famous. One Copper River King in an Alaska fisherman's net is worth more than a barrel of oil on Wall Street. The Copper River Delta is largest contiguous wetland on the Pacific coast of North America, supporting entire world populations of some species of birds.

The Brady Report was commissioned by Cascadia Wildlands Project as an expert opinion in our legal challenge of the state approval of Alyeska's oil spill contingency plan. It was filed with our witness lists and exhibits December 17, 2007. We are arguing they break the law in refusing to identify or protect the Copper as an "environmentally sensitive area." Under existing regulations this would require a higher level of spill prevention and readiness.

We are joined in the legal action by commercial fisherman Bill Black, and entepreneur Lauren Padawer, Alaska Glacial Mud Co. We also have strong support from villages and tribes upriver... more on that later.

Special thanks for the many whose grassroots financial support for citizen oversight of the pipeline possible—in particular Brainerd and Alaska Conservation Foundation, and Cordova District Fishermen United.

—GWS 1/16/08

BIA decides to build a road to nowhere

2007-12-06T15:49:00.001-08:00

CORDOVA, AK—A Decision has been signed by the Department of the Interior choosing the controversial Shepard Point location for a proposed road and port, according to tribal and government sources. Even with a Decision, it is far from certain whether any actual construction will occur. Internal squabbling, legal and financial troubles continue to dog the project.

The counter-productive and illegal Decision would build 4.5-miles of coastal road, and a deepwater port, in eastern Prince William Sound near Cordova. The selected location would actually hurt oil spill response, while handing corporations a deepwater port to use for heavy industry. Hopefully, this Decision is the last gasp of a bad idea.

No public notice or copy of the decision has been issued. We expect it to be posted on the official project website shortly: www.cordovaresponsefacility.com.

The Decision is certain to prove contentious. In choosing Shepard Point locations, BIA passed up several several alternative locations in-town, that were endorsed by project critics. Selection of the Shepard Point location comes at the insistence of Eyak corporate officials, who also just happen to own that land, and who hope to steamroll the project through opposition from their own members, local fishermen, oil spill responders, conservationists, and the Army Corps of Engineers.

This project has been bouncing around one stage or another of planning for over twenty years, has failed repeatedly and I predict will again. Three major unanswered questions face BIA on issuing this decision:

1. Who will pay?

At last count they were about $20 million short on funds for construction. This is even after tapping the Exxon Valdez state settlement for $10 million, and another $8 million of taxpayer transportation dollars.

2. How does the Decision get around the Clean Water Act?

The BIA-selected alternative is illegal under the Clean Water Act, according to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Environmental Protection Agency. That's because it would destroy critical wetlands, when there are "practicable" alternatives that would achieve the same purpose. Construction can't happen without Corps permits.

3. What is the real agenda?

Is this Decision actually about oil spill response? If it is, then why does the selected location slow down initial oil spill response time, which experts agree is by far the most important?

If it is, then why aren't any oil spill responders onboard? One would expect Alyeska SERVS and the Coast Guard would be involved in the project, but none are. SERVS has said they would not use a facility at Shepard Point, even if it is built for them.

BIA claims oil spill response requires a deepwater port. That is not true. There are no deep draft spill response vessels for Cordova, where the shallow-water Delta is actually the top oil spill concern. (More on that in other posts). What does require deepwater ports are large ships, such as those that would ship coal or timber off of Chugach Corp's holdings on the Copper River Delta, or cruise ships.

Stopping this project remains Cascadia's top priority in Alaska. The port, with deepwater capacity in private hands, would be the lynchpin for a generation's worth of resource extraction schemes threatening the Copper River Delta. Project opponents, including the local fishermen's union, enthusiastically endorse several alternative locations that would better achieve oil spill and economic development goals.

If they are serious about oil spill response, BIA will embrace one of the consensus alternatives, not push a polical pork machine. Their own studies identify three affordable alternatives, that could better achieve the same oil spill response benefits for all the same spill response vessels, faster, for less than half the cost, and without any environmental controversy.

—GWS

For more information, call our field office in Cordova at 424-3835, or gscott@cascwild.org.