Mideast Files

Thoughts on the Obama-Netanyahu Meeting

2009-05-20T21:21:00.007-04:00

The meeting between President Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu had been highly anticipated for a number of reasons. Both men had recently ushered in new administrations promising new approaches to their countries' foreign policies. During the campaign, Obama spoke of the advantages of increased diplomacy and the dangers of unilateral military actions, while Netanyahu was widely seen as the candidate least likely to engage in former and most likely to engage in the latter. All these factors contributed to predictions of a clash between the US administration's policies and those favored by Netanyahu. What clues did their first official meeting give to forecast the future relationship between Obama and Netanyahu?

1. The private meeting between the two men lasted almost an hour longer than scheduled. Obama even rearranged his schedule for the day to accommodate the extra time with Netanyahu. This indicates that their discussion was highly substantive.

2. Both men came to the meeting with differing priorities. Netanyahu's top priority was to convince Obama of the urgency of the threat posed by Iran and its quest for nuclear weapons, while Obama sought to convey to Netanyahu the importance of continuing the peace process, both for halting Iran's regional ambitions and for overall US goals in the region.

3. Although there had been the possibility of a joint statement, the meeting did not result in one, indicating that any draft resulted in enough disagreement that separate statements became necessary (as retired U.S. ambassador to Israel Sam Lewis pointed out).

4. Netanyahu's real audience was the Knesset and, as such, he was attempting a balancing act. On the one hand, he was conscious of the need to maintain good relations with a popular American president, and therefore he made statements consistent with that objective, stating that Obama is "pro-Israel" and that Israel doesn't intend to rule the Palestinians. On the other hand, despite Netanyahu's coalition with the Labor Party, there are still many in his own Likud party who oppose a Palestinian state. Given Netanyahu's prior refusal to endorse such a state, supporting it at the press conference would have been seen as Netanyahu "caving in" and might have resulted in the fall of his government.

5. Obama also displayed his characteristic diplomatic tact and skill by alluding to the serious threat posed by a nuclear Iran and mentioning that the US was not "foreclosing a range of steps...in assuring that Iran understands that we are serious," while not actually mentioning the possibility of military action. Obama also outlined his disagreements with Netanyahu on a Palestinian state and settlements while at the same time praising Netanyahu, stating: "Netanyahu has the benefit of having served as Prime Minister previously. He has both youth and wisdom and I think is in a position to achieve the security objectives of Israel, but also bring about historic peace. And I'm confident that he's going to seize this moment." This allowed Obama to satisfy both those who were watching to see if he would push to advance the peace process and also those concerned about maintaining a strong US-Israel relationship.

6. While Obama never mentioned the 2002 Arab peace initiative, he did state, "I actually think that you're going to see movement in - among Arab states that we have not seen before." This stance is consistent with both US and Israeli recognition that Iran and its proxies pose not only a threat to Israel, but to other Arab allies of the US including Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Shimon Peres in particular has called for taking advantage of that opportunity for closer Israeli-Arab cooperation. Recently, Jordan's King Abdullah has also endorsed this analysis by heavily promoting the Arab peace initiative, even coining the term "57-state solution" to describe the end result of recognition of Israel by the entire Muslim world. Obama's alluding to "movement among Arab states" may suggest that the US agrees that a regional approach should be taken to the peace process, rather than simply continuing bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. There has also been talk of Arab states offering Israel new incentives, such as giving El Al the right to fly over Arab airspace and granting visas for Israeli tourists to Arab states, in exchange for Israel freezing settlements and moving a diplomatic process forward.

Obama's speech to the Muslim world from Cairo on June 4th will now be closely watched to see if he will unveil a more specific proposal for the Middle East. While Netanyahu and Obama share the same end-goal with regard to Iran, they may differ on the means to the end. Netanyahu may find that he has trouble balancing the needs of the US with the sentiments of the more right-wing elements in his coalition. Only time will tell if Netanyahu and Obama, both skilled politicians, can find a creative solution that allows both of them to achieve their political goals.

Mideast Court Battles

2009-05-17T22:42:00.002-04:00

One of my good friends, Josh Goodman, recently published an article in the WSJ Europe on "lawfare" against Israel. Check it out.

The Iranian Threat Turn Netanyahu into a Peacemaker

2009-05-17T22:25:00.004-04:00

Since the formation of the current Israeli Government earlier this year, foreign policy analysts have frequently used adjectives such as "hard-line" and "hawkish" to describe the makeup of the government and by implication, its likely policies. There has been less focus on the deliberate choices Prime Minister Netanyahu has made when forming his coalition and what these choices may signal with regard to the diplomatic path the Israeli government will embark on.

When the election results were certified, it had become clear that the "right-wing bloc" had won a majority of the seats in the Knesset. Under Israel's parliamentary system of government, the President of Israel is tasked with asking the leader most capable of assembling a stable coalition to form the next government. Even though the centrist Kadima had received one more Knesset seat than Likud did, President Peres asked Netanyahu to form the next government based on the stronger showing for the parties that comprise Israel's right-wing. What happened next can shed much light onto Netanyahu's political evolution since his failed term as Prime Minister from 1996-1999.

Lessons from Netanyahu's First Term as Israeli PM

Despite the fact that Netanyahu could have put together a stable coalition majority of 65 seats consisting of all of the right-wing parties, he deliberately started working secretly with Ehud Barak, leader of Israel's center-left Labor party, in order to bring him into the coalition. This was a direct result of the lessons that Netanyahu learned from his first term when his parliamentary coalition consisted of exclusively right-wing parties, setting it on a collision course with the United States and the international community. Netanyahu came into office in 1996 on the heels of multiple Hamas suicide bombings and he interpreted his election as a mandate to slow down the peace process with the Palestinians. Despite the Hamas violence, the signing of the Oslo accords in 1993 had ushered in an era of optimism and grand expectations that was still present and Netanyahu soon came under pressure from the international community to move forward with a peace process that would culminate in a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians.

Bound by both his coalition partners and the expectations of Israel's Western and Arab allies, Netanyahu managed to bungle his relationships with both sides. He authorized the transfer of the city Hebron to the Palestinian authority, thereby angering his settler allies who attach tremendous national and religious significance to the city. At the same time, he angered the international community with actions deemed unhelpful to the peace process such as opening the Hasmonean Tunnel and bungling an assassination attempt of Hamas' Khaled Me'shal in Jordan which almost caused a complete rupture in Israeli-Jordanian relations only a few years after they had first been established. Netanyahu's demeanor was also an issue recounts Aaron David Miller. In his book "The Much Too Promised Land," Miller relates that during their first meeting in the summer of 1996, Bibi lectured the president about the Arab-Israeli issue, prompting Clinton to expostulate when it was over, "Who the fuck does he think he is? Who's the fucking superpower here?"

Netanyahu learned that one thing Israelis value highly is their relationship with their allies, especially the United States. Their country frequently singled out for condemnation in international forums such as the United Nations, Israelis don't take their friendship with the United States for granted and they trust that their Prime Minister understands the importance of a strong US-Israel relationship. This was a lesson that former Prime Minister Yitzchak Shamir learned as well, when his election defeat in 1992 was blamed in part on his public row with then President Bush over the issue of settlements.

Now that Netanyahu is returning to the Prime Minister's office he is not taking the lesson of his first term lightly. His election campaign frequently featured photos with Obama and touted the supposed personal chemistry between the two men. Netanyahu is desperate to leave a successful legacy that will eclipse his previous shortcomings and he knows the key to achieving that is in being able to work with the Obama administration. How can a rightist Israeli Prime Minister and President Obama work together to achieve their goals?

The Labor-Likud Alliance Shows Netanyahu's Pragmatism and Concern about Iran

By forming a government with the Labor Party Netanyahu is sending the signal that he realizes that the diplomatic process with the Palestinian Authority must move forward. This is reflected in Barak's response to Haaretz was asked about Netanyahu's declaration that he will "not return to the 1967 lines or evacuate the Golan Heights."

Barak:

"Look at what Menachem Begin said in the election campaign and what he did afterward [referring to the return of the Sinai to Egypt]. Look at what Netanyahu said 12 years ago and what he did afterward [referring to the transfer of Hebron to Palestinian control]. Look at what I said and what I was ready to do [referring to dividing Jerusalem]. I say, take only these examples and you will understand that Bibi has a hard choice to make: Does he want to be Shamir or Begin? There is a deep understanding between us on the need to address the political issue and that it is impossible to leave things in a state of paralysis. If we sink into paralysis, we are liable to find...acceptance by the world that the solution is not two states for two nations but one state for two nations, which for us is a concrete risk, a slippery slope."

Indeed Netanyahu's campaign did not specifically focus on the Palestinian issue. These signs point to a certain pragmatism with regard to negotiations with the Palestinians. The dream of permanent Israeli borders that stretch from the Mediterranean to the Jordan river is over for anyone in the Israeli political mainstream. But if Netanyahu is willing to compromise on this issue, what will he likely demand in return? Action on Iran's nuclear program.

Israeli journalist Aluf Benn has written that Netanyahu, who has a reputation of being unprincipled, is actually being extremely straightforward and honest with he speaks of the the Iranian nuclear threat.

"Netanyahu has compared Iran to Nazi Germany and its president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to Adolf Hitler, and has spoken of the international community's silence in the face of both threats - in 1938 and at present...His role model is Winston Churchill, the man who warned about Germany's strengthening in the 1930s and was considered an eccentric right-wing militarist until he was called upon to save Britain in World War II, after his doomsday prophecies came true. Like him, Netanyahu also sees himself as a prophet at the gate, who saw the dangers of terror and extremist Islam before others did, and has now received a second chance to prove the justice of his claims and remove the threats to Israel and the Jewish people."

Netanyahu understands that in order to convince Obama of the seriousness of the Iranian threat and the need for action he will have to gain favor with Obama by moving the diplomatic process forward with the Palestinians, something that Obama has always considered a priority. This point was underscored during a meeting between Clinton and Netanyahu where she endorsed the idea of "linkage" - where diplomatic progress between Israel and the Arabs is necessary to enlist Arab support against Iran.

In his trip to the US this past week Shimon Peres also spoke of "linkage." In an interview with Joe Scarborough Peres stated, "for the first time, most of the Arab world, which are Sunnis, are supporting Israel more than Iran." The fact that the Arab regimes and Israel are both threatened by the rise of Iran and its imperial ambitions present an unprecedented opportunity for an Israeli-Arab partnership in confronting Tehran. Arab regimes like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia recognize that Iran and its proxies, Hamas and Hizballah, represent the biggest threat to their stability. Just last month Egypt arrested 49 Hizballah operatives whose mission was to destabilize the Mubarak regime. The Arab-Israeli peace process is an integral component of the multi-pronged approach to stemming Iran's influence. By moving the process forward, Israel can weaken support for Iranian proxies Hamas and Hizballah, strengthen the moderate forces of Fatah, and perhaps shift Syria into the Western axis and out of the Iranian orbit. By picking Barak as his coalition partner, Netanyahu may be signaling that he is prepared to do what it takes not only to avoid a clash with Obama, but to redefine his legacy as someone who managed to stem the threat that eclipses all others, Iran's nuclear and hegemonic ambitions.

The Road Map, Annapolis, and a possible US-Israel clash

2009-04-11T03:19:00.009-04:00

Certain publications have recently opined on an upcoming policy clash between the Obama administration and the newly-elected Netanyahu government in Israel. The disagreements have been communicated through a series of speeches; most notably the first press conference of the new Foreign Minister of Israel, Avigdor Lieberman, and Obama's speech to the Turkish parliament in Ankara.

The line most quoted from Lieberman's press conference was, "There is one document that obligates us - and that's not the Annapolis conference, it has no validity," The document he was referring to was the international peace plan known as the Road Map, signed in 2003, while Lieberman stated, "the Israeli government never ratified Annapolis, nor did parliament".

The difference is crucial. The Road Map for peace was a plan presented by the "Quartet" of the US, the EU, the UN, and Russia in the spring of 2003. While the plan did present itself as a "framework" for a two state solution, it was a "performance-based" plan with three phases. The third phase, which includes resolving the most contentious issues such as Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian refugees, and final borders, could only come about once the first 2 phases have been completed. The first phase calls for the Palestinian Authority to "begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption."

This is the reason why Lieberman has no issue with the Road Map. As long as the Palestinian Authority and its president, Mahmoud Abbas, remain too weak to confront Hamas, the Israelis know that the Road Map will not progress to the third phase where the tough politically-sensitive issues and concessions will have to be considered.

The Annapolis conference on the other hand, was a last ditch effort by Condleeza Rice to expedite the Israeli-Palestinian political process. Its aim was to break the "deadlock" that had resulted from the "performance based" Road Map. While the principles of the Road Map were still valid, the Annapolis declaration called for the immediate establishment of a steering committee to deal with the all outstanding issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition, Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas would meet on a bi-weekly basis to follow up on the negotiations conducted by the steering committee.

As long as the Palestinian Authority government remains to weak to confront Hamas, the current Israeli government can point to the Road Map to point out that the Palestinians have not met their stage 1 obligations and therefore Israel will not have to deal with concessions and negotiations that may cause their right leaning coalition to fall apart.

President Obama, who has never made a secret of his commitment to be an active participant in the promotion of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, made a point to specifically mention Annapolis in his speech to the Turkish parliament stating, "Let me be clear: the United States strongly supports the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security... That is a goal that the parties agreed to in the Road Map and at Annapolis. That is a goal that I will actively pursue as president."

While the statement is ambiguous enough as to leave room for the Israelis and Palestinians to each claim their own interpretations of it, the mention of Annapolis, like everything else in a President's speech, was carefully calculated. By mentioning Annapolis and Israel's security in the same breath, the President was throwing a bone to the moderate Muslim world, letting them know that he would be involved in a process neglected by his predecessor, while at the same time reassuring the majority of Americans who continue to be sympathetic to Israel and its security needs.

The question remains: Why push for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement at a time when Palestinian political disunity between Fatah and Hamas makes the implementation of such a comprehensive settlement impossible at this time? Some may point to statements by US officials that seem to signal that the US may be open to dealing with a Fatah-Hamas unity government, especially if Hamas can be co-opted into controlling the violence and rocket fire that it has been causing Israel's southern region. Still, that possibility seems remote while Obama is a pragmatist at heart. Others believe that if Israel and the Palestinians can present an attractive peace agreement to the Palestinian public, Hamas will be forced to support the agreement lest they become politically irrelevant. The problem with this scenario is that as an armed actor, Hamas will have the ability to subvert the political process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The last Gaza war accomplished just that with regards to the Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Palestinian rocket fire or terror attacks force the Israeli government to react which then sets back support for the political process among both the Israeli and Palestinian public.

The more likely reason that Obama voices support for the process is that in this case, he believes that the process may have value regardless of the likelihood that it culminates in a grand peace agreement. As long as the process continues and there can be even minimal progress towards Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, dismantling of illegal settlements, lifting of roadblocks, and helping the Palestinian economy - the conflict can be "managed." The problem again is that Hamas, as an armed actor, can use violence to interrupt the political process as it sees fit. Eventually, the moderate actors in the Middle East including Israel and the Palestinian Authority will have to find a way to deal with Hamas and its supporters if they ever hope to move toward reconciliation.

More evidence that Iran is exaggerating

2008-07-10T12:35:00.005-04:00

The photos released of the latest missile test were apparently doctored to show more missiles than were actually launched.

That would also explain why some reports claim nine missiles were originally launched, yet according to this report:

Analysts said an early assessment showed that U.S. tracking systems detected seven missile launches, including a version of Tehran's longer-range Shahab-3, which officials have said has a range of 1,250 miles. Intelligence analysts were studying data from radar, satellites and other tracking systems to determine the distance it traveled, look at its accuracy and so on, one official said.

Is Iran weaker than we think?

2008-07-09T21:01:00.008-04:00

Tensions between Israel, Iran, and the United States have heated up even further in a renewed round of sabre-rattling and accusations: Iran test-launched several missiles allegedly capable of reaching Israel, and has dredged up some rather dubious claims that Israel is secretly holding Iranian diplomats that disappeared during the Lebanese civil war in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the American and British navies recently wrapped up a simulated operation to protect oil interests in the Persian Gulf, which Iran has threatened to target in the event it is attacked.

Yet, at the same time, Israel just sealed a prisoner exchange deal with Hezbollah, Iran's proxy in Lebanon, and Syria and Israel are friendlier and closer than ever to direct talks. What gives?

It is possible that Iran, whose strength in the region has been apparently burgeoning, may have overplayed its hand and is bluffing right now to keep its tough image up, when, in fact, it faces a relative deterioration in its regional power in the future. Here are some reasons why that might be:

First, the U.S. revised its National Intelligence Estimate to suggest the Iranian nuclear program was less advanced and aggressive than previously thought.

Second, the recent gains in security in Iraq weaken Iran's status and influence in its traditional regional rival.

Third, there are reports that U.S. covert operations in Iran are underway, perhaps as a way to counteract Iranian operations in Iraq.

Fourth, Syria, not long ago Iran's best friend, now appears to be trying to get back into the good graces of the West, and has become curiously cordial with Israel, a peculiar development considering that Israel bombed a suspected nuclear weapons site in Syria last fall. As discussed in a previous post, it appears that this airstrike triggered some kind of turning point in the shifting relationships between Israel, Syria, and Iran, and it is possible that Syria invited the attack to eliminate an Iranian-affiliated military target on its territory.

Fifth, when a new president is elected in the United States in November -- either McCain or Obama -- the U.S. will attempt to cast off the legacy of George W. Bush and rebuild its international reputation. Therefore, there will presumably be less "reward" for reflexively anti-American behavior, and greater multilateral, international consequences for rogue actions. This, in part, explains why Syria wants to distance itself from Iran, and why Iran's status as U.S. public enemy number one will bring it less cachet come November.

Iran, with its opaque government structure, is a difficult country to read, but one thing is clear -- a war between Israel and the United States and Iran should be avoided. Israeli military officials often speak as if they are compelled to act militarily to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, though, stopping weapons development in Iran is not a goal the Israeli military (or the U.S. military) can reliably achieve because Iran has anticipated such attacks and has hidden and distributed its facilities accordingly. An attack on Iran would merely ignite a destructive regional war with fronts likely at least in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel, and the global oil supply coming out of the Persian Gulf would be cut off, leading to dire ramifications. That's why the best way to deal with Iran remains through diplomacy and containment.

Did Syria secretly tell Israel to bomb its own nuclear reactor?

2008-06-22T09:52:00.012-04:00

A new report claims that the al-Kibar weapons site that Israel bombed in Syria last year was working to aid the Iranian nuclear program, with the help of North Korean scientists.

First, there are some questionable elements to this report. It is unclear why the Iranians would want to house one of their research facilities in a shaky country like Syria, or to share nuclear knowledge with the Syrians. And it appears somewhat convenient that this story comes out now: Israel and Syria have been very friendly (relatively speaking) lately, while Israel just finished a major military drill designed to send a public message of warning to Iran -- and now suddenly this nuclear site was an Iranian site after all.

However, let's assume that the story is accurate. Here's a novel theory about what may have been going on behind the scenes, and how Israel found out about al-Kibar in the first place. Maybe the Iranians basically forced the weapons site on their weaker ally, Syria, a few years ago so that they could conduct the more weapons-related part of their nuclear research far from the watchful eyes of the IAEA, and with plausible deniability as to Iranian involvement. Having enough problems of its own, Syria was unhappy about being used as Iran's nuclear playground, but, internationally isolated and domestically shaky, the Syrian regime couldn't very well tell their biggest ally, Iran, to buzz off and do their dirty work elsewhere. So instead they secretly invited their old friends the Israelis to clean up the mess. That would explain how the Israelis found out about the site and how they were able to destroy it so easily. That would also explain not only why the Syrians have been so very quiet after having their country bombed by Israel, but also why relations between Syria and Israel have apparently improved dramatically in the wake of the incident -- with current speculation about direct talks and a possible Olmert-Assad handshake.

Israel's Mid-Life Crisis

2008-05-30T18:24:00.006-04:00

At 60, Israel appears to be going through what the cliches of pop psychology might call a mid-life crisis. Since the exit of Ariel Sharon, the last larger-than-life leader from the days of Israel's youth, everything has seemed just a bit blah for Israel. Here are some key symptoms of the crisis:

* Self-questioning - The secular majority in Israel seems to have lost its moral bearings and sense of purpose. This is not necessarily praise for the religious population, since their own moral vision can often be insular and restrictive. Yossi Klein Halevi puts the problem succinctly:

When socialism waned, the society lost its moral certainties. No official ethos has replaced Labor Zionism. Add three more factors--the rise of consumerism, the constant threat of war and terrorism, and the ongoing occupation--and the strain on ethical norms becomes formidable.

* Conspicuous consumption and indulgence in luxuries - Hello, Ehud Olmert. While Olmert is probably somewhat unfairly vilified for his extravagances (which aren't really that extreme, he has become a symbol of corruption, hedonism, and moral bankruptcy among Israel's leadership. Similar indulgences in corruption and hedonism among Palestinian Fatah leaders, combined with the inability of those leaders to achieve political goals, led to the erosion of popular support for Fatah and the rise of Hamas. Unfortunately, there is no party in Israel that can claim freedom from corruption--certainly not the religious parties. As an individual leader, Tzipi Livni has the cleanest hands around, if only because they are the least experienced.

* Sexual affairs, especially with someone much younger - The prime exhibit is Moshe Katsav, Israel's previous President, who was accused of rape. Of course, sexual affairs are nothing new, but Katsav's hesitance to resign contributed to the sense of shamefulness and crisis.

* A deep sense of remorse for goals not accomplished - Peace process, anyone? After 60 years, it's still a crowd-pleaser in much of the Muslim world to rant about wiping Israel off the map. Israelis are asking what, if anything, have they accomplished in terms of gaining acceptance from their neighbors?

* Desire to achieve a feeling of youthfulness - The military glories of Israel's youth resound in the national consciousness, but they are increasingly remote memories in a country that feels impotent in light of today's threats, despite its large military arsenal. The inconclusive Second Lebanon War was a major national embarrassment, as are the daily rocket attacks on southern Israeli towns from Gaza--not to mention the steady stream of belligerent verbal abuse wafting over from Iran.

How to cope?

The best treatment for a mid-life crisis is to change one's mental outlook, finding new purpose in your life without giving into quick fixes and poor decisions. It will take a new, younger generation of political leaders to restore faith, credibility, optimism, hope and a sense of civic mission to in Israel. Those leaders need to stand up soon, because political, military, and social challenges loom large on the horizon.

How to Take Over Lebanon: A Step-by-Step Guide

2008-05-22T16:16:00.006-04:00

By Hassan Nasrallah

Step 1: When all Lebanese militias agree to disband in order to end a civil war and reach national peace and reconciliation, make sure your militia does NOT disband. In fact, make sure your militia starts arming itself ever more heavily with the most advanced weaponry that your friendly co-religionists can supply. That way you'll be able to intimidate the national army in no time. Now, the other Lebanese might not like all this very much, and they might start asking questions about why you need so many weapons - so that brings us to the next step.

Step 2: Create phony excuses for using your military power "defensively." Provoking Israel into attacking you will work wonders here. Try invading Israeli territory and killing and kidnapping their soldiers. You won't even have to kidnap too many -- the Jews are very touchy. This will create a great pretext for you to flex your military muscles and intimidate the rest of Lebanon.

Step 3: Now that everyone sees how many weapons you really have and how strong you are, demand control over all government decisions. This is a tricky step because the other Lebanese are still going to be hesitant to give you so much power. But don't give up, no matter how many months it takes. And if they still won't budge, then send your troops into the streets to fight and take over territory. Sounds risky, and sure, it will be a little bloody, but you don't really have to worry too much -- no one else has a militia anymore (see Step 1). After that, you'll be able to oust the government and get a veto over national decisions for sure.

What steps come next? Well, there are a couple of different ways you can go, but here's what I prefer.

Step 4: Consolidate your control over the government until it is absolute. Use that control to dissipate the power of the national army, so that it poses virtually no challenge to your authority. Of course, you will want to make sure you continue increasing your own military strength all the while, since that is the source of your power.

Step 5: Turn all of Lebanon into a revolutionary Islamic republic. At the end of the day, this is the goal that really keeps us going, right? Some people won't like this move (Christians, liberals, whatever). It's OK -- they will either get used to it or move to France.

Juan Cole's not so "Informed Comment"

2008-04-28T12:10:00.003-04:00

In a post dated 4/26 Juan Cole comments on Israeli UN Ambassador to the UN, Dan Gillerman's denouncing of Hizballah. Cole writes:

"Gillerman called Hizbullah, an Arab party, "animals" in summer of 2006. Would he like to expand the reference to include other races? How many of us exactly are Untermenschen in his view? For Likudniks to call Jimmy Carter a "bigot" is sort of like the Ku Klux Klan denouncing Nelson Mandela for racial insensitivity.

Now one of Cole's readers responded to him and said,

"Juan Cole misquotes Israel's UN Ambassador, Dan Gillerman.

He said "Hezbollah" not "Arabs."

Here is his exact quote: "Why do you only address the Israeli bombings in Lebanon and not the shelling of our cities? Why don't you talk about the fact that those ruthless, indiscriminate animals yesterday targeted the holiest city, one of the holiest places to Christianity? Nazareth!"

To which our "informed" Juan says:

Yeah, I think you would find Hizbullah, those "animals" in Gillerman's terms, would be Arabs.

So Juan Cole, who spends countless Blog posts telling us that criticizing Israel and Zionism is NOT anti-semitic, even going so far as to say that a holocaust denier like Mahmoud Ahmedinajad (who said of Israelis, 'Are they human beings? 'They are like cattle, nay, more misguided.' A bunch of bloodthirsty barbarians.') was not Anti-semitic now tells us that to call Hizballah animals is racist because "Hizballah are Arabs." I'm guessing logic isn't Prof. Cole's strong point.

If that wasn't hypocritical enough, Gillerman's strong denouncement of Hizballah was in response to the shelling of the city of Nazareth - which anyone who is "informed" would know, is an ARAB city inside of Israel. Looks like "Informed Comment" isn't so informed after all.

Tony Blair Becomes Middle East Envoy

2007-07-02T03:39:00.000-04:00

Today's New York Times had an excellent editorial on Tony Blair's appointment as Envoy to the Middle East and the steps that the Bush administration must take to ensure Blair's success:

Let Blair Be Blair

It is already clear what Tony Blair's first challenge will be in his new job as international envoy to the Middle East. Unless he stands up to the White House and insists that his responsibilities include peacemaking - not just fund -raising and "institution building" for the embattled Palestinian party Fatah, as the Americans insist - he will quickly be marginalized. You don't send a Tony Blair into a raging conflagration to stand on the sidelines and distribute charity.

The Palestinians desperately need economic development and better institutions. But these goals cannot be realistically separated from the larger challenge of restoring their belief in a livable future in a viable Palestinian state. The job of peace envoy is extremely challenging, requiring a leader of Mr. Blair's prominence and skills. The job of everything-but-peace-envoy is a cynical waste.

That was the unfortunate experience of the previous envoy, James Wolfensohn, the former World Bank president. Few people know more about fund-raising and institution building than him. But he couldn't make progress in the face of an immobilized peace process, an imminent Palestinian civil war and an American president and secretary of state who wouldn't deeply engage in peacemaking and refused to let anyone else try.

Mr. Blair's greatest talent is his ability to persuade, shame and
wheedle people into doing things they would just as soon not do. He should be
allowed to use it.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, to whom the White House now expects Mr. Blair to defer, regularly travels to the region but has repeatedly declined to put American influence to any constructive use. She has yet to propose a Rice plan and challenge those leaders to accept it. Nor has she pressed Israel's politically wounded prime minister, Ehud Olmert, to take the
necessary steps he feels too weak to take on his own, like a full settlement freeze.

Mr. Blair might not have been the ideal choice for this job. But he
brings real international stature and, we would think, a large claim on support
from President Bush, with whom he stuck loyally in Iraq at a huge cost to his
domestic standing and political legacy. As British prime minister, Mr. Blair
felt a need to swallow his pride and go along in silence. If he means to be
useful in the Middle East, he now needs to push back and make clear that the
role of a peace envoy is to negotiate peace.

How Can you Blame the Occupation?

2007-05-16T10:12:00.000-04:00

SECURITY BREAKDOWN: "As the Olmert government is continuing to threaten a large-scale military operation against the occupied Palestinian territories - especially the Gaza Strip - the only thing that is delaying it is the choice of the right time and the appropriate circumstances, writes Talal 'Awkal in Monday's leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

Meanwhile, the comprehensive security breakdown continues, reaping more lives and what remains of the public's trust in its political leadership. Despite the Mecca Accord, the national unity government, and the ratification of a security plan, a new wave of intentional and unintentional violence is sweeping over the Gaza Strip.

Violence has indeed been on the rise over the past few days, despite all the moves, ideas, and initiatives regarding the Palestinian cause, few of which are public and most of which are private.

The new wave of internal violence is threatening even those modest activities that civil society organizations and some factions were intending to stage on the 59th anniversary of the nakba [the 1948 catastrophe as a result of the establishment of Israel].

People seem to be able to say nothing more than it would be unacceptable to squander the refugees' right of return. But the refugees themselves are saying: 'before speaking of our right to return, do something to prevent the increasing numbers of citizens who are leaving the country' - as the president of the Childhood Society in Tal az-Za'tar camp [in Lebanon] put it before a large crowd that included people of all ages who were either contemporaries of the nakba, or are waiting their turn to play a role in protecting Palestinian rights.

I do not understand the logic of those Palestinian officials who are still in the business of traveling here and there to hold meetings and talk to the media. Those who complain about the occupation's injustices and demand sympathy for their cause must answer the following question: 'why do you not show mercy towards yourself? How can you blame the occupation when you are doing what you are doing to yourselves?'

In response to Israel's recent decision to build 20 thousand new housing units in Jerusalem to complete the chain of settlements surrounding the city, isolate it from other Palestinian cities and territories, and enhance its Judaization, we have heard nothing but words of condemnation and denunciation, and demands that the international community should intervene, because what Israel is doing threatens all hope of making peace.

But in our immediate response to each other, we only hear the sound of bullets, shells, and bombs.

Jordanian King Abdullah II expressed deep sadness at the possibility of wasting the current opportunity for peace. He continues to repeat his fears that the passage of time could squander what remains of the territories we are trying to regain.

Meanwhile, we continue to drown in our domestic squabbles and struggles for power, finding no time to exploit this opportunity, at least to convince the international community that Israel is responsible for foiling the efforts aimed at reviving the peace process - a fact that everyone knows.

Before King Abdullah announced his intention to visit Ramallah for the first time, certain internet sites circulated what they described as a Jordanian initiative to establish a federal or con-federal relationship (or something in between) with the Palestinian territories. This would have gone back on the [1988] Jordanian decision to disengage [from the occupied Palestinian territories] before the establishment of the Palestinian state.

This was just a mere rumor as no official source could confirm it. But its spread may have been one of the reasons why the King cancelled his visit to Ramallah. There may have been other reasons for his decision, but the weather conditions were obviously not one of them. Rather, these reasons may have had to do with Israeli objections to such a visit because it suggests Jordanian support for the PA and President Mahmoud 'Abbas.

The strange thing is that many regional and international circles are displaying greater concern for the Palestinian problem and the peace process than some Palestinians who are drowning in their own factional agendas.

It is true that the horizon for renewing the peace process is occluded because of the Israeli government's weakness and the U.S. administration's deliberate unconcern, as well as everyone else's impotence.

But it is also true that the proper thing to do in the circumstances would be for the Palestinians to actively clarify Israel's responsibility for foiling the peace process - within the framework of Arab policy.

The public's patience has run out with their political leadership's disregard for their needs and suffering. The public expected a dialogue based on reason rather the dialogue of weapons.

The former dialogue led to the Mecca Accord, which we described at the time as a temporary truce, but which nonetheless constitutes a limited move in the process of reconstituting the Palestinian political system based on its new emerging factors.

A month and a half after the Mecca Accord, a national unity government was formed with great effort. This government was, and remains, our best option. But what if the national unity government were to collapse?

This is the question being raised now. There are those who believe that the fact a national unity government has priority over everything else provides them with suitable cover for their continued pursuit of power and authority, and that they can hold security hostage in their hands to achieve further gains and positions. And this places us before some difficult choices.

While the other options raise the threat of a major catastrophe for the entire Palestinian situation, the public can no longer bear to see the unity government paralyzed except when it is being used as a cover to be exploited to achieve factional and private interests at the public's expense.

Two months have passed since the formation of the government and one month since the security plan that it ratified. But nothing has changed. When certain security forces took the initiative - as the interior minister the fate of whose resignation remains unknown put it - storms was raised in their path. And these storms did not subside even when Hamas and Fateh agreed to pull all armed elements - legitimate and illegitimate - off the streets.

The stories on the Palestinian street about the daily transgressions against citizens are enough to turn one's hair white. But officials just seem to see them as run-of-the-mill transgressions that should not threaten the national unity government.

Quite frankly, I am ashamed to recount some of these very real stories. But one such story speaks of certain criminals daring to ask a man to hand his wife over to them after he
handed them his car keys under threat from their weapons.

The fact of the matter is that if there is no concern for the ordinary Palestinian citizen's sufferings, then our decision-makers need to consider the future of their politicals movement and personal roles carefully, now that a major part of the resistance's weapons are being used for matters that have to do solely with domestic agendas.

Where are the Palestinian central authorities heading in light of these circumstances? This is a question being asked by everyone, but we hear only one answer: Everything is pitch black like asphalt, except the roads which remain without asphalt!"When will we finally wake up?" asks 'Awkal in conclusion.

Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora on the Arab Peace Initiative

2007-05-10T22:43:00.000-04:00

by Fuad Siniora

Beirut

ALMOST a year has passed since Israel's bombardment of Lebanon, time enough to draw lessons from the conflict and reflect on its consequences.

Last week, Israel's Winograd Commission published an interim report scrutinizing Israel's conduct during what it called the country's most recent military "campaign." But the report failed to draw the most essential lesson from the July war and the wars that preceded it: military action does not give the people of Israel security. On the contrary, it compromises it. The only way for the people of Israel and the Arab world to achieve stability and security is through a comprehensive peace settlement to the overarching Arab-Israeli conflict.

It is in this vein that participants in the March Arab League summit in Riyadh called again for a peace proposal originally put forward at a similar gathering in Beirut in 2002. The Arab Peace Initiative, as it is called, was introduced by Saudi Arabia and endorsed by all the Arab countries. It offers Israel full recognition by the 22 members of the Arab League in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal to its pre-1967 borders, thus allowing the Palestinians to create a viable independent state on what is only 22 percent of historic Palestine.

This is a high price but one the Arabs are willing to pay, as it is the only realistic path to peace that conforms to all United Nations Security Council and General Assembly resolutions addressing the conflict, and ensures the right of return of the Palestinian people. The Arab states are not seeking to wipe Israel off the map. Rather, we are seeking the legitimate goals of an armistice, secure borders and the ability of all of the region's people to live in peace and security.

Last summer's war was only the latest eruption of violence in this enduring conflict, and hindered prospects for peace rather than creating opportunities for it. The Winograd interim report criticized the Israeli government's war goals as being unclear and unachievable, yet the Israeli Army came dangerously close to achieving the stated goal of its chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz: to "turn Lebanon's clock back 20 years."

The report made no mention of the sheer damage inflicted. Lebanon's airports, bridges and power plants were systematically ravaged. Villages were destroyed, and more than an eighth of its population displaced. The bombardment caused an estimated $7 billion in damage and economic losses while leaving behind 1.2 million cluster bomblets that continue to kill and maim innocent people.

Most important, the war took the lives of more than 1,200 Lebanese citizens, the vast majority of them civilians. This epitomizes the protracted injustice Arabs feel as a result of Israel's record of destruction of their lives and livelihood, its oppression of the Palestinian people and its continued illegal occupation of Arab lands. The July war proved that militarism and revenge are not the answer to instability; compromise and diplomacy are.

This should be the impetus for Israel to seek a comprehensive solution based on the Arab Peace Initiative. The Winograd Commission' failure to discuss the war's implications for peace prospects leads one to wonder whether Israel would rather allow this conflict to fester as long as it is under relatively controlled conditions. Its goal should be regional peace and security, which can be realized only through a just resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The inevitable alternative is increased extremism, intolerance and destruction.

Like the Israelis, the Arab people have legitimate security concerns, as evidenced by what Lebanon endured last summer. So often we have seen parties to the conflict use force in the name of self-defense and security, only to further aggravate the situation and compromise the very security they seek. These escalations also occur because there has never been full compliance with international law. Thus, illegal occupations, over-flights, detentions, house demolitions, humiliating checkpoints, attacks and counterattacks continue to heighten the anger and despair. Perpetuating hostility and distrust in this manner goes against the tide of confidence-building this region needs to foster stability. The conflict has persisted for so long, generating so many tangled consequences, that diplomacy remains the only option.

Because of its unique role in the world, the United States has a responsibility to display leadership and courage in helping the two sides achieve a just and lasting peace. The people of the Middle East aspire simply to live in freedom and dignity, without constant threats of violence, occupation and war. This is achievable if we demonstrate political will and learn the harsh lessons from the past. Leading these peace efforts is not only an American responsibility, it is in the United States' interests: peace in the Middle East would offer a gateway to reconciliation with the Muslim world during these times of increased divisiveness and radicalism.

The Winograd Commission tried to draw conclusions about the Israeli political and military leadership from their actions during the July war. The correct lesson is that the only path to long-lasting peace is itself peaceful. With the support of the United States and its partners in the Quartet on the Middle East - the European Union, the United Nations and Russia - we hope to use the Arab Peace Initiative as the foundation to finally bring about a comprehensive peace to our troubled region. Only then will the people of the Middle East be able to finally realize their shared goal of living in freedom with security and lasting peace.

Fuad Siniora is the prime minister of Lebanon.

A New Opportunity for the 2002 Arab Initiative

2007-03-29T16:59:00.000-04:00

The 19th Arab summit began with high hopes for those in the region anxious for a resumption of diplomatic activity. While the political situations in Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran currently constitute some of the Arab world’s major concerns, the Beirut Arab initiative for solving the Arab-Israeli conflict was this year's top priority. Even Iraqi Foreign Minister Hosheyar Zibari, in a special interview with Al Sumara TV, acknowledged that the Iraqi issue came in second to the Arab initiative. The initiative is in fact, quite revolutionary considering the history of Israeli-Arab negotiations. It offers Israel full peace with all 22 Arab countries in return for a withdrawal to the borders that existed before the 1967 war and a "just solution" to the problem of the Palestinian refugees. If the initiative was unveiled in 2002 why is it now being taken seriously by the Israelis, Americans, and the Arabs?

The answer may have less to do with a renewed desire for a peaceful world and more to do with a confluence of interests that present an opportunity for a renewed diplomatic process. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who came into power with the premise that Israel will act unilaterally to draw its own borders, has now realized that the unilateral strategy has failed for Israel. Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza strip was done without any sort of negotiation with Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas and was seen by many Palestinians as the result, not of negotiations which had never produced a dismantling of settlements, but of armed struggle against Israeli occupation. It was therefore no surprise that the withdrawal was met with the weakening of Fatah, the election of a Hamas government, and the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. This distressing outcome made it impossible for Olmert to continue any further withdrawals unilaterally and has resulted in the diplomatic freeze that continued until recently.

Saudi Arabia unveiled the initiative in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks for good reason. The initiative was first made public in the pages of the New York Times by journalist Thomas Friedman. An Israeli official, Dore Gold, pointed out that the key figure making the press contacts for the Saudis was Adel al-Jubeir, who had been sent to Washington to coordinate the Saudis' efforts to improve their declining image in America after it was made public that 15 out of the 19 hijackers on September 11th were Saudis. If this was the reason for the initiative back then, the Saudis have an additional incentive to renew their offer at this time. With Iran’s nuclear program moving ahead unfettered and Iranian influence growing in Lebanon and Iraq, Saudi Arabia is worried about losing its regional hegemony. Iraq’s Shiite government, Bahrain's Shiite majority, and a restive Shiite minority in Saudi Arabia provide an opportunity for Iran to create what King Hussein called, "A Shiite Crescent" comprising Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and parts of the Gulf which is a frightening prospect for Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have already wrested the Palestinian issue away from Iranian and Syrian interference by setting the terms for the Palestinian unity government deal on their own turf in Mecca. By renewing the Beirut initiative, the Saudis may be able to wrest Syria away from its Iranian friends, unite the Arabs, and may be able to put Iranian proxies Hizballah and Islamic Jihad on the defensive.

Israel for its part is not enthusiastic about the initiative. Returning to the 1967 borders without any modification has always been problematic due to large settlements and the location of Jewish holy sites outside of the "green line," specifically around Jerusalem. A "just solution" to the refugee issue which includes returning large amounts of refugees into Israel as opposed to a future Palestinian state triggers an Israeli fear of a demographic threat to the State's Jewish majority. However, what concerns Israel now is Hamas' standing. After having been bruised by a year of boycotts and sanctions, Hamas appears to be coming out of the Mecca unity deal as a winner. While Hamas still maintains a strong presence in the Palestinian government and has not publicly accepting the quartet conditions of renouncing violence and recognizing Israel, the Palestinian unity government is nevertheless being looked at as legitimate and therefore worthy of foreign aid by European governments eager to avoid a humanitarian disaster in the Palestinian territories and by a US administration eager to have some sort of diplomatic achievement after the Iraq debacle. Therefore, by cautiously agreeing to consider parts of the Saudi initiative which it ignored back in 2002 while Hamas refrains from endorsing it, Israel again puts Hamas on the defensive and makes them look like the rejectionist party. It is because of these circumstances that we are likely to see a renewed interest in the Arab initiative specifically as Condoleezza Rice travels to the region in the near future.

How Did a Global Jihad Network Take Root in Nationalist Palestinian Camps?

2007-03-26T12:10:00.000-04:00

For those of you who read the interesting New York Times article about the infiltration of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon by global jihadist groups with ideological ties to Al-Qaeda will find the following report by Bernard Rougier interesting. While these camps were previously hotbeds of Palestinian nationalism, hosting groups such as Fatah and even leftist groups such as the PFLP and DFLP, the internal politics of Lebanon makes it impossible for Lebanese security forces to enter the camp which makes these autonomous entities within Lebanon an ideal refuge for Jihadists.

Interview with Abu Mazen

2007-03-23T12:40:00.000-04:00

In the Israeli daily, Yedioth Ahronoth, Nahum Barnea and Ronny Shaked report from their meeting in Ramallah with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

"Toward the end of our interview with him - the first interview since he joined Hamas in a national unity government - Mahmoud Abbas decided to talk about the future. It did not sound good. 'I have one year and nine months left in office,' he said. 'I am counting every day. I will complete my term of office and that will be it. I will not run for another term.'

What will you do then, we asked him? 'Come pick me up and we can go visit Safed, the city of my birth,' he answered. When Abu Mazin sought permission in 1994 to visit Safed, there was an almighty uproar among the Israeli Right, which said that the planned visit was a clever attempt to exercise the right of return. Abu Mazin made it as far as the home of MK Ahmed Tibi in Taibeh and, after consultations, decided instead to visit Haifa, where he was greeted by Mayor Amram Mitzna. 'The people who stopped me from visiting Safed do not know what peace is' says Abu Mazin.

One year and nine months is a long time in the life of a politician. But it is like the blinking of an eye in the Middle East. Abu Mazin, 72, will not admit as much, but he knows that if he finished his legal term of office, it will be as president of a non-country that carried the name of a people without a nation. As things currently look, it is unlikely that his term of office will be remembered as anything but a footnote in the tragic history of his people. His term is the period between the Arafat era and the abyss, between Arafat and Hamas.

Who will come after you, we asked: 'Whoever the people choose,' was the immediate answer.

Marwan Barghouti?

'Maybe,' Abu Mazin replied, without any trace of enthusiasm.

Haniyeh and Hamas? 'Maybe.'

To a large extent, the efforts that Abu Mazin put into giving legitimacy to the new Palestinian government have been superfluous. The international boycott has already been broken. It was broken despite the objections of the Israeli government. The U.S. cannot stand in the way. The U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem met last week with the new Palestinian finance minister in Ramallah. It is no coincidence that Salam Fayyad was appointed finance minister: he is a great favorite of the U.S. administration. On Saturday, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrives at the Muqata'a in Ramallah, she will not only meet Abu Mazin; she will also see Fayyad. Haniyeh, for the time being at least, has not been invited.

In this battle, Israel will almost certainly be defeated. Hamas has won. It has got its foot into the door of legitimacy. In addressing the Israeli people, Abu Mazin is simply trying to make the Israeli rearguard action shorter.

You appointed Mohammad Dahlan as your national security adviser. You made him part of the Hamas government.

'Dahlan is not in the government,' he insists. 'There is a distinction. The government is the government. It has its own agenda and the president has an agenda of his own. I have already stated that they will be responsible for domestic problems; I will take care of external problems.'

What are your thoughts on negotiations between Israel and Syria?

'From my point of view, you have to talk to Syria. Why should you not talk to them? Barak talked to them.'

There is, we said, a long-standing Israeli understanding that the Israeli government has the right to talk to only one Arab party at any one time. If we talk to Syria, we cannot talk with you.

'Nonsense,' he said. 'We are offering you a peace deal with 57 Moslem countries. You will no longer be a pariah state. The Israeli flag will fly from Indonesia and Mauritania to Morocco. Everyone is ready to back the Saudi initiative - which is the most serious peace plan since 1948.'"

New Poll of Iraqis

2007-03-21T15:17:00.000-04:00

USA TODAY/ABC News recently released their results of a comprehensive poll of Iraqis. Among their findings:

While 58% support a unified Iraq, an equal majority predict that within five years Iraq will divide into regional governments or even separate states.

A 43% plurality say democracy would be the best political system for Iraq, a marked decline in 16 months. In an ABC News survey before elections in 2005, 57% chose democracy.

The USA TODAY/ABC News survey was taken door-to-door in all 18 provinces of Iraq from Feb. 25 to March 5.

It found sharp and sometimes contradictory attitudes toward U.S. troops:

•A 51% majority, including one-third of Shiites and 94% of Sunni Arabs, say attacks on U.S. forces are acceptable political acts. Only 7% of Kurds agree.

•In all, 83% of Shiites and 97% of Sunni Arabs oppose the presence of coalition forces in Iraq; 75% of Kurds support them. By more than 3 to 1, Iraqis say the presence of U.S. forces is making the security situation worse.

•Even so, only 35% of Iraqis want U.S. forces to leave immediately. Two-thirds say they should remain until security is restored, the Iraqi government is stronger or Iraqi security forces are better able to operate independently.

Full version of the poll can be found
here

Dear Bandar

2007-03-19T13:30:00.000-04:00

Writing in the popular Israeli daily newspaper Maariv, Shlomo Gazit urges the man behind the Saudi peace initiative, Prince Bandar, to adopt the same tactic that Egypt's Anwar Sadat did 30 years ago - visiting Jerusalem and addressing the Israeli people directly.

"An open letter to Bandar bin Sultan: In one week's time, the Arab League will convene in Riyadh to formulate and re-approve the Saudi Arabian peace initiative as the outline of a full and comprehensive peace deal between Israel and her Arab neighbors. It is supposed to be a peace deal that will end a six-decade long conflict.

I am writing to you as a member of the Israeli peace camp, an Israeli who believes that there is a 'partner' for negotiations and agreement on the Arab side and that the gaps between the Arab position and the Israeli position are bridgeable.

We are yet to see the final draft of the plan that is set to be approved by Riyadh. I can only hope that there will be no radicalization of the previous draft and that you will not place additional stumbling blocks on the path of talks. Moreover, I see the document that you are due to unveil as the starting point for the Arabs' negotiations, just as you must see the statements coming out of Jerusalem as Israel's opening stance. If this is not the case, and if you see the decisions taken in Riyadh as the final Arab position, a position that cannot be moved one iota and that leaves no room for flexibility or willingness to negotiate, then I am afraid that both I and the majority of the Israeli public will unite in rejecting the Riyadh document.

If your intentions are positive and you truly wish to end the conflict and reach an agreement, and the resolutions you pass will act merely as a starting point for talks, I am afraid that my government, the current government in Jerusalem, will not be able to rise to the challenge. The current Israeli government is politically weak. It will not make any brave or controversial decisions that could lead to its ouster. I am afraid that the prime minister and his ministers will come up with countless rationalizations to justify their refusal to enter into talks.

I appreciate your initiative, your honest desire to end the violence and the grave dangers of continued conflict, and your aspiration to promote a diplomatic solution. Under these circumstances, Israel cannot allow the opportunity for peace to slip through its fingers.

I call on the Royal House of Saud, to the heads of state who will be gathering in Riyadh next week and to you personally - choose the same path that the late Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, chose 30 years ago. Do not condition your willingness to enter into talks on decisions made by Ehud Olmert. This is too important and we cannot let the opportunity go by. I call on you: bypass the Olmert government, come to Jerusalem and speak directly to the Israeli people. By doing so, you would force the government to accept the peace proposal, to listen to what the majority of the Israeli public wants - and that is peace talks. Sadat once said that 90 percent of the obstacles that were preventing peace between Israel and the Arabs were psychological. By visiting Jerusalem and addressing the Knesset, he claimed that he removed this barrier.

I urge you: immediately after the end of the Riyadh summit, publicly announce that you want to come to Jerusalem and that you intend to present the Israeli people and the Israeli government with the plan adopted at the Arab League summit and that you want to explore immediate avenues to starting peace talks.

No Israeli government could turn down such a proposal. No government could avoid entering into a diplomatic process. The weakness of the coalition would not be able to withstand the pressure and the unequivocal voice of the people, which will welcome you with flowers and open arms."

Updates on Al-Zawraa TV

2007-02-27T16:18:00.000-05:00

I first became familiar with Al-Zawraa TV during my overnight stay in the Deheishe Refugee Camp near Bethlehem. I was with a group touring the West Bank that had arranged for us to stay with local families in the Deheishe camp in order to get a better understanding of the reality of Palestinian refugees. Since the house we stayed in didn't have many spare rooms, my host, a single Palestinian male in his late 20's, gave me his bed and slept on the floor in the room. Before we went to sleep he was flipping channels on his television and alternating between an old Clint Eastwood movie, a racey Nancy Ajram music video, Al-Jazeera, before finally settling on what looked to me like a b-rated satellite news channel. There was a man in military fatigues reading angry communiques interspliced with unsuspecting military vehicles suddenly being blown up by improvised explosive devices. "What is this channel?" I asked him.
"This is the channel of the Iraqi fighters" he replied.

I later found out that this was Al-Zawraa TV, a satellite TV channel sympathetic to Iraq's sunni insurgency. The channel is funded by Mish'an al-Jabouri, an Iraqi Parliament member from the Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc which is supported by many former Baathists. He has currently fled to Syria under investigation that he stole millions of dollars intended to protect kirkuk oil pipelines from attack. This would be the second time he fled to Syria, the first being after he was implicated in an assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein in 1989 which makes his colorful and vigorous defense of the late dictator on Al-Jazeera all the more surprising.

Egypt has just announced that they will stop transmitting the channel on its powerful and widely viewed NILESAT which coincides with Jabouri's rather surprising recent rant against Al-Qaeda in which he states:

Despite all that the Al-Qaeda organization has contributed in challenging the occupation, but they have also broken the back of national unity in Iraq and they resulted in bringing great suffering upon Iraqis, and the Al-Qaeda organization bears [responsibility] for a large part of the bombings among civilians, and that [manner of] targeting does not differentiate between a Sunni or a Shi’i or a child, and the targeting of Shi'as is a crime in every respect, and we condemn anyone who has committed such acts.

These acts gave the excuse for the Safavid sectarian militias, of which we absolve our Shi'a [brethren], it gave the excuse for it to retaliate and go to the Sunni neighborhoods to kill 4 or 5 or 10 times the number that was killed of the Shi'as.

Some speculate that this move may have been orchestrated by his new Syrian hosts who have intelligence that Al-Qaeda may be contemplating new attacks on targets outside of Iraq and seek to mettle in Syrian, Lebanese, and Israeli affairs. One clue is the rather cryptic statement by Jabouri, "“We will not allow Iraq to turn into a dangerous place that threatens the countries of the region under any pretext." (Credit Talisman Gate)

Al-Zawra TV is however still carried by the powerful ArabSat which is owned by members of the Arab League but headquartered in Saudi Arabia. Perhaps this is consistent with former Saudi advisor Nawaf Obeid's op-ed in the Washington Post that announced that Saudi Arabia would support the Sunnis in Iraq should the US pull out.

New Study on Attitudes of British Muslims

2007-01-29T11:20:00.000-05:00

A new study just released from the British think tank,Policy Exchange comes up with a number of conclusions regarding the attitudes of Muslims living in the UK. The Study, entitled, "Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the Paradox of multicultural" finds that:

-62% of 16-24 year olds feel they have as much in common with non-Muslims as Muslims, compared to 71%of 55+ year olds.

-60% of Muslims would prefer to send their children to a mixed state school, compared to 35% who would prefer to send their child to an Islamic school. There is a clear age difference. 37% of 16-24 year olds preferred to send their children to Islamic state schools, compared to 25% of 45-54 year olds and 19% of 55+ year olds.

-59% of Muslims would prefer to live under British law, compared to 28% who would prefer to live under sharia law. 37% of 16-24 year olds prefer sharia compared to 17% of 55+ year olds.

-31% of 16-24 year olds believe if a Muslim converts to another religion they should be punished by death, compared to 19% of 55+ year olds.

-7% admire organizationss like Al-Qaeda that are prepared to fight the West. 13% of 16-24 year olds agreed with this statement compared to 3% of 55+ year olds.

-74% of 16-24 year olds would prefer Muslim women to choose to wear the veil or hijab compared to only 28% of 55+ year olds.

There is clearly a more pronounced religiosity and sense of alienation and radicalization among the youth. This may be due to the increase in Arab satellite stations and the changing identity of many Pakistani youths from the South-Asian identities of their parents to a more pan-Islamic and even philo-Arab identity of their children. Despite the increasing awareness of pan-Islamic political issues such as Kashmir, Palestine, and Iraq, the study found that many Muslims lacked certain basic political knowledge of these issues. For example, while 58% believe that many of the problems in the world today are a result of arrogant western attitudes, only 18% of Muslims could name the President of the Palestinian National Authority and only 14% could name the Prime Minister of Israel."

Also, 84% of Muslims believe they have been treated fairly in British society. The sense of alienation and radicalism may have much more to do with the increased access to pan-Islamic political groups and issues and less to do with discrimination. This would help explain why the committee appointed by Blair to reduce extremism after the London bombings came up with recommendations such as replacing Holocaust remembrance day with a genocide remembrance day that would recognize the killing of Muslims in Kashmir, Chechnya, and Palestine, and a reversal of the decision to ban the pan-Islamic caliphate party, Hizb ut-Tahrir.

The Baker-Hamilton Commission and a Shift in US Foreign Policy

2006-11-14T00:57:00.000-05:00

The Baker-Hamilton Commission met with President Bush today, coincidentally, the same day that President Bush met with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. The recent establishment of the Baker-Hamilton Commission and the replacing of Rumsfeld with Gates are not events that can be viewed in isolation and may herald a shift in US Middle East policy, especially with regards to the Israeli-Palestinian front.

The most prominent and telling change of a shift in attitude inside the White House was the choice of Robert Gates to replace Donald Rumsfeld. Robert Gates was Deputy National Security Advisor under the first President Bush and is considered part of the "realist" school of foreign policy along with his close confidants such as Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Gates co-authored a report on Iran with Brzezinski in which they recommended "limited or selective engagement with the current Iranian government" stating:

"Just as the United States maintains a constructive relationship with China while strongly opposing certain aspects of its internal and international policies, Washington should approach Iran with a readiness to explore areas of common interests, while continuing to contest objectionable policies."

Brzezinski, who recently authored a piece in Foreign Policy criticizing the disproportionate amount of power that the Israel lobby supposedly wields among policy makers, has recently been quoted in the Washington Post as saying that he hopes that Gates will bring a fresh change in the administration's Middle East Policy.

The first President Bush was known for having neglected the evangelical wing of the Republican party, a move which his son and other political analysts have blamed for his failure to secure a second term. Part of George W Bush's support of Israel stemmed from a desire to appease evangelical Christians who consider themselves Zionists (albeit for a much different reason than many Jewish supporters of Israel) along with having a convenient ideological ally in the "War on Terror". The first Bush made no such considerations and his administration in general, and his secretary of State James Baker in particular, was known for chastising Israel when its interests clashed with those of the United States. It was during this time that Bush cut off loan guarantees to Israel in response to the expansion of West Bank settlements and also dragged Israeli Prime Minister Shamir to a 1991 peace conference in Madrid against his political wishes.

Now that President Bush does not have to worry about re-election but does have to worry about the deteriorating situation in Iraq, he may be counting on his father's realists to clean up the mess by cooking up a new Middle East policy approach that will not view Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in isolation but rather will attempt a comprehensive solution that may include negotiations with Syria, Iran, Israel, the Palestinians, and a "softening" of the insistence on an American style democracy in Iraq. This would echo Rice's close advisor, Philip Zelikow's remarks to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's annual Weinberg Conference that the coalition that would help solve the Iraq morass and the Iranian threat is bound by the "sense that the Arab-Israeli issues are being addressed, that they see a common determination to sustain active policy that tries to deal with the problems of Israel and the Palestinians." The Washington Post also reports that Tony Blair is expected to call for a strong US push to start a diplomatic peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians in his testimony to the Baker-Hamilton Commission. These are all signs that a more active engagement on the Israeli-Palestinian front will be underway, connected to the US desire for a "realist" solution to the seemingly intractable Iraq war.

Military Chart Showing Iraq's Slide to "Chaos"

2006-11-01T12:44:00.000-05:00

A classified October 18th briefing by the military on Iraq reportedly included a chart which shows Iraq steadily progressing from the ideal of "peace" on the far left, to dangerously close to the red "chaos" on the far right of the chart. The New York Times reports that

for a military culture that thrives on PowerPoint briefings, the shifting index was seen by some officials as a stark warning about the difficult course of events in Iraq, and mirrored growing concern by some military officers.

For the full story click here.

This story comes on the heels of an Economist report on the changing mood among military families and new soldiers in basic training titled "The Silent Majority". From the Report:

Unhappiness with the war is growing within the military community

ON ANY Saturday San Antonio's colorful, lazy downtown is full of airmen. After graduating from basic training at nearby Lackland air-force base on Friday morning, they get a town pass. Last weekend the mood was quiet. Some airmen, Mum and Dad in tow, went for a ride on putt-putt boats. Others poked around the Alamo. One spent several minutes looking at a duck...

You can forgive the airmen for being subdued. As many potential soldiers have noticed, this is a difficult time to join up. The army has managed to scrape up slightly more than 80,000 recruits this year, but only by lowering its qualification standards and offering large enlistment bonuses...

"For military families, and especially young service members, there's a lot of frustration about how long and how difficult this war has been,Â says Jim Martin, a retired army colonel at Bryn Mawr College. But the magnitude of that frustration is hard to measure...

People who study the armed forces, including Mr Kohn and Mr Martin, agree that officers support the Republicans by a big margin. But having questioned many, Mr Kohn has found that their conservatism has its limits. Enlisted men and women still lean towards the Republican Party too, but not as heavily as they once did. George Marshall, the army's chief of staff during the second world war, once famously argued that soldiers should not vote because it might compromise their ability to serve. There may yet come a day when some Republican strategists are tempted to make that same argument...

Iraq: What Now?

2006-10-31T15:27:00.000-05:00

Since a few weeks ago, we have finally seen a turning point with regards to the War in Iraq. The turning point has nothing to do with actual events occurring on the ground in Iraq, but rather with our own administration's acknowledgement of a situation that has been steadily deteriorating for the past 3 years.

On October 18, Bush was asked by George Stephanopoulous whether he agrees with columnist Thomas Friedman who had written in a New York Times that day that the situation in Iraq may be compared to the Tet offensive in Vietnam 40 years earlier. His answer?

"He could be right...There's certainly a stepped-up level of violence, and we're heading into an election."

The Tet offensive was a combined offensive by the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese army against South Vietnamese and US forces. Even though the Communist forces failed to achieve their tactical goals and sustained massive casualties, the offensive was a hugpropagandada victory for the Vietcong and public opinion against the Vietnam war continued to grow. President Johnson saw his support fall sharply and withdrew as a candidate in March 1968.

The White House sought to clarify Bush's remarks by stating:

"The full context was that the comparison was about the propaganda waged in the Tet Offensive...and the president was reiterating something he's said before - that the enemy is trying to shake our will," spokeswoman Dana Perino said in a statement.

Nevertheless, Bush comparing the current Iraq war with a war that history regards as a failure should be an acknowledgment of a change of attitude from the President, (even among critics who claim hpossesseses an ignorance on historical issues such as the Vietnam war stemming from his political apathy during the 1960's's).

If this wasn't confirmation enough, a week later the White House announced that Bush would refrain from using the now familiar catch-phrase, "Stay the Course". "He's stopped using it," said Tony Snow, the White House press secretary. "It left the wrong impression about what was going on and it allowed critics to say, `Well, here's an administration that's just embarked upon a policy and not looking at what the situation is,' when, in fact, it is the opposite." Bush has not used the phrase since a stump speech back in August.

The developments coincide with reports that the US failed to track weapons shipments going to Iraq, has had a falling out with the Prime Minister of Iraq, and has suffered one of the deadliest months in terms of troop casualties.

Those hoping for a refreshing, forthright and honesassessmentnt of the war shouldn't get their hopes up explains George Will in Newsweek.

Fareed Zakaria, also in the current Newsweek, explains that the best hope for Iraq can be a result somewhat like the Korean War:

For Americans, the Korean War was not a defeat the United States had gathered a coalition to resist aggression but it was certainly not a victory. After three years of fighting and 4 million dead, Korea remained divided. The North a communist bulwark, the South itself turning into a nasty dictatorship. Asia was bubbling over and the danger of war with the forces of international communism seemed greater than before.

Something like the close of the Korean War is, frankly, the best we can hope for in Iraq now. One could easily imagine worse outcomes - a bloodbath, political fragmentation, a tumultuous flood of refugees and a surge in global terrorist attacks. But with planning, intelligence, execution and luck, it is possible that the American intervention in Iraq could have a gray ending - one that is unsatisfying to all, but that prevents the worst scenarios from unfolding, secures some real achievements and allows the United States to regain its energies and strategic compass for its broader leadership role in the world.

Meanwhile, Anthony Cordesman at The Center For Strategic and International Studies has a new report, (The Almost Good, The Bad, and the Ugly) out on options for Iraq that includes, among the "ugly" options, supporting an Iraqi strongman or a coup! So much for "Freedom".

Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra TV

2006-10-18T17:27:00.000-04:00

Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra Television are major American government funded media outlets that target audiences in the Arab world. There are special stations for different regions and there is special attention paid to the Iraqi version of Al-Hurra and Radio Sawa.

There have been mixed reviews of Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra. Radio Sawa's playlist is a strange hybrid of Western pop artists such as Brittany Spears and Christina Aguilera and contemporary Arab pop songs. Interspliced amidst the music are short news clippings and short discussions on topics that brush on questions of values such as "would you marry someone outside your religion?" and "how do you feel about freedom of the press?" (To sample this for yourselves simply click here).

This has made Radio Sawa popular throughout the Arab world but left a debate as to the effectiveness of the station. The station is known as a provider of pop music and there is rarely a level of debate beyond the surface level.

Al-Hurra TV is a newer initiative that has so far been unable to penetrate the Arab media market. To understand some of the reasons for this simply go over to Abu Aardvark blog who has an exhaustive list of posts about the failure of Al-Hurra.

Just recently it was announced that Muwafic Harb, who was brought over from Al-Hayat to be in charge of this endeavor, announced his resignation. Is this a signal that the American administration recognizes the present difficulties and problems and may attempt a new approach to public media diplomacy? From Abu Aardvark:

Muwafic Harb has (finally) resigned, and there will be a total revamping of the station's management and programming. The trigger was the recent audit by the GAO, which presented a pretty damning picture of the station's management practices and creative use of audience research. Elaph also speculates that the US government finally recognized that after two years, the station had failed to penetrate the Arab TV market, present more daring or important programming than its rivals, or have its intended effects on Arab public opinion. The station had been forgotten, ignored by even the American government which rarely granted al-Hurra exclusive news or interviews.

The United States would do well to consider some of the ideas of Robert Satloff (who incidentally was a critic of Al-Hurra before being offered his own talk show on the station) in his book The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror: Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East.

In the book, Satloff recounts his 2 years in Morocco and his travels throughout the Middle East to deduce certain problems with the current American approach to democracy. Instead of advocating for US policies, all too often administration speakers and media initiatives patronize Arabs by attempting to seduce them with Western culture (a la radio sawa) or appeal for Arab support on the basis of shared values and the emphasis on the status of Muslims in the US showcasing successful Muslim immigrants. The failure of this approach was seen during Karen Hughs

Critics of the US government correctly argue that part of the reason for the unpopularity of the US in the Arab world is its policies and therefore if the US believes in its policies, it must present persuasive arguments and explain to Arabs why the US acts as it does as opposed to treating Arabs like children who will be seduced by a Western pop song or a story of a Muslim immigrant in America.

Arab Public Opinion and Perceptions of Violence

2006-10-10T22:12:00.000-04:00

Arab Public Opinion and Perceptions of Violence

What is Changing?

Fares Braizat

CSIS
October 10, 2006

On October 10, 2006, Fares Braizat, a visiting fellow at CSIS, presented data from polling on Arab Public Opinion regarding violence, terrorism, and militant groups in the Middle East and came to some interesting conclusions:

Trends

1. Overall, there is diminishing support for violence and violent groups.
2. There is support for radicals OUTSIDE of the respondents home country.

Polling Data shows that the Arab public is increasingly uncomfortable with violence and terror. At the same time, the Arab public is growing more radical in their opposition to US and Israeli policy in Palestine and Iraq. The paradox is that there is more disagreement with the US and Israel, but not more support for terror tactics and radical groups.

This effect could be due to negative consequences militant groups are having in their own societies. Support for Hamas has gone down in Palestine as a result of increasing lawlessness and poverty there. Support for Al-Qaeda has decreased substantially in Jordan (presumably as a result of the Amman hotel bombings). Hizballah's actions and armament are still contested issues in Lebanon where many question the utility of capturing Israeli soldiers and provoking a harsh response.

On the other hand, all these organizations, have broad support in the greater Arab World. The percentage of Sunnis in Lebanon who have a positive view of Hassan Nasrallah stands at 50% while the percentage of Sunnis in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and other Sunni Arab states who favor Nasrallah exceeds 70%. Support for Hizballah in Palestine is much higher than support for Hamas in Palestine and for Hizballah in Lebanon while support for Hamas is higher in Arab states outside of Palestine than it is in the Palestinian territories.

There is a clear trend of Arab public more likely to support outside insurgencies or those with a global audience like Iraq and Palestine on an emotional level. There is a sense of satisfaction among Arabs that these organizations are able to stand up to Israel and the United States but also a recognition that these movements can have destructive consequences for their home societies.

There is a majority of Jordanians and Palestinians who are in favor of negotiations with Israel and 43% of Lebanese who are in favor of a peace treaty with Israel. Public opinion is turning more moderate at home, but more radical with respect to other countries.