IMINT & Analysis

Worldwide SAM Site Overview

2009-11-24T17:35:00.002-05:00

Click here to download

Current as of: 24 November 2009 (5125 locations)

Latest updates: inactive sites in Kazakhstan (EW) and Kyrgyzstan (SA-2); active and inactive sites in Russia (EW, SA-2) and the Ukraine (36D6, SA-2); active sites in Armenia (SA-4), Azerbaijan (36D6), and Libya (SA-3); recategorized one Libyan inactive SA-2 site ans an active SA-3 site based on new imagery; removed low resolution SA-2 sites from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan based on examination of high-resolution imagery, Kazakh site dropped and Kyrgyz site moved to relevant section.

This reference work contains the locations of SAM sites and related air defense facilities identified in Google Earth imagery. The downloadable file found above contains six separate folders: SAMs by country, SAMs by type, SHORAD SAMs, Historical Sites, Target Range SAMs, and Low Resolution Sites. There is a seventh folder, Range Rings, which may be downloaded here: Range Rings

SAMs by country: This folder is at first organized identically to the Range Rings folder. Each geographic area features a folder populated by subfolders for each nation. A nation's subfolder will contain up to three folders of its own, depending on the types of systems or facilities identified therein: Active (containing subfolders for each active SAM system), Inactive (containing all inactive sites), and Facilities (containing EW radar sites, SAM garrisons, and other related facilities). Clicking on the folder name for a continent or a nation will cause a pop-up window to appear displaying the inventories of that continent or nation. Different icons denote different types of facilities. These are as follows:

Squares: facilities such as garrisons, test and training centers
Diamonds: EW radar sites
Circles: 36D6 and 64N6 radar sites co-located with or operating in direct support of S-300P series SAM units
Triangles: SAM sites

The icons in the SAMs by country folder as well as the representative range rings are color coded as follows:

Dark red: SA-2 and HQ-2
Bright red: S-300P series, PATRIOT, TIen Kung series, NIKE-HERCULES, Arrow II
Dark blue: EW radar, to include 36D6 and 64N6 radars
Bright blue: SA-3, FM-90
Bright green: SA-6
Faded green: SA-4, SA-11
Lime green: KS-1A
Orange: HAWK, HQ-9, S-300V
Purple: SA-5
White: an unoccupied location
Brown: a general facility or garrison

An active S-300PS site will therefore display as a red triangle. An S-300P garrison will display as a red square, denoting the facilities affiliation. The placemark names are hidden for clarity, but will display when an individual site is clicked on in Google Earth, along with the identified components at each site. By manipulating the individual folders for each nation and employing the color scheme above, users should find this a much enhanced visual representation of the available data.

SAMs by type: This folder contains numerous subfolders organizing the placemarks from the SAMs by country folder in a different fashion. Each individual system or type of facility (such as SAM garrisons or EW radar sites), or has its own subfolder, allowing the user to browse all the examples of a particular SAM system worldwide without sorting through each nation's subfolder in the SAMs by country folder. This allows users to identify nations operating different types of systems with relative ease. There is also a subfolder for inactive SAM sites, which is further divided into subfolders pertaining to each individual SAM system. Icons in this folder will be displayed as basic placemarkers with the name of the system displayed.

SHORAD SAMs: This folder is populated with subfolders arranged similarly to the SAMs by country folder. This folder contains placemarks identifying various SHORAD SAM emplacements that have been identified, such as Rapier and Crotale positions. Range rings are not provided, given the short ranges involved.

Historical Sites: This folder is populated with subfolders arranged similarly to the Range Rings and SAMs by country folder. The intent is to separate SAM site locations pertaining to systems which are no longer in active service in respective nations from the main database. For example, two folders are present containing placemarks for the inner and outer SA-1 SAM locations surrounding Moscow. SA-1 sites containing other systems such as SA-10 or SA-20 batteries will remain marked as to their current occupant within the main portion of the database.

Target Range SAMs: This folder contains subfolders arranged by country. Each folder contains the locations of SAM-site configured targets on bombing and electronic combat ranges. Many of these sites employ emitters or actual hardware to simulate a given system.

Low Resolution Sites: This folder contains subfolders arranged in the same manner as the SAMs by country folder. Each folder contains SAM sites found in various nations which are typically not visible in sufficient resolution as to ascertain their operational status. Various information, however, including country inventories and site imagery, have been conducted to provide an estimate of site status, and the sites have been labeled accordingly using the same scheme found in the SAMS by country folder. These sites will be monitored using Google Earth and various other online imagery sources to determine their status for inclusion into the main portion of the database. Many of these sites have been submitted by IMINT & Analysis readers who have researched various sources to ascertain their locations.

Range Rings: This folder contains representative range rings generated for all SAM sites which are currently active. The folder is divided into various subfolders. First, there is a subfolder for each geographic area. This folder is divided into subfolders, one for each country in that area featuring identified SAM systems. Each country folder will contain various subfolders for each type of active SAM system or identifiable EW radar system. These folders contain the color-coded range rings. The range rings are color coded using the same system described in the next section. The ranges were taken from Jane's Land-based Air Defence. System modifications such as the Pechora-2M, which increases the SA-3's range to 35km, have not been taken into account as these systems cannot be identified as of yet in Google Earth imagery. Also, ranges for the SA-2 and SA-5 are representative of either the system's maximum ranged variant (SA-5: 300 km), or the most common variant (SA-2: 43 km).

Key Contributors

Various individuals have provided SAM site locations for inclusion into this database, and their help is greatly appreciated. These individuals include Lex2 and ChristianNL from the Google Earth Community, Hpasp, RoAF, p_shadow, and Planeman from the IMINT & Analysis forums, Tim Brewer, and all the readers who have posted site locations in the comments to this article.

Additional Discussion

Feel free to discuss the content of this file at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the SAM Site Overview discussion thread found here.

Past Updates

Information regarding previous updates to this database has been archived in the comments page attached to this post.

Taiwan Isn't Pleased

2009-11-23T13:29:00.002-05:00

A Taiwanese news article posted online on November 21st had an interesting topic: an IMINT & Analysis forum member's article posted to militaryphotos.net detailing Taiwan's air defense facilities. In a roundabout way, this site was also mentioned, as the article stated that the air defense overview's author "was working with another that had previously worked on Taiwan air defense, and photos/imagery". Hey, that's me, referring to my May 2009 piece on Taiwan's Strategic SAM Network.

The news piece claims, by way of comments from ROCAF officials, that the sites detailed are public knowledge and not secret, and that the distribution of commercial satellite imagery makes it more difficult to keep such facilities concealed. That's all well and good, but they have to be privately annoyed, given the fact that a good deal of these sites are in fact censored in the most recent Google Earth imagery. If they weren't meant to remain hidden from public view, why bother censoring the sites?

Of course, that didn't stop me in the least from utilizing Google Earth's features to extract uncensored images of the sites and display the relevant imagery. Besides, if anyone thinks that the Chinese military doesn't know exactly where these facilities are located, they're deluding themselves. Taiwan may desire to hide these locations from the general public, perhaps to conceal their proximity as likely Chinese targets to major population centers, but talking about them on the internet is certainly not a serious security concern.

At the end of the day, I can take pride in one aspect of all of this apparent international annoyance: If I wasn't accurate, the ROCAF's responses would've been different.

Image of the Week: Zhengzhou

2009-11-23T13:14:00.002-05:00

POSSIBLE HEL FACILITY?
The image above depicts a new facility on the outskirts of Zhengzhou, China. Of note is a building built between 2008 and 2009, displaying the same layout as those described in the Chinese ASAT article posted here on November 3rd. While the true nature of these facilities is not conclusively known, there is circumstantial evidence and open-source reporting available suggesting that they may fulfill an ASAT role to some degree. The continued appearance of such facilities suggests that they are significant to some degree, and are certainly worthy of further analysis in order to definitively determine their true purpose.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

China's LPAR Revealed

2009-11-20T00:21:00.007-05:00

GOOGLE EARTH SHOWS COMPLETED RADAR

Google Earth's latest imagery update now provides a high-resolution view of the completed LPAR facility in western China. This facility was previously illustrated as an Image of the Week while in an incomplete state using then-available Google Earth imagery, and identified as an LPAR facility using Terra Server imagery. Google Earth's newly-uploaded imagery from 2009 displaying the operational radar facility can be seen below:

There is still no information regarding this facility, although its positioning and orientation suggests a BMEW function. An alternative, given the relative proximity to the Xinjiang possible HEL site, could be a space tracking role providing early warning data to the ASAT network.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Old blog reactivated

2009-11-18T15:03:00.002-05:00

Some of you might remember that I had another blog about two years ago, dealing with the fact that I am a confessed Miami Dolphins fanatic. It's been relaunched with a sports and music theme, so check it out if you feel so inclined:

Fins and Riffs

Image of the Week: DPRK FULCRUMs

2009-11-16T13:14:00.003-05:00

SUNCHON AB
The image above depicts a lineup of North Korean fighter aircraft at Sunchon AB in December of 2002. While a number of Su-25 FROGFOOT attack aircraft are visible, as well as a handful of probable F-5 FRESCO and MiG-15UTI MIDGET obsolete day fighters and trainers, the most significant aircraft are the five MiG-29 FULCRUM air superiority aircraft. The MiG-29s represent the most advanced and capable combat aircraft in the DPRK's inventory. FULCRUMs are present in three variants: the baseline MiG-29, the MiG-29UB combat trainer, and the MiG-29S FULCRUM-C. It is believed that a total of thirty FULCRUMs were delivered, broken down as follows:

MiG-29 - 20
MiG-29UB - 4
MiG-29S - 6

FULCRUM-Cs were delivered as SKD kits and assembled upon delivery to Sunchon. It was the FULCRUM-C which shadowed the USAF RC-135 flight off of the DPRK's eastern coast in 2003.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Mikoyan MiG-29, Yefim Gordon, 2006

Image of the Week: Syrian CP

2009-11-09T02:26:00.004-05:00

DAMASCUS HARDENED FACILITY
The image above depicts a buried, hardened control center being built north of Damascus, Syria. The facility can be seen under construction in August of 2004 at left, and in a relatively recent image from June 2009 at right. Note that the major components, including four possible air intake/exhaust structures, have been buried in the intervening years. Construction continues, suggesting that the facility is significant, but the prolonged pace suggests that it is not a critical facility. One possibility is that of a local air defense command and control node.

This particular facility was identified by IMINT & Analysis forum member Planeman.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Sary Shagan Update

2009-11-09T01:29:00.006-05:00

Last week I mentioned that I am working on an expanded and updated look at Russia's ABM programs, including the Sary Shagan test range. Well, this project might take a little bit longer than expected. To understand why I have decided to make this a far more time-consuming project than originally anticipated, take a look at the work in progress in the image below:

I'm pretty sure we can all agree that the end result will be worth the wait, right? My intention is to model the major facilities, including operational radars like the Don-2NP (HORSE LEG) seen above, and launch components like the 53T6 silos. I've found this to be ridiculously easier than when I tried modeling the S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE), albeit still time consuming. The level of detail in the structures will depend on how long it takes to generate the basic structures. The HORSE LEG seen above is pretty basic; at the very least it still requires the two array faces and a few more odds and ends atop the radar housing. I'll probably build the basic buildings and structures (i.e. something like the HORSE LEG only with the array faces and a paint job) and then see where I'm at before deciding whether or not to go back and make them ridiculously detailed with windows and whatnot.

Anyway, since it is in fact now Monday, why don't I go see about a new Image of the Week.

Oh, an for those of you who might be curious, this is what my S-300PS ended up looking like:

Yeah, oops.

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth; 3D model created using Google Sketchup

Sary Shagan Unveiled

2009-11-04T22:25:00.006-05:00

IMAGERY UPDATE REVEALS ABM TEST CENTER

Google Earth's imagery update on 3 November incorporated a fair amount of medium-quality imagery of central Kazakhstan. For the first time, the entire range area surrounding the Sary Shagan ABM test facility can be seen. The following image denotes the locations of downrange facilities and testing areas outside of the main complex, which remains visible in high resolution.

To present an example of the detail now visible, the following image depicts a SAM trials facility. Numerous S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE) positions and a partial S-300P (SA-10 GRUMBLE) emplaement can be seen.

IMINT & Analysis will be detailing the Sary Shagan range facilities in the near future as part of an expanded and updated look at Soviet and Russian ABM efforts. Until that point, interested readers can view the following two articles:

Russia's ABM Network

SAM Test & Training Ranges in Russia and China

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

China's Other ASAT

2009-11-03T02:12:00.004-05:00

INTRODUCTION

Iran. Afghanistan. Iraq. North Korea. All are well-known actual or potential conflict zones. However, there is potentially a new conflict brewing behind the scenes, one that has been kept out of the public eye. Evidence suggests that China has entered an arms race for the potential control of space, and their weapon is the anti-satellite laser.

LASER WEAPONS RESEARCH

China's interest in laser weapon systems originated in the 1960s. Laser weapons research was ordered as part of Project 640, China's early ABM development program. The laser sub-program, designated Project 640-3, was overseen by the Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (SIOFM). Project 640-3 was intended to produce a high-power laser designed to intercept ballistic missiles and, according to some sources, high-altitude aircraft. While Project 640 was cancelled around 1980, a decision to continue laser weapons development had been made in 1979, eventually becoming part of the 863 Program regarding the development of high technology in China.

During the 1980s, China began serious research into high-energy lasers (HELs). The most significant developments were those relating to free-electron lasers (FELs) and chemical oxygen-iodine lasers (COILs), as they would possess the specifications required for an ASAT system. Research into various other less powerful laser systems was also conducted, but they are not believed to possess the required capabilities to effectively engage exoatmospheric objects.

FEL research began in earnest in 1985 at the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP). China's first FEL, named Shuguang-1 (SG-1), was activated in 1993. It was designed by CAEP's Southwest Institute of Fluid Physics. The University of Science and Technology in China (USTC), which had been operating a linear accelerator since 1987, began FEL research no later than 2003, and likely much earlier. COIL research began at the Dalian Institute of Chemistry and Physics (DICP) in the 1980s. In 1993 a COIL was tested by DICP against a target 140 meters distant.

SIOFM and the Anhui Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (AIOFM) have been involved in researching adaptive optics and deformable mirrors. SIOFM began serious work in the 1980s, and it was reported that China had made progress in this field in the 1990s. China has fielded numerous laser range-finding systems for satellite tracking, possibly as an offshoot of this work. One of these systems can be seen in the image below:
Laser weapons research may have benefitted China's ballistic missile program. China has researched the concept of rolling ballistic missiles in-flight to prevent a ground-based laser from concentrating its power on a single spot on the airframe, potentially preventing its destruction. It is possible that a prototype HEL would have been used during a trials program to provide accurate test results, validating or invalidating the research done to that point on both the laser weapon and the BMD countermeasures concept.

THREE SITES

Open source reporting from 2009 suggests that China has deployed an ASAT laser system in Xinjiang province, in or near the Tian Shan mountain range. Examination of the region has provided the probable location of such a site. Furthermore, examination of the site in the context of its similarity to other sites at known HEL-affiliated locations in China lends credibility to the assertion that some form of high-energy laser system is being deployed.

In order to develop an operational ground-based laser ASAT weapon system, China would require both a laser and sufficient deformable optics and target tracking systems. The current hypothesis is that a CAEP-designed FEL has been mated with optics from AOIFM. It is important to note that CAEP is based in Mianyang, with AOIFM based in Hefei. Facilities identified at both of these locations are of a design useful for developmental work regarding exoatmospheric-oriented weapons. And as will be seen, the probable operational facility in Xinjiang province is largely identical to the facilities at Hefei and Mianyang.

Hefei

Identifying the relevant facilities likely to support development and deployment of an operational FEL-based system begins with AIOFM's Hefei facility. AIOFM's Hefei research complex is situated to the west of downtown Hefei, across the shores of Lake Dongpu on what is referred to by the institute as "science island".

AIOFM's suspect facility contains a very unique structure clearly designed to support some sort of upward-viewing system. A large rectangular building with a sliding roof over half of its width represents the likely testing center for AIOFM's optics and mirrors. AIOFM may also be researching lasers of varying power. The USTC may share a facility containing a 200MeV RF linear accelerator with AIOFM's parent organization, the Chinese Academy of Sciences. In 2003 USTC's Hefei facility received a grant to continue researching various FEL applications related to the linear accelerator. This facility has been described in scientific journals, and interestingly, a map of the facility matches up with a facility adjacent to the AIOFM sliding roof building, albeit if the map were mirror imaged. Regardless, given AIOFM's research areas, the only area which would require a facility resembling the rectangular building would be optics, specifically those designed for upward viewing.

AIOFM's Hefei facility can be seen in the image below:
Mianyang

CAEP's Mianyang facility is home to a great deal of research and development programs. Apart from the FEL work, CAEP is heavily involved in nuclear weapons design. CAEP's Mianyang facilities may have developed China's first FEL, but the potential ASAT facility is much newer. The facility appears to have been built between 2002 and 2004, perhaps providing a general timeline for development of the prototype FEL-based ASAT. The facility is also remarkably similar to the AIOFM facility in Hefei.

Both the AOIFM and CAEP complexes share a large rectangular building fitted with a sliding roof. Once again, this suggests that the purpose of the facility is to house an object or objects designed to view skyward or spaceward through the roof. The construction timeline also hints at the possible development program for a trial FEL-based ASAT. Hefei's facility was present in a completed state in 2004, while CAEP's facility was under construction. Any developmental or test FEL-based system would likely be trialled by AIOFM to fine-tune the optics before being weaponized by CAEP. This suggests that the FEL-based system in question was likely under development around the year 2000, before beginning checkout and trials work at CAEP around 2004.

The probable laser research facility at Mianyang can be seen in the image below. The area outlined in red was built between 2004 and 2008.
Xinjiang

Having identified the likely facilities where development and test work of a FEL-based laser system took place, identifications made more credible given the facilities' association with known laser and optics research organizations, the 2009 report of an operational facility in Xinjiang province becomes far more interesting.

Sited near the aforementioned Tian Shan mountain range is a complex remarkably similar to both the Hefei and Mianyang facilities. This facility, however, is definitely military. Camoflaged buildings and robust security measures mark it as a military facility, but its contents make it the likely location where a developmental or operational FEL-based ASAT has been deployed. The Xinjiang facility, imaged under construction in 2005, contains two large sliding-roof hangars, with a third being built. One hangar likely supports the AIOFM tracking system, with the other supporting the CAEP-designed FEL. The third hangar may support backup systems, another system entirely, or may be half of a yet-to-be-seen pair of hangars mirroring the completed two in design and purpose.

The Xinjiang facility can be seen in the image below:
A graphic shown below illustrates the three facilities side-by-side and to scale. Note that the large buildings are of similar dimensions and all share the same sliding roof assembly, suggesting that they may be part of the same development effort spread across AIOFM and CAEP, the likely contributors to a FEL-based ASAT.
CORROBORATION?

Simple research, even when matched with likely facilities, is not wholly sufficient to suggest that China is actively weaponizing laser systems for the ASAT role. However, events in 2006 may provide the required evidence to tie the whole argument together.

In August and September of 2006, the US government acknowledged that Chinese laser systems had been aimed at US satellites as they passed over Chinese territory. Some analysts have suggested that these events constituted low-power demonstrations of China's ASAT weapon systems, while others have suggested that they were merely laser rangefinders used to plot precise satellite orbits. Given that the satellites which were interfered with were imaging satellites, either possibility has merit. On one hand, a low-power demonstration of an ASAT would provide notice of the capability without conducting an overt or destructive test. On the other hand, accurate plots of imaging satellite orbits would aid in denial and deception efforts. Accurate position data would also provide an ASAT network with targeting information. Either answer, therefore, lends credibility to the ASAT development argument.

The likely answer, however, is a combination of the two. As illustrated previously, China does operate various laser systems used for satellite tracking. It is possible, therefore, that a satellite with a previously measured trajectory was illuminated by a targeting or tracking laser from the Xinjiang facility. This would serve to both fine-tune the optics and tracking systems at the new facility, while sending a tacit message that the system is in place and a threat to be considered in the future.

This is, of course, speculation, as while the 2006 event has been officially acknowledged, the location of the illumination source has not, as that would be a potential indication of the trajectory of a classified overhead reconnaissance asset. However, given that the Hefei facility was operational before the CAEP facility, the optical and/or laser tracking system for the FEL may have been available prior to the actual weapon itself, allowing for it to be emplaced at Xinjiang prior to the remaining system components.

As further evidence to support the assertions made here, the DoD's 2009 edition of Military Power of the People's Republic of China mentions that China is actively pursuing laser ASAT programs.

POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES

The term "FEL-based ASAT" conjures up images of Star Trek-style ray guns obliterating satellites with precision. It should be noted that the term laser-based ASAT system is not being used to suggest a very high-power system whose only goal is to destroy an orbiting satellite. A laser-based ASAT could be employed to do one of three things: dazzle, blind, or destroy a satellite. Destruction is the most complex as it requires significant amounts of power output, high accuracy, and highly precise deformable optics to minimize loss due to atmospheric effects, all three being very significant given that a typical satellite is only viewable from a location on the ground for around 100 seconds.

Dazzling a satellite is commonly mentioned as a tactic to employ against imaging satellites. The beam is directed to the satellite's sensor apparatus, pushing out enough power to temporarily confuse the sensor systems. This is a credible threat to an optical sensor systems. Blinding a satellite is similar to damaging. In this case, the intent is normally to focus energy on a particular sensor in order to damage it to the point where part or all of it is no loger viable, a permanent effect whereas dazzling is only temporary. Finally, destruction involves a high-powered system able to physically destroy any component of the satellite, useful against non-optical systems but requiring comparatively more power than optical counters.

A fully developed and miniaturized FEL could be employed in numerous capacities. Not only could it be employed as a high-powered system at fixed sites, but as lower-power dazzling systems mounted on mobile units and dispersed around the nation. A system able to be emplaced within a satellite laser ranging station would be an interesting weapon as well. Laser ranging systems use pulsed rather than continuous beams to ensure that they are not adversely affecting their targets. A FEL with such a "firing mode" would make a credible dual-use system that could conceivably be deployed at existing ranging sites with little or no knowledge until it was required to switch over to a war footing.

CONCLUSION

In this case, open source imagery and source material seems to corroborate the 2009 report that China has fielded some sort of laser system in Xinjiang province. Whether it possesses the power output to destroy a satellite is not known, but the admittedly circumstantial evidence does seem to indicate that a system may be in place, that it would likely be a product of AIOFM and CAEP, and that it is likely a FEL. With the operationally tested direct-ascent ASAT being tested, however, another form of satellite destruction is not necessarily a must-have capability. As such, the Xinjiang facility may yet be found to serve another wholly unrelated purpose. May we live in interesting times, indeed.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Anhui Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics
China and Iran: ancient partners in a post-imperial world
Chinese Lasers and U.S. Satellites
Project 640
Assessing China's ASAT Program
Sichuan Quake & Nuclear Weapons

The following documents were used as references and can be downloaded as a .zip file here. The file is almost 40MB, be warned!

The Great Game in Space: China’s Evolving ASAT Weapons Programs and Their Implications for Future U.S. Strategy
China's ASAT capabilities as a potential response to US missile defense and "space control" plans
Current FEL Developments in China
The High Accuracy RF Phase Detector Research For 200 MEV LINAC
An Assessment of China's Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs, Policies, and Doctrines
Chinese Perspectives on Space Weapons
The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual
China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States
Military Power of the People's Republic of China - 2009
Operational Implications of Laser Weapons

The following documents and publications were used as references and are not included in the downloadable file above:

Design and Experiment of SG-1 FEL, Hui Zhongxi, Institute of Engineering Electronics, IEEE, 1993
Free Electron Laser Research In China, Jialin Xie, Chinese Academy of Sciences, IEEE, 1996
The Laser BMD and Other Radiant Energy Weapons: Some Thoughts, Paul J. Nahin, IEEE, 1977

Image of the Week: Schriever AFB

2009-11-02T15:11:00.002-05:00

GPS, INTERFERENCE, AND EXPLOSIVES...
Ever wondered just what makes a JDAM work? The JDAM is an INS guided weapon that incorporates GPS assistance for added precision. JDAM's CEP is generally around 10 meters, decreasing to around 30 meters without GPS input. It is important to note that the JDAM is neither solely GPS guided nor GPS dependant; assertions that GPS jamming devices render JDAMs useless are utterly false, and are typically the result of ignorance regarding the actual guidance system incorporated by the weapon. The GPS position is constantly updated in the weapon's "brain", allowing it to make course corrections. Newer JDAMs incorporate anti-jamming and anti-spoofing upgrades, and Boeing completed testing of an anti-jamming system in 2007. In Boeing's flight trials, 5 JDAMs out of 5 dropped were not affected by GPS jamming signals. If a jamming signal is somehow able to affect the military's secure GPS signal at all (in one instance, an Iraqi Russian-made GPS jammer was destroyed by...you guessed it...a JDAM), the weapon does not automatically revert to a 30m CEP. Rather, any degradation in accuracy will be dependent on the remaining time of flight and path to target. A close-by, nose-on target will, in all likelihood, still be struck. INS is, after all, a relatively accurate, precise form of navigation.

So what does any of this have to do with the satellite image posted above? Simple. That facility is Schriever AFB, Colorado. Schriever AFB is the home of the USAF's Satellite Control Network, and is the main control center for the GPS constellation. Controllers and technicians at Schriever AFB ensure that the network is operating correctly, enabling tourists to find hotels and high explosives to locate targets.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Polish Strategic Air Defense: A Cold War Case Study

2009-10-31T05:49:00.005-04:00

INTRODUCTION

Poland's countryside is dotted with numerous abandoned SAM sites, a lasting legacy of its Cold War role as part of the Warsaw Pact's air defense network. Numerous strategic SAM batteries played key roles in the Cold War, securing the Warsaw Pact's northern border and defending Polish and Soviet military units.

GENERAL LAYOUT

The Polish strategic SAM network operated five different SAM types during the Cold War: the SA-75 Dvina and S-75 Volkhov (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 Neva and S-125M Neva-M (SA-3 GOA), and S-200VE Vega (SA-5 GAMMON). The network was arranged in accordance with both barrier and area air defense concepts, with a contiguous SAM network along the northern coastline and clustered sites inland protecting key areas such as the capital. At first the strategic SAM forces were under the control of the Polish Army, but in 1962 they transitioned to the control of a new service branch, the Air Defense Army. The Polish Army would, however, operate the 2K11 Krug (SA-4 GANEF) and 2K12 Kub (SA-6 GAINFUL) tactical SAM systems.

Engagement ranges of the strategic SAM systems employed by Poland are as follows:

SA-75 Dvina: 34 km
S-75 Volkhov: 43 km
S-125 Neva: 15 km
S-125M Neva-M: 25 km
S-200VE Vega: 240 km

In the imagery contained within this article, SAM systems will be identified as follows: SA-75 sites are marked with yellow triangles and range rings, S-75 series sites are marked with red triangles and range rings, S-125 series sites are marked with blue triangles and light blue range rings, and S-200 series sites are marked with purple triangles and range rings. Soviet SAM sites are identified using the same color scheme but are marked with stars in place of triangles.

BUILDING THROUGH THE YEARS

Poland's strategic SAM network was born in a 1959 government decree determining that air defense units would be equipped with SAM systems. Crew training on the SA-75 Dvina began in 1960, with 26 batteries available by the end of 1963. The decision to obtain the S-75 Volkhov was also made in 1963, with training beginning in 1964. Nine SA-75 units would reequip with the S-75 and twelve new units would form by the end of 1971. In 1968 the S-125 was acquired and crew training initiated, progressing to the S-125M in 1978. Ultimately, 17 S-125 batteries would form, as well as nine S-125M batteries. 8 S-125M batteries would replace older SAM systems, in some cases even the shorter-ranged S-125. Poland's last Cold War strategic SAM acquisition was the S-200VE. Work towards that end began in 1985, with the battery becoming operational in 1987.

The following image depicts the layout of SAM facilities around Poland. It should be noted that not all of these sites were operational at any given time, this image merely illustrates the overall deployment strategies. Note the coastal barrier extending east from the DDR border to Gdansk, and the clustered arrangement of SAM batteries around major cities. Scattered around the nation are red icons denoting Soviet SAM sites, primarily S-125Ms tasked to defend Soviet airfields. Also of note is Bemowo Piskie, in the northeastern sector. This was the facility responsible for training Polish SAM operators and units.
OVERALL COVERAGE

Due to the constant upgrades and expansion present within the Polish strategic SAM network, chronological analysis provides the most convenient method for viewing the network's status and capability at a given point in time. The following images will depict the SAM network as it existed for a given time period, accompanied by a brief analysis where appropriate. Soviet SAM batteries will not be included here as there is no documentation regarding their deployment timelines.

1966: SA-75 deployment had completed, providing the nation's first SAM network. At this point the sites were positioned to defend key locations, being deployed in a quasi-circular pattern around their areas of interest.
1970: S-75 deployment was nearly complete. By this time, the framework for the coastal SAM barrier was in place, and select SA-75 batteries near Gdansk and Warsaw had been upgraded with the newer S-75.
1976: By this time S-75 deployment was completed, and S-125 deployment had begun. The coastal SAM barrier was complete. S-125 batteries were used to supplement the SA-75 and S-125 batteries, providing enhanced low-altitude coverage.
1977: By 1977 a solitary S-75 battery near Skwierzyna had been deactivated. This battery, the sole strategic SAM battery operated by the Polish Army, was reequipped with the 2K11.
1978: By the end of 1978, S-125 deployment was expanded around Katowice, and the first S-125M batteries had entered service. Warsaw S-125 batteries were reequipped with the newer, longer-ranged S-125M.
1984: By this time, S-125 deployments had taken place around Poznan, supplementing the SA-75 batteries already in place.
1986: S-125M deployment had been completed by 1986, with the system replacing select SA-75 and S-75 batteries near Mrzezyno along the northern coastline, Poznan, and Katowice.
1987: The Polish SAM network saw its last Cold War alteration by 1987, with the deployment of the S-200VE near Mrzezyno.
SOVIET FORCES

Soviet SAM units deployed to Poland during the Cold War were established primarily to provide air defense for Soviet troop locations. Most commonly, S-125M batteries were emplaced on or near military airfields occupied by the Soviet military. Identified Soviet air defense deployments included two S-75M batteries and four S-125M batteries.

Soviet air defense deployments and coverage in Poland can be seen in the image below:
Soviet air defense deployments in Poland were apparently far less robust than they were to the west in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The reason behind this is likely due to the fact that high-performance Su-27 (FLANKER-B) air superiority fighters were based at Soviet-occupied airfields, providing a far more capable air defense asset than any S-75 or S-125 variant. Also, it was likely believed that any attacking force having penetrated through the GDR and Polish SAM and interceptor nets would be more readily dispatched by available air assets.

An apparent S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE) emplacement near Warsaw provides the only indication that the system was considered for deployment to Poland. Given that there is no evidence to suggest that the Polish government has attempted to purchase the system in the past, the likely operator would have been the Soviet military. The site was in use as recently as 2002 by the Polish military, most likely to support EW assets which would be able to take advantage of the raised berms initially constructed to enhance the fields of view of the S-300PS's 5N63S (FLAP LID B) engagement and 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) or 64N6 (BIG BIRD) EW/battle management radar systems.

The Warsaw S-300PS site can be seen in the image below:
CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

As designed, the Polish strategic SAM network was fairly robust and during later years did provide relatively layered coverage zones where systems were deployed. Consider the following image, depicting SAM deployments and coverage zones circa 1989 of both Polish and Soviet strategic SAM units:
While the network appears at first glance to contain a significant number of open areas, particularly in the southwestern, central, and eastern portions of the nation, the network must be analyzed in the context of the entire Warsaw Pact air defense network. The GDR was likely to serve as the front line of any conflict with NATO, and as such enjoyed a much more contiguous SAM network.

The following image depicts the strategic SAM deployments in the western Warsaw Pact circa 1989:
The majority of the Warsaw Pact's SAM defenses were consolidated in the GDR, and in western Czechoslovakian territories closest to the West German border. Polish airspace was therefore protected by these networks, their presence acting as an external SAM buffer zone. This may in part explain why Poland continued to rely on the older SA-75 Dvina in greater numbers throughout the Cold War; Czechoslovakia and Hungary, for example, had phased the system out by 1989.

The limitations inherent in the Polish strategic SAM network were ultimately the same shared by its allied states: reliance on outdated Soviet weapon systems. The SA-75, S-75, and S-125 were all single-target command-guided systems, able to engage one target per engagement radar and vulnerable to ECM interference with either the engagement radar or missile guidance command link. However, even these limitations should be taken in context; the Warsaw Pact did not see itself fighting a defensive battle for an extended period and as such the limitations of Polish systems deployed well behind the predicted front lines would have been mitigated by Soviet Army advances into the heart of NATO.

Ultimately, Poland's strategic SAM network was well designed to serve its purposes, even if the systems themselves became more susceptible to Western electronic combat systems as the Cold War continued.

THE 90S AND BEYOND

Following the end of the Cold War, the Polish strategic SAM network began to see a number of changes. In 1990, the SA-75 was finally removed from service, with the S-75 following in 2001. Poland has relied almost solely on the S-125 family since 2001, developing a mobile variant dubbed the Neva-SC featuring truck mounted engagement radars and tank mounted launch rails. The only other holdover from the Cold War period is the S-200VE.

CONCLUSION

Poland's strategic SAM network played a critical role for the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. The coastal SAM barrier guarded against NATO incursion into one of the Warsaw Pact's main resupply and logistical areas, and would have aided in protecting naval units transiting from the Baltic Sea. Although its strength waned following the Cold War, at strength it was a critical component in the Warsaw Pact's overall air defense strategy.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.

GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA

A Google Earth file containing the placemarks and range rings used in the generation of this article can be downloaded here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

SAM range data taken from various editions of Jane's Land-based Air Defence, and from Fakel's Missiles, an unclassified Fakel publication detailing the bureau's missile development.

I have chosen to pretty much ignore unit subordination for this piece, not because the data is unavailable, but because it can be read in much more depth at the following link:

Polish Air Defense, 1959-1985

Image of the Week: Chinese UAV

2009-10-26T19:52:00.003-04:00

CHENGDU XIANGLONG UAV
The image above depicts the main ramp area at the Chengdu airfield in central China. Chengdu has been an important fighter manufacturer for the PLAAF and PLANAF for many decades, with its most significant products being the venerable J-7 and advanced J-10. Nine of the newer J-10s can be seen in the image, with the primer aircraft possibly representing the J-10B demonstrator. The J-10B is believed to have flown for the first time in December of 2008, and may have been present at the airfield in June of 2008 for taxi tests and other evaluations. Apart from the J-10s and various J-7 derivatives, the most significant aircraft is Chengdu's first serious venture into UAV design: the Xianglong. The Xianglong, roughly 20 meters in wingspan and 10 meters in length, resembles the American RQ-4 Global Hawk, albeit approximately 40% smaller.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Thanks to IMINT & Analysis forum member Raj47 for mentioning the UAV's presence following an imagery update.

New Sidebar Items, Updates

2009-10-26T05:30:00.005-04:00

With my increase in productivity the past couple of days, I've added a few new menus over on the right of the page. Underneath "Latest Updates" and "Forthcoming Articles" you'll now find the following options:

-Strategic Forces: anything relevant to strategic warfare, nuclear submarines, ballistic missile forces, etc

-SAM Site Overviews: site overviews for various SAM systems

-Strategic SAM Networks: present-day SAM network architecture

-Cold War SAM Networks: historical SAM network architecture

The links presented in each section are, of course, to articles here on this site. This just provides an easier way for people to go back and find some of the old pieces that they might have missed. Each menu will be updated whenever a new piece is added that fits in one of those categories.

Plus, seeing all of this stuff laid out in an organized, accessible fashion has already made me start work on updating some of the older features linked in those sections.

Other than that, the next two pieces to be finished (they are really just about done) will be the Polish Cold War SAM Network and the Chinese Laser ASAT Facilities pieces. Then its back to picking around from lists of topics, updating old articles, etc. There may also be a new fun item coming along soon: PDF downloads. These will be significantly expanded versions of existing pieces, or in some cases new features entirely, available for receipt through the mailing list. Free of charge, of course, at least for the time being. Some of the things I'm working on are several hundred pages long. Why through the mailing list? Because then I won't run into the old problems with the SAM Site Overview file again.

All for now. Don't forget, if there are any suggestions for site improvement or ideas for future articles, let me know!

And yes, despite my apparent productivity, the Image of the Week hasn't been posted yet today. I know. I've got a few to consider, it'll be posted this afternoon or early evening.

SFRY Strategic Air Defense: A Cold War Case Study

2009-10-26T04:44:00.004-04:00

INTRODUCTION

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) existed throughout the Cold War, before succumbing to internal fractions and secessions. While not a Warsaw Pact member state, being a founding member of the Non-aligned Movement, the SFRY did rely on the USSR for the majority of its air defense weaponry. Strategic SAM defenses were no exception, but a lack of serious cooperation with the Soviets may ultimately have led to the creation of a less capable air defense network.

THE S-75

The first strategic SAM deployed in the SFRY was the S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE). Two air defense missile regiments (ADMRs), the 250th and 155th, were formed in 1962 and 1965 respectively. Each regiment defended the airspace around a key city, Belgrade for the 250th and Zagreb for the 155th, and consisted of four S-75 batteries. Heading into the 1970s the SFRY could count on a total of eight S-75 batteries for strategic air defense.

The 250th ADMR was equipped with the SA-75 Dvina. The missile system had a range of approximately 34 kilometers. The 250th ADMR's four sites were deployed in a roughly semicircular pattern south of Belgrade. The 155th ADMR, being established three years later, was equipped with a more capable, longer-range S-75 variant, the S-75M Volkhov. This system had an effective range of approximately 43 kilometers. Both systems were constrained, however, by their single-target engagement capability and simple command guidance methodology. In the mid-1960's, however, they were state of the art. The 155th ADMR's four batteries were arranged in a rectangular pattern, with Zagreb aligned along the right "side".

The following image depicts the layout and coverage zones of the 250th ADMR's SA-75 batteries:
The following image depicts the layout and coverage zones of the 155th ADMR's S-75M batteries:
The following image depicts the layout and coverage zones of SFRY strategic SAM assets, circa 1970. Note the larger engagement zones of the S-75M batteries.
THE S-125

In the 1970s, a new weapon system was added to the SFRY's strategic air defense network: the S-125M Neva-M (SA-3 GOA). The S-125M was a command-guided SAM system with a range of 25 kilometers. Like the S-75, it possessed a single-target engagement capability. It did enjoy better low-altitude capability than the S-75 variants, however, and was initially conveived in part to augment the S-75 for this very reason. The SFRY, however, initially chose to deploy the S-125M in a similar manner to the S-75: four-battery ADMRs would be established around important cities.

Two ADMRs were established to operate the S-125M, the 350th and 450th. The 350th ADMR was established in 1974 around Ljubljana in the northwest, with the 450th ADMR following in 1977 around Skopje in the south. The 155th and 250th ADMRs retained their earlier S-75 variants, the SFRY choosing, initially, to deploy the S-125s in undefended regions.

The following image depicts the layout and coverage zones of the 350th ADMR's S-125M batteries:
The following image depicts the layout and coverage zones of the 450th ADMR's S-125M batteries:
In 1978, a further four S-125M batteries were assigned to the 250th ADMR, which was redesignated the 250th air defense missile brigade (ADMB) to reflect its increased strength. These S-125M batteries were deployed around Belgrade and provided an increased coverage area as well as overlapping coverage zones with extant SA-75 batteries.

The following image depicts the layout and coverage zones of the 250th ADMB following S-125M deployment:
The following image depicts the layout and coverage zones of SFRY strategic SAM assets during the 1980s:
CAPABILITY

Being a non-aligned nation, neither part of NATO nor the Warsaw Pact, the SFRY was not committed to the air defense networks of either bloc. The SFRY was also a nation which contained a significant amount of varied terrain. These factors helped shape the general layout of strategic SAM deployments.

Given that the SFRY was not permanently joined to one side of the Iron Curtain, its strategic SAM network allows for interesting comparisons to be made between "aligned" and "neutral" nations. Unlike the DDR, for example, the SFRY's strategic SAM network was relatively sparse, designed only to defend key areas rather than provide true nationwide or border area air defense. Nationwide or border deployment strategies would have been hampered by the aforementioned terrain constraints, particularly in the areas of present-day Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Non-Warsaw Pact member status may have also prevented the SFRY from obtaining long-range systems such as the S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON), or hosting similarly-equipped Soviet units. Alternatively, as a non-aligned nation, the SFRY may have seen the deployment of such a network or the purchase of more advanced assets as unnecessary.

Ultimately, the SFRY's strategic SAM network was fairly porous, and in later years suffered from reliance on 1960s-era technological assets. While the network fulfilled the requirement for air defense of key locations, it would not have provided a significant impediment to a modern, equipped air force, especially during the 1980s when the effectiveness of the S-75 and S-125 had been reduced to a significant degree by Western electronic warfare systems and system exploitation.

BREAKUP

In the 1990s the SFRY began its gradual disintegration into the various nation-states and autonomous provinces which exist today. As the nation degraded, so did the air defense network once emplaced to defend it. The 155th and 350th ADMRs were relocated to Bosnia in 1992, with the S-125M batteries being used to replace the SA-75 batteries in the 250th ADMR. The 155th ADMR was deactivated in accordance with the 1995 Dayton Accords, leaving the S-125M the only remaining strategic SAM asset operational in any former Yugoslavian state. At some point between 1990 and 1999, the 450th ADMR was relocated to Bosnia and emplaced near Kraljevo. Only one prepared site has been located in the area, seen in the image below, suggesting that the remaining batteries may have been kept in reserve and subsequently field deployed during the 1999 conflict with NATO.
Due to reliance on largely outdated systems and operating only twelve S-125M batteries, it is no suprise that the 250th ADMB and 450th ADMR failed to achieve great success in repelling NATO air attacks in 1995 and 1999. Many of the same nations, flying the same warplanes, had enjoyed great success over Iraq in 1991, which operated significantly more S-75 and S-125 batteries. The only NATO warplane shot down in 1995 was a French Mirage 2000, and this was downed not by an S-125M but by a shoulder-fired SAM system. 1999 saw marginally more success statistically, likely related to the increased number of sorties which were mounted by NATO.

F-117 DOWN

The 250th ADMB would reach the end of the 1999 conflict with a significant victory for any air defense unit, regardless of strength or sophistication: the shootdown of an F-117A. On the 27th of March, 1999, an F-117A was shot down by an S-125M unit commanded by Colonel Zoltan Dani. Col. Dani has stated that the missile system was modified, although he has not provided any details which could compromise such systems still in service in Serbia, and has discussed communications intercepts which provided insights into flight routes. The most likely explanation is that a long wavelength radar system was incorporated allowing the F-117A to be tracked at greater-than-normal range for the system, allowing ingress and egress routes to be studied. An S-125M battery deployed underneath a known ingress/egress corridor would have an excellent chance of tracking an F-117A, as the aircraft is not, after all, invisible. By masking such a deployment from NATO reconnaissance assets, the S-125M battery would be able to engage and shoot down an F-117A.

Given that there were no other LO aircraft shot down, despite persistent propaganda claims of B-2 shootdowns to the contrary, this would appear to be a credible scenario, as the likely NATO response of altering future flight routings would alleviate the possibility of a SAM battery being purposely deployed underneath a known route. Again, while Serbian air defense units did not ultimately prevent NATO aircraft from conducting their bombing raids, and therefore failed to achieve their strategic purpose, on a single night in 1999 the 250th ADMB demonstrated to the world that with proper support, competent tactics, and effective training, a less technologically advanced system can still be an effective part of a strategic air defense network.

As a side note, the F-117A shootdown likely resulted in the second most famous event of the 1999 conflict-the bombing of the Chinese embassy on 7 May. While various sources have claimed that the building was bombed due to signals intelligence information, alleging that China was studying cruise missile systems to develop effective countermeasures, this story makes as much sense as the official response that the site was hit due to an error caused by outdated maps. By 1999 China was well into developing the HQ-9, and had imported various iterations of the S-300P (SA-10 GRUMBLE/SA-20 GARGOYLE) and Tor (SA-15 GAUNTLET) SAM systems, providing viable cruise missile defense. It is more likely that the site was deliberately bombed to prevent the transfer of F-117A airframe and RAM components to the Chinese.

CONCLUSION

The SFRY did not take an consistently belligerent stance on one side of the Iron Curtain or the other, and as a result was not ultimately under a constant and serious threat from either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Given the political considerations, it is not suprising that a more robust and capable strategic SAM network failed to materialize. The SFRY simply deployed what it felt was necessary to achieve its goals, and the failings of the network's remnants in the 1990s were simply a result of oversaturation and undermodernization of the remaining weapon systems themselves.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions

Zoltan Dani on the F-117A shootdown

Special thanks to IMINT & Analysis forum member Hpasp for providing SFRY order of battle information and historical data.

Image of the Week: SAM Display

2009-10-19T23:45:00.000-04:00

DINGXIN AB SAM DISPLAY
The image above depicts a static lineup of SAM hardware displayed at Dingxin AB, China, during March of 2006. HQ-9 and S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE) components were on display, as well as various EW systems. Lineups such as this are useful for analysts to determine dimensions of newly discovered equipment in comparison to known values, and to identify differences between similar components in overhead imagery. In this case, it is useful to compare the engagement radar units and TELs of the S-300PMU-1 and HQ-9. This lineup was most likely arranged for inspection by high-ranking officials or VIPs. Other modern PLAAF systems such as the J-10 multi-role fighter and KJ-2000 AWACS were also on display as part of a separate lineup.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Chinese Military Airfields

2009-10-12T19:30:00.000-04:00

CHINESE MILITARY AIRFIELDS

Latest update: 12 October 2009

A Google Earth placemark file detailing Chinese military-affiliated airfields can be downloaded here. There are five folders available, one each for PLAAF bases, PLANAF bases, PLA bases, manufacturer & test facilities, and bases whose affiliation is currently unidentified. The locations are color coded, with PLAAF bases being green, PLANAF bases being blue, PLA bases being orange, manufacturer & test locations being red, and unidentified bases being yellow. Each folder is also divided where appropriate into subfolders based on military region. This file will be updated as more current information becomes available.

If anyone has any information regarding the locations in the "Unidentified Affiliation" folder, please let me know!

SOURCES

Globalsecurity.org
Sinodefense.com
Scramble

Image of the Week: CIA's OXCART

2009-10-12T18:02:00.002-04:00

A-12 DISPLAYED AT CIA HQ
The image above depicts the most recent Blackbird to have found a new home, A-12 Article 128. Article 128 was removed in 2007 from the Minnesota ANG museum, where it had been on display. Following a brief restoration and maintenance period, the A-12 was delivered to the CIA headquarters in Virginia to be placed on display as a monument to the Agency's most ambitious overhead reconnaissance program of the Cold War. Amusingly, the CIA actually had to work through the USAF to acquire an OXCART for display; following retirement of the Blackbird fleet from operational service, all of the airframes were "owned" by the USAF Museum, which was then responsible fordistributing them to various museums for public display.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Image of the Week: WSMR Laser Test Facility

2009-10-05T19:04:00.003-04:00

NORTH OSCURA PEAK
The image above depicts the North Oscura Peak test facility on the grounds of White Sands Missile Range. North Oscura Peak is a USAF Research Laboratory facility involved in laser weapons research. The 1 meter telescope, annotated on the image above, transmists energy to a facility at Salinas Peak 35 miles southwest. Atmospheric distortion is measured, and work is then done on developing deformable optics to compensate, allowing more power output to be possible at greater range.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Image of the Week: Pechora-2M

2009-09-28T05:45:00.002-04:00

EGYPTIAN PECHORA-2M
The image above depicts an Egyptian Pechora-2M SAM system deployed on a training range near Cairo. The Pechora-2M is a modified S-125 (SA-3 GOA) incorporating an enhanced, longer-range 5V27DE missile and featuring the RSN-125 radar and launch rails mounted on mobile vehicles for rapid relocation and increased mobility. Numerous improvements have also been made to the internal electronics of various system components, including the engagement radar. Upgrading Egyptian S-125 systems to Pechora-2M standard has provided increased capability at limited cost, avoiding the impulse to spend money on big-ticket items such as the S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE). While the S-300P series, for example, remains well ahead of the Pechora-2M in terms of capability, upgrading the older systems will enable an incrased number to be brought online to replace obsolete S-125 batteries.

While the electronics have been greatly improved, however, the Pechora-2M is still constrained by the command guidance mode and the RSN-125 radar. The radar has been upgraded to allow tracking of 16 targets, but only one missile may be guided at a time. Therefore, for a battery to possess multiple target engagement capability, at least two RSN-125 radars would need to be present. Ergo, while survivability, range, and ECCM capability of the Egyptian S-125 may have improved on an individual battery basis, overall combat effectiveness of the air defense network may or may not have increased a significant amount. For this to occur, significant restructuring and reequipping with legitimate, modern, strategic SAM systems would need to take place.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Image of the Week: Chinese S-300PMU-2

2009-09-14T23:48:00.000-04:00

SHANGHAI S-300PMU-2
The image above depicts one of four S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE) SAM batteries surrounding Shanghai. Imagery from 2008 suggests that Chinese S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE) equipment may be in residence at the site. Photographic and documentary evidence has shown that China's S-300PMU-2 batteries are equipped with export variants of the 5P85T2 TEL and 96L6 EW radar used by the Russian S-400 SAM system. Both of these items, not found in China prior to S-300PMU-2 delivery, have been possibly identified at this location. This suggests that Chinese S-300PMU-2 components are being delivered to locations already operating S-300PMU-1 batteries. This is likely being done for crew training due to the familiarity between the two systems, with the probable end result being the redeployment of the S-300PMU-1 or S-300PMU-2 battery to a new location.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Image of the Week: Monino

2009-09-07T21:45:00.000-04:00

RUSSIA'S CENTRAL AIR FORCE MUSEUM
The image above depicts the aircraft on display outdoors at the Russian Central Air Force Museum at Monino, east of Moscow. Monino is without a doubt home to one of the most impressive collections of civil and military aircraft anywhere in the world. Some of the more significant aircraft on display, from the Tupolev Tu-144 SST to the Sukhoi T-4 Mach 3 maritime strike aircraft, are annotated on the overhead image. Outdoor museum displays such as this are valuable for imagery analysts as they provide a baseline of known aircraft appearances which other aircraft or objects can be compared to.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Image of the Week: China's 7010 LPAR

2009-08-31T01:07:00.003-04:00

THE 7010 BMEW LPAR
The image above depicts the position formerly occupied by China's 7010 LPAR. The 7010 radar became operational in 1976 as part of China's Project 640 initiative to field a missile defense network. The radar array has been dismantled since the site was removed from operational service in the 1990s. The facility is interesting given that it is aligned to detect inbound missile launches coming from the west, ostensibly meaning Russia or the former Soviet Union. Nearly all of Russia and the FSU's current and former ICBM complexes would have fallen within the radar's field of view, the only exceptions being those at Drovyanaya, Svobodnyy, and Olovannaya.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

China's Project 640

Image of the Week: S-200 Test Complex

2009-08-24T17:16:00.004-04:00

SARY SHAGAN S-200 SITE
The image above depicts the S-200 trials site at Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan. While there is another S-200 site on the grounds of the ABM test range closer to the shores of Lake Balkhash, this facility is likely the original trials site for development work pertaining to the S-200. Positioning the S-200 launch facility in this portion of the Sary Shagan range complex suggests that it did in fact undergo an ABM trials program. This area of the Sary Shagan range complex is home to the former V-1000 and current 53T6 launch areas, as well as numerous SAM launch sites of systems known to have at least been evaluated in an ATBM or ABM role.

The second Sary Shagan S-200 site was likely an operational site positioned to defend the area from overhead reconnaissance, a Soviet strategy that proved to largely be a wasted expense after May of 1960: President Eisenhower banned all manned overflight of the USSR from that point forward, a decision which would remain in total effect until the advent of the Open Skies program.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Update

2009-08-23T16:28:00.002-04:00

The Image of the Week will now be done on Monday instead of Friday. Ergo, the one you expected to see last week will be posted...tomorrow! This change is due to a rearranging of my schedule.

Comments...some of the comments I've been getting have been asking questions, or asking for a bit of analysis. These will always be posted to the site, but I won't approve them for publishing until I have the answer or an appropriate reply to post as well. So, if you've posted a comment with some inquiries, and haven't seen it appear yet, that's why. Most other comments are approved for posting right away, unless I reject them as spam.

I'm also working on a piece detailing Chinese laser ASAT facilities, expect that to be the next significant article posted. There will also be a SAM Site Overview posted this week, perhaps today or tomorrow. Much of the credit for this update goes to Tim Brewer for sending along a whole mess of new sites over the past few weeks.

Life seems to be settling down a bit for me here of late, so expect to finally begin to see a return to regularity and a greater deal of articles posted beyond the standard SAM Site Overview and Image of the Week. That's all for now, and as always, feel free to send me any comments or ideas!