Comments on Alanyzer: Open Theism and the Test for a Prophet

I'm not sure I see the problem here, but anyway bi...

2009-05-04T09:03:00.000-07:00

I'm not sure I see the problem here, but anyway biblical interpretation in the Judeo-Christian tradition asks that we harmonize seemingly contradictory passages. For example, one might think that Deuteronomy 18:22 and 1Corinthians 13:8 clash: “… but whether there be prophecies, they shall fail ...”

There is also the place where God says (Jonah 1:2): “Arise, go to Nineveh, that great city, and cry against it; for their wickedness is come up before me.” The prophet ultimately prophesies (Jonah 3:4), “Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown.” But Nineveh was not overthrown because Nineveh repented.

Was Jonah a false prophet?

Maybe better—did God prophecy falsely? Yes, if what God said was “Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown. Period.” But we have to assume that God was smart enough to leave himself an opening, perhaps the opening that Jonah feared, which was that if Nineveh repented there would be no overthrow in 40 days.

A man may say, “Yet 40 days and I will do such and such,” but not having control over all exigencies he is wise to add (James 4:15), “If the Lord will, we shall live, and do this, or that.” One assumes that God need not hedge his word with respect to a higher power. He can give his word and we can be assured that nothing can stand in his way.

But if as presentists we assume that the future hasn’t happened yet from any perspective, then God has only the crystal ball of his will and his word. He does not know what he has chosen not to know, namely the decision of those to whom he has granted the freedom to decide.

Further incidentally, that paper is even more done...

2008-12-13T01:56:00.000-08:00

Further incidentally, that paper is even more done, but with a name-change, here (the previous link won't work soon).

More incidentally, I now think little of those cri...

2008-11-06T02:04:00.000-08:00

More incidentally, I now think little of those criticisms (although I wonder what is the best reply to the possibility of God creating an unobserved free-willed creature). Very few of my thoughts stand the test of time, I find.

My paper is pretty much done now, and on my website here. I agree with all your philosophical reasons for Open theism, and found (I think) a couple more (one of which is my most recent blogpost)... very quiet round here (?)...

Incidentally, today I posted some superficial crit...

2008-09-27T03:04:00.000-07:00

Incidentally, today I posted some superficial criticisms of your forthcoming paper (on Presentism implying Theism) on my blog. I was bored and couldn't find anything else worth criticising. It's not a detailed criticism, as I've yet to delve into either the truthmaker or the Presentism literature (fortunately I found your paper very accessible).

Many thanks, that was very clear, much clearer tha...

2008-09-12T02:47:00.000-07:00

Many thanks, that was very clear, much clearer than my questions!

Hi Enigman,Good questions. I've been thinking more...

2008-09-11T11:46:00.000-07:00

Hi Enigman,

Good questions. I've been thinking more about the semantics of 'will' lately, and I agree that it does not have causal content as a rule since we can merely suppose or entertain the possibility of some event's occurring in the future.

My semantic argument against Ockhamism is not that Ockhamist propositions about the future fail to be genuine propositions, but rather that bare Ockhamist propositions about the future are unassertible. Since at least some predictions are assertible, it follows that Ockhamism does not adequately capture the semantics of predictions.

Now that argument is certainly not airtight. The question of how to sort out the literal meaning of utterances is, as you say, a messy one.

I think your argument appealing to the lack of correspondence (given indeterminism and an ontically open future) is a good one. Alicia Finch and Mike Rea defend a similar argument in "Presentism and Ockham's Way Out" (Oxford Studies in Phil. of Religion, vol. 1).

Regarding your question, I think we can appropriately say that the coin will land heads even though it is not now causally settled, but I think that involves a kind of "loose use". Strictly speaking, I would say that "the coin will land heads" is false under those conditions. The key distinction for me here is between a "loose" and a "strict" use of terms. The distinction is pragmatic, having to do with our communicative goals or purposes. But I think it has a bearing on the semantics as well.

Well, I hope that's tolerably clear! Take care.

Thanks, I will... incidentally, I'm a bit unsure a...

2008-09-11T02:12:00.000-07:00

Thanks, I will... incidentally, I'm a bit unsure about 'will' (used in the apposite way) having causal content as a rule. Maybe I misread you...

Suppose I suppose that a coin will land heads up. Then that 'will' is only about the coin landing heads up. And surely I might use 'will' in such a way in other contexts with that meaning whether or not I ought to. The question of how we interpret each others utterances, and how that affects literal meaning, is very messy... but surely that acausal content is very naturally indicated?

Consequently I'm unsure how far my response to Mawson's argument differs from your response to such arguments. I say that (given indeterminism, and the future not yet being real) it is not literally true that the coin will land heads up because there is nothing in reality for those words to correspond to - although we could be saying that the coin is likely to land heads up, e.g. if it is two-headed and unlikely to land on its edge (and although we might know that we could correctly say that it was true if it lands heads up (etc.))...

Were you explaining how we might correctly say that the coin will land heads up even though it could not then be literally true that it will (as I see it), or were you saying that such a statement is literally true if there is a reasonable probability of the possible outcome - or indeed, is this a very apposite distinction that I'm seeing here?

Hi Enigman,No, I haven't replied to Mawson yet. If...

2008-09-02T08:44:00.000-07:00

Hi Enigman,

No, I haven't replied to Mawson yet. If you have the inclination to do so, then by all means go for it. Just send me a copy of your paper when it's done.

Best wishes,
Alan

Hi Alan, I totally agree with you about (2). If Go...

2008-09-02T02:29:00.000-07:00

Hi Alan, I totally agree with you about (2). If God was undecided why would he act as though he was not? (Of course he might do, cf. how parents do, and might even do so via his prophets, but presumably only if he did not mind them being considered to be false prophets if he got unlucky.)

Incidentally, I'm aiming to respond to an argument by Mawson (from his 2005 book, repeated in the last IJPR), some of which resembles what Francis said in the comment above, that God can get things wrong, and I couldn't see a response in your publications (nor much of my response already there, fortunately); so I'm wondering, have you responded to Mawson's arguments (I'm going to reread the 3 papers on your website today, but thought I'd add this here as I get side-tracked v. easily)?

Frank,Thanks. My family and I are doing well. I lo...

2008-08-26T08:27:00.000-07:00

Frank,

Thanks. My family and I are doing well. I look forward to seeing you and Frankie again. Perhaps tonight at the opening celebration.

Regarding your argument, while it's true that some open theists (e.g., Pinnock) have ill-advisedly stated that God has made incorrect predictions, I don't think that open theism per se is committed to either the actuality or the possibility of false predictions on God's part.

As I'm sure you know, open theists have sometimes let sensationalism get the best of sober judgment. If it is ever to become widely accepted as a viable option for evangelicals, open theism is going to have to become more moderate.

Michael,Thanks for your interest. In the abstract ...

2008-08-26T08:14:00.000-07:00

Michael,

Thanks for your interest. In the abstract I agree with you that the prophecy objection is not a strong defeater for open theism. Matters can get a bit more difficult, however, when some specific Biblical passages are brought into focus. Open theist explanations of specific cases of predictive prophecy haven't always been the most convincing. I think we can do better, but at the end of the day there might be some bullets we have to bite.

Alan:Hope you're doing well. Frankie and I just ar...

2008-08-25T20:48:00.000-07:00

Alan:

Hope you're doing well. Frankie and I just arrived at Notre Dame on Thursday of last week.

One thing about my argument: what I suggested in the article is that according to open theism, as I understand it, in some possible world God makes a prediction about the future that does not come to pass. But in that case, he fails the test of a prophet; that is, he does not speak for God. But that paradoxically means that God does not speak for God.

Alan,I eagerly anticipate your forthcoming philoso...

2008-08-25T09:16:00.000-07:00

Alan,
I eagerly anticipate your forthcoming philosophical work on open theism. Thanks for your response to Beckwith's challenge. I do not at present think open theism and prophecy are incompatible (although it is possible that I could be wrong). Those who suggest that they are seem to misunderstand one or the other or both. I find this a fascinating area of study and look forward to more posts on the topic.